The criminal offence in international law. by Micallef, Antony Edmund
THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
By
ANTONY EDMUND MICALLEF
Thesis Submitted to the University of London 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Law
London School of Economics and Political Science
November 1991
UMI Number: U048646
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U048646
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
-ytAese^
Library
British Library of Political 
and Economic Science
\ZZhOS6
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a study of 
a much neglected concept in international law, namely the 
criminal offence. The work consists of four parts which 
incorporate ten chapters. Part I introduces the study by 
examining the way in which the concept of criminal offence 
has developed through the various recognised sources of 
international law. The difficulties involved in 
distinguishing the criminal offence from other unlawful 
acts in international law, as well as the problem of 
defining the concept, are issues which are addressed in 
Part II. Part III examines seventeen classified criminal 
offences and practices in international law in order to 
determine the juridical indicia of the concept. Finally, 
Part IV addresses the legal consequences engendered by the 
concept of criminal offence, namely international criminal 
responsibility. Individual as well as State criminal 
responsibility in international law are discussed, 
particularly, in the light of the substantial contributions 
made by the International Law Commission in this field.
The author has limited his research to source material 
available up to July 1991.
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PART I
1CHAPTER 1
The Sources of International Law and the Concept of the 
Criminal Offence
The criminal offence in international law, like all 
other concepts in international law, has developed through
concept of a criminal offence in international law.
l.(a) International Custom
The difficulties traditionally associated with the 
definition and meaning of custom in international law are 
ever present. A debate persists on whether State practice
and opinio juris are both necessary elements for the
• • • 2creation of a customary norm of international law. There
is a considerable degree of disparity in doctrine (extreme
• 1 t • • •in some cases ) on this issue. The debate gives rise to a 
number of controversial questions including: what
constitutes State practice? How and by what means do we 
tell whether States are following a particular practice?
See Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (hereafter cited as ICJ Statute) 
which enunciates guidelines to be applied by the 
International Court in the determination of disputes 
formulated for decision, but is widely acknowledged 
as an accurate statement of the sources of 
international law. Also see: Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law. (hereafter cited as 
Principles  ^ 1990, p.l; O'Connell, International Law, 
v.l, p.3 and Virally, writing in Manual of Public 
International Law. Sorensen, M., (ed.), 1968, p.118.
See Van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International 
Law. 1983, p.85.
For instance, Professor Gross, Essavs on International 
Law and Organisation. 1984, v.l, p.323, insists that 
State practice alone is not sufficient for the 
formation of customary international law. He contends 
that the consent and acquiescence of States is equally 
necessary. On the contrary Professor Cheng (see Van 
Hoof, op.cit., p.86) considers opinio juris to be 
sufficient.
the various recognised sources.1 
the relationship
This chapter will review 
ticular source and the .r
2How often must a practice be repeated before it matures 
into custom? Furthermore, what is the meaning of opinio 
juris? Is it evidence of States7 belief in a particular 
practice as being legally required?1 Notwithstanding all 
uncertainties, it is generally recognised that customary 
rules of international law reflect a particular practice 
adopted, followed and accepted as law (opinio jurist by 
States.2
The concept of a criminal offence in international law 
is the result of a combination of certain acts or omissions 
and the response of States thereto. Accordingly, physical 
persons can perpetrate acts which may become criminal 
offences under customary law if States recognise the 
character of such acts as penal. Such recognition may be 
expressed through unilateral or bilateral action. States 
may, individually through legislative, judicial and 
diplomatic practice, or collectively through international 
agreements, proscribe certain practices as criminal 
offences. Such classification eventually comes to form 
part of customary international law. Piracy is the 
classical criminal offence in international law. The 
concept has developed from judicial decisions and State 
practice, and not solely from Article 15 (which defines 
piracy) in the 19^jGeneva Convention on the High Seas.3
On these issues generally see, Akehurst, 47 BYIL 
(1974-75) 1 and Villiger, Customary International Law 
and Treaties. 1985, pp.4-35.
See Brownlie, Principles. pp.5-9; Van Hoof, op.cit.; 
O'Connell, op.cit., pp.15-16? the Asylum Case. ICJ 
Rep. . 1950, pp.276-277, the Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta’) 
hereafter referred to as Libva v Malta Continental 
Shelf Case, ibid., 1985, p.29 para.27 and the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Merits). Judgment, (hereafter referred to as 
the Nicaragua Case). ibid., 1986, p.97 para 183 and 
pp.108-109 para 207.
UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, 1982. Text also at 21 ILM
(1982) 1261.
3Some treaties, however, are so reflective of majority State
practice that either singly or collectively they are an
evidence of custom.1 Treaties are not only a separate
source of international law but in certain cases can play
a significant part in the development of international
customary norms. For example Hague Convention IV of 1907
2 ,
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land was cited as 
evidence of the proscription of violations of the laws and 
customs of war in the Judgment3 of the International 
Military Tribunal4 delivered at Nuremberg.
(b) Treaties
International agreements are a rich source from which 
acts have come to be recognised as crimes under
international law.5 Broadly classified, they may be
depicted in three divisions. In the first category we find 
international instruments which have had a pioneering
effect in the development of crimes in international law.
Keenan and Brown, Crimes Against International Law. 
1950, p.84, in the course, of determining whether 
aggressive war is criminal in international law, 
acknowledge that "....treaties, recognising the same 
moral standard, give rise to customary international 
law." The principle was affirmed by the International 
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Denmark: Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands^ 
ICJ Rep.r 1969, p.41 para.71, but it was not found to 
apply to the facts of the case before the Court.
Hereafter referred to as Hague Convention (IV)
1907.
Cnd 6964 p.40. Hereafter referred to as 
Nuremberg Judgment.
Hereafter referred to as IMT.
A detailed study of some of the relevant international 
instruments concerned with crimes in international law 
and not just their status as a "source" is found in 
Part III infra.
an indirect effect on the criminal proscription of acts at 
the international level. They oblige State Parties to make 
certain practices criminal offences under their laws rather 
then expressly declaring them to be criminal offences in 
international law. Categorical description of their status 
under international law is often avoided, although 
acknowledgement of the criminal character of the particular 
act is likely to be found either in the travaux 
preparatoires and in the preambles, or implied in the 
provisions of the treaty text. These traits are evident in 
instruments such as the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons Including Diplomatic Agents1, the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages2, and in more 
recent instruments such as the Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation3 and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.4
An important question which concerns treaties and the 
development of criminal offences in international law is 
the following: must acts be stipulated in international 
agreements in order to qualify as criminal offences in 
international law? The present writer believes not. To 
answer otherwise would be tantamount to dismissing the 
relevance and importance of customary international law. 
But there is some disagreement on this poi nt. _jihe-re_ arp 
those who maintain that unlawful acts may only( gradua£e^in 
international law as criminal offences through the faculty
1035 UNTS 168. Text also at 13 ILM 41.
Adopted by GA Res. 34/146, December 7th, 1979. Text 
also at 18 ILM 1456.
Adopted by the International Maritime Organisation 
(hereafter referred to as IMO) in Rome, March 10th, 
1988. See IMO Doc.SUA/CON/15. Text also at 27 ILM 
672.
See UN Doc.E/Conf.82/15, 1988. Text also at 28 ILM 
(1989) 497.
7of international instruments. In 1922 a sub-committee of
the American Society of International Law was entrusted to
report on "offences which may be characterised as
international crimes". The sub-committee found:
"There first appeared a difficulty as to the 
conception of an international crime. That 
conception as ordinarily set forth in text books 
of international law, upon investigation and 
discussion, seemed not to set forth an 
international crime in a strict sense, but rather 
an offense recognised by international usage as 
'international' largely because of its 
universality. For instance, the making of the 
slave trade piracy by international agreement, or 
later those acts denounced under the white slave 
convention, such acts to be punished as crimes in 
accordance with the municipal legislation of each 
of the Powers signatory to the Convention. We 
did not think, .... that this general type of 
offense was particularly in mind. Rather the 
subcommittee's work involved the consideration of 
certain acts to be designated as crimes, 
international in a strict sense ....
(Crimes) are strictly speaking international,
(when they) are, by the signatories to the 
Convention denominated as crimes with a penalty 
affixed.1,1
The sub-committee concedes that an act is a crime in 
international law if it is so declared in an international 
convention. Further still, the sub-committee requires that
the drafters of international instruments attach a penalty 
to the act in question.
The sub-committee's criteria for the development of 
crimes in international law are somewhat rigid. Thus, if 
a treaty text, without specifically describing a practice 
as a crime and without stipulating the punishment attached 
to that crime, simply requires State Parties to enact 
appropriate legislation providing for prosecution and 
punishment of the said practice, then the conduct is not to 
be considered a criminal offence under international law. 
However, acts do develop as criminal offences in 
international law separately from any efforts to render the
16 Proc. ASIL (1922) 69-70.
8same activities criminal under domestic law,1 although 
national criminal legislation common in a large number of 
States may embody general principles of law which, as a 
separate source, may contribute to the development of 
criminal offences under international law.
The concept of a criminal offence in international law 
cannot be construed solely within conventional law. An act
Cf. draft article 2 of the International Law
Commission's (hereafter referred to as ILC) current
project entitled Draft Code of Crimes Against The 
Peace and Security of Mankind (hereafter referred to 
as Draft Code). (Formerly, the title of the ILC's 
project on the Draft Code was: Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. All
references in this thesis to the ILC's Draft Code 
between 1950 and 1954 is referred to as Draft Code of 
Offences. The term "Offences" was eventually
substituted by the more accurate term "Crimes" by 
virtue of GA Res. 42/151, 1988.)
Draft article 2 reads:
" Characterization
The characterization of an act or 
omission as a crime against the peace 
and security of mankind is independent 
of internal law. The fact that an act 
or omission is or is not punishable 
under internal law does not affect this 
characterization."
See ILC's Report on the work of its forty-second 
session (1990) to the UNGA, GAOR, Supp.No.10 (A/45/10) 
p.54. This article was provisionally adopted by the 
ILC at its thirty-ninth session (1987). See ILC Yrbk.. 
1987, v.II, pt.II, p.14. For summary records of the 
debate on draft article 2 see ibid., v.l, meetings: 
1992-2001. See also Sixth Committee views, UN Doc. 
A/CN. 4/L. 420, 1988, pp.17-18.
Cf. also Principle II of Principles of International 
Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunalr adopted 
by GA Res. 95(1) 11th December, 1946, (hereafter 
referred to as Nuremberg Principles), ILC Yrbk.. 1950, 
v.II, p.374. For the discussion of Principle II by 
the ILC see ibid., v.l, p.37. See also replies of 
Governments, ibid., 1951, v.II, p.104.
is a criminal offence under international law not simply
because it is so declared in an international instrument.
Multilateral agreements may act as a thermometer to gauge
the international community's consideration of the
juridical nature of certain conduct. However, they are not
necessarily conclusive evidence of the criminal character
of particular practices. Other sources and principles of
international law equally have a contribution to make to
the development of acts as criminal offences under
international law. In re List and Others (Hostages Trials
the US Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg in 1945
responded to the accusation that it was applying ex post |
facto law by stating:
"It is not essential that a crime be specifically 
defined and charged in accordance with a 
particular ordinance, statute or treaty if it is 
made a crime by international convention, 
recognised customs and usages of war, or the 
general principles of criminal justice common to 
civilised nations generally."1
(c) General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised 
Nations2
An unlawful act may be described as an international 
crime because it is punished as a criminal offence in a
WC Law Rep.f vol. VIII, p.53.
See Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. There is 
much debate among publicists on the meaning of this 
phrase. Some writers believe that it refers solely to 
municipal law rules. Others interprete them as 
international law rules within domestic legal systems. 
A further group advocates that they are a mixture of 
international and national legal rules. A valuable 
presentation of the various doctrinal expositions is 
given by Lammers writing in Essays on the Development 
of the International Legal Order. Kalshoven, F., 
(ed.), 1980, p.53. Also see Brownlie, Principles f
pp.15-19, and Van Hoof, op.cit., pp.131-150.
The Canadian Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals 
interpreted this source as including, "at least", 
principles common to all legal systems and which have 
been elevated to the level of international norms. 
See its Report published 30th December 1986, Part I, 
p.131.
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number of municipal criminal codes and laws.1 This does not 
automatically mean that it constitutes a criminal offence 
under international law. However, its recognition as a 
crime in the laws of a substantial number of States is 
evidence of a general consensus that it merits to be 
prohibited and punished as such.
The presence of a rule or principle of law common to 
a substantial number of national legal systems may emerge 
as a rule or principle of international law. Van Hoof 
explains that "the source of international law which is 
called 'general principles of law' draws upon a reservoir 
consisting in the national legal systems of the States.”2 
Accordingly, municipal criminal laws may trigger the 
process by which practices are adopted as criminal offences 
under international law. In addition, criminal offences 
defined under municipal laws may also serve as models on 
which criminal offences in international law may be 
defined. Illustrations of this development include: the
concept of "crimes against humanity” defined in the 
Nuremberg Charter, the concept of crimes committed against 
internationally protected persons including diplomats and 
the crime of "mercenarism”.
Furthermore, in as much as municipal laws are legally 
binding within their own sphere of application they 
manifest a sense of righteousness, of a willingness to mete 
out punishment for whomsoever commits such acts. National 
laws, which may reflect general principles of law accepted 
by States, may be considered evidence of State practice 
which in turn leads to the creation of customary law.3 
Thus, in some cases the criminal offence in international 
law is the result of the combined effort of more than one 
source: general principles of law recognised by civilised
See Sui Generis Meaning of "International Crime" in
Part II, Chapter 2, infra.
2. Op.cit., p.140.
3. See Akehurst, op.cit., pp.8-10.
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nations and international custom.
It is necessary, however, to make two important 
reservations to the above principles. First, acts may be 
deemed criminal offences in international law regardless of 
whether or not national penal law provides for the 
punishment of same offences. The second reservation, 
already stated, but which deserves some elaboration, is 
that a crime contained in the national legal systems of 
almost all States does not render it automatically a 
criminal offence under international law. Thus, for 
instance, it is safe to say that homicide is considered to 
be a criminal offence under the laws of every member of the 
international community. But, it would be wrong to 
identify it as a criminal offence in international law.
For instance, were the crime of murder to be committed 
on board an aircraft in flight, many States may have a 
claim to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the offender 
including, the State of registration, the national State of 
the offender or of the victim, or even perhaps the State of 
the aircraft's destination. In such circumstances the 
concept of a criminal offence in international law may not 
necessarily feature, although a crime with an international 
element is certainly present.
However, the systematic killing of an ethnic group of 
people by government forces in national territory presents 
a totaly different perspective of the crime of homicide. 
Although the taking away of one's life against one's will 
may be common in both sets of circumstances, the juridical 
nature of the criminal offence varies. In one situation we 
may have a case of homicide under municipal 
(extraterritorial) criminal law, whereas in the other case 
we may be faced with the question of genocide which is a 
criminal offence under international law.
The translation of a criminal offence under municipal 
law into a criminal offence under international law begins 
where the effects of the crime and its consequences cease 
to be the sole concern of the lex loci delicti and attract
the reproach of the society of nations. The principal 
determining factors in this process of transition are the 
nature and the capability of the act to disrupt 
international public order and to violate the basic values 
of humanity.1
(d) Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions rarely focus squarely on the 
conceptual nature of the criminal offence in international 
law. Mainly they have contributed to the development of 
specific practices as criminal offences under international 
law such as piracy, war crimes, crimes against humanity or 
hostage taking. They are also useful to the study of the 
features characteristic of the concept of the criminal 
offence in international law. Their contribution towards 
understanding the development of the concept of criminal 
offence in international law is discussed in Parts II and 
III of this thesis rather than in this context as a 
separate source of international law.
(e) The Writings of Publicists
The principle stated in Paragraph D above applies also 
with regard to the writings of publicists. Their works on 
the concept of the criminal offence in international law 
appear^r throughout this study not only as a source of 
information but also as evidence of opinion on the 
development of international law concerning criminal 
offences.
2. The Concept of "Jus Cogens" and the Criminal offence
in International Law
The scope of this section is to address the question 
whether or not the ius coaens concept has any bearing on
In its Report on the Draft Code the ILC fILC Yrbk. . 
1983 v.II, pt.II, p.14 para.48) determines the serious 
nature of the crimes it seeks to include in its 
project by the extent of their calamity or by their 
horrific character, or by both these factors.
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the notion of a criminal offence and its development in 
international law.
The concept of jus coaens1 has been properly described 
as "multi-faceted and complex".2 It consists of a body of 
rules considered to be essential, fundamental and non­
derogable. The presence of these rules has been recognised 
in the writings of publicists3 and in international judicial 
practice4 but their juridical nature continues to give rise 
to such questions as: on what basis can we claim to have 
rules of international law that are indelible?? are they a 
reflection of a public policy system in international law;5
See generally: Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 1984, p.203 and Brownlie, Principles. 
p.513. In particular reference should also be made to 
the 1968 (UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/11) and the 1969 (UN 
Doc.A/Conf.39/11/Add/l) Sessions of the Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties where the ius coaens 
concept was greatly debated and widely recognised or 
accepted.
Van Hoof, op.cit., p.151.
See, among others, Sinclair, op.cit., p.207; Brownlie, 
Principlesr p.512, Schwarzenberger, 43 Tex.LR (1965) 
455 and Macdonald, 25 Can. YIL (1987) 130.
The ius cogens concept in international judicial 
practice has featured in individual opinions 
(dissentient or otherwise) and much less in collective 
judgments. See Judge Schucking, Diss. Op., in the 
Case of the SS "Wimbledon". PCIJ Rep. Ser. A f No.l, 
1923, p.47? Judge Anzilotti, Ind. Op., in Customs 
Regime between Germany and Austria, PCIJ Rep. Ser. 
A/B, No.41, 1931, pp.58-59; and Judge Moreno Quintana, 
Sep. Op. , in Case Concerning the Application of the 
Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of 
Infants. ICJ Rep.. 1958, p.106.
While these judicial dicta further the understanding 
of the concept of ius cogens. they have attracted 
considerable comment in the writings of jurists. See 
Sinclair, op.cit., p.210.
See Schwarzenberger, op.cit., p.456. See also Judge 
Moreno Quintana, loc.cit., p.104 et seq.
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how do they emerge,1 and how do they change?2 Finally, a
question with circular overtones: If the ius coaens concept
is understood as representing a system of supremacy among
rules of international law, is it conceivable to suggest
that there may be such a hierarchical system even within
the ius coaens concept itself?3
There is a considerable degree of debate concerning
the origin of ius coaens principles:
"Some say that such rules are derived from 
custom, while others say that they can be derived 
either from custom or from treaties. A few 
maintain that they are derived from general 
principles of law, or from either custom or 
general principles of law, or from either custom, 
treaties or general principles of law. Judicial 
dicta speak of rules of ius coaens being derived 
from treaties or general principles of law, but 
without apparently implying that they are limited 
to those sources. Some authorities have argued 
that treaties or customs which conflict with 
basic principles of natural law are void? others 
reject this view."4
However, there is a wider consensus on the general
proposition that ius coaens rules are those "which derive
from principles that the legal conscience of mankind deems
absolutely essential to co-existence in the international
community? those higher norms which are essential to the
life of the international community".5
See Van Hoof, op.cit., pp.165-166.
See Brownlie, Principles. p.513.
Brownlie, Principles. p.515, illustrates this point 
through a most pertinent question: "If a state uses 
force to implement the principle of self-
determination, is it possible to assume that one 
aspect of ius coaens is more significant than
another?" However, no response is offered to the 
question.
A leading exposition of the various doctrinal
viewpoints is furnished by Akehurst, 47 BYIL (1974-75) 
282. See also Van Hoof, op.cit., p.156 et seq.
Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1968 
Session, see UN Doc A/Conf.39/11, p.294.
Jus cogens rules do not emerge simply because they are
15
Jus coaens rules operate within spheres of 
international relations that are of singular importance? 
spheres which concern some of the most sacred values and 
interests of mankind. We find recognition of this 
principle in doctrine1 and judicial practice2 where the
considered as fundamental and necessary by States for 
the preservation of law and order in the international 
community. As Article 53 of the Vienna Convention 
requires, a peremptory norm must be accepted and 
recognised by all States and can only be modified by 
a subsequent norm of the same character. Akehurst 
(op.cit., p.285) interprets this condition as imposing 
a two-tier test. He claims that "a rule, in order to 
qualify as ius coaens. must pass two tests - it must 
be accepted as law by all the States in the world, and 
an overwhelming majority of States must regard it as 
ius coaens11.
However, Akehurst adds (ibid., p.285 n.4) that in the 
case of treaties, all States in the world must be 
parties to the convention for a rule to acquire the 
ius coaens character. This condition spells bad 
tidings for the concept of a criminal offence under 
conventional international law. It would mean that 
acts may be criminal in international law, but this 
would not necessarily be considered ius coaens because 
they are not contained in treaties to which all the 
States in the world are parties. * Thus the rules 
prohibiting slavery and genocide may be considered as 
not having the force of ius coaens because not all the 
States are parties to the relevant treaties concerned 
with the criminal proscription of these practices. 
This, especially, would be the case with apartheid 
where the number of States Parties to the Apartheid 
Convention hardly reflects an equitable geographical 
representation of the international community, and 
even if the position were otherwise, the prospect of 
S.Africa's accession to the convention is not likely. 
Nevertheless, the ILC (ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.II, pt.II, 
p.15 para.53) reports that "the fact that some States 
had not acceded to the Convention on Apartheid did not 
deprive it of its force as ius coaens.11 For this 
writer's view of the status of apartheid as a criminal 
offence in international law, see Part III Chapter 6 
infra.
Rules of international law, however, do not acquire a 
ius coaens character exclusively from multipartite 
treaties, but also from the customary practice of 
States which includes treaties.
See: Sinclair, op.cit., p.207? Rozakis, The Concept of 
Jus Coaens in the Law of Treatiesr 1976, at pp.2, 24- 
25, 27 and particularly at p. 16 where the author
application of ius coaens norms features within regimes
such as: the legal limits to the use of force by States,
the international protection of human rights, and possibly,
the right to self-determination and to permanent
sovereignity over natural resources.1 In its Commentary to
the relevant draft article (now Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties) the ILC admitted:
"It is not the form of a general rule of 
international law but the particular nature of 
the subiect-matter with which it deals that may, 
in the opinion of the Commission, give it the 
character of jus cogens."2
The relevant question, therefore is: does this principle
apply to the concept of a criminal offence in international
law? Doctrine, jurisprudence and practice all seem to
offer a positive indication in this respect.
Doctrine and State Opinion
With respect to the writings of publicists Brownlie
conveniently sets the stage:
"The least controversial examples of the class 
(i.e. of ius coaens  ^ are the prohibition of 
aggressive war,3 the law of genocide, the 
principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes 
against humanity and the rules prohibiting trade
envisages norms of ius coaens applying within the 
spheres of international commerce, economics and 
maritime law? Scheuner, 27 ZAORV (1967) 526? and Van 
Hoof, op.cit., pp.160-161.
See: Ad. Op. on Reservations to the Genocide
Convention. ICJ Rep.. 1951, p.15? Judge Tanaka,
Diss.Op., S.W. Africa Cases. ICJ Rep.. 1966, p.298
(Cf. Higgins, Proc.ASIL in 64 AJIL (1970) 47) and Case 
Concerning US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Teheran, ICJ Rep.r 1980, p.40 para.86 - para.88 and 
p.42 para.91.
Brownlie, Principles. p.513. The concept of the 
common heritage of mankind has also been cited as a 
candidate norm. See Sloan, 58 BYIL (1987) 81.
ILC Yrbk.. 1966, v.II, p.248 para.2. Emphasis 
added.
See Sinclair, op.cit., p.207.
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in slaves and piracy."1 
Among his illustrations of ius coqens rules, 
Schwarzenberger2 selects slavery, piracy jure gentium, war 
crimes and other crimes listed in the Nuremberg Charter.
The significant point is that acts of a criminal 
nature and indeed, the violation of human rights in 
international law, are invariably submitted as evidence of 
the concept of ius coaens.3 To support this observation, we 
find that in a list of examples of ius coqens drawn up by 
Dr. M. Whiteman, several are considered as criminal 
offences under international law.4
Principles. 3rd ed., 1979, p.513. In his fourth 
edition (1990) p.513, Brownlie drops the reference to 
"aggresive war" without explanation and substitutes it 
with "prohibition of the use of force" accompanied by 
a footnote referring the reader to the ICJ Judgment in 
the Nicaragua Case.
Op.cit., pp.463 and 473.
See for e.g. McDonald, 25 Can. YIL (1987) 137-138 
and Mann, Further Studies in International Law,
1990, p.96.
The following is the list put forward by Whiteman, 7 
Ga.JICL (1977) 609 at pp.625-626. Those underlined, 
though serious in nature and effect, seem questionable 
as to whether (a) they are either criminal under 
international law, or (b) whether they may be regarded 
as ius coaens. In addition the order of the practices 
listed does not reflect rank or importance of the 
various practices. 1. Genocide, 2. Slavery and the 
slave trade, 3. Piracy, 4. Political Terrorism abroad, 
including terroristic activities. (It is rather 
peculiar to limit terrorism ratione loci. Terrorist 
acts are usually considered, criminal at home and ? ~
abroad). 5. Hijacking of (^ ir traffic> 6. Recourse to c ^ 4 
war except in self-defence/^TT^nTreat or use of force 4 
against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State (intervention), 8. Armed 
aggression, 9. Recognition of situations brought about 
by force, including fruits of aggression, 10. Treaty 
provisions imposed by force, 11. War crimes, 12.
Crimes against peace and against humanity, 13.
Offences against the peace and/or security of Mankind,
14. Dispersion of germs with a view to harming or 
extinguishing human life, 15. All methods of mass 
destruction (including nuclear weapons) used for other 
than peaceful purposes, 16. Contamination of the air.
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When drafting articles on the law of treaties, ILC 
members were much divided on whether the ius coaens 
provision in a proposed convention on the law of treaties 
should contain illustrations of the concept. In the end 
this suggestion was not adopted. However, delegations in 
favour of illustrating the ius coaens doctrine argued that 
acts criminal under international law such as genocide and 
slavery and piracy were excellent examples of the concept.1 
It is worth mentioning that those who opposed an 
illustrated ius coaens provision did not object to the 
above as evidence of ius coaens. They were more concerned 
with the question of limiting the concept ratione materiae.
It seems that jus coaens does operate within the penal 
and the human rights aspects of international law. Another 
area in international law where ius coqens has featured, 
and which is relevant to the concept of a criminal offence 
in international law, is that of State Responsibility.
The definition of an "international crime", as a 
breach of an international obligation "so essential for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community", in Draft Article 19 of the ILC Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility,2 is responsible for the link
sea or land with a view to making it harmful or 
useless to mankind. 17. Hostile modification of 
weather, 18. Appropriation of outer space and/or 
celestial bodies. 19. Disruption of international
communications with a view to disturbing the peace.
20. Economic warfare with the purpose of upsetting: a. 
the world's banking systems. b. the world's 
currencies, and c. the world*s supply of energy or d. 
the world's foodsupply.
The criteria used for the compilation of this list may 
not have been strictly legal. Political factors are 
suspected to have had an influential effect in the 
selection process. Indeed, serious unlawful practices 
such as torture are noticeably absent.
Similar lists have been submitted by other writers, 
see Sinclair, op.cit., pp.217-218.
ILC Yrbk.f 1966, v.II, p.248 (para.3).
ILC Yrbk.r 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.95.
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between the concept of ius coaens and that of the criminal
offence in international law. The wording cited from Draft
Article 19 above is language borrowed from Article 53 on
peremptory norms in the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties. Further, Prof. Ago, the principal author of
Draft Article 19, pointed out that it is
"no accident that the (international) obligations 
whose breach entails .... the personal punishment 
of the perpetrators correspond largely to those 
imposed by the rules of ius coaens. The 
specially important content of certain 
international obligations and the fact that
respect for them in fact determines the 
conditions of the life of international society 
are factors which, at least in many cases, have 
precluded any possibility of derogation from the 
rules imposing such obligations by virtue of 
special agreements. These are also the factors 
which render a breach of these obligations more 
serious than failure to comply with other 
obligations.1,1
International Judicial Practice2
The International Court has not had many opportunities 
to address the relationship between acts recognised as 
criminal offences in international law and the concept of 
ius coqens. Few as they may be, the judicial
pronouncements are most revealing. In the Case Concerning 
the Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co. Ltd (Second Phase ^3 
the International Court distinguished between obligations 
of a State owed towards the international community as a 
whole and those arising vis-a-vis another State. The 
former known as 'erga omnes7 are understood to be 
inalienable, having ius coaens characteristics. To 
illustrate these kinds of obligations the judgment cites 
acts of aggression, genocide, and other violations of human 
rights such as slavery and racial discrimination.
Ibid., v.II, pt.I, p.33 para 101.
Generally see Sinclair, op.cit., pp.209-213. 
ICJ Rep., 1970, p.32.
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The Advisory Opinion on the Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide1 is
another occasion where the International Court addressed
the universal character of States' obligations in
international law. In brief, the Court opined that the
raison d'etre behind the Genocide Convention was the
embodiment of a universal assertion against the horror and
shock of the crimes which it sought to prevent and supress:
"States do not have any interests of their own? 
they merely have, one and all, a common interest, 
namely, the accdriililishment of those high purposes (/\
which are the raison d'etre of the convention."
Furthermore, the principles enshrined by the convention
"are principles recognised by civilised nations as binding 
on States, binding, even without any conventional 
obligation.1,2
In a Separate Opinion in the Case Concerning the 
Application of the 1902 Convention on the Guardianship of 
Infants3 Judge Moreno Quintana spoke of rules within 
international law "respect for which is indispensable to 
the legal co-existence of the political units which make up 
the international community."4 He recognised the peremptory 
character and universal scope of principles which were non­
derogable even though he did not refer specifically to the 
ius cogens doctrine. The repression of piracy and the 
rules governing warfare were among the illustrations used 
to corroborate the force of those principles in 
international law.
The notion of ius cogens truly seems to represent the
ICJ Rep.. 1951, p.15.
Ibid., at p.23. Emphasis added. It has been 
questioned, however, whether this comment necessarily 
indicates a reference to ius cogens. See Sinclair,
op.cit., p.210.
ICJ Rep.f 1958, p.55.
Ibid., pp.106-107.
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embodiment of those rules which regulate some of the most 
highly sensitive and significant aspects of the conduct of 
international relations. Criminal offences in
international law mark one such aspect. As Schwarzenberger 
put it, they are examples of "breaches of the standard of 
civilisation."1 They are heinous acts beyond the boundaries 
of toleration. It is the nature of acts such as criminal 
offences in international law which renders necessary the 
presence of ius coaens rules.
The concepts of ius coaens and of the criminal offence 
in international law have much to offer each other. Two 
points remain unquestionably significant:
(i) Jus coaens contributes to the development of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law by 
strengthening the force of its juridical character, 
(ii) As rules of international law develop to regulate 
criminal matters, the ius coaens concept matures.
The development of both concepts is mutually reinforcing.
Op.cit., p.466.
PART II
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CHAPTER 2
The Criminal Offence; Problems of Identification and 
Designation
1• Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to separate clearly the 
criminal offence from other unlawful acts in international 
law. It does not include a discussion of the definition of 
the concept of criminal offence in international law. The 
attempts at and the problems involved in defining the 
concept are tackled in Chapter 3. This chapter examines 
the difficulties that have arisen as a result of the 
failure in international practice and especially in the 
writings of publicists to separate one serious legal wrong,
i.e. the criminal offence, in international law from 
another.
The identification of the criminal offence in 
international law is marked by the recognition that 
specific acts create serious cause for concern in the 
international community because their effects extend beyond 
the immediate environment of the locus delicti and generate 
harm which is not sufficiently remedied by the traditional 
forms of international responsibility.
The reasons for which certain conduct may be 
proscribed as a criminal offence by the community of 
nations are varied, but may generally be explained in terms 
of humanitarian values. For instance, war crimes concern 
the protection of civilians and prisoners of war in time of 
armed conflict; slavery concerns the concept of equality? 
and torture concerns the dignity of mankind. However, the 
use of force or the pollution of rivers may also be in 
breach of humanitarian values and though possibly unlawful, 
do not necessarily constitute criminal offences in 
international law. It is necessary to separate clearly the 
criminal offence from other unlawful acts under 
international law. This question is considered presently.
Further, the criminal offence in international law is
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not easily identified by the popular though ambiguous term: 
' international crime9. The term has been used by 
publicists in their writings, by States in diplomatic 
practice, and in judicial decisions. Sometimes it is used 
to refer to criminal offences defined under international 
law. But in other instances it may refer to crimes which, 
while involving some foreign or transnational element, are 
not the concern of international law. 'International Crime7 
will not be used by the present writer in this work to 
refer to acts recognised as criminal offences under 
international law.
Finally, this chapter includes a section which reviews 
the various terms and phrases that have been employed to 
refer either to specific crimes in international law or to 
the concept of a crime in international law.
2. The need to distinguish in international law criminal 
offences from other unlawful acts
The notion of an "unlawful act" is a broad concept. It 
covers legal wrongs which give rise either to civil 
liability or criminal punishment. However, in
international law the notion of an unlawful act connotes 
civil rather than criminal implications.
This is the position usually found in doctrine1 and 
jurisprudence.2 But, notwithstanding a general tendency to
See, among others, Cavare, Le Droit International
Public Positif. 1969, v.II, p.473 et seq.; Guggenheim, 
Traite de Droit International Public. 1954, v.II, p.l? 
Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile 
Acts of Private Persons against Foreign States. 1962, 
p. 15; Brownlie, Principles, Ch. XX, p. 432, and in 
System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility
(Part I) 1983, p.23. But see, Maryan Green,
International Law - Law of Peace. 1987, p.241, who 
employs the term illegal act in relation to the 
doctrine of State responsibility in international law. 
This is curious because the international
responsibility of the State is principally delictual 
but the term "illegal act" traditionally has had 
criminal overtones.
2 Some of the leading cases include: The Chorzow Factory
equate unlawful acts with civil responsibility, there is no 
rule which necessai^ defines them in a criminal character 
in international law, nor, for that matter, which excludes 
the criminal responsibility of States.1
Specific unlawful acts such as piracy jure gentium and 
slavery, violations of the laws and customs of war and, 
more recently (since the Second World War), violations of 
certain fundamental human rights have been recognised as 
criminal offences under international law in the practice 
of States, in judicial decisions, in international 
instruments, and in the writings of jurists. However, the 
theoretical division between criminal offences and other 
unlawful acts in international law has not received as much 
exposure as perhaps it deserves, particularly in two 
significant sources: the practice of the International
Court and doctrine.
(a) Practice of the International Court
The approach of the International Court vis-a-vis the 
criminal character of unlawful acts in international law 
appears to be somewhat evasive, even when specifically 
asked to adjudicate upon consequences arising from the 
alleged breach of international obligations designed to 
proscribe certain practices as criminal offences.
In Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the International 
Court acknowledges that genocide, which represents "a 
denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, a
Case (Indemnity) fMerits) . PCIJ Rep. . Ser. A . No 9 . 
1928, p. 5; The Corfu Channel Case (Merits) . ICJ Rep. . 
1949, p. 4. See also the distinction between (a) 
international delinquencies, (b) prejudicial acts and
(c) unlawful acts, drawn by Judge Alvarez, Ind. Op., 
ibid., p.45; and The Reparation Case for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ 
Rep.. 1949, p. 174.
See Brownlie, Principles. p.434 n. 8. The concept of 
State Criminal Responsibility is discussed in Part IV 
Chapter 10 below.
25
denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results 
in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral 
law"1, is a criminal offence in international law. This is 
perhaps one of the rare occasions where the International *-4
Court's position on unlawful acts recognised as criminal 
offences in international law is unequivocal.
In the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction. Light 
and Power Co. Ltd2 (Second Phased the Court cited, among 
other unlawful acts, genocide and slavery as 'outlawed 
acts'. In the Court's opinion, these acts violate 
international rights the protection of which rests not with 
one State but with all States. The Court distinguished 
between two types of unlawful acts in international law.
On the one hand, there are unlawful acts which violate such 
important rights that "all States can be held to have a 
legal interest"3 in protecting them. On the other hand, 
there are unlawful acts that violate rights but not all 
States are deemed to have a legal interest in their 
protection. By citing as examples of the first kind 
unlawful acts recognised as criminal offences, the Court 
separates, albeit indirectly, criminal offences in 
international law from other acts unlawful in international 
law.
In the Corfu Channel Case* Albania was held responsible 
under international law because it failed to ensure safe 
passage for vessels passing through an international
j
waterway. The incidents5 which gave rise to the dispute 
were the result of conduct described in diplomatic
ICJ Rep. , 1951, p.23.
1 *■) ~f cT :
ICJ Rep. . 1970, p.l. <<■
a
Ibid., p.32.
ICJ Rep., 1949, p.4.
For a description of the facts see, ibid., p.10.
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statements and submissions as an "international crime",1 a 
"crime against humanity"2 and an "offence against 
humanity".3 Minelaying in waters used for international 
navigation was presented in several dissenting opinions4 as 
a criminal offence, indeed "as an abominable international 
crime, very close to an act of terrorism as defined by the 
(1937 League of Nations) Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism".5 However, the judgment does not 
indicate that the Respondent (Albania) behaved criminally 
in international law, and / or that its conduct may have 
given rise to a form of State responsibility other than 
that which is civil.6
More recently, in the Case Concerning US 
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran7 the International 
Court did not address the question whether the hostage- 
takers' acts were criminal or not in international law. 
The Court did not pronounce itself on all of the United
See statement by H.E. Ambassador Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, (U.K.), Security Council Meeting 107, Febuary 
18th, 1947, ICJ Pleadings. 1949, Vol I, Annexe No. 23, 
p.211; and H.E. Ambassador Mr. Hasluck (Australia), 
Security Council Meeting 111, Febuary 24th, 1947,
ibid., p.244.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, ibid., p.213.
Memorial submitted by the United Kingdom, ibid., p.40 
para. 72.
Judge Winiarski, Diss. Op., ICJ Rep. . 1949, p.56?
Judge Badawi Pasha, Diss. Op., ibid., p.63/ Judge 
Krylow, Diss. Op., ibid., p.69 and Judge Azevedo, 
Diss. Op., ibid., p. 85.
Dr. Ecer, Judge Ad_Hoc, ICJ Rep.. 1949, Diss. Op., p. 
115.
The Applicant did not request a judicial pronouncement 
on the Respondent's conduct as criminal or as one 
which constituted a criminal offence in international 
law. The International Court was asked to adjudge and 
declare the Respondent to be in breach of its 
obligations under international law for which 
reparation is due. ICJ Pleadings. 1949, v.I, p.51.
7 ICJ Rep.. 1980, p.3.
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States contentions. Of the various international treaty 
obligations which Iran was alleged to have violated, the 
Court did not consider Applicants' submission1 that Iran 
failed to meet its international obligations under the 1977 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents.2
This case presented the International Court of Justice 
with an occasion to declare itself on: (a) whether certain 
unlawful acts were criminal in international law and, if 
so, (b) on their juridical consequences. The opportunity, 
not being necesssary for a determination of the issue as 
fomulated for decision, was not seized.
In the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua3 it was claimed that the 
United States was responsible for, among a number of other 
violations of international law, unlawful use of force 
through " recruiting, training, arming, equipping, 
financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, 
aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in 
and against Nicaragua.”4 In addition, the United States was 
also charged with the killing, wounding and kidnapping of 
Nicaraguan citizens.5 Of the several claims filed against 
the United States, the above sail closest to the question 
of the criminal character of unlawful acts in international 
law; principally for the following reasons:
ICJ Pleadings. 1981, pp.176-178.
1035 UNTS 167. This Convention obliges State Parties 
to prosecute if they do not extradite criminal 
offenders for attacks "upon the person or liberty of 
internationally protected persons”. (See Articles 2 
and 7. Emphasis added). A full discussion of this 
convention is found at Part II Chapter 7 below.
ICJ Rep.. (1986) p.14.
Ibid., p.18 para 15(a). 
Ibid., p.19 para 15(f).
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(a) At the time the United Nations was working towards the
a criminal offence. This instrument, recently adopted, is 
entitled International Convention Against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries.1 The definition 
of 'mercenarism'2 in the text is depicted by language which 
is almost identical to the wording used by the Applicant in 
the first of the above two charges.
(b) With respect to the alleged kidnappings and murders 
committed by US personnel, or other persons in th^ ir- nav.
The Court3 held that it possessed insufficient
(perhaps due to the non-participation of the United States 
in the Merits phase of the proceedings) and thus was not in 
a position to determine whether the murder and kidnapping 
allegations were well and truly founded. With respect to 
the charge of recruiting, training and supporting personnel 
for the purpose of carrying out military and paramilitary 
activities within and against Nicaragua, the United States 
was found:
(i) to have intervened in the domestic affairs of a 
sovereign State contrary to international law;4 and,
(ii) to have violated the principle of non-use of force 
under customary international law.5
The question whether 'mercenarism' is a criminal 
offence under international law remains to be determined. 
In part, this question may be answered by reference to the 
existing municipal legislation defining certain practices
Adopted by GA Res. 44/34, 1989. Text at 29 ILM
(1990)89.
See Article 2.
Loc. cit., p.64, para.115 and p.113, para.216.
Ibid., p.124, para.242 and p.146, para.292(3).
Ibid., pp.118-119, para.228. Cf. Article 2 (4) of the 
UN Charter.
adoption of a convention intended to render 'mercenarism
against Nicaraguans, these acts, per se . are 
acknowledged as criminal offences.
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as constituting 'mercenarism', which when committed result 
in criminal punishment. Other relevant sources include 
resolutions adopted by international organisations and 
international treaties (bilateral and multilateral) 
denouncing 'mercenarism' as a "universal crime against 
humanity” and an "international crime".1
Though the International Court could have devoted some 
consideration to these sources and to the nature and 
character of mercenaries2 and 'mercenarism' especially in 
the light of current efforts to regulate this area under 
treaty law, it chose not to involve itself in the question 
concerning the status of 'mercenarism' as a crime, and thus 
in the matter of criminal offences under international law.
(b) Doctrine
Rarely, in the writings of publicists (even in
contemporary international law with a substantial number of
acts recognised as crimes), is the concept of an unlawful
act in international law said to include, other than civil
wrongs, criminal offences. Jurists address the concept of
an unlawful act in international law either by providing a
broad theoretical definition of the concept or by reference
to its consequences, i.e. it gives rise to responsibility
in international law. Thus Professor Cheng writes:
"In principle, it may, therefore, be said that an 
unlawful act in international law engendering 
responsibility is any act on the part of the 
State which transgresses a rule of international 
law" .3
Even though worded in terms generic enough to include acts
The status of "mercenarism" as a crime in 
international law is discussed in Part II Chapter 5 
below.
See Judge Ago, Sep. Op., ICJ Rep. . 1986, p.185 para 
11, indicating the Court's refusal "to go along with 
the Applicant's assertions that the contra forces are 
mere bands of 'mercenaries'".
General Principles of Law as applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals. 1953, p.174.
30
recognised as criminal offences in international law, this‘
\ 7 • b Jhformula does not, in any case, admit criminal offences : j
— — — ---------   LvrfN
committed by private individuals, i.e. by persons n o t ^
acting on "the part of the State".
In a similar generic style Schwarzenberger and Brown1 
define an 'international illegal act'2 "as an act or 
omission which is unjustified, uncondoned, attributable to 
a subject of international! law and voluntary". 'Delict' 
according to Kelsen3 covers any unlawful conduct including 
'crime' and 'tort', and he opined that in international law 
it is generally accepted that there is such a thing as a 
delict which consists of State conduct "considered illegal, 
contrary to international law, and, therefore, a violation 
of international law".4 For Professor Tunkin5 "a violation 
of either a customary or a treaty norm of international law 
is an international delict". One writer6 declared that the 
distinction between a violation of international 
obligations and the commission of international crimes is 
obvious. But he fails to explain why and what is meant by 
"international crimes".
There is a similar tendency among Continental lawyers 
to adopt broad generic formulae. According to Professor 
Guggenheim7 the unlawful act in international law consists 
of the violation of an obligation stipulated by a rule of 
international law. Following a similar approach, Professor
A Manual of International Law. 1976, p.142.
'International Illegal Act', 'International Tort' and 
the breach of an international obligation are 
understood by the writers as synonymous. Ibid.
Principles of International Law. 1966, p.5.
Ibid., p.17.
Theory of International Lawf 1974, p.383. 
Lador-Lederer, 4 Is Yrbk HR (1974) 89.
Traite de Droit International Public. 1954, v.II,p.l.
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Balladore-Pallieri1 asserts that an unlawful act involves 
any conduct or practice which violates an international 
obligation. Inversely, Professor Giuliano2 submits that a 
violation of an international obligation results in an 
unlawful act in international law.
Other writers have adopted a less orthodox approach.
Thus, Professor Sereni3 explains that the unlawful act in 
international law is a concept having unitary 
characteristics. It is not a concept to be divided into 
categories, i.e. a civil wrong and a criminal offence.
At any rate, either approach fails to identify 
adeguately the presence of acts recognised as criminal 
offences in international law.
The term 'International Delinquency' employed in 
Oppenheim,4 which "ranges from ordinary breaches of treaty 
obligations, involving no more than pecuniary compensation, 
to violations of International Law amounting to a criminal 
act in the generally accepted meaning of the term", is 
equally unhelpful and possibly misleading. It does not
w  \ *“-----' \ifrt4
assist the identification of the concept of a criminal 
offence in international law because it can apply both to ijbxkvtfwj 
civil and criminal matters.
The following writers are noteworthy because they 
clearly specify that in international law the concept of an 
unlawful act includes criminal offences. As early as 1916, 
one writer5 acknowledged that unlawful acts in international 
law are not solely of a civil nature but possibly also of 
a "quasi-criminal nature".
Diritto Internazionale Pubblico. 1962, p.245, para.
80.
Diritto Internazionale. 1974, v.I, p. 592, para.17.
Diritto Internazionale. 1962, v.III, p.1515, para.3.
International Law - A Treatise. 8th ed., 1955, v.I, 
p.339 para 151. Hereafter referred to as Oppenheim, 
International Law.
Peaslee, 10 AJIL (1916) 335.
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According to Professor Glaser1 a violation of 
international law (termed "infraction international”) 
includes wrongs which give rise to civil as well as 
criminal responsibility.
In his lecture at the Hague Academy of International 
Law in 1939, Professor Ago2 noted that in international law 
it is possible to identify two types of unlawful acts: an 
"international criminal offence" ("un delit international 
penal") and an "international civil offence" ("un delit 
international civil"). They are distinguishable by the 
character of their legal consequences: that of the latter
are reparatory whereas that of the former are punitive. 
This thesis was subsequently developed by Professor Ago in 
his capacity as Special Rapporteur to the ILC on State 
Responsibility.3 Following the position adopted by his 
predecessor the former ILC Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility, Professor Garcia-Amador,4 Ago recognised 
that the concept of an unlawful act in international law 
includes criminal and non-criminal offences. He termed the 
former "international crimes" and the latter "international 
delicts".5 Writers6 have since reiterated this distinction 
in their consideration of the concept of an unlawful act in 
international law.
The need to distinguish clearly in international law
RDPCrim.. 1949, p.812.
68 Hague Receuil pp.524-525 para. 6.
Fifth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN. 
4/291 & /Add.1 & /Add.2, ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.I, 
p.24 para 72.
See his work at: 49 AJIL (1955) 345; ILC Yrbk.. 1956, 
v.II, p.183 para 51; and 94 Hague Receuil (1958) 395.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.I, pp. 53-54 para 153.
See, Droit International Public. Nguyen Dinh, (ed.), 
1987, p.678 para 483, and Wolfrum writing in 10 Ency. 
PIL p.272: "The term internationally wrongful act has 
to be regarded as a generic term which covers both the 
international crime and the internaitonal delict".
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between unlawful acts which are recognised as criminal 
offences and those which are not, has either been ignored 
or imprecisely addressed. The evidence reveals two trends 
of thought concerning this division. First there is a 
general presumption in judicial and juristic opinion that 
the concept of an unlawful act in internatonal law includes 
criminal and non-criminal offences and that it is not 
invariably necessary to reflect this position. Second, the 
traditional rule that the responsibility of States is non­
criminal, i.e. unlawful acts in international law (criminal 
and non-criminal) engender 'civil' responsibility, has in 
the main, neither encouraged nor necessitated the need to 
specifically identify criminal offences in international 
law from other unlawful acts under international law.1
The concept of a criminal offence in international law 
is largely discussed outside the broader concept of an 
unlawful act in international law. It is addressed as a 
quite separate concept3 and, unfortunately, very often 
identified by the label "international crime", which is an 
ambiguous term. In the two following sections we shall 
consider the possible meanings of this term and suggest why 
it does not sufficiently reflect acts recognised under 
international law as criminal offences.
3. The meaning attributed to "International Crime"
(a) Traditional Meanings
There are at least two instances when an offence may 
be described as an 'international crime'. The first is the 
case where the elements of the offence and the participants 
(offender and victim) involve more than one State either by 
virtue of the locus delicti or by virtue of the lex
See Brownlie, Principles. p.432? Shaw, International 
Law. 1986; and Mann, Further Studies in International 
Law. 1990, Ch.4, p.4.
See for example Glaser, Droit International Penal 
Conventionnel. v.I, p.49, 1970, and Plawski, Etude des 
Principes Fondamentaux du Droit Internaitonal Penal. 
1972, p.142.
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patriae. The second instance is that of an act considered 
to be a criminal offence under the domestic laws of most, 
if not all, the civilised nations of the world and one also 
defined as a crime by international law. At the same time, 
it is possible to have an act deemed criminal under 
international law but which is not necessarily a criminal 
offence under domestic law.
The principal factor which distinguishes the latter 
from the former type of 'international crime' is that 
certain kinds of behaviour or conduct could very well be 
criminal in so far as international law is concerned 
without actually possessing some form of international or 
transnational ingredient. For instance, genocide practices 
may be carried out by the nationals of one State (probably, 
but not necessarily, acting on its behalf) against their 
fellow citizens. In this case there is no foreign element 
in a traditional sense. The acts occur in a purely 
domestic environment. However, the practices and policies 
in question remain criminal offences as far as 
international law and the society of nations are concerned.
In contrast, it is also possible to have a situation 
where the only qualification a criminal offence may have 
to receive the label of 'international crime' is the 
presence of some foreign element. This may arise either 
because of the different nationalities of the offenders and 
their victims or through the involvement of several States 
all possibly having an interest to exercise criminal 
jurisdiciton. A typical example is where homicide is 
committed by a national of State A against the national of 
State B in the territory of State C.
Thus the so-called foreign or international element, 
alone, does not necessarily determine whether the crime in 
question falls under municipal or international criminal 
law. It is a universal outrage for specific acts which 
threaten the foundations of international society and their 
recognition as criminal offences by the vast majority of 
civilised nations which begins to identify the line
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separating criminal offences under municipal law from 
criminal offences in international law.
(b) "Sui Generis" Meaning of "International Crime"
The recognition of a specific act as a criminal
offence in the municipal laws of a substantial number of
States gives the term 'international crime' a new meaning
namely, that the criminal offence is international because
it is universally proscribed under various national laws
and codes. This understanding of the term 'international
crime' is promoted by Max Radin:
"If we were to put (the penal codes of modern 
civilised countries) side by side, we should see 
that different as they are in a great many 
respects, most of the acts which shock moral 
sensibilities in one country, do so in the 
others, and these acts are listed as punishable 
offences, or crimes, in all of them....
It would accordingly not be difficult to prepare 
a penal code of substance and procedure that 
would easily find general acceptance among most 
of the civilised nations of the world because in 
essence it is already accepted by them. The acts 
made punishable would be 'international crimes' 
in a wholly different sense from that which 
usually attaches to the word. They would not be 
acts which impair the relations between states, 
acts like those which instigate war or the 
violations of treaties. They would be acts which 
the moral sense of the unorganised but real 
international community has. independently of 
formal relations, already condemned and treated 
as punishable.111
The criminal offences listed in the Nuremberg Charter, 
especially the category of offences known as "crimes 
against humanity", have been invoked in support of this 
theory. Radin notes that 'crimes against humanity' as 
defined in the Nuremberg Charter essentially amounted to 
assault, rape, enslavement, robbery and murder. 
Accordingly, he argues that "not only have these acts been 
punishable within the borders of the four signatory powers, 
but they are equally punishable in all the civilised
32 Iowa LR (19451 40 (emphasis added).
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The contribution of this sui generis meaning of 
'international crime' in terms of identifying criminal 
offences in international law is twofold. It identifies 
municipal legislation as a wealthy source of evidence ), 
concerning the criminal character of certain acts in 
domestic law which may develop as criminal offences in * .... 
international law. In turn, municipal legislation may .
embody general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations and thus be a source relevant to the formation of 
criminal offences in international law.
4. The term 'International Crime' in practice and
doctrine
The term 'international crime' is seldom employed to 
reflect specifically the sui generis meaning it is given in 
this chapter. Often it is used to portray either of the 
two traditional meanings explained in Section 3(ft) supra.
However, the distinction between the two traditional 
meanings is rarely accurately drawn.
The distinction betweeen acts recognised as criminal 
offences under international law and acts having a foreign 
element but only recognised as criminal offences under 
municipal law, is blurred when writers attempt to separate 
the two types of 'international crimes' by classifying them 
under a seemingly endless number of categories depicted by 
fanciful headings. Professor Dautricourt1 illustrates this 
experience well. He postulates three principal divisions:
(i) "Crimes Against the Domestic or Municipal Public
those on whose territory the crimes had been 
committed or whose subjects had been committed 
or whose subjects had become their victims."
See History of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission and the Development of the Law of War. 1948, 
(hereafter referred to as History UNWCC^. p.179 para
(iii) (c).
Writing in A Treatise on International Criminal Lawf Ch 
Bassiouni, M. Ch., and Nanda, V.P. , (eds.), v.I, p.
637, 1975. Hereafter cited as Bassiouni, Treatise.
order”; (ii) "Crimes Against the International Public 
Order"; and (iii) "Crimes Against the Universal or World 
Public Order".
The first group is designed to address criminal 
offences (including those involving some international 
element) traditionally defined under municipal law. In the 
second group organised crime is cited as a typical example. 
But, organised crime, though it often may, does not always 
affect the public order of more than one State and 
therefore it is not necessarily a "crime against 
international public order". Under the same heading 
Dautricourt provides three further sub-divisions1 of 
criminal offences. Slavery and piracy jure gentium. 
recognised as criminal offences under international law, 
are included under these three sub-divisions.
The third of Dautricourt's principal groups: "Crimes
Against the Unviersal or World Public Order", seems to be 
home for other criminal offences recognised under 
international law including genocide, aggressive war, war 
crimes and the Nuremberg Charter concept of crimes against 
humanity. But, even this third group contains new sub­
divisions. A distinction is drawn between "Major and Minor 
Crimes Against World Public Order". Genocide and 
aggressive war are listed as the former type of crimes 
whereas war crimes and crimes against humanity are listed 
as the latter, thus begging the question: by what criteria 
are crimes against humanity considered minor and genocide 
major crimes against world order?
The purpose of such delicate sub-divisions is 
questionable. They seem arbitrary ratione materiae. 
especially where criminal offences such as genocide and the 
Nuremberg concept of crimes against humanity are so similar
These are: (i) "Crimes against Human Persons and
against the Rights of Men"; (ii) "Crimes against 
Public Morality" and (iii) "Crimes against the 
international good faith, the international trade and 
the international means of communication". Op. cit., 
p.639.
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in nature. Organised crime may well be included under the 
first of Professor Dautricourt7s three general headings, 
whereas slavery and piracy iure gentium belong to the third 
group along with other recognised criminal offences under 
international law. The scope for the second group thus 
becomes unclear. Dautricourt7s various categories and 
divisions do not clearly separate criminal offences in 
international law from other so-called 'international 
crimes7, and the headings raise issues which require 
separate attention such as - are there two or more types of 
non-municipal public order, i.e. an international and a 
universal public order? If so, are there criminal offences 
which only affect one system of public order and others 
which strike at both systems concurrently?
A similar approach to that of Professor Dautricourt 
was pursued by Mr Thiam,1 ILC Rapporteur on the Draft Code. 
In his first report, Mr Thiam submitted three separate 
meanings of the term 'international crime7. The first 
meaning refers to criminal offences under international 
law. He identifies them per natura and by their grave 
consequences. They are recognised as criminal offences in 
international law because they "assail sacred values or 
principles of civilisation - for example human rights or 
the peaceful coexistence of nations".2 The second meaning 
refers to criminal offences which are called 'international 
crimes' because, for the purposes of punishment, they have 
been raised from the national to the international level by 
virtue of an international convention. The difficulty here 
is that, if given this interpretation, the term 
'international crime' would include many practices which 
may or may not be recognised under international law as 
criminal offences. The third meaning of 'international 
crime' is that where criminal offences become the concern 
of international law because of the involvement of the
ILC Yrbk.f 1983r v.II, pt.I, pp.141-143, paras 31-35. 
ILC Yrbk.. 1983, v.II, pt.I, p.142, para 34.
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State. Again, State participation in perpetrating criminal 
offences does not necessarily identify them as ones 
proscribed under international law.1
According to Professor Bassiouni an 'international 
crime' must possess either an international or a 
transnational element. The distinction between the two 
elements is not made clear. But it seems that an 
'international crime' is said to have an international 
element when it refers to acts which are recognised as 
criminal offences under international law (delicti jure 
gentium!. An 'international crime' is said to have a 
transnational element where an act "affects the interests 
of more than one State".2
At the International Conference on Military Trials in 
London in 1945, which was responsible for drafting the 
Nuremberg Charter, Professor Gros, head of the French 
delegation, replied in the negative when asked whether 
there was any distinction between international crimes and 
criminal violations of international law.3
An interim conclusion is that the term 'international 
crime' is generally defined in terms of the traditional 
meanings explained in Section 3(^) supra. i.e. it includes cc 
acts recognised as criminal offences under national and 
international law.
Other than the traditional meanings attributed to 
'international crime', the term is also used to describe 
practices and conduct which seriously threaten the 
stability of international relations4 and are likely to
Mr Thiam, ILC Yrbk.. 1983, v.II, pt. I, p.142, 
para 34, concedes that the third meaning is a 
weak interpretation of 'international crime'.
15 Case Western (1983) 28.
See report by Mr Justice Robert Jackson to the 
International Conference on Military Trials. 
(hereafter referred to as Jackson Report), p.336, 
1945.
See Trainin, Hitlerite Responsibility under Criminal
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become criminal offences in international law.1
In re List and Others (Hostages Trial)2 the United 
States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that an 
'international crime' "is such an act universally 
recognised as criminal, which is considered a grave matter 
of international concern and for some valid reason cannot 
be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that 
would have control over it under ordinary circumstances." 
Extermination of whole classes of a State's own nationals 
on the basis of race, religion, or political beliefs was 
considered "the gravest international crime".3 The concept 
of aggressive war has been described as an 'international 
crime' "because it unjustly contravenes the interest which 
the international community has in the maintenance of order 
and tranquility, and in its own integrity.1,4 Professor
Law. 1945, pp.32-33. Elsewhere, (Jackson Report. 
p.333) Professor Trainin has stated that an act
becomes an international crime if it is done in
preparation of aggression or domination over other 
nations.
See Roling writing in International Law in the
Netherlands. Van Panhuys, H.F., (ed.), 1979, v. II,
pp.185-188. In correspondence between H.M. Attorney- 
General and H.M. Solicitor-General concerning legal 
justification for the possible use of force by the 
United Kingdom against Egypt following the Suez Canal 
crisis in 1956, the Lord Chancellor (then Viscount 
Kilmuir) opined:
"I am a great believer in the fact that 
International Law is dynamic. If I had 
not been I do not think that aggression 
would now be generally agreed to be an 
international crime. I therefore think 
that one must, in applying the doctrine 
of self-defence to international 
entities, make the logical changes."
Cited in Marsten, 37 ICLO (1988) 773 at 792.
WC Law Rep.. vol. VIII, p.54.
History UNWCCf p.175.
Keenan and Brown, op.cit., p.57. Aggressive War - An 
International Crime. 1957, is the title to a work by 
Pompe which considers the development and status of
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Pella subscribed to this diagnosis of an 'international 
crime' in a memorandum submitted 1 to the ILC when it was 
first entrusted2 with the task of preparing the Draft Code 
of Offences.
In 1950 the ILC formulated the Nuremberg Principles.
In draft form Nuremberg Principle II read as folows:
"the fact that domestic law does not punish an 
act which is an international crime does not free 
the perpetrator of such crime from responsibility 
under international law".3
During the ILC debate on this clause it was suggested4
that the term "international crime" be deleted and
substituted by; "an act which constitutes a crime under
international law". The amendment was adopted in order that
the concept of the criminal offence in international law be
described more accurately.5 Subsequently, however, in a
different context6 the ILC stipulated that an "international
crime" may result from "a serious breach of an
international obligation of essential importance":
(a) for the maintenance of international peace and 
security;
(b) for safeguarding the right of self-determination of
the concept of aggressive war in international law.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/39, 1950, reprinted in ILC Yrbk.. 
1950, v.II, p.278 at p.295 para 40. Hereafter 
referred to as Pella's Memorandum.
See UN GA Res. 177(11), 21st November, 1947.
Report on the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles 
by J. Spiropoulos, UN Doc. A/CN.4/22, in ILC Yrbk. . 
1950, v.II, p.192. Emphasis added.
See Hudson, ILC Yrbk.P 1950, v.I, p.38 para 43.
A full discussion of the implications of the terms 
"international crime" and "crime under international 
law" as used by the ILC in the formulation of the 
Nuremberg Principles is given in Chapter 3 Section 4 
below.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. ILC Yrbk.. 
1976, v.II, pt. II, p.95 et seq.
peoples;
(c) for safeguarding the human being; and,
(d) for safeguarding and preserving the human environment.1 
When the ILC renewed its interest2 in the Draft Code, 
"international crimes" were recognised as "the most serious 
international offences"3
Professor Ago,4 as Rapporteur to the ILC on State 
Responsibility, argues that only the breach of an 
international obligation arising out of a norm "accepted 
and recognised as essential by the interna^Dnal community 
of States as a whole", can be considered an 'international 
crime'. The suggestion being that an 'international crime' 
can only result from an unlawful act which violates rules 
protected by ius coaens. Therefore, 'international crime' 
is identified because it is in breach of a ius coaens rule. 
Accordingly, if, ex hvpot^si. 'international crime' is 
understood as referring to the concept of a criminal 
offence in international law, the implication is that it is 
not possible to commit under international law a criminal 
offence which does not violate peremptory norms in 
international law. If so, the issue arises whether 
criminal offences under international law must constitute 
violations of norms considered ius coaens.
Others5 have submitted that the gravity and the threat 
posed by certain criminal offences allow them to be 
addressed as 'international crimes'.
True as they all may be, these explanations of the 
term "international crime" do not justify its application 
as a term which exclusively identifies acts recognised as
*. The concept of "international crime" as adopted by the 
ILC in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility is 
discussed in Chapter 3 infra.
2. See GA Res. 36/106, 1981 and GA Res. 37/102, 1982.
3. ILC Yrbk.f 1983, v.II, pt.II, p.14 para 47.
4* ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.53 para 151.
5. See, for instance, Plawski, op. cit., p.75.
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criminal offences under international law.
In diplomatic practice the term 'international crime' 
has been employed by States in various, contexts reflecting 
various, sometimes even vague, meanings. It is difficult 
to trace a consistent pattern in its use by States as 
indicative of acts recognised under international law as 
criminal offences.
As cited earlier, the laying of mines in waters used 
for international navigation was described as an 
'international crime' by the United Kingdom in proceedings 
against Albania before the International Court.1 In the 
S.W. Africa Cases applicants Ethiopia and Liberia 
understood the term 'international crime' to refer to 
criminal offences in international law, such as piracy, 
whereby an "extraordinary power of jurisdiction" is 
conferred by the international community upon individual 
States. Each State becomes "an agent of the whole 
(community)" to act upon and suppress crimes in 
international law.2
The term 'international crime' is found in treaties 
and their travaux preparatoires. It is employed to 
identify the particularly heinous and serious nature of 
certain unlawful acts such as aggressive war, and other 
practices whose status as criminal offences under 
international law is yet to be determined. For instance, 
'mercenarism' is declared an 'international crime'. In the 
UN Third Committee's debate on a Draft Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, it is
See the Corfu Channel Case. Section 2 supra.
See ICJ Pleadings. 1966, v.9, pp 354-355. Cf. 'Crimes 
communis juris' defined by Parry (3 ILO (1950) 211) 
as 'international crimes' which upon close examination 
are actually criminal offences under national law "in 
relation to which the alleged principle of the 
territoriality of criminal jurisdiction is recognised 
not to apply".
reported1 that a convention is not necessary to establish
apartheid an 'international crime'.
br
'Internatinal crime' appears also in General Assembly 
resolutions. The policies of 'bantustanization' ,2 apartheid 
and racial oppression have been denouned as an 
'international crime'.3
In diplomatic correspondence an attack upon a 
country's heritage has also been described as "the most 
heinous of all international crimes".4
The term 'international crime' is not capable of a 
single definition. As we have seen, it may refer to 
criminal offences defined under municipal or under 
international law. It may also be used to describe 
conduct, which though serious, is neither a criminal 
offence under municipal law nor under international law. 
Professor Johnson's assesment in 1957 on "international 
crime" is still valid today: " in my view the expression is 
scarcely appropriate for the present stage of international 
law".5
The question whether 'international crime' represents a 
defined juridical concept or whether it is used as a term 
of art may not always be answered by reason of the context 
within which it is used. It is an ambiguous term,6 and its
Mr Wiggins (USA), UN Doc.A/C3 ./SR. 2003, p. 140 para. 
12.
G.A.Res.: 36/172(A), 1981; 37/69(A), 1982; and,
38/39(A), 1983.
GA Res. 3103, 1973.
Reply of Poland concerning the Draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance, 1923, reproduced in Ferencz, Defining 
International Aggression/The Search for World Peace, 
1975, v.l, p.108. Hereafter cited as Ferencz, 
Aggression.
43 Grotius Trans■ p.69. Prof. Johnson conceeded that 
the term "international crime" may be suitable if and 
when an international criminal court is established.
See Oehler, 52 RIDP (1981) 411-412.
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use, particularly to denote criminal offences under 
international law, should certainly be avoided.
5. The Problem of Designation
In addition to the difficulties generated by the term 
"international crime", problems of terminology persist 
because publicists have used one term to designate the 
concept of criminal offence in international law whereas 
other writers have employed the same term to refer either 
to practices which do not constitute criminal offences in 
international law or to refer to criminal offences under 
national law. The contributions of various writers are 
discussed below under the following sub-headings.
(a) International Infraction
The phrase "infraction internationale" is employed by
some Continental lawyers to refer to practices which are
considered to be criminal offences under international law.1
But it may also be understood to refer to criminal offences
under domestic law containing some foreign element, such as
murder committed by a national of State A in the territory
of State B .3
The term "infraction internationale" is present in the 
writings of Professor S. Glaser, one of the more prolific 
Continental writers on international criminal law. The 
term is said to refer to criminal offences as well as civil 
wrongs.3 However, Glaser's own understanding of the term is
See Plawski, op.cit., p.72; Lombois, Droit Penal 
International. 1979, p.33 para 32.
Levasseur and Decocq writing in Repertoire de Droit 
International. Francescakis, Ph., (ed.), 1969 v.II, 
p.183.
See RDPCrim. (1947-1948) 766, and ibid., (1949) 811.
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that which refers to criminal offences in international 
law.1
In the English language the term "infraction of the 
laws of nations" has been used in respect of practices 
which are considered criminal offences. In Respublica v De 
Lonachamps.2 (1784) Chief Justice McKean of Pennsylvania 
described an attack upon the person of an Ambassador as a 
"crime against the whole world and an infraction of the law 
of nations".3 In the Antelope4 smuggling was said to be a 
practice which begins in perjury, may end in murder, and 
possibly constitutes an offence cognizable by the law of 
nations, i.e. an infraction of that law. Article 6 of the 
1926 Slavery Convention obliges High Contracting Parties to 
make provision for the punishment of "infractions" of laws 
which prohibit slavery and slave-trading.
(b) "Delit International"
The traditional meaning of the phrase "delit 
international" is the breach of a rule of international law 
which results in international responsibility.5 It is not 
generally employed to refer to the concept of criminal 
offence in international law. However, in his exposition 
of the concept of international criminality in 1925 
Professor Saldana6 offers no less than six separate types of 
"delit international", and almost all refer to criminal 
offences. They are reproduced succinctly below.
(i) Delits Juris Gentium These are so-called "private
1. See Introduction a 17 Etude du Droit International 
Penal, 1954, p.11 and Droit International Penal. v.I, 
p.49, 1970.
2. Dallas 1 in 1 US Sup.Ct.Rep.(1784).
3. Ibid., para 116.
*. 23 US Sup.Ct.Rep. 98.
5. See Strupp, 47 Hague Receuil (1934) 557 and Ago, 68
Hague Receuil (1939) 422.
6. 10 Hague Receuil (1925) 227.
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international law” crimes committed by nationals of 
different States. They may also include "delits de droit 
des gens”, i.e. crimes defined under public international 
law, which may, therefore, be termed "public international 
law” crimes.1
(ii) Crimes Contre Le Droit des Gens Universal. These 
refer to acts which cause harm or threaten the security of 
States.
(iii) Delit de Droit International (interetatique): an act 
or omission by a State to the detriment of another State in 
breach of international law. Criminal offences are strictly 
speaking not included in this head.
(iv) Delit Contre le Droit International or Delits Contre 
le Droit des Gens (antinationaux): acts recognised under 
international law as criminal offences such as piracy. 
Other writers2 also referred to crimes in international law 
such as the crimes laid down in the Nuremberg Charter as 
"delits de droit des gens”.
(v) Delits Interessant le Droit International 
(intemationaux): acts which are criminal offences under 
national law but may be of interest to international law by 
reason of the international rule violated or by reason of 
the capacity of the offender at the time of the commission. 
An example would be a crime committed by or to the 
detriment of an internationally protected person.
(vi) Delits d'apres le Droit International 
(extranationaux): This group covers acts which are criminal 
offences under national law but unlike in paragraph (v) 
above where the capacity of the offender or the rule 
violated are the determining criteria, violation of "humane 
interests" is the determining factor. Piracy, damage to
The term "international law crime" appears in the law 
report of In re List and Others. It is employed 
specifically to refer to practices recognised as 
criminal offences in international law. See WC Law 
Rep.f vol.VIII, pp.51-52.
Donnedieu de Vabres, 28 RDI Sc.Dip.Pol. (1950) 159.
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submarine cables and acts against aerial traffic are cited 
as examples. Saldana considers these to be largely "private 
international law crimes". Certainly this group overlaps 
with "delits juris gentium" in group (i) above as well as 
groups (iv) and (v).
Valid as the contribution of these several terms may 
be to a study on international criminal justice, it is safe 
to conclude that Saldana has succeeded in revealing that 
the phrase "delit international" hardly begins to identify 
the concept of criminal offence in international law.
(c^ "Offences Against The Law Of Nations" and other Labels 
The term "offences against the law of nations" 
appears in Article 1 Section 8 Clause 10 of the United 
States Constitution. Writers1 have applied the term to refer 
to piracy and war crimes. Professor Bassiouni2 uses the same 
term interchangeably with "delicti ius gentium" within the 
broader heading of "international crimes". Bassiouni does 
not define the concept of "international crimes" except by 
way of reference to offensive conduct declared by treaty to 
be an "international crime". His language is circular. 
The only clue provided by Bassiouni is a list of a number 
of practices which he considers to be "international 
crimes". These include: the crimes defined in the
Nuremberg Charter, traffic in narcotic drugs, slavery, the 
taking of internationally protected persons hostage and 
counterfeiting. The problem, however, is that not all of 
these practices are recognised as criminal offences in 
international law. The following questions are, therefore, 
left unanswered: does the concept of "international crime" 
include the concept of "offences against the law of 
nations"? Are the two concepts synonymous or separate? 
Furthermore, how do these terms help identify the concept
Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights. 1950, 
p.38 (5).
International Extradition and World Public Orderr 
1974, p.416.
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of criminal offence in international law? Matters are made 
worse when Bassiouni concludes by referring to all of the 
above practices as "international offences".1
Professor Dinstein2 has also drawn up a list of acts 
under the heading "international offences - delicta juris 
gentium" . The list is largely similar to that drafted by 
Bassiouni and includes piracy, genocide, the "grave 
breaches" provisions under the 1949 Geneva Conventions for 
the Protection of Victims of War, apartheid. prostitution, 
obscene publications and breaches of the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. But 
Dinstein admits that the term "international offence" is 
controversial, problematic and does not accurately identify 
the concept of criminal offence in international law.3
The term "crimes against the law of nations" appears 
in Oppenheim4 and is said to include acts committed against 
foreign States. The said acts are criminal offences under 
national law and engender international responsibility for 
the State on whose territory they are committed. They also 
include piracy jure gentium: being practices which every 
State may punish under international law regardless of the 
nationality of the offender and of the victim. It is valid 
to say that "crimes against the law of nations" as defined 
in Oppenheim would include acts recognised as criminal 
offences under national and international law.
Under the head of "crimes against the law of nations" 
one writer5 offers the following sub-divisions: (i) crimes
Op.cit., p.425.
5 Israel YHR (1975) pp.56 & 67-68.
"International Offence" is also used to refer to the 
Nuremberg concept of crimes against humanity. See 
History UNWCC. p.176. See also Schubber, 52 BYIL 
(1981) 215 with respect to the practice of hostage- 
taking.
International Law, v.l, p.339, para. 151.
Schindler, 8 Ency. PILr p.109.
punishable under internationally prescribed municipal 
criminal law. This includes crimes committed against 
foreign States and their representatives, and crimes 
defined in international treaties but punished under 
municipal law. Examples include genocide, apartheid, drug 
trafficking, and prostitution? (ii) crimes punishable under 
internationally authorised municipal criminal law. This 
covers crimes in respect of which customary international 
law permits States to exercise jurisdiction to punish the 
persons responsible regardless of nationality and of the 
locus delicti. Piracy and war crimies are the examples 
cited here; and (iii) crimes punishable under international 
law. This category comprises crimes for which there is 
direct individual responsibility under international law. 
Only war crimes are cited under this bead.
"Crimes against international laiw" are distinguished 
from "crimes under international law" by Judge Pal1. The 
latter refers to crimes defined by international law but 
punishable only under municipal law. Judge Pal referred to 
them as delicta juris gentium and cited piracy, genocide 
and slavery as the examples. The former are described as 
the real crimes in international relations, namely those 
which deteriorate, hamper and disrupt the social order 
established by international law. There is a stark and 
dangerous implication here namely, that genocide and 
slavery are not "real" criminal offences under 
international law because they are not classified as 
"crimes against international law".
Professor Brownlie2 too employs the term "crimes under 
international law" and like Judge Pal cites genocide as an 
example. But Brownlie defines these crimes as acts 
declared criminal by international law, as opposed to those 
crimes which international law r allows jStates to punish
Former member of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East. See Crimes in International 
Relations. 1955, p.l.
Principles, pp.305 & 315.
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under national law. Brownlie1 also uses the phrase 
"international crimes, including genocide". We take this to 
mean that there is a pre-defined concept of "international 
crime" and genocide is typical of that concept. But 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention confirms that genocide 
is a "crime under international law"2.
All of the above terms mentioned in this sub-section 
continue to be deployed in the writings of publicists.3 
Writers4 have employed the terms "international crime" and 
"international criminal acts" interchangeably with the 
phrases: "internationally prescribed acts" and
"international delicts". In particular Rozakis,5 commenting 
on a set of draft articles drawn up by the ILC on crimes 
committed against internationally protected persons and 
diplomats, explained that the acts proscribed under the
Principles. p.316.
This declaration meant, in part, that the rules 
included in the convention designed to prevent 
genocidal practices were inserted specifically to 
define an "international crime". This is reported by 
M. Ordonneau, French Representative on the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee established to draft the Genocide Convention 
(see UN Doc E/AC.25/SR6, p.11). But, see also, the 
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Report on the Genocide Convention (28 ILM 760 at 763). 
It interprets the term "crime under international law" 
which appears in article 1 of that convention as 
combining two elements: "internationally authorised
municipal criminal law" and "municipal criminal law 
common to civilised nations". Neither element 
endorses the meaning of the term ascribed to it by 
Brownlie. But the interpretation may endorse the 
definition provided by Judge Pal.
"Crimes against international law", "crimes under 
international law", "international crimes", "inter­
state crimes", "crimes by international law" are some 
of the phrases used by Professor Green in his various 
writings. See 3 Dal.LJ (1976-1977) 560, 29 ICLO
(1980) 567, and 11 Israel YHR (1981) at p.24.
Friedlander, 52 RIDP (1981)393 and at 15 Case Western 
(1983)13.
23 ICLO (1974) 32 at 52.
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relevant provisions are punishable by States regardless of 
the locus delicti. They are thus "international delicts - 
(delicta juris crentium  ^ and in this sense they are 
"internationalised crimes" of the kind of piracy, slavery 
and genocide.
In other contributions1 the term "international criminal 
wrongs" appears and it is used to refer to acts deemed 
punishable under international treaties. Such 
"international criminal wrongs" also appear as 
"international crimes" of which, it is suggested there are 
three possible types namely, crimes defined in the 
Nuremberg Charter including genocide; terrorism? and, such 
international practices as illegal exportation of treasures 
and drug trafficking.
Finally, the concept of criminal offence in 
international law has been referred to in the writings of 
some American lawyers by phrases such as "crimes of 
universal interest" or "universal crime".2
(d) Treaty Practice
Attacks by submarines against merchant vessels were 
considered by the drafters of the 1937 Nyon Agreement3 as 
violations of international law and "contrary to the most 
elementary dictates of humanity which would be justly 
treated as acts of piracy".
The terms "crime against humanity" and "crimes violating 
the principles of international law" are both found in the 
Apartheid Convention 4? whereas the phrase "crime under 
international law" is found in the Genocide Convention. The
Hassan, 15 Case Western (1983) 39.
See Sweeney, The International Legal System; Cases 
and Materials. 1981, pp.120-121 and Steiner and Vagts, 
Transnational Legal Problems - Materials and Texts. 
1976, p.903.
181 LNTS 137.
Article 1.
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term "international crime*1 appears in the travaux 
preparatoires of instruments relative to the proscription 
of torture as a criminal offence. The Inter-American 
Juridical Committee submitted that it described torture as 
an "international crime” in. order to give effect to the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and to 
the American Convention on Human Rights.1 The phrases: 
"international crime", "crime against humanity", "criminal 
offence under international law", "crime of international 
concern", "crime of international significance" and "crimes 
against the law of nations" all appear in various draft 
texts of the UN Convention on the Pxevention and Punishment 
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 
Including Diplomatic Agents. But neither term appears in 
the convention as adopted. The Nuremberg Charter refers to 
"crimes" for which there is individual responsibility. But 
"criminal violations of international law" appeared in one 
draft document at the London Conference on Military Trials.2
Current treaty practice refrains from refering to the 
practices sought to be proscribed by any of the labels 
discussed in this chapter.3
6. Conclusion
The sources reviewed in this chapter reveal that the 
concept of criminal offence in international law largely
See Statement of Reasons for the Draft Convention 
Defining Torture as an International Crime. 19 ILM 
(1980) 628.
See, Article 6 in Draft of Agreement and Charter, 
Reported by Drafting Subcommittee, July 11, 1945, Doc. 
No XXV, Jackson Report, p.197.
See the 1988 IMO Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, the 1989 UN Convention, Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, and the 1989 UN Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. These instruments are discussed in 
Chapters 7, 5 and 8 respectively below.
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fails to be properly identified and is poorly addressed. 
This occurs in a number of circumstances. First, the 
concept of criminal offence has received scant attention 
within the broader concept of unlawful acts in 
international law. In view of the current trend in 
international practice to proscribe certain practices as 
crimes it is necessary that future studies on the concept 
of unlawful acts in international law include the concept 
of criminal offence in their considerations. Second, the 
concept of "international crime” is ambiguous. It has too 
frequently been used far too inconsistently to be seriously 
considered as an authoritative statement for the concept of 
the criminal offence in international law.
In the main hardly any attention has been paid to the 
general principle so well enunciated by the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee: " a crime should not only be
considered in relation to the circumstances under which it 
was committed, but it should also be described with 
prescision in order to avoid connotations different from 
those anticipated".1 Criminal offences in international law 
are often classified under any of the various headings 
which have been reviewed in this chapter. But few, as 
defined, describe accurately and exclusively practices 
recognised under international law as constituting criminal 
offences. The sources also reveal that the effort to 
separate such practices from those which are not is 
conspicuously weak. Further, where this distinction has 
been drawn successfully and the concept of criminal offence 
in international law has been defined and identified by a 
specific term, often other phrases are subsequently brought 
in without explanation rendering complex matters worse. It 
is submitted that standard terminology such as "crimes" or 
"criminal offences" "in" or "under" international law are
See "Study on Political Offenses" prepared by the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee cited in its 
Statement of Reasons for the Draft Convention on 
Terrorism and Kidnapping, 9 ILM 1250 at 1254.
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most appropriate terms. They are succinct and clearly 
reveal that reference is made to practices which are 
regulated and defined by international law.
The line of demarcation between the identification, 
the designation and the definition of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law is very fine. Though 
each represents a separate aspect to the study of the 
concept they are indeed interdependent. Thus, having 
considered the problems of identification and designation, 
the question of definition of the criminal offence in 
international law is discussed in the next chapter.
57
CHAPTER 3
Defining -the Concept: of Criminal Offence
1. Introduction
Almost since inception international law has provided 
for the proscription and punishment of criminal offences. 
A specific corpus of rules in international law is 
developing and regulates a number of these practices. It 
now boasts a broad spectrum of crimes ratione loci and 
ratione materiae. and addresses, inter alia, crimes 
committed on the high seas, on board aircraft, in time of 
war and in time of peace. However, the focus of academic 
study has been, in the main, on defining specific crimes 
such as piracy, war crimes, certain violations of 
individual human rights such as torture and the taking of 
hostages; the study of each crime being prompted by 
contemporary developments in the international community. 
The concept of criminal offence in international law per se 
has not, by contrast, received the same degree of 
consideration.
Relevant sources for the definition of the concept of 
criminal offence are: the writings of learned publicists, 
a number of judicial decisions and the work of the ILC, in 
particular, its projects on the Draft Code and on State 
Responsibility. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
examine the evidence provided by these sources; to assess 
the value of their contribution to the question of defining 
the concept of criminal offence in international law and, 
to address the validity of the concept of criminal offence 
defined.
2. Doctrine
Most of the literature concerning criminal offences in 
international law does not include a definition of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law but 
concentrates on specific crimes. Some of the relevant 
contributions are referred to in the context of the various
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crimes discussed infra in Part III. The writers cited in 
this present section are few in number but it is they who 
have attempted to formulate a definition of the concept of 
the criminal offence in international law.
A characteristic common to the contributions made by 
Continental writers, that the definition of the concept of 
criminal offencers broadly worded and includes reference 
to practices that threaten order in the international 
community. Professor Glaser, whose important work may be 
cited as typical of the Continental School in this field, 
submits that the criminal offence in international law is 
an unlawful act which is so harmful and contrary to the 
interests of the international community, as protected by 
international law, that it deserves the reproach of 
criminal law1. In his writings2 Glaser explained that the 
scope for a criminal law in a national society is, in 
principle, identical to that in the international society 
namely, to protect the members of that society and their 
material, intellectual and moral development. Glaser 
distinguished between crimes under international law 
committed in time of peace and in time of war. He 
emphasised that in the former case certain practices which 
violate the concept of humanity especially identify the 
concept of criminal offence in international law. This 
observation was not repeated with regards to the latter 
case, i.e. crimes committed in time of war. This seems 
strange given that the laws of war are founded on respect 
for "considerations of humanity” and that grave violations 
thereof are recognised criminal offences in international 
law.
Professors Plawski3 and Lombois4 have submitted similar
See his works: Droit International Penal
Conventionnel. 1970, v.I., p.51, para 32 and Droit
International Penal. 1954, p.11.
See Infraction Internationale:______ Ses Elements
Constitutifs et Ses Aspects Juridicruesr 1957, p.46.
Op. cit., pp.74-75.
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definitions of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law, but with Professor Plawski's 
contribution differing significantly in emphasising the 
personal criminal responsibility of individual offenders 
under international law. Others1, as early as 1932, have 
submitted their understanding of the concept of criminal 
offence in international law by focusing on a number of 
factors. These include: the locus delicti, the status of 
the victim and the circumstances in which it is committed. 
Jointly these factors allow the threatened or victim States 
to denounce the practices as crimes jure gentium, thus 
rendering such crimes to become justiciable by 
international rather than exclusively by national 
tribunals.
It is also interesting to note that the concept of
i
"Crime International" is addressedin more recently 
published international law textbooks on the Continent. But 
this concept is defined in terms of Draft Article 19 on 
State Responsibility as drafted by the ILC.2
Lauri Hannikainen writing on ius coaens in international
law offers, however, one of the most accurate statements of ^r
the concept of criminal offence in international law:
"An 'international crime' is a grave offence against 
international law which the international community of 
States recognizes as a crime and for the committing of 
which the responsible individuals can be punished 
under international law even if the domestic law of a 
particular State does not declare it to be 
punishable".3
In Soviet writings the definition of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law has been worded in
Op.cit., para 32.
Dumas, 59 RDI Lea.Comp. (1932) 737.
See Droit International Public. Nguyen Dinh, p. 711 
para 510. The concept of "international crime" 
defined by the ILC in Draft Article 19 on State 
Responsibility is discussed infra in Section 4B.
Peremptory Norms fJus Coaens) in International Law. 
1988, p.285 para 3.2.
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ideological terms. Thus, its understanding is clouded by 
political rather than strict juridical thinking. This is 
evident in Professor Trainin's work,1 who made substantial 
contributions on the concept of criminal offence in 
international law in 1945 and in the immediate post Second 
World War period. Professor Trainin's premise is that a 
crime in international law is a punishable act or omission 
and proclaimed to be such by an alliance of States, rather 
than by the international community. "International Crime" 
is "an infringement of the connection between States and 
peoples, a connection which constitutes the basis of 
relations between nations and countries. Consequently it 
must be defined as an infringement of the foundations of 
international communion".2 This definition is in line with 
Western legal thinking, but Trainin attributed the 
complexity in the development and maintenance of 
international relations to the "capitalist system".
Professor Trainin remarked, quite properly, that the 
concept of criminal offence in international law is not 
limited to specific prcatices defined in international 
treaty law. One must also look to customary law. In 1945 
he identified aggressive war and violations of the laws of 
war as examples of criminal offences in international law 
and successfully forecast that other crimes would emerge in 
international law as the conduct of international affairs 
increases. Overall, Trainin produced a general but valid 
account of the concept of criminal offence in international 
law. However, the ideological framework within which that 
account is reproduced does detract from its validity and 
this has become more pronounced in the analysis afforded by 
more recent contributions from Soviet writers.3
A more juridically worded definition is an early
x. Op. cit., p.26.
2. Ibid., pp.32 - 33.
3. See, for instance, Mochalov and Nadezhdin, 12
Int.Affs. (1983) 43.
contribution by Professor Wright1. It echoes, in part, the 
well endorsed view that such crimes are those which are 
"committed with intent to violate a fundamental interest 
protected by international law or with knowledge that the 
act will probably violate such an interest, (but) which may 
not be adequately punished by the exercise of the normal 
criminal jurisdiction of any state". This definition is 
particular in that it introduces the question that the 
concept of criminal offence in international law 
necessitates the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds other 
than the traditional territorial principle. This 
observation is endorsed in the more recent writings of 
publicists2. The point is often made that the universality 
principle of jurisdiction is considered to be one of the 
most effective forms of exercising jurisdiction in respect 
of crimes defined under international law. But, along with 
the concept of individual criminal responsibility, a wide 
range of jurisdictional bases are usually identified as key 
juridical features of the concept of criminal offence 
rather than as a definition of that concept.
Professor Bassiouni, who in the last decade has 
contributed in no small measure through his writings to the 
development of rules concerning crimes in international 
law, has recently (1987) published a tome entitled Draft 
International Criminal Code and Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Tribunal.3 In the text of the Draft 
International Criminal Code we find evidence of his 
understanding the concept of criminal offence in 
international law but, it contains no succinct defirjfcion. 
Indeed, as we shall see presently, the evidence resurrects 
problems of terminology examined in Chapter 2 above, i.e. 
due to the interchangeable use of phrases such as
1. 41 AJIL (1947) 56-58 and also at 42 ibid., (1948) 133.
2. See Green, 29 ICLQ (1980) 567 and Kobrick, 87 Col.LR
(1987) 1520 et seq.
3. Hereafter referred to as International Criminal Code.
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"international crime", "international offence" and 
"international delict".
In a substantial explanatory introduction to 
International Criminal Code entitled "A Rationale for 
International Crimes", Prof. Bassiouni explains the method 
of inquiry employed to determine what constitutes an 
"international crime".
Although not specifically stated, it emerges from an 
overall reading of his introduction that the term 
"international crime" is used to refer to an act proscribed 
as a criminal offence under international law and not to an 
act defined as a crime under national law involving some 
foreign element. Thus, Bassiouni refers to the concept of 
a crime under international law as "international crime". 
It is perfectly legitimate to use this form of terminology 
to refer to acts defined in international law as criminal 
offences as long as this is made explicit by the writer 
concerned. But this is not the case with Bassiouni. There 
is a weakness in his approach to defining the concept of 
criminal offence in international law because, as we have 
seen in Chapter 2, an unqualified use of the term 
"international crime" may be misleading as it is capable of 
more than one meaning. It does not refer express is verbis 
to the concept of criminal offence in international law.
Bassiouni further explains that he will limit his 
inquiry on "international crimes" to treaties because they 
are, par excellence, the primary source of international 
law. However, while the importance of treaties as a source 
is undeniable, it is unacceptable to limit a study of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law to one 
source alone. Nonetheless, Bassiouni's study of treaties 
is thorough: he looks at no less than 312 international
instruments and identifies 10 penal characteristics common 
to the crimes defined therein.1
The 10 penal characteristics are the following, and
Op.cit., p.25 and at pp.28-29.
63
they are a refined version of a list of 8 characteristics 
drafted by Bassiouni in earlier contributions1:
(1) Explicit recognition of the proscribed
conduct as constituting an international 
crime, or a crime under international law, 
or a crime;t
(2) Implicit recognition of the penal nature of 
the act by establishing a duty to prohibit, 
prevent, prosecute, punish, or the like;
(3) Criminalization of the proscribed conduct;
(4) Duty or right to prosecute;
(5) Duty or right to punish the proscribed
conduct;
(6) Duty or right to extradite;
(7) Duty or right to cooperate in prosecution,
punishment (including judicial assistance in 
penal proceedings);
(8) Establishment of a criminal jurisdictional 
basis (or theory of criminal jurisdiction or 
priority in criminal jurisdiction);
(9) Reference to the establishment of an 
international criminal court or 
international tribunal with penal 
characteristics (or prerogatives);
(10) Elimination of the defense of superior 
orders."
The eight characteristics which appear in "The Penal 
Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal 
Law" at 15 Case Western (1983) 30 are:
(i) explicit or implicit declaration 
that certain conduct is a crime 
under international law;
(ii) criminalisation of specific 
conduct under national law;
(iii)provision for prosecution or 
e x t r a d i t i o n  of a l l e g e d  
perpetrator;
(iv) punishment of the person found 
guilty;
(v) co-operation through various 
modalities of judicial assistance 
in the enforcement of the 
convention;
(vi) establishment of a priority system 
in theories of jurisdiction and 
p e r h a p s  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  
applicability of universal 
jurisdiction;
(vii)reference to an international 
criminal jurisdiction;
and,
(viii) exclusion of the defence of 
superior orders.
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Bassiouni submits that the presence of any one of these
features in a convention warrants the inclusion of that
instrument in international criminal law. This, in part,
is a reiteration of a thesis advocated by Bassiouni
elsewhere.1 He explained: "a given act or conduct (is)
deemed an international crime by virtue of its inclusion in
an international convention containing one or more of the
eight penal characteristics”2 listed. Bassiouni has
admitted that the selection of these criteria is arbitrary
3. However, even if this "penal characteristic" element
were to be an acceptable standard by which to arrive at a
definition of the concept of a criminal offence in
international law, it would be necessary to assume, a
priori. that each of the penal characteristics is customary
law applicable outside the constraints of particular
international treaty law.
On the basis of the ten features listed, Bassiouni
attempts a definition of the concept of criminal offence in
international law. The formula submitted contains a
summary of the characteristics:
"An international offence4 is conduct 
internationally proscribed for which there is an 
international duty for states to criminalize the 
said conduct, prosecute or extradite and 
eventually punish the transgressor, and to 
cooperate internationally for the effective 
implementation of these purposes and duties".5
Certainly the key elements which appear in this
definition such as the obligation to proscribe conduct 
(presumably under national law) as a criminal offence and 
the aut dedere aut punire principle were taken by its 
author from the realm of conventional law. But the
15 Case Western (1983) 30.
2. Ibid., p.37.
3. International Criminal Code, p.26.
4. Emphasis added.
5. Op.cit., p.55 Para 2.A.
authority of this definition would have to be determined 
against data drawn from an examination of other sources.
Other difficulties which arise with this definition 
are generated by reason of the terminology used. The 
"Special Part” of Bassioni's Draft International Criminal 
Code includes three categories of "International Offences”: 
"International Crimes", "International Delicts" and 
"International Infractions". This division of crimes is 
meant to reflect in an international code of crimes the 
distinction traditionally made in municipal codes between 
crimes and contraventions, and in this respect the 
terminology presents little difficulty. However, the 
concepts of "international crime” and "international 
delict” which have been promoted and have gained some 
significance in international law, by the ILC in its Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, carry totally different 
overtones. Without prejudice to the nature and form of 
international responsibility intended by the drafters of 
the ILC Draft Articles, the concept of "international 
delict" contained in Draft Article 19 was certainly not 
meant to represent criminal offences of a nature less 
serious than "international crimes" as is the position in 
Prof Bassiouni's Draft International Criminal Code. The 
concept of "international delict" in Draft Article 19 is 
intended to reflect international responsibility engendered 
by non-criminal offences in international law.
Concluding Note
The generally recognised definition of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law found in the 
literature provides that: an act which damages, or
threatens to damage, the fundamental interests of, and to 
disrupt public order within, the international community,
may be considered to be punishable as a crime. It is 
further submitted that such an unlawful act would involve 
the criminal reponsibility of the individual perpetrator 
and entail the application of jurisdictional principles of
criminal law that would not normally be applicable in the 
realm of municipal law.
3. Judicial Decisions
There are few judicial decisions which directly 
address the concept of criminal offence in international 
law. In part, we have already seen this in the practice of 
the International Court reviewed in the preceeding chapter. 
Fewer still are the decisions which have submitted a 
definition of the concept per se. Principally, judicial 
decisions have contributed to the identification of a 
number of features in various practices considered criminal 
offences under conventional and customary international 
law. Collectively these features are telling of the 
juridical nature of the criminal offence in international
features and relevant judicial pronouncements are 
considered in that context.
The definition of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law is inferred rather than stated in the 
majority of judgments. This is noticeable in the early 
decisions concerning crimes such as piracy, slavery, even 
attacks upon diplomats. In Respublica v De Lonachamps1 
(1784), assault upon the physical person of an ambassador 
was deemed an "infraction" of the law of nations and, in 
turn, this was held to hurt "the common safety and well­
being of nations" rendering the offender "guilty of a crime 
against the whole world."
This pronouncement reiterates the general principle 
that the concept of a crime in international law inherently 
involves the notion of harm or threat thereof to the 
international order. But, in another early judgment, The 
Antelope2 (1825), the United States Supreme Court, defines 
"a crime against all nations" as an offence which engenders
Dallas 1 Para 110, in 1 US Sup.Ct.Rep. (1784). 
Wheaton 10 in 23 US Sup.Ct.Rep.
law. The study of these
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"the duty of all (States) to seek out and punish offenders, 
as in the case of piracy". Thus begins a pattern, ratio 
decidendi. where the concept of criminal offence in 
international law is defined not in theoretical terms but 
with reference to the legal consequences engendered by it. 
This trend in judicial reasoning is also evident in post 
Second World War military trials.1
It is significant to note that in none of the 
following sources can a definition of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law be found: (i) the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters? (ii) the Indictment for the 
Major German War Criminals and for Japanese War criminals 
before the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo; and (iii) the Nuremberg and Tokyo Judgments. 
The question of defining crimes in international law was 
discussed at the London Conference on Military Trials by 
the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter. The discussions 
were devoted to the formulation of acceptable definitions 
(in juridical and political terms) of the crimes that 
emerged as "crimes against peace", "war crimes" and "crimes 
against humanity". However, a record of the deliberations 
of the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter, reveal that 
theoretical discussions of the concept of criminal offence 
in international law took place. It is reported2 that the 
view on which general agreement was reached, was that which 
defined a crime in international law as an act which cannot 
be circumscribed either ratione loci or ratione personae. 
It is justiciable regardless of the place where it is 
committed, of the nationality of the victim and of the 
offender, and, of the status of the perpetrator.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Judgments, including the 
greater part of decisions delivered by military tribunals 
in the period following cessation of hostilities in 1945, 
focus on the nature and definition of specific crimes
See WC Law Rep.. 15 vols., 1947-1949. 
Jackson Report, pp.vii - viii.
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presented for judicial determination. However, In re List
and Others1 provides an exceptional exposition of the
definition of the criminal offence in international law
formulated in a judicial decision. The two principal
elements which feature prominently in the various
definitions above, namely: (i) the question of harming the
international order, and (ii) the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, are reiterated in this
decision by the United States Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg. It held:
"An international crime is such an act 
universally recognised as criminal, which is 
considered a grave matter of international 
concern and for some valid reason cannot be left 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
that would have control over it under ordinary 
circumstances.11
The key words "for some valid reason" have attracted 
juristic comment and the following explanation has been
offered. States may not be prepared perhaps for
ideological reasons, to prosecute and punish the alleged 
offender. Therefore, the State in whose territory the 
offender is present would be able to prosecute or to 
extradite him to a State which has expressed an intention 
to do so. A "valid reason" may also be construed in terms 
of the nature of a particular crime, i.e. it constitutes 
such a breach of the rule that either by treaty or custom 
it is accepted that any State may exercise jurisdiction 
over the offender in respect of that offence2.
The decisions of the Israeli Courts in Attorney- 
General for the Government of Israel v Eichmann3 addressed 
the nature of the crimes with which Adolf Eichmann was 
charged under the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
WC Law Rep.r Vol. VIII, p.54. 
See Green, 29 ICLP p.568.
36 ILR 1.
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Law of 1950 x. The crimes defined in that law are an almost
verbatim exposition of the crimes that are defined as "war
crimes" and "crimes against humanity" under the Nuremberg
Charter, and as "genocide" under the Genocide Convention.
The District Court of Jerusalem held:
"The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not 
crimes under Israel law alone. These crimes, 
which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked 
the conscience of nations, are grave offences 
against the law of nations itself (delicta juris 
gentium^. Therefore, so far from international 
law negating or limiting the jurisdiction of 
countries with respect to such crimes,
international law is, in the absence of an 
International Court, in need of the judicial and 
legislative organs of every country to give 
effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring 
the criminals to trial. The jurisdiction to trv 
crimes under international law is universal".2
The Supreme Court of Israel reiterated the position
taken by the District Court. The Supreme Court also
pointed to individual responsibility under international
law: "the underlying principle in international law
regarding such crimes is that the individual who has
committed any of them .... must account for his conduct."3
With regards to the juridical character of the crimes under
the 1950 Law, the Supreme Court concluded:
"(T)heir harmful and murderous effects were so 
embracing and widespread as to shake the
international community to its very foundations.
The State of Israel therefore was entitled, 
pursuant to the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of 
international law and an agent for its 
enforcement, to try the appellant."4
These dicta in Eichmann constitute one of the most 
authoritative declarations of the meaning of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law. The reservation may
4 LOSI 154.
36 ILR 26 para 12. Emphasis added. 
36 ILR 291-292 para 11(b).
Op.cit., p.304 para 12(f).
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be made, however, that the Courts expressed opinions on 
crimes defined under Israeli law and not of the concept of 
criminal offence under international law. In other words, 
is it proper to apply mutatis mutandis the assessment made 
of the crimes discussed in Eichmann to the broader concept 
of criminal offence in international law? A string of 
recent judgments delivered by United States courts 
concerning crimes proscribed under international law may 
help us to address this issue.
The actions cover a broad spectrum ratione materiae 
and include the following crimes: war crimes, crimes
against humanity, torture, hostage-taking, unlawful seizure 
of aircraft and acts of terrorism in general. Some of the 
crimes came to be justiciable in United States courts by 
virtue of legislation enacted in view of international 
treaty obligations and others by virtue of Chapter 28 US 
Code Paragraph 1350 1 which permits tort actions to be 
brought, even by non United States nationals, for a 
violation of the law of nations or a breach of a treaty to 
which the United States is party.
In United States v Layton2, defendant, a United States 
national, was charged with conspiring to murder and with 
aiding and abetting in the attempted murder of an American 
diplomat attached to the US mission in the Republic of 
Guyana. Defendant sought to dismiss the charge, inter 
alia, on the ground that US courts lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over offences occurring outside US territory. 
The court found that national law permits jurisdiction to 
be exercised over persons, solely by virtue of their 
presence in US territory, who murder or attempt to murder 
internationally protected persons and diplomats. This 
provision was enacted as a result of US treaty obligations 
under the 1974 UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Hereafter referred to as 28 USC 1350. 
509 F.Supp. 212 (1981).
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Persons Including Diplomats1, which incorporates, inter 
alia, exercise of jurisdiction by States Parties on the 
basis of presence of the offender in their territory 
(universality principle). In its application of this basis 
of jurisdiction to the defendent as charged, the Court 
held2:
"This type of jurisdiction had its origins in the 
special problems and characteristics of piracy.
It is only in recent times that nations have 
begun to extend this type of jurisdiction to 
other crimes, crimes considered in the modern era 
to be as great a threat to the well-being of the 
international community as piracy was in an 
earlier time and therefore properly included 
within this type of jurisdiction”.
In Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic3 an action for damages 
was brought in the Federal District Court of Columbia by 
the heirs of victims and survivors of a terrorist attack by 
Palestinian forces on a civilian transport vehicle in 
Israel.
It was claimed, inter alia, that as a result of the 
incident the victims had been subjected to torture and acts 
of terrorism; that their attackers violated obligations 
imposed by the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection 
of Victims of War and by the 1977 Additional Protocols 
thereto, relevant treaties proscribing acts of terrorism 
and the Genocide Convention; and that these constituted 
violations of the law of nations for which there is 
tortious liability under 28 USC 1350.
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs' motion on the 
basis that they failed to show that either federal criminal 
law statutes or the international treaties cited in their 
application provided them with a private cause of action 
thus enabling the court to grant relief for the damage and 
suffering caused. The court held that it was necessary for
1. 1035 UNTS 168. Article 3.2. See further Part III 
Chapter 7.B infra.
2. 509 F.Supp.223.
3. 517 F.Supp. 542 (1981) and 726 F.2d. 774 (1984).
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the plaintiffs to show private cause of action, otherwise:
"Federal Courts would clutch power over cases, 
under the guise of the law of nations, 
undoubtedly casting effect on international 
relations and foreign policy when no country, 
freiend or foe, has consented to an American 
Court opening its door to one alleging violations 
of international legal principles.1,1
Accordingly, the District Court did not address the 
substantive issue of whether particular practices, alleged 
to have been committed during the course of the incident, 
constituted violations of the law of nations. In view of 
the criminal nature of the practices involved namely, 
torture, genocide and acts of terrorism, a judicial 
assessment of their status as particularly serious 
violations of the law of nations could well have resulted 
in a much desired contribution which furthers understanding 
of the concept of criminal offence in international law.
The Court of Appeals2 upheld the decision of the 
District Court but separate and differing reasons for the 
decision were submitted by each of the three members of 
that Court.3
The contribution made to the question of defining the 
criminal offence in international law by the Court of 
Appeal in Tel-Oren is, however,only marginally greater than 
that found in the District Court, and it is provided by 
Judge Edwards4. He acknowledged that there are certain 
unlawful acts in international law considered as criminal 
offences for which there is personal responsibility. The 
learned Judge also addressed the question whether
517 F .Su p p . at 550.
726 F .2d. 774 (1984).
The view that there is insufficient evidence in 
international law of a generally acceptable definition 
of terrorism to be considered a violation of the law 
of nations was, however, shared by all three judges. 
See, especially Judge Edwards op.cit., pp.795-796; and 
Judges Bork, pp.806-807, and Robb p.823 et seq.
Op.cit., p.781.
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international law provides personal responsibility for 
violations of the law of nations (including crimes) 
committed by persons acting in a non-public capacity. 
Following the decision in Filartiaa v Pena-Irala1. where 
defendant had committed torture when holding the Office of 
Chief of Police in Paraguay, Judge Edwards held that the 
view that there is personal responsibility in international 
law for private wrongs ”is not widely accepted doctrinally 
or practically as to represent consensus among nations”.2
Given that the acts in Tel-Oren were committed by 
Palestinian and other non-state actors, Judge Edwards 
accordingly followed preceedent and denied motion for 
Appellants.
A more explicit recognition of acts as crimes in 
international law was made by the United States District 
Court of Ohio in the matter concerning the extradition of 
Pemianiuk3. John Demjanjuk, a naturalised US citizen of 
Ukrainian origin, was alleged to have committed war crimes 
and crimes against humanity while serving at Treblinka 
Concentration Camp during the Second World War. A request 
for his extradition was submitted to the United States by 
Israel. The matter came before the District Court in Ohio. 
It held, inter alia, that Israel could properly assert 
jurisdiction on the basis of universality because these 
crimes fell under that category of unlawful acts in 
international law where the perpetrator is considered an 
enemy of mankind and in whom all nations have an interest 
in apprehending and punishing.
Finally, in United States v Yunis4. we find one of the 
most recent decisions affirming the universally punishable 
nature of crimes proscribed by international law. Yunis,
630 F.2d. 876. A fuller discussion of this decision 
is found in Part III Chapter 6.D infra.
2. Op.cit., pp.792-795 at p.793.
3. 612 F.Supp. 544 at pp.555 - 556.
4. 681 F.Supp. 896 (1988).
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a Lebanese national, unlawfully seized a non-US registered 
civilian aircraft and took the passengers hostage. Some of 
the passengers were US nationals but the offences took 
place outside US territory. The defendant, subsequently 
present in the United States, was charged with crimes 
against aircraft and with hostage-taking. The crimes are 
proscribed under relevant international conventions which 
contemplate universal jurisdiction and which are ratified 
by the United States. The court dismissed motion 
challenging exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction on the 
basis that such jurisdiction was in accordance with 
relevant municipal statutes. It held that in having 
enacted such enabling legislation, "the United States (is) 
acting on behalf of the world community to punish alleged 
offenders of crimes that threaten the very foundations of 
world order."1
4. The Work of the International Law Commission
A. The Nuremberg Principles, the 1950-1954 Draft Code of
Offences and the Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind: 1984-1991
The concept of criminal offence in international law has 
been a principal topic of consideration for the ILC since 
it adopted the Nuremberg Principles at its second session 
in 1950,2 which provide, inter alia, that a "crime under 
international law" engenders individual criminal 
responsibility for the perpetrator even when it is 
committed by a Head of State or Government; that it is 
justiciable regardless of whether or not it is considered 
a criminal offence under internal law; and that all those 
who commit such a crime have the right to a fair trial.
The key phrase "crime under international law" above 
is most relevant to the question of defining the concept in 
international law of criminal offence. In draft form the
Ibid., p.903.
ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II, p.374.
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Nuremberg Principles contained the phrase "international 
crime” later to be substituted by "crime under 
international law" because it was suggested1 that though the 
two phrases had the same meaning (and there is some 
evidence that the Rapporteur used them interchangeably in 
his drafting of the Principles2) the phrase "crime under 
international law" is more accurate to depict the concept 
of criminal offence in international law.
There is no definition of the concept of "crime under 
international law" as debated by the ILC in the context of 
the Nuremberg Principles3, but it is clear that it refers to 
conduct proscribed as criminal under international law 
which is quite distinct from criminal conduct proscribed 
under domestic law.
The wording "crime under international law" was 
retained by the ILC Rapporteur in the formulation of 
articles submitted in three reports on a Draft Code of 
Offences between 1950 and 1954.4
The ILC first adopted the Draft Code of Offences at
See Mr. Hudson, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.33 para 55 and 
at p.38 para 43.
See Commentaries to the Draft Principles ILC Yrbk..
1950, v.II, pp.191-193.
See comment by Peru in the Sixth Committee, reproduced 
in ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, p.49 para 59:
"(Nuremberg) Principle I, as formulated 
by the Commission, (is) not a
definition of an international crime 
.... What constituted a crime under
international law should have been 
specified before anything else. Crimes 
were clearly defined in national law
and the same should be true in
international law".
See First Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/25 ILC Yrbk.. 1950, 
v.II, p.253; Second Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/44, ibid.,
1951, v.II, p.43 and Third Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/85, 
ibid., 1954, v.II, p.112.
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its third session1 and the final version at its sixth
session in 1954. Though the phrase "crime under
international law" was retained there was no discussion of
the definition of the concept of criminal offence in
international law. Indeed, there was no provision for a
definition of the concept of crime against the peace and
security of mankind. But Draft Article 1 contained a
declaration to the following effect:
"Offences against the peace and security of 
mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes 
under international law, for which the 
responsible individuals shall be punished".2
This declaration attracted a number of comments from
Governments which are telling of the juridical character of
the concept of crimes against the peace and security of
mankind, and thus also of the concept of criminal offence
under international law. It was submitted by the
representative of Bolivia that it would be desirable to
emphasise that the crimes included in the Draft Code of
Offences may not be considered political crimes under
international law. The representative of Yugoslavia, in
turn, wished to reiterate that the crimes would remain
punishable as such, independently of whether they were
proscribed as crimes under municipal law.3
Accordingly, in and up to, 1954 the ILC did not
formulate a definition of the concept of crime against the
peace and security of mankind, not did it define the
broader concept of criminal offence in international law.
However, Professor Pella, in his Memorandum4 to the ILC
included a number of definitions of the concept of criminal
offence in international law. In this context, i.e. with
respect to the ILC effort to draft an international code of
See ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, p.133 at pp.134-137.
a. See ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.II, p.151.
3. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/85, 1954, p.11-12. Also in French
at ILC Yrbk., 1954, v.II, p.112.
4. UN Doc. A/CN.4/39, in ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.278.
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crimes, Pella's contribution is singular.
In the Memorandum Pella cites three separate 
definitions of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law which were drafted in some of his earlier 
writings. Of the three, two have a common standard, 
namely, an "international crime" is an act or omission 
which violates the fundamental interests of international 
order.1
This approach to defining the concept of criminal
offence in international law falls squarely within the
general pattern of definitions identified in the writings
of publicists above in Section 2. But, Prof. Pella also
submitted a third and more juridically tailored formula of
a crime in international law:
"an act or omission sanctioned by punishment 
established and enforced for and on behalf of the 
community of States".2
At any rate, the drafts produced by the ILC in the 1950s
concerning criminal offences in international law failed to
take on board a conceptual definition of the criminal
offence in international law.
In 1981 the ILC was re-instructed by General Assembly
Resolution 36/106 of that year to recommence work on the
Draft Code. The position was improved since the 1954 Draft
Code of Offences because the new ILC Rapporteur, Professor
Thiam, elected to consider the question of defining the
concept of a crime against the peace and security of
mankind.3 It is discussed here in so far as it is relevant
to the definition of the concept of criminal offence in
international law.
In the First Report submitted by Prof. Thiam, the
concept of criminal offence under international law was
identified as a concept in its own right quite separate
Op.cit., p.295 para 40 and also at p.296.
Memorandum, op.cit., p.296 n.77.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.II, pt.I, pp.66-71 paras 18-67.
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from crimes which are defined under municipal law.1 In the 
Sixth Committee2, it was suggested that "the gravity or 
heinousness or horrific nature of a particular offence” 
were to be the general criteria by which certain crimes in 
international law would be included in the proposed code. 
Thus, the principal distinguishing element of the concept 
of crimes against the peace and security of mankind was to 
be that of "extreme seriousness" and this was reiterated in 
the Rapporteur's Second Report. There it was also stated 
that "today, the concept of international crime has 
acquired a greater degree of autonomy and covers all 
offences which seriously disturb international public 
order"3. This statement follows (a) the general view
expressed with respect to the broader concept of crime 
under international law in the writings of publcists in 
Section 2 above and, (b) is in keeping with the principle 
adopted by the ILC4 that all crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind are crimes under international law. 
Thus, the ILC criterion of "extreme seriousness" was seen 
to be common to crimes under international law generally, 
and to crimes against the peace and security of mankind 
specifically.
However, the Rapporteur indicated that the work on the 
definition of the concept of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind should not be limited to the element of 
seriousness. His remarks were endorsed in the Sixth 
Committee5 and representatives suggested other criteria, 
such as the doctrine of ius coaens. by virtue of which the 
concept of crime against the peace and security of mankind 
is to be identified. During deliberations of the ILC's
See ILC Yrbk.. 1983, v.II, pt.I, p.141 para 31. 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.369, 1984, p.21 para 57.
ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.II, pt.I, p.90 para 10.
ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.II, pt.I, p.90 para 7.
UN Doc. A/CN•4/L.382, 1985 p.17 para 29.
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thirty-sixth session, most members1 stressed that the 
concept of crime against the peace and security of mankind 
needs to be defined in precise terms and that the element 
of seriousness was too vague, subjective and volatile to 
satisfy the maxim nullum crimen sine leae. A valid 
contribution to defining the concept of crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind, which is also of relevance 
to the concept of criminal offence in international law, 
was submitted by the United Kingdom member, Sir Ian 
Sinclair2. He recommended that 11 it was necessary to find 
the equivalent of the concept of hostis humani generis 
which had, in classical international law, justified the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction in relation to piracy 
under the law of nations.” This clearly reveals an 
understanding of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law as a universally punishable act.
A draft provision defining the concept of crime 
against the peace and security of mankind was included in 
a set of Draft Articles submitted in the Rapporteur's Third 
Report at the ILC's thirty-seventh session.3 The definition 
was drafted in terms almost identical to that which defines 
the concept of "international crime" in Draft Article 19 of 
the ILC's set of Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
Draft Article 19 will be discussed presently, but its 
election by the Rapporteur as a definition of the concept
ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.I, see, inter alia.: Thiam, p.5
para 5; Calero-Rodrigues, p. 14 para 13? NI, p.15, para 
23; Al-Qaysi, p. 18 para 4? Mahiou, p. 21 para 20; 
Lacleta-Munoz, p. 25 para 22? Ogiso, p. 33 para 36? 
Jagota, p.39 para 25? and Koroma, p.42 para 18. In 
particular see McCaffrey's criticism who depicted the 
"serious crimes" factor as sloganistic (p.17 para 37). 
McCaffrey submitted seven additional criteria 
necessary for the determination of crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind (pp.46-47 paras 3-11). 
But these too met with criticism from other members of 
the Commission. See Balanda, p.48 para 22.
Ibid., p.29 para 3.
See Draft Article 3 in UN Doc. A/CN.4/387, 1985, ILC 
Yrbk.. 1985, v.II, pt.I, p.81.
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of crime against the peace and security of mankind received
little support by the ILC membership1 and there was much
division of opinion in the Sixth Committee's2 consideration
of that provision.
Accordingly, the matter of definition was re-drafted
and reappeared as article 1 in the Rapporteur's Fourth
Report.3 The previous draft provision was deleted in toto
and has now been
replaced by the following:
"Article 1 Definition"
"the crimes [under international4] law defined in 
this draft Code constitute crimes5 against peace 
and security of mankind".6
The ILC did not consider this provision properly at the 
thirty-eight session. Only a handful of the membership
See, ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.I, inter alia: Calero-
Rodriguez, p.16 para 29; Lacleta-Munoz, p.28 para 44? 
Razafindralambo, p.44 para 34; Njenga, p.48 para 3-4? 
McCaffrey, p.53 para 40-41? Yankov, p.56 paras 8-10? 
Diaz-Gonzalez, p.54 para 24-25? and Tomuschat, p.71 
para 11. Some members offered their own proposals for 
defining the concept of crime against the peace and 
security of mankind, see, ibid., Malek, p.18 paras 47- 
48, Sir Ian Sinclair, p.23 paras 13-15 and Uschakov, 
p.28 para 44.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, p.29 paras 131-144.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.53.
This wording has been placed in parenthesis because 
the ILC is yet to take a decision as to whether to 
adopt them or not. See ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.II, pt.II, 
p. 13 para 5. See also GAOR, Supp. No 10, (A/45/10)
p. 55.
The term "offences" first appeared when this draft 
provision was formulated by the Rapporteur in his 
fourth report.
This is the text as provisionally adopted by the ILC. 
It has not altered substantially since it was first 
drafted. See ILC Report to the General Assembly on 
its work at its forty-second session (1990), GAOR, 
Supp. No 10, (A/45/10) p.55.
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offered comments on the new "definitional” draft article.1 
It was decided to defer the matter to the next session.2
The majority view on article 1 at the ILC's thirty- 
ninth session preferred to see the element of "seriousness" 
specifically included in the wording.3 Some members4 would 
have endorsed an "open-ended" definition, preferably 
followed by an enumeration of the offences including a 
phrase to the effect that new offences may be included by 
virtue of general rules recognised by the international 
community to be of a peremptory nature. But, it is 
imperative to affirm that such formulae for definition 
violate the maxim nullum crime sine leae. Typical of these 
definitions is a proposal by one member to have the concept 
of crimes against the peace and security of mankind defined 
by a formula having the following concluding phrase: ".... 
as well as any other such crime as may be adopted by the 
General Assembly from time to time."5
However, the difficulties with draft article 1 cited 
above arise at a more fundamental level than concern for 
specificity in the wording of definitions in international 
law. The question is that this provision is not a 
definition but a statement concerning crimes against the
See, ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.I: Calero-Rodrigues, p.154, 
para 46? Sucharitkul, p. 158, para 12 and Barboza, 
p.163, para 65 who all felt that article 1 was a far 
better effort than either of the two alternatives of 
the article as previously drafted. Sixth Committee 
views were very similar, see UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 
1987, p.114 para 586.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.II, pt.II, p.54 para 185.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1987, v.I: Koroma, p. 19 para 43;
Graefrath, p. 20 para 5? Jacovides, p. 21 para 13; 
Hayes, p.23 para 29; Njenga, p.24 para 40; and Yankov, 
p.26 para 65.
Ibid., Tomuschat, p.8 para 5; Mahiou, p.24 para 25; 
and especially Bennouna, p.12 para 37 and 38.
See Prince Ajibola, ibid., p.36 para 2.
peace and security of mankind.1 The issue was discussed in
the ILC's Drafting Committee and its Chairman
(Razafindalambo)2 explained that the meaning of the term
"defined" in article 1 is "intended" or "determined". In
addition, the question of sepcifically including the
criterion of "seriousness" in article 1 re-surfaced in the
Drafting Committee and proposals to take this element into
account resulted in the following wording being submitted
for consideration:
"Crimes against the peace and security of mankind 
are the acts which jeopardize the most vital 
interests and the very existence of mankind, 
violate the fundamental principles of 
international law, and threaten civilization and 
the basic human right to life."3
The distinction between the previous format, i.e. 
defining the concept of crime against the peace and 
security of mankind on the basis of Draft Article 19 on 
State Responsibility and the present draft article 1 is 
evident. The relevance of the current formulation to the 
general concept of criminal offence in international law is 
significant because, although the latest statement is not 
a definition it is an improvement * it suggests that 
whichever crimes are included under the Draft Code they are 
not only crimes against the. peace and security of mankind 
but first and foremost criminal offences under 
international law. The words in parenthesis: "under
international law" are responsible for this interpretation. 
Their inclusion would be consistent with the position under 
the Nuremberg Principles, the 1954 Draft Code of Offences 
and the Genocide Convention. The ILC's majority view 
endorses this understanding.4
*. See Calero Rodrigues, ibid., p. 15, para 3 and Shi, 
p.32 para 32.
2. Ibid., p.227 para 15.
3. Razafindralambo, ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.I, p.227 para 16.
Also see, ibid., Jacovides, p.228 para 31.
4. ILC Yrbk., 1987, v.I, pp.227-232.
Again, Sixth Committee views on the definitional article 
were divided1: some favoured an enumerative type of
definition whereas others insisted on having a conceptual 
definition of the concept of crimes against the peace and 
security of mankind. The inherent problem in the first 
option, however, is the question of legality. This is 
evident orima facie. But the second type of definition 
generated comments relevant beyond the concept of a crime 
against the peace and security of mankind to the concept of 
criminal offence in international law. Thus, those who 
expressed support for a conceptual definition identified 
the following elements: (a) seriousness of the crime, (b) 
its massive and systematic nature, (c) acts which threaten 
survival of mankind including certain violations of human 
rights such as the right to life (for example, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, apartheid. torture) and (d) 
violations of the fundamental principles of international 
law (ius coaens^.
These elements have not been adopted, despite Sixth 
Committee recommendations, as criteria in draft article 1 
of the Draft Code. However, their identification, is 
evidence of a consensus, which emerges clearly in the 
sources reviewed so far in this chapter, on certain indicia 
which do not define but characterise the concept of 
criminal offence in international law.
Should draft article 1 be included in the Draft Code 
as provisionally adopted by the ILC then the contribution 
of that pfco the definition of the criminal offence in 
international law would take the following form. The 
question would arise whether the principles of criminal law 
applicable under the Draft Code to the concept of crimes 
against the peace and security of mankind are also 
applicable to the broader concept of criminal offence under 
international law which, as purported under draft article 
1, includes crimes against the peace and security of
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p. 12 para 25 - p. 14 
para 29.
mankind.
In addition to article 1, the general principles 
provisionally adopted so far by the ILC include: (i) the 
personal responsibility of the individual offender for 
these crimes under international law; (ii) the aut dedere 
aut punire principle? (ii>) non-applicability of the 
principle of statutory limitation? (iv) the protection of 
judicial guarantees for individuals charged with crimes 
under the code; (v) non bis in idem rule? (vi) the 
principles: nullum crimen sine leae and nulla poena sine 
lege; (vii) responsibility of superiors? and (viii) the 
official position of the offender is not a ground which 
excuses responsibility.1
If these general principles are applicable to all 
crimes proscribed under international law and have not been 
selected from general principles of criminal law by the ILC 
drafters solely for the purposes of the Draft Code, then 
they are telling of the nature of crimes in international 
law, but they do not, as such, provide a definition of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law. The 
following chapter contains a systematic examination of a 
number of criminal offences in international law in order 
to determine whether the applicability of certain legal 
principles appear as juridical features of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law. In its turn, that 
exercise will go some way in determining whether the 
principles that are to be incorporated in the Draft Code 
are merely de lege feranda or whether their selection by 
the ILC is, in part, an exercise in the codification of 
customary rules applicable to crimes in international law. 
B Draft Articles on State Responsibility
The principle of responsibility in international law is 
generally understood as liability incurred by a State for
See GAOR, Supp No 10, (A/45/10) pp.55-58. See also
draft articles 6-13 inclusive adopted by the ILC 
Drafting Committee at its forty-third session (1991). 
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459, 1991.
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a wrongful act committed in breach of international
obligations. Traditionally the responsibility incurred is
of a civil nature. However, Professor Garcia-Amador, the
first Rapporteur since the ILC was requested by General
Assembly Resolution 799 (VIII)1 to undertake the
codification of the principles of State responsibility,
argued that codification of the concept should not be
limited to civil responsibility:
"Contemporary international law .... considers 
that the notion of responsibility covers not only 
the duty to make reparation for damage or injury, 
but also the other possible legal consequences of 
the breach of non-performance of certain 
international obligations? the obligations in 
question are those the breach of which is 
punishable.1,2
Thus, Prof. Garcia-Amador clarified the position
namely, that international responsibility may be civil
and/or criminal depending on the character of the
international obligation breached.3 This thesis was based
on the principle that "since the Second World War, the idea
of international criminal responsibility has become so well
defined and so widely acknowledged that it must be admitted
as one of the consequences of the breach or non-observance
of certain international obligations".4 In support of this
position Garcia-Amador submitted that certain violations of
fundamental human rights are so serious in nature as to
have come to be considered as crimes against humanity? and
that as early as 1948 the UN Secretary-General in a
Memorandum on the Surve^y of International Law in Relation
to the Work of Codification of the International Law
Commission recommended that the ILC
"must take into account the problems which have 
arisen in connection with recent developments
Adopted on the 7th December 1953.
ILC Yrbk.. 1956, v.II, p.180 para 35.
ILC Yrbk.. 1956, v.II, p.183 para 52.
ILC Yrbk.. 1956, v.II, p.175 para 4.
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such as the question of the criminal 
responsibility of States as well as that of 
individuals acting on behalf of the State."1
Accordingly, since the beginning of its consideration
of the topic, the ILC membership was not unappreciative of
the distinction between unlawful acts in international law
which give rise to civil and criminal responsibility. But
it was felt that a codification of the rules of
international law governing State responsibility should be
restricted to its traditional understanding i.e. State
"civil" and not "criminal" responsibility.2 However,
Professor Ago (later to succeed Garcia-Amador as Rapporteur
on State Responsibility3 and who in 1976 advanced the theory
that international responsibility varied in form according
to the nature of the international obligation breached)
endorsed, as early as 1957, an inquiry by the Commission
into whether an unlawful act in international law produced
legal consequences for the responsible State other than the
duty to make reparation, such as whether a State may be the
addressee of reprisals by a wronged State.4
The relevance of Prof. Ago's contributions to the
definition of the concept of criminal offence in
international law within the context of State
Responsibility is discussed presently. However, the issue
here is that in the initial period (1956-1961) of the ILC's
discussion of the topic of State Responsibility,
notwithstanding a recognition in the ILC that civil wrongs
and criminal offences are both unlawful acts in
international law which may give rise to different forms
and degrees of international responsibility, there appears
no definition or discussion of the concept of criminal
Ibid., p.175 para 4.
Generally see ILC Yrbk.. 1956, v.I Meetings 370-373.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1963, v.I, Meeting 686, p.86 para 76.
See Ago, ILC Yrbk. . v.I, 1957, at Meetings 413 and 
415.
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offence in international law.
In the Fifth Report on State Responsibility1 presented 
by Prof. Ago the following issue was submitted for 
consideration: whether it is possible to distinguish
between different types of unlawful acts in international 
law on the basis of the content of the international 
obligation breached.2 The Rapporteur examined judicial 
decisions, State practice and doctrine in order to 
determine this matter and found the following. Especially 
since the end of the Second World War, which represents an 
era in history notorious for systematic and mass violations 
of human rights on an unprecedented scale, and in view of 
the difficulties experienced by the movement for 
decolonialisation over the past three decades, there are 
present in international law rules which appear as evidence 
of the conviction that certain types of unlawful acts 
engender a more serious regime of responsibility necessary 
to remedy the harm generated by these same acts. The 
pertinent rules identified by Ago are:
(i) peremptory rules of international law (ius coqens):
(ii) the principle that individuals are personally 
responsible in international law for the commission of 
certain acts even if at time of commission the offender 
acted on behalf of the State; and (iii) rules defined in 
the UN Charter for the determination of legal consequences 
flowing from, the exercise of unlawful use of force, 
threats to and breaches of the peace, and, acts of 
aggression.
Prof. Ago's analysis of these three classes of rules 
is considered with a view to determine their relevance to 
the question of defining the concept of criminal offence in 
international law.
(i) & (ii). Prof. Ago identified a class of acts
UN Doc. A/CN.4/291, 1976, see ILC Yrbk. . 1976,
v.II, pt.I, p.3.
Ibid., p.24 para 72.
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prohibited under international law known as "crimes under 
international law". Two features are submitted as typical 
of this class: (a) the individual perpetrators are
personally responsible for the crimes committed regardless 
of whether they acted in a public or private capacity and
(b) these crimes are justiciable by the tribunals of States 
other than that of the nationality of the offender. Prof. 
Ago also submitted that there are rules of international 
law which deny perpetrators of "crimes under international 
law" territorial asylum, the principle of the political 
offence exception to extradition and that of statutory 
limitation.1
(iii). Ago also focused on the regime existing under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter2. On the basis of relevant 
international declarations, General Assembly resolutions, 
international conventions, and statements by government 
representatives in UN bodies, the Rapporteur proceeded to 
show how the concept of aggression and practices such as 
apartheid, genocide and colonial domination, though not 
being strictly speaking the traditional practices that 
would trigger mechanisms operative under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, are considered to be among the most serious 
internationally wrongful acts. In his examination of these 
sources of evidence, the Rapporteur submitted that UN 
practice frequently refers to "systematic", "constant" or 
"persistent" practices involving "massive", "gross" or 
"flagrant" violations of rights or freedoms. Thus the ILC 
reported3:
"this, then, is the kind of offence which the 
General Assembly appears to distinguish from 
other, less serious, possible violations of 
obligations existing in the same sphere, and this 
is the kind of breach which is viewed as an 
'international crime'".
See ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.I, p.32 para 100.
2. See ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.I, pp.33-40 paras 102-
119.
ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.110 para 34.
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Finally, Ago examined writings of publicists in three 
separate periods: (a) from the mid-19th century to the
First World War; (b) the period between the two World Wars, 
and (c) from the end of the Second World War to present 
times1. It was revealed that since the isolated views of 
progressive thinkers such as Bluntschili, the notion that 
the nature of unlawful acts in international law is 
determined by the content of the international obligation 
breached, gained increasing support among publicists.
The considerations relevant to the definition of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law as 
identified by Ago may be stated succinctly as follows:
(i) There are serious and less serious internationally 
wrongful acts in international law.
(ii) Internationally wrongful acts of a serious character 
are deemed crimes in international law.
(iii) There is a class of acts in international law 
considered as criminal offences which entail personal 
responsibility and broad jurisdictional reach.
(iv) Criminal offences in international law generally 
violate preremptory norms of international law.
(v) Certain practices such as, aggression, racial 
discrimination, colonial domination, apartheid and 
genocide, which have been referred to or designated as 
"crimes”, "crimes against humanity" or "criminal 
policies", and may constitute a threat to or a breach 
of peace and international security, are 
internationally wrongful acts of a serious character.
(vi) They thus engender a specific regime of international 
responsibility other than that operative under 
traditional international law.
All of these elements can be seen directly or 
indirectly, in Ago's first attempt at defining
ILC Yrbk. f 1976, v.II, pt.I, p.40 para 120 - p.52 para 
145.
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"international crime". Draft Article 18 1 read as
"1. The breach by a State of an existing 
international obligation incumbent upon it is an 
internationally wrongful act, regardless of the 
content of the obligation breached.
2. The breach by a State of an international 
obligation established for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security, and 
in particular the breach by a State of the 
prohibition of any resort to the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, is an 
"international crime".
3. The serious breach by a State of an 
international obligation established by a norm of 
general international law accepted and recognized 
to be essential by the international community as 
a whole and having as its purpose:
(a) respect for the principle of the equal 
rights of all peoples and of their right of 
self-determination? or
(b) respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all, without distinction based on 
race, sex language or religion; or
(c) The conservation and the free enjoyment fqr 
everyone of a resource common to all mankind.fit
, ................  ” “  Juw.is also an "international crime".
4. The breach by a State of any other
international obligation is an "international 
delict."
This draft provision was discussed by the ILC at its 
twenty-eight session where it experienced substantial 
drafting amendments.2 There was general agreement on the 
basic principle namely that international responsibility 
varied according to the content of the international 
obligation breached3. Some of the observations made by 
members are telling of the meaning of the concept of
ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.I, p.54 para 155.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1976, v.I, Meetings 1371 - 1376 and 
1402 - 1403.
Ibid., Meetings 1361 - 1363.
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criminal offence in international law. Some1 argued that a
single distinction be drawn between "international delicts”
and "international crimes”, rather than as in Draft Article
18 between "international delicts" and "international
crimes" and "international crimes par excellance" in
paragraph 2 thereof. It was also suggested that the
definition of "international crime" would be worded as much
as possible on the meaning ascribed to peremptory norms in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This would
be in line with the general principle that crimes in
international law are practices which strike directly at
the fundamental interests of States recognised as such by
the international community as a whole. Mr. Rossides
remarked that the distinction between "international
delicts" and "international crimes":
".... represented an advance in the progressive 
development of the law of international 
responsibility in the vitally important field of 
the maintenance of peace and security. (The 
distinction) was not only in keeping with the 
Commission's mandate but would also bring 
international law into harmony with the present 
day international legal conscience.1,2
Some of the suggestions made by the members were taken
on board when the Drafting Committee re-drafted article 18
which now appears as Draft Article 19 and, provisionally
adopted by the ILC, reads as follows:
"1. An act of a State which constitutes a breach 
of an international obligation is an 
internationally wrongful act, regardless of the 
subject matter of the obligation breached.
2. An internationally wrongful act which results from 
the breach by a State of an international obligation 
so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that its 
breach is recognized as a crime by that community as 
a whole, constitutes an international crime.
3. Subject to paragraph 2, and on the basis of
See, ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.I: Tammes, p.64 para 24; Sir 
Francis Vallat, p.68 para 12 - p.69 para 14; and 
Uschakov, p.71, para 37 - p.73 para 5.
ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.I, p.82 para 28.
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the rules of international law in force, an 
international crime may result, inter alia, from:
(a) a serious breach of an international 
obligation of essential importance for the 
maintenance of international peace and 
security, such as that prohibiting 
aggression;
(b) a serious breach of an international 
obligation of essential importance for 
safeguarding the right of self-determination 
of peoples, such as that prohibiting the 
establishment or maintenance by force of 
colonial domination;
(c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an 
international obligation of essential importance 
for safeguarding the human being, such as those 
prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;
(d) a serious breach of an international 
obligation of essential importance for the 
safeguarding and preservation of the human 
environment, such as those prohibiting 
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of 
the seas.
4. Any internationally wrongful act which is not 
an international crime in accordance with 
paragraph 2, constitutes an international 
delict.1,1
Draft Article 19 was adopted unanimously by the 
Commission.2 It retained all the elements identified above 
in Ago's thesis on the legal consequences of international 
crimes as serious unlawful acts in breach of international 
obligations. But, certain weaknesses in the drafting are 
evident.3
Paragraph 2, which attempts a conceptual definition of 
"international crime", has been said to be in breach of the
ILC Yrbk.f 1976, v.I, p.239.
Ibid., p.253 para 55.
For a critical review of Draft Article 19 see, among 
others, Marek, 14 RBDI (1978-79) 460, Stein writing in 
International Crimes of State. Weiler, J., (ed.),
1989, at p.222; Gounelle writing in Melanges Offerts 
a Paul Reuter. Le Droit International: Unite7 et
Diversite/f 1981, p.315, and Mohr writing in United 
Nations Codification of State Responsibility. Spinedi, 
M., (ed.), 1987, p.115.
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general principle of criminal law - nullum crimen sine
lego. Professor Marek1, for instance, submits that the two
criteria contained in paragraph 2 are vague and subjective:
the first i.e., that the obligation breached is to be
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of
the international community is "qualitative”? and the
second, that the act in question must be recognised as a
criminal offence by the international community as a whole,
is "conditional". Prof. Marek points out that there are no
definite criteria by which it is possible to determine the
"fundamental interests" of the international community and
the concept of "international community" itself is
questionable. Furthermore, the "inter alia" qualification
in paragraph 3, which purports to reflect the substantive
part of a Penal Code, is severely criticised by Marek:
"The general extensibility announced at the
outset by the %inter alia/ clause is thus made
operative in every particular case. There is no 
limit to further criminalization and advance 
knowledge of what may or may not be recognised as 
criminal is withheld from the future 'accused' 
State."2
Marek also finds that there is great uncertainty with 
regards to the status as crimes in international law of 
some of the practices cited in paragraph 3 namely, 
aggression, maintenance by force of colonial domination, 
and pollution of the seas.3
In the light of these observations the value of the 
contribution of Draft Article 19 to the definition of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law is 
considerably diminished. Even if a solution to the 
difficulties identified above were to be found, the 
following issue would still need to be addressed: a joint
Op.cit., p.472.
Op.cit., pp.474-475.
The status of most of the examples cited in Draft 
Article 19 (3) is considered in relevant chapters in 
Part III infra.
reading of paragraphs 2 and 3 suggests that only a breach 
of a non-derogable international obligation may constitute 
a criminal offence under international law. This criticism 
finds some support in the four sub-paragraphs of paragraph 
3 which have been selected as areas of peremptory 
regulation in international law. Each one is considered 
"essential" for the protection of specific regimes 
operative in the international community.
Mr. Reuter1, (former) ILC Member, reveals that sub- 
paragraph 3 was never intended to be a complete list of 
crimes and admits that the examples cited was a political 
choice. But, they were the most important "international 
crimes". Further, Mr. Quentin-Baxter2 indicated, quite 
clearly, that the concept of "international crime" in Draft 
Article 19 had nothing to do with the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility but with State 
responsibility. This view is reiterated by the ILC in its 
report to the General Assembly on the work of its twenty- 
eight session.3 It confirms that the special regime of 
responsibility intended by Draft Article 19 within the 
context of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility is 
separate from the remedy provided^ b^jthe principle of 
individual criminal responsibility in international law.
Draft Article 19 was only well received by some 
Governments4 and there was much division of opinion in the
*. ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.I, p.245 para 62.
2. ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.I, p.79 para 6.
3. ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.119 para 59.
4. At the time of its drafting, Draft Article 19
represented a doctrinal devide that may well not 
obtain in the next decade. Evidence of this divide 
can be seen, to some extent, by the particular States 
which then endorsed Draft Article 19. See, inter 
alia, ILC Yrbk. . 1980, v.II, pt.I: Mali, p.101 para 2; 
Byelorussia SSR, p.93 paras 3-4; Ukrainian SSR, p.103 
paras 2-3? USSR, p. 104? Yugoslavia, p. 106 para 19? 
Canada, p.94 para 5 and the Netherlands, p. 103 para 
10? ILC Yrbk.. 1981, v.II, pt.I: Bulgaria, p.72? and 
Czechoslovakia, p.73 para 7? and ILC Yrbk.. 1982,
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Sixth Committee.1 Nevertheless its wording remains capable 
of far too many interpretations to be seriously considered 
candidate for an authoritative definition of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law. It does represent, 
however, an admirable effort to define a concept which 
largely escapes definition.
5. Conclusion
The sources reviewed in the present chapter reveal
that the concept of criminal offence in international law
can only be defined by general formulae, more often than
not, incorporating subjective criteria. Common to the
various draft definitions is the general consideration that
a crime in international law is an act (or ommission) which
violates interests fundamental to the orderly conduct of
international relations. Also in municipal law, a criminal
offence is defined as
11 a wrong which affects the security or well being 
of the public generally so that the public has an 
interest in its suppression, (and) a crime is 
frequently a moral wrong in that it amounts to 
conduct which is inimical to the general moral 
sense of the community”.2
These statements are equally valid explanations of the 
ratio behind the proscription of certain acts as criminal 
offences in international law. Thus, the recognition that 
certain violations of the international law of armed 
conflict constitute criminal offences is due to the moral 
concept of “considerations of humanity”. This is true also 
of the proscription of the crime of slavery under 
conventional international law. The crimes of genocide, 
torture and hostage-taking (these especially when committed 
in time of peace), unlawful acts against the safety of 
civil aviation and 'mercenarism', are all illustrations of
v.II, pt.I: Spain, p.17. For further State Comment 
see Spinedi, op.cit., pp.78-79 para 8.
\ See, UN Doc. A/31/370, 1976, p.44 et seq.
2. Halsbury's Laws of England. 4th ed., v.II, para 1.
the response of the international community to practices 
which place in manifest jeopardy its security and well­
being. But, is it enough to state that the concept of 
criminal offence in international law is an act which 
ruptures international order?
We have seen in doctrine and judicial practice as well 
as in the ILC and Sixth Committee debates on the Draft Code 
that the concept of criminal offence in international law 
is often defined by reference to its legal consequences 
namely, that it gives rise, inter alia, to individual 
responsibility, to the application of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and to the non-applicability of specific 
grounds of defence that may otherwise be invoked by the 
accused.1 We have also seen drafts de leae fer^nda which 
have tried to define the concept by combining two principal 
elements i.e.: (i) actual threat to international interests 
and public order and (ii) legal consequences of the 
offence.
Notwithstanding these efforts, we are aware of the 
difficulties generated by a definition such as that in ILC 
Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility which qualifies 
the first element by virtue of subjective criteria, stating 
that only "serious” breaches of international obligations" 
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of 
the international community" constitute an international 
crime. It is not improper, faced with such a definition, 
to question which breach of international obligation is
A recent illustration of such a definition is provided 
by Spinedi writing in International Crimes of State, 
op.cit., p.138:
"The expression "crimes under 
international law" is generally taken 
to mean individual actions, committed 
by private individuals or State organs 
considered to be so serious that the 
States are authorized, and often even 
obliged, to judge and punish them, on 
the basis of their internal law, 
waiving the ordinary rules of 
jurisdiction, extradition, etc."
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"serious” to be able to be considered a crime and which are 
the fundamental interests of international society?
If no satisfactory answer can be provided for these 
questions save that no definition of the concept of
criminal offence can escape formulation on the basis of
subjective crieria, the need for a definition of the 
concept becomes questionable. What is the value of a
definition which is either circular or rife with subjective 
criteria or both? Alternatively, if the concept of
criminal offence in international law is defined solely by 
reference to the legal consequences which it engenders it 
would be prudent to attempt to identify those features 
which are telling of (and thus "define") the concept. This 
is the purpose of Part III.
PART III
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Introduction
Part III consists of five chapters which collectively 
classify ratione materiae a number of practices that are 
well accepted as constituting criminal offences in 
international law. A number of practices whose status as 
such, is more debatable are also included. The task here is 
to identify and examine in each of the practices classified 
the principal juridical indicia which contribute to their 
status as criminal offences in international law and thus 
give substance to the concept of criminal offence in 
international law.
The various practices are considered in the following 
groups:
(1) acts which are considered to be the classical examples 
of criminal offences in international law (Chapter 4);
(2) criminal offences and other practices which usually 
occur in armed conflict (Chapter 5);
(3) certain violations of human rights which have come to 
be considered in international law as criminal 
offences (Chapter 6);
(4) acts which have been deemed criminal offences because 
of their effect on the political and economic 
interests of the international community (Chapter 7);
and,
(5) other practices (Chapter 8).
Other classifications of crimes in international law 
have been submitted.1 They are wider in scope than the 
present one and more specific in their classification 
ratione materiae. although they have not been entirely
See the following works by Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code. 1980;
International Criminal Code. 1987; and, International
Crimes; Digest/Index of International Instruments 1815- 
1985, 1986, v.I, p.lvi (hereafter referred to as Digest).
See also Convention on International Crimes prepared by 
the Foundation for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court.
immune from critical comment.2 It is true that some of the 
crimes listed could easily be included under either one of 
two different headings. For instance, piracy jure gentium 
is placed in the first group because of its traditional 
status as the classical criminal offence in international 
law. But it may also come under the fourth group because 
the origins of its criminal proscription under the law of 
nations are not totally unconnected with the strain which 
piracy jure gentium has placed upon international trade. 
At the same time, terrorist practices committed on the 
high seas also affect the traditional concept of piracy 
jure gentium in a way as to make it a matter of 
international political concern. Similarly, the taking of 
hostages (considered in Chapter 7), which is generally 
committed for political purposes, could well be classified 
along with practices found in the third group because it 
inherently involves the violation of a number of 
fundamental freedoms.
The present scheme has been adopted because it is 
convenient for purposes of exposition.
See Blishchenko and Shdanov, 14 Can. YIL (1976) 288-290 
and Carnahan, 80 AJIL (1986) 998.
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CHAPTER 4 
Classical Crimes
A±. Piracy
Piracy jure gentium is acknowledged as a crime in 
international law in the writings of publicists,1 in 
judicial decisions2 and in international practice by 
States.3 Its juridical status as such has long been 
recognised,4 but the fact that piracy may also be defined as 
a criminal offence under municipal law has not always 
helped its status as a crime under international law. In
Generally see: Brownlie, Principles. pp.233-237;
O'Connell, International Law of the Sea. 1984, v.2, 
p.966 et seq.; E. du Pontavice & P. Cardier, La Mer et 
le Droit. 1984, v.I, p.49? Rousseau, Droit 
International Public. 1980, v.IV, p.330 para. 266? 
Report of the International Law Association (hereafter 
referred to as ILA) Committee on Piracy: Sea and Air,
I LA (19701. p.706 et seq? Goldie writing in 
International Law at a Time of Perplexity - Essays in 
honour of Shabtai Rosenne. 1989, p.225; and Green,
also at ibid., p.249.
Some of the earlier and leading cases include: US v 
PalmerP 16 US Sup.Ct.Rep.. 610, 1818? and US v Smith. 
18 US Su p .Ct.Rep.. 513, 1820. See also the Opinion of 
the Privy Council, In re Piracy Jure Gentium. 1934, 7 
Ann.Dig. (1933-34^ 213.
See replies of States to Questionnaire No. 6 in the 
League of Nations Report on Questions Which Appear 
Ripe For International Regulation, submitted by The 
Committee Of Experts For The Progressive Codification 
Of International Law, (LN Doc. C.196. M.70.1927 V). 
Hereafter cited as LN Report on Progressive 
Codification of International Law. Also refer to 
replies of governments to the ILC Questionnaire on the 
Regime of the High Seas, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.52 
et seq. Hereafter referred to as ILC Questionnaire on 
the High Seas. Furthermore, see Moore, A Digest of 
International Law. v.II, p.263, 1906? Hackworth,
Digest of International Law. 1941, v.II, p.681 and 
Whiteman, Digest of International Law. 1964, v.IV, 
pp.663-665. Hereafter cited as Digest.
See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. 
1800, vol.IV, p.68. See also ILC's Report to the GA 
on the work of its thirty-sixth session, ILC Yrbk. . 
1984, v.II, pt.II, p.17 para 65(c)(vi).
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the past there has been debate on whether piracy is really 
a crime in international law1 and some2 rejected this 
proposition on the basis that there is no "international 
agency to capture (pirates) and no international tribunal 
to punish them". They preferred to think of the practice 
in terms of "a special ground of State jurisdiction - of 
jurisdiction in every State." The prevailing view, 
however, is that piracy is a crime under customary and 
conventional international law.3
Much of the discussion concerning piracy has focused 
on the question of its definition.4 The general opinion is 
that piracy as defined by Article 15 5 of the 1958 Geneva
See Harvard Research Draft Convention on Piracy 
(hereafter referred to as Harvard Draft), 26 AJIL
(Sudd.) (1932) 756, and the discussions in the ILC on 
the preparation of a Draft Code of Offences, ILC 
Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.317 paras 48-58. Also cf. reply of 
the US Government to the ILC Questionnaire on the High 
Seas, op. cit., v.II, p.63 section VII.
See Harvard Draft, op. cit., pp.759-760. 
Acknowledgment of the view that piracy constitutes an 
exception to the exercise of territorial criminal 
jurisdiction by States and to the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas, continues to be found in 
more recent contributions, see ILC Memorandum, ILC 
Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.70; ibid., 1955, v.II, p.l para
4. Also see Lauterpacht, International Law and Human 
Rights, 1950, at pp.9 & 38, Brownlie, Principles.
p.233, and Professor Valladao, ILA (19701 p.737 
para.5.
Cf. Articles 13-19 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas and Articles 100-105 of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention. See also Draft Statute of an 
International Criminal Code submitted by the 
International Association of Penal Law (hereafter 
cited as IAPL) where piracy is listed in Article X as 
a crime in international law. Op.cit., 52 RIDP 
(1981) 144. See also Bassiouni, International
Criminal Code. Articles X, p.156.
See especially the literature cited so far. Also see, 
ILC Yrbk. . 1955, v.I, pp.38-45 and pp. 52-57, and
ibid., 1956, v.II, pp.18-19.
The relevant text reads as follows:
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Convention on the High Seas1 does not adequately cater for 
current international criminal activities and terror- 
violence on the high seas. The adoption of the unamended 
1958 definition by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention2 is 
perhaps one of its lesser achievements in the progressive 
codification of international law. Since the Santa Maria 
incident in 1961, a re-assessment of the traditional 
definition of the crime of piracy jure gentium has been 
demanded.3 The Achille Lauro affair in October 1985 
refuelled outcries for changes (long overdue) to be made to 
the definition of piracy.4 Two principal amendments have
"Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or 
any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers 
of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship 
or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or 
aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons, or 
property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship 
or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in sub- 
paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this 
article."
450 UNTS 82. Hereafter referred to as 1958 High Seas 
Convention.
UN Doc. A/Conf.62/122, October 10th, 1982. Text also 
at 21 ILM 1261. Hereafter cited as LOS Convention 
1982.
See Franck, 36 NYULR (1961) 839 and Professor A. 
Evans, ILA f!970^ pp.717-718.
See McGinley, 52 Tenn.LR (1985) 691; McCredie, 16 
Ga.JICL (1986) 435; Joyner and Francioni at 31 GYIL 
(1988) at p.230 and p.263 respectively, and Green 
writing in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 
Essavs in honour of Shabtai Rosenne. at p.271.
been suggested.1 The first is the elimination of the 
requirement that more than one vessel should be involved in 
the course of the perpetration of the crime.2 An internal 
uprising on a ship would then perhaps be able to qualify as 
piracy jure gentium. The second proposition is that acts 
committed for "public ends" rather than solely for "private 
ends" may, in certain circumstances, also be considered 
piratical. A third suggestion is that if the definition of 
piracy jure gentium under contemporary international treaty 
law were ever to be revised, the wording ought clearly to
state that piracy as defined is a crime in international
law.
The single most telling consequence of the crime of 
piracy jure gentium is that it places its perpetrators, 
irrespective of their nationality, ioso facto outside the 
protection of the law of nations and allows any State to 
capture and to try them.3 In his Dissenting Opinion in the 
Lotus Case Judge Moore stated: "in the case of what is
known as piracy by the law of nations, there has been
conceded a universal jurisdiction, under which the person 
charged with the offence may be tried and punished by any 
nation into whose jurisdiction he may come".4 Pirates are 
known as the enemies of all mankind, but as it has been 
rightly pointed out, their designation as hostis humani 
generis "is neither a definition, nor as much a description
See Constantinople, 26 Va.JIL (1986) 723 at 748-751, 
and McCredie, op.cit., p.446 para.4. Also see the 
reply of Greece in LN Report on Progressive 
Codification of International Law, p.168. Further, 
see Poland, ILC Yrbk. . 1955, v.II, p.2 para 17; and 
Czechoslovakia, in Official Records of the 1958 UN Law 
of the Sea Conference on the High Seas, v.IV, p.78 
para 33.
See, Professor Johnson, Rapporteur, I LA (,19701) p. 709 
and at p.732 et seq.
Cf. Article 19 of the 1958 High Seas Convention.
PCIJ Rep. Ser. A.. No. 10 (1927) 70. See also 
People v Lol-Lo and Saraw. US Supreme Court of 
the Phillipine Islands, 1 Ann. Dig. 165.
102
of a pirate, but a rhetorical invective to show the
odiousness of that crime."1 Historically, the principal
reason attributed to the universal repugnance of the crime
of piracy jure gentium was its inherent attack on
international trade and commerce2, but more significantly
piracy jure gentium strikes directly at the concept of the
freedom of the high seas.
"Piracy has as its field of operation 
that vast domain which is termed "the 
high seas". It constitutes a crime 
against the security of commerce on the 
high seas, where alone it can be 
committed. The same acts committed in 
territorial waters of a State do not 
come within the scope of international 
law, but fall within the competence of 
the local sovereign power.
When pirates choose as the scene of 
their acts of sea-robbery a place 
common to all men and when they attack
all nation? indiscriminately, their
practices become harmful to the 
international community of all States.
They become the enemies of the human 
race and place themselves outside the 
law of peaceful people."3
The locus delicti of the crime of piracy jure gentium - 
the high seas - is central to the character of this 
criminal offence in international law. Indeed it is one of 
the most significant contributing factors to its status as 
such. But, piracy is not a criminal offence in 
international law because it is committed on the high seas. 
It is a criminal offence in international law also because 
of its effect upon world public order, in particular it 
disrupts international navigation by rendering unsafe and
See Sundberg writing in Bassiouni, Treatise. 1972,
v.I, p.455.
See LN Report on Progressive Codification of
International Law, op. cit., p.117, and Harvard Draft
op. cit., p.757.
See LN Report on Progressive Codification of
International Law, op.cit. p.117. Emphasis added.
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thus detracting from States the freedom of the high seas.
The principal "trade-mark" of piracy as a crime in
international law is the permissibility of States to
capture and to prosecute pirates and to exercise criminal
jurisdiction on the basis of the universality principle 1.
Roumania, in its reply2 to the Questionnaire attached to the
LN Report on Progressive Codification of International Law,3
highlights in piracy jure gentium the principle of
"universality" and projects it as a standard feature of
criminal offences in international law:
"We already see here (with piracy) in embryo the 
principle which, in future social relations will 
become the practice - of penalising throughout 
the world violations of law which are common to 
every country."
Our outlook on piracy jure gentium should be in 
consonance with contemporary international life. The 
society of nations continues to experience an unprecedented 
surge in its history of movements seeking national 
identity, territorial sovereignty and political
independence. Political goals and values remain noble but 
it is a common occurrence that the need is now taken to 
justify the means by which they are fulfilled. Criminal 
practices within and against the international community 
have become more frequent, organised, sophisticated and 
indiscriminate. Accordingly the notion of piracy jure
ju'L«. -
gentium can no longer be viewed in terms of classical sea- (>u, ^
/ /-/' fan*
brigands. The motives behind current international 1 /
A
criminal practices have changed dramatically. Present-day
A *
Professor Johnson, as Rapporteur of the ILA Committee 
on Piracy: Sea and Air, reported, "the basic approach 
of the Committee has been that Piracy, whether 
committed at sea or in the air, is a crime that merits 
the application of the universal principle of 
jurisdiction". ILA (197CM . p.709.
Drafted by Prof. Pella, who later was to advise the 
ILC on the preparation of the Draft Code of Offences. 
See Memorandum, UN Doc. A/CN.4/39, in ILC Yrbk. . 1950, 
v.II, p.278.
Op.cit., p.202.
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criminal activities occuring in regimes such as that of the 
high seas address a larger State audience than in the 18th 
and 19th centuries. They seriously challenge international 
order, yet due to technical reasons do not qualify as 
piratical. Change in the meaning, scope and definition of 
piracy jure gentium, is therefore, necessary. However, the 
value of its most important feature as a criminal offence 
in international law: the exercise by any State of criminal 
jurisdiction on the universality basis, is timeless. It 
is a feature which should not be restricted to piracy jure 
gentium, as much as the "enemies of mankind" should not be 
an "exclusive club" for pirates but for all perpetrators of 
criminal offences in international law.1
B. Slavery
This practice formed part of Roman law. It was 
accepted as lawful among many early civilisations and up to 
the mid-19th century it was still legal within certain 
parts of the United States.2 It does not, therefore, have 
the same history as piracy iure gentium i.e. as being 
since time immemorial, 'delicto iure gentium7. Indeed it 
is not unreasonable to question the status of slavery as a 
criminal offence in international law. The available 
evidence: early international declarations, agreements,
national legislation, judicial practice, including the most 
recent multilateral instruments and their travaux 
preparatoiresf clearly suggests that, initially, the raison 
d'etre behind the legal proscription of slavery (at both
Constantinople, op. cit., p.727, argues that a 
contemporary definition of piracy ought not to cater 
only for "traditional pirates who were hostis humani 
generis to the commercial interests of States, but 
also (for) 'modern' pirates, the terrorists who are 
'hostis humani generis' to the humanitarian interests 
of the world community." (Emphasis added). See also 
Rovine, 3 Israel YHR (1973) 34 and Friedlander, 52
RIDP (1981) 400 n.43.
Cf. 13th Amendment to the US Constitution abolishing 
slavery in 1865.
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the national and international level) was to outlaw it i.e. 
to make it an unlawful (and a criminal) offence under the 
national laws of all States, but not to render it a crime 
under international law.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the Great Powers of 
Europe signed a declaration1 deeming slave-trading a 
practice "repugnant to the principles of humanity and 
universal morality.” They also called for its immediate 
and complete abolition in all parts of the world. In 1841 
they signed an international agreement concerning the 
suppression of slavery.2 That treaty is particularly 
significant because the Contracting Parties declared slave- 
trading to be piracy and established that rights of visit 
and search may be exercised by properly authorised warships 
against merchant vessels3 reasonably suspected of engaging 
or having been engaged in slave-trafficking.
A number of other bilateral and multilateral treaties 
continued to mushroom throughout the 19th century 
reaffirming the general principle that slavery, like piracy 
jure gentium, is repugnant to justice and humanity, and 
that an effective way towards, achieving its total 
suppression was through exercising rights of visit and 
search on suspect vessels by warships.4
Legislative action was undertaken along similar lines
Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the 
Slave-Trade. Text at 63 CTS 473.
Treaty between Austria. Great Britain. Prussia and 
Russia for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade. 
Text at 92 CTS 437.
There is nothing in the treaty text to indicate that 
ships of war may not be searched but, at any rate, 
those flying the flag of the High Contracting Parties 
are specifically excluded from the exercise of such 
rights. (Article IV).
Generally see UN Doc. E/AC.33/3, 1950; Fischer, 3 ILO 
(1950) pp.46-47 and Fischer 61 RGDIP (1957) 69 at p. 73 
para.5 (hereafter cited as Fischer, RGDIPi.
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at the national level1 and other declarations and proposals 
were made at international fora.2
The international denunciation of slavery did not 
subside at the turn of the century even though early 
treaties such as the 1904 International Agreement for the 
Suppression of the White Slave Traffic3 and the 1910 
Convention for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic"4 
refrain from expressly declaring the character of slavery 
to be criminal.5
A pattern, therefore, begins to develop where slavery 
is assimilated to the crime of piracy jure gentium. 
Initially this trend unfolds in two ways: the first is the 
quest to suppress universally (as is the case with piracy 
jure gentium  ^ practices and institutions of slavery; and 
the second is to achieve this objective through the visit 
and search of 'slave vessels7 on the high seas as if they 
were piractical. However, in early 19th century judicial
See the 1824 British Slave Trade Act and Title 18 USC 
Section 421. Later the American provision was amended 
whereby the word 'pirate7 was deleted as a description 
of the slave-trader, see Title 18 USC, Ch. 77, para. 
1585. See also Moore, op.cit., v.2, p.6 and at p.946 
re: 1862 Treaty on the Suppression of the Slave Trade 
between the United Kingdom and the United States.
See replies of governments to Letter sent by the
League of Nations Temporary Slavery Commission, 1924, 
nos: 1-5, 7, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19, 30, 37, 39, 40, 52-
55. But see especially nos: 18, 36 (para. 8 a & c
p.10), 42 (para. 52 p. 23), 42(1) & (2 para. 44 p.16 
& para. 50 p.18) where reference to piracy jure
gentium is found. See also UN Docs. E/AC.33/10 Add.l- 
99 and E/AC.33/L29.
1 LNTS 83. Text also at 195 CTS 326.
Text at 211 CTS 45.
In the 1910 convention the word 'infraction7 is used 
which does not really help in determining whether the 
parties considered slavery as a criminal offence or 
simply a legal wrong. The convention, however, 
provides for extradition proceedings and this throws 
some light on the juridical character of slavery in 
international law at the time.
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practice1 we find that the criminal character of slavery is
acknowledged in principio. but the notion that it is piracy
jure gentium. and therefore criminal under international
law, is dismissed. In the Antelope2 we find that slavery
is declared unlawful, criminal, contrary to the law of
nature but not to the law of nations. The position at that
stage in the history of the international legal status of
slavery is summed up as follows:
".... the Court will show the present state of the 
world's opinion and practice upon this subject, and 
will prove that the time is at hand, if it has not 
already arrived, when the slave-trade is not only 
forbidden by the concurrent voice of most nations, but 
is denounced and punished as a crime of the deepest 
die. This is shown by the declarations contained in 
the treaties of Paris and Ghent? by the acts and 
conferences at the Congresses of Vienna, London, and 
Aix la Chappelle; by the treaties between Great 
Britain? and by the reports of the Committees of the 
House of Commons, and the House of Representatives in 
Congress. We contend, then, that whatever was once 
the fact, this trade is now condemned by the general 
consent of nations, who have publicly and solemnly 
declared it to be unjust, inhuman and illegal. We 
insist, that absolute unanimity on this subject is 
unnecessary? that, as it was introduced, so it may be 
abolished by general concurrence. This general 
concurrence mav not authorise a Court of Justice to 
pronounce it a crime against all nations, so as to 
make it the duty of all to seek out and punish 
offenders as in the case of piracy ....
(T)he slave trade is not contrary to the natural law 
of nations because until recently, it was universally 
tolerated and encouraged. It is not contrary to the 
positive law of nations, because there is no general 
compact inhibiting it...113
The court then proceeds to examine relevant State and 
judicial practice, concluding that slavery and the slave- 
trade could not possibly qualify as crimes in international 
law simply on the basis that they were proscribed as 
criminal offences under several municipal laws and 
associated with piracy jure gentium under certain
See generally Fischer, ILO. p.30 et seq.
10 Wheaton, in 23 US Sup.Ct.Rep. (1825).
Op. cit., paras. 76-77 & 90. Emphasis added.
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international instruments. This view, expressed more than 
a century ago, is still present in recent doctrine.1
This perception of the juridical character of slavery 
persisted and is evident in the two leading instruments on 
the subject: the 1926 Slavery Convention2 and the 1956 UN 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to 
Slavery.3
The 1926 convention neither declares nor implies that 
slavery is a crime under international law. It calls for 
the co-operation of the Contracting Parties to prevent, 
suppress and punish the practice but this hardly identifies 
it as criminal? it only establishes that it is illegal. At 
the drafting stage of the convention, the United Kingdom 
delegation had submitted a proposal where slave-trading on 
the high seas would be treated like piracy iure gentium and 
Mthe public ships of the signatory States should have the 
same rights in relation to vessels and persons engaged in 
such act as over vessels and persons engaged in piracy". 
The British draft article also stipulated that the captured 
vessel and the offenders would be brought before the court 
of the flag State of the capturing vessel to be handed over 
to their own authorities. The slaves, in all cases, would 
be set free. However, opposition within the League of 
Nations Temporary Slavery Commission4 was such that, despite 
the support of the LN's Sixth Committee and a 
recommendation previously adopted by same Commission 
suggesting the assimilation of slavery to piracy 5, the
See Fischer, ILO, p.45 and Fischer, RGDIP. p.74.
60 LNTS 255.
266 UNTS 3. Hereafter cited as the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention.
LNOJ, 1924, p.909. Hereafter cited as TSC.
See Minutes of Second Session TSC, LN Doc. C426.M. 157 
(1925.VI) pp.34-35 & 52-53? LN Doc. A.19.1925 VI pp.6- 
7, and also Hackworth, Digest. v.II, Ch.8, p.669.
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British proposal was withdrawn.1
The 1926 convention marks the first concrete effort 
made by States, under the auspices of a truly international 
organisation, to proscribe slavery as a criminal offence. 
Also, Mits importance lies in the fact that for the first 
time in international law slavery and the trade in slaves 
were defined.”2 It does not, however, render them criminal 
offences in international law, either by express 
declaration or implicitly by assimilating them to piracy 
jure gentium. The overall value of the convention is that 
it partakes in the formulation of the status of slavery as 
a crime under customary law.
This development process is traceable in the 
declarations of States* before the League of Nations 
Committee of Experts on Slavery.4 In a statement5 by the 
Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society(London), the 
sale and purchase of human beings was described as a crime 
against humanity. In addition, the CES reiterated the 
necessity to study the question of assimilating slavery on 
the high seas to piracy jure gentium.4 This "assimilation 
pattern” is also present in the reports of the UN Ad Hoc
See UN Doc. E/AC.33/3, pp.23-25 paras.89-91. Also see 
Gutteridge, 6 ICLO (1957) 449 at 455-456.
Fischer, ILOf p.511.
Generally see the oroces-verbaux of the Committee of 
Experts on Slavery, 1932, Minutes of Meeting VI. 
Mexico (op. cit., p.29) cited national legislation 
which declared all slaves brought into its territory 
to be free ipso facto and any vessel caught carrying 
slaves shall be confiscated and the responsible 
persons prosecuted and punished as criminals.
This later came to be known as the Advisory Committee 
of Experts on Slavery. Hereafter cited as CES. See 
LNOJ, 1932, pp.428-484.
CES Doc.1(c) 1932, VI pp.7-8.
Minutes of IVth Meeting, First Session 5th May, 1932, 
pp.8-9.
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Committee on Slavery1 which paved the way for the 1956 
Supplementary Convention. On several occasions,
suggestions were made that if an instrument were to be 
formulated as a sequel to the 1926 instrument, the notion 
of placing slavery on equal footing with piracy jure 
gentium deserved serious consideration.2
However, objection to such proposals was made in the 
Ad Hoc Committee's debates, even though the juridical 
character of slavery as a crime in international law was 
acknowledged and some of the members strongly urged that a 
future international convention ought to reflect that 
position unreservedly.3
These recommendations were short-lived. The 1956 
Supplementary Convention does not assimilate slavery to the 
crime of piracy jure gentium. However, in so far as the 
legal character of slavery is concerned, the convention 
clearly acknowledges it and other similar practices as 
being criminally unlawful even though the criminalisation 
process takes place under municipal and not under 
international law: "the act of conveying or attempting to 
convey slaves from one country to another .... shall be a 
criminal offence under the laws of the States Parties to 
this Convention . . . .1,4 In this respect5 the 1956 treaty 
has improved and clarified the position as it existed under , k,rd
the LN Convention, but the status of slavery as a crime in 
international law remained in the balance. The travaux 
preparatoires and the debates which led to the 1956
ESC Res. 238, UN Doc. E/1553, 1949.
See UN Docs: E/AC.33/4, p. 6 para. 19(c); ibid. /9,
p.12 para. 29; ibid. /13, p.20 no.2, and Doc. 
E/AC.33/L 17, p.13 para. 32.
UN Doc. E/AC. 33 /SR27, pp. 8-10 paras. 39-52. See 
also UN Doc. E/AC.33/R3, p. 2 para 2, ibid., /R4, 
pp.2-4; ibid., /R6, p.11 and ibid., /R14, p.106.
Article 3(1). Emphasis added.
Other aspects of the 1956 Supplementary Convention are 
discussed by Gutteridge, op. cit., p.449.
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instrument reveal a conflict of opinion on this issue.
The United Kingdom delegation tried, as it had thirty 
years earlier, to equate the conveyance of slaves on the 
high seas to piracy jure gentium and to make it punishable 
as such.1 Its efforts met with as much success as they did 
in 1926.2 Some delegations felt that there was no real 
cause why slavery should be assimilated with piracy on the 
high seas.
"Piracy was held to be a danger to international 
navigation and trade and should accordingly be 
dealt with through international co-operation.
The slave trade, on the other hand, was a 
violation of the inherent right of every 
individual to freedom, but it had no 
international significance except in relation to 
the conscience of mankind."3
Others4 based their reservations on the basis that piracy
jure gentium "implied violence on the high seas and should 
therefore be suppressed by force, but similar action could 
not be taken in regard to the slave trade". Given this 
argument, protests were also launched against proposals 
whereby government ships would have the power to visit and 
search vessels suspected of slave-trading as is the 
practice with pirate ships on the high seas.
The UK Anti-Slavery Society presented a very 
interesting approach. Initially, they felt "glad that 
slave trading at sea would be declared to be an act similar 
to piracy in international law."5 They did not consider it 
appropriate, however, for 'slave trading' to be equated 
with piracy jure gentium as that practice usually occurred
See UN Doc. E/2824, p.27 paras. 97-100.
See UN Doc. E/AC.43/SR.14, p. 3 and E/Conf. 24/SR.17, 
pp.2-5.
Egypt, UN Doc. E/Conf.24/SR 7, p.2.
Portugal, UN Doc. E/Conf. 241/SR8, p.2.
UN Doc. E/AC.43/SR4, p.4. Also see, UN Doc. 
E/AC.43/Ll p.27, para. 62.
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on land and not at sea. Later/ the Society argued that 
slaves were only carried "...on the seas around Arabia, ... 
and it is not necessary to make conveying of slaves on the 
high seas throughout the world an offence similar to 
piracy.1,2
These views opposing the treatment of slavery as 
piracy jure gentium are not easily reconciled. First there 
is an assumption that the former unlike the latter is not 
a crime of international significance except in so far as 
the conscience of mankind is concerned. If this were true 
does it therefore mean that slavery is less criminal than 
piracy jure gentium? Is the violation of humanitarian 
values inherent in slavery not sufficient to render it a 
crime in international law? Are such values only 
significant in so far as they ensure that a multilateral 
instrument dealing with slavery ought not to have the 
standard treaty provision for reservations?3
Second, slavery was not thought fit to be in the same 
class of crimes as piracy jure gentium for the latter 
involved violence whereas slavery did not. Suffice it to 
describe such an approach as naive given that violence is 
not restricted to one form be it physical, moral or social.
Third, the assimilation of slavery or any similar 
practice (including 'slave raiding') to piracy iure gentium 
cannot be dismissed simply because the locus delicti of the 
offence differs. As we have seen, the qualities of piracy 
jure gentium as a crime in international law do not derive 
force solely from the fact that it is committed on the high 
seas but also from the unaffordable dangers with which it 
presents the international community. This is the real 
significance that lies behind any attempt to place slavery 
"on par" with piracy iure gentium. Acts come to be
UN Doc. E/Conf.24/NG01, 1956.
Ibid., p.2.
Article 9 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention. See 
also Peru, UN Doc. E/Conf. 24/SR 24, p.7.
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considered as crimes in international law because of their 
nature and not by virtue of the locus delicti alone. 
Unfortunately the prevailing view among the drafters of the 
1956 instrument overlooked these significant points and 
subscribed to the narrower line of approach namely, slavery 
and other related activities were affirmed as criminal 
practices which ought to be made punishable as crimes under 
national law.1 At any rate, whilst criminal proscription at 
the municipal level does not render acts crimes in 
international law it does not detract from but contributes 
to their development as such.
Thus, the general position under treaty-law up to 1956 
testifies that slavery is illegal, criminal and possibly in 
the process of developing as a crime in international law.2 
However, there remains further significant evidence to be 
weighed before a reasonable assessment of slavery and its 
qualities as a crime in international law can be made.
Reporting to the ILC on The Regime of the High Seas, 
M. Francois 3 did not advocate assimilation of slavery to
See the position taken by Monaco, UN Doc.E/AC.43/LI, 
p.32 para. 69? and see also UN Docs: E/Conf.24./SRI1, 
p.5 and E/AC43/L41, para. 3.
Gutteridge (op.cit., p.471) who, as member of the UK 
delegation, participated in the drafting of the 1956 
Supplementary Convention, only cares to admit that 
".... slavery may come to be regarded as not merely 
illegal under municipal law, but as illegal under 
international law." Emphasis added. In Oppenheim, 
International Law. v.I, p.733 para 340 it is conceeded 
that "it is difficult to say that customary 
International Law condemns two of the greatest curses 
which man has ever imposed upon his fellow-man, the 
institution of slavery and the traffic in slaves." 
Cf. Rejoinder of South Africa in the S.W. Africa 
Cases. 1966, ICJ Pleadings, v. 10, p.20.
Second Report on the Regime of the High Seas, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/42, ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, p.75. The question 
of assimilating slavery to piracy iure gentium did not 
arise in Francois's first report to the ILC, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/17, ibid., 1950, v.II, p.36, and slave-trading 
per se is dealt with in a most succinct manner, ibid., 
p.41 para 14.
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piracy iure gentium, because the slave-trade usually only 
concerns two particular States at any one time and, 
therefore, it should not be 'internationalised' giving 
powers of search and seizure to all government ships over 
'suspected' merchant vessels sailing the high seas. This 
line of thought is conditioned by the Rapporteur's personal 
view of slavery namely, that, unlike piracy iure gentium, 
it was not universally recognised as a crime.1 However the 
majority opinion within the ILC differed and felt that 
slavery ought to be treated as piracy iure gentium.3 This 
was due to the ILC's interest in the concept of the right 
of approach on the high seas;3 an interest which 
crystallised in the 'right of visit' provisions of the 1958 
High Seas Convention4 and the 1982 LOS Convention.5
To this extent, therefore, slavery came to be 
considered in the same light as piracy iure gentium.6 The 
ILC also considered a recommendation made by the UN Ad Hoc 
Committee on Slavery where slave-raiding and slave-trading 
would be declared crimes similar to piracy iure gentium, 
but in the end it opted to concentrate on obliging States 
to implement effective measures designed to punish and 
prevent the conveyance of slaves on ships flying their 
flag.
The ILC's work on the Regime of the High Seas 
proceeded concurrently with its preparation of the Draft 
Code of Offences. In the period 1950-1954, slavery, as 
contemplated under the 1926 Convention, was not among the
1» ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.I, p.350 para 79.
2. See ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.I, pp.350-354 paras 61-132;
pp.359-361 paras 73-94; and ILC Report, ibid., 1952, 
v.II, p.46 para 4.
3. ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.I, pp.353-354 paras 114-132.
4. Article 22.
5. Article 110.
6. See ILC Yrbk. . 1951, v.I, p.360 para 79. Cf.
Article 13, 1958 High Seas Convention.
list of crimes considered candidate by the ILC for the 
formulation of the Draft Code of Offences.1 However, 
'enslavement' as expressed in the Nuremberg Charter 
(Article 6c) definition of the concept of crimes against 
humanity2, appears in the Draft Code of Offences as part and 
parcel of a broader category of crime known as "inhuman 
acts".3 This is an important clue for an investigation of 
the international legal status of slavery. It shows the 
concept of slavery and its related practices, committed 
either in time of war or peace, to have been considered 
criminal under international law by the draftsmen of the 
Nuremberg Charter whose provisions are now accepted rules 
of international law. Jurists who consider slavery to be 
a crime in international law4 have found this evidence
indispensable for the presentation of their argument 
Since 1982 when the ILC returned to the consideration 
of the topic of the Draft Code, the 1956 Supplementary 
Convention was included in a list6 of acts considered to be
Some ILC members expressed doubts whether slavery, 
like piracy iure gentium, could be considered a crime 
in international law. See ILC Yrbk. . 1950, v.I, p.317 
paras 48-58. It should also be pointed out that the 
ILC had decided not to include such practices as 
piracy, slavery, traffic in dangerous drugs and damage 
to submarine cables because they did not fall within 
the scope of the Draft Code of Offences. Ibid., 1950, 
v.II, p.380 para 149.
Cf "Slave-labour" in Article 6(b) (which defines "war 
crimes") of the Nuremberg Charter.
See Article 2(11) of the 1954 Draft Code of Offences. 
ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.II, p.151.
Generally see, Whiteman, Digest. v.II, pp.866-867.
See Fischer, ILOf pp.517-518 and Trebilcock, 8 Ency. 
PIL op. cit., pp.483-484.
Slavery is also included in a Draft International 
Criminal Code prepared by the IAPL, Article VII, 52 
RIDP (1981) 134-138. See also Baussioni,
International Criminal Code, p.146.
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crimes under conventional international law1. Initially, 
the position taken by the ILC Rapporteur, had been that the 
absence of slavery from the Draft Code was explained by the 
fact that it was covered by "inhuman acts" as defined in 
the 1954 Draft Code of Offences.2 However, during the 
course of the ILC's consideration of the topic at its 
thirty-sixth session (1984) some members recommended 
inclusion of slavery, per se. in the Draft Code.3
The matter concerning slavery arose again at the ILC's 
thirty-eight session (1986) when the Rapporteur presented 
a draft article on the concept of crimes against humanity 
for consideration. Again slavery did not feature as a 
crime per se. but appeared in the form of "enslavement" as 
an "inhuman act" and recommended for consideration as part 
and parcel of the concept of crimes against humanity.4 In 
the debate on slavery, though revealing a certain division, 
opinion was for rather than against including it as a 
criminal offence in its own right.5 Accordingly, at the 
ILC's forty-first session (1989) a draft article 14 on 
crimes against humanity appears as having a sub-clause on 
slavery and all other forms of bondage including forced
See ILC Yrbk. . 1984, v.II, pt.I, p.95 para 44
No.(14).
See ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.I, p.53 para 56.
See, ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.I: Sir Ian Sinclair, p.30 para 
17; Calero Rodrigues, p.33 para 33 and Njenga, p.45 
para 42. Sixth Committee's views on slavery were 
scant. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.25 para 70.
See draft article 12 (3), ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.II, 
pt.I p.86.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1986, v.I: Balanda, p. 107 para 34;
Jacovides, p.121 para 27; Arangio-Ruiz, p.123 para 59; 
Koroma, p.135 para 84 and Rapporteur Thiam, p.179 para 
59 who admitted planning to include a separate 
provision for slavery. Contra. see Razafindralambo, 
p.129 para 28. For Sixth Committee views see UN Doc. 
A/CN.4./L.410, 1987, p.105 para 530.
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labour.1 The ILC (and the Sixth Committee) expressed 
favourable views on retaining this provision but has yet to 
study a better formulation of the provision.2 As at its 
forty-third session, the ILC's Drafting Committee adopted 
a draft provision (article 21) on systematic violations of 
human rights and has thus provided for the punishment of 
the crime of "establishing or maintaining over persons a 
status of slavery, servitude and forced labour”.3
Slavery is also included as one of the so-called 
"international crimes" in ILC Draft Article 19 (3c) on
State Responsibility.4 It is clearly stated there that an 
international crime may result from ".... a serious breach 
on a widespread scale of an international obligation of 
essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such 
as those prohibiting slavery...." In the course of the ILC 
debates on State Responsibility there was no doubt that 
slavery was considered criminal in international law.5 
Some6 stressed that the quality of slavery as a crime in 
international law derived from "the systematization of a 
policy contrary to human dignity."
Slavery also marks the threshold for the proscription 
of human rights violations as criminal offences in 
international law. Together with its related practices, it
See Rapporteur's Seventh Report to the ILC on the 
Draft Code. UN Doc. A/CN.4/419, 24th February 1989, 
p.11.
See ILC Report to the General Assembly on the work at 
its forty-first session, GAOR, Supp.No.10 (A/44/10) 
pp.158 - 160 paras 169-174. Summary Records of the 
ILC's debates at its forty-first session are not in 
print at time of writing. See also UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.443, 1990, p.33 paras 92-95.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 1991, p.6.
ILC Yrbk.f 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.75.
Ibid., v.I, pp.239-253.
Ramagasoavina, ibid., p.247 para. 5.
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is condemned and outlawed by important instruments 
concerned with the international protection of human 
rights. These include: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,1 the European Convention on Human Rights,2 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3 the 
American Convention on Human Rights4 and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights.5 The freedom from slavery 
provision also occupies a prominent place in the 'non­
derogable' clauses of some of these instruments6 and enjoys 
the force of ius cocrens in international law.7
Slavery constitutes a fine illustration of a practice 
which was once an accepted institution in the history of 
civilisation, but later came to be regarded as morally 
reprehensible; as an illegal practice? as a criminal 
offence under the municipal laws of States? a violation of 
internationally protected fundamental freedoms? and, 
indeed, a criminal offence in international law.
Article 4. UN. Doc. A/811, 1948.
Article 4(1), 1950 ETS No. 5. Hereafter referred to 
as ECHR.
Article 8, 1966, GA Res. 2200 (XXI). Hereafter cited 
as International Covenant.
Article 6. Text also at 9 ILM 673. Hereafter cited 
as AmCHR.
Article 5. Text at 21 ILM 59. Also known as the 
Banjul Charter. Hereafter cited as African Charter on 
Human Rights.
See: ECHR, Article 15(2), International Covenant,
Article 4(2), and AmCHR, Article 27(2).
See Chapter 1 supra. generally, Trebilcock, op. cit., 
p.484 and Hannikainen, op. cit., p.444 et seq.
119 
CHAPTER 5
Conflict Related Crimes and Practices 
A. Aggressive War
Until the beginning of the present century several 
international instruments and declarations accelerated the 
movement towards outlawing war.1 But, the Treaty of 
Versailles and the findings of the 1919 Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement 
of Penalties 2 are, initially, the most revealing sources in
The legal status of war during the 19th Century is 
meticulously expounded by Brownlie, Use of Force, 
pp.18-50, and is recorded by: Rifaat, International
Aggression, p. 19 et seq., and by Roberts and Guelff 
in Documents on the Laws of War. 1989, p.2. But the 
following instruments may be cited among the principal 
participants in the formation of its status at that 
time: Secret Treaty of Defensive Alliance, 1815. For
juristic comment see Pompe, Aggressive War an 
International Crime. 1953, p.47 and Brownlie, Use of 
Force. p.351 n.3. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907, texts in Scott, The Hague Conventions and 
Declarations of 1899 and 1907. 1918 (hereafter
referred to as Hague Conventions: Texts). See also 
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907. 2 
vols., 1909. The World Peace Conference of 1878 
adopted a resolution describing aggressive war 
asHbrigandage international". See Wehberg, The 
Outlawry of War. 1931, p.6. See also Treaties For The 
Advancement of Peace (also known as the Bryan Peace 
Treaties  ^concluded by the United States in 1913-1914. 
Text in Scott, Treaties for the Advancement of Peace. 
1920. For juristic comment see Brownlie, Use of 
Force. p.23 and Rifaat, op.cit., pp.30-31. In 
addition, note should be made of the following 
instruments namely, Declaration Respecting Maritime 
Law, 1856, (also known as the Declaration of Parish 
115 CTS 1 and at 1 AJIL (1907) 89? Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
Armies in the Field 1864, 129 CTS 361 and at 1 AJIL 
90? Additional Articles Relating to the Condition of 
the Wounded in War, 1868, 138 CTS 189? and the
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of War, 1874, (also known as the 
Brussels Declaration).
See Majority and Dissenting Reports of the American 
and Japanese Members at 14 AJIL (1920) 95. Hereafter 
referred to as the 1919 Commission on the Authors of
120
the formation of the concept of aggressive war and
subsequently of its character as a criminal offence in
international law. 1
The 1919 Commission on the Authors of War' was
instructed, inter aliaf to inquire and to report on the
responsibility of those persons (regardless of rank or
office) who committed offences against the laws and customs
of war and to advise on the question of establishing
tribunals empowered to hear cases concerning the
perpetration of these offences.2
The Commission identified the Central Powers - Germany
and Austria and their allies, Turkey and Bulgaria, as the
principal authors responsible for waging a "deliberate" and
premeditated war.3 They were also held responsible for
violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg.4 The
Commission further concluded that the Central Powers and
their Allies, "by barbarous or illegitimate methods
(violated) the established laws and customs of war and the
elementary laws of humanity."5 In addition, it recognised
that the sponsors of such violations were deserving of
nothing less than to be held personally liable for their
actions. Indeed, given the following extract from a letter
sent by German Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Austrian Kaiser
Franz Josef, little can be said in opposition to such a
recommendation:
"....everything must be put to fire and sword; 
men, women and children and old men must be 
slaughtered and not a tree or house be left
War.
Generally see; Gleuck, 59 HLR (1946) 396 at p.401;
History UNWCC. pp. 32-52; Brownlie, Use of Force P p.52 
et seq., and Rifaat, op.cit., 1979, p.34.
See Report, op.cit., p.95.
Ibid., p.107.
Ibid., p.112.
Ibid., p.115.
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standing. With these methods of terrorism, which 
are alone capable of affecting a people as 
degenerate as the French, the war will be over in 
two months, whereas if I admit consideration of 
humanity it will be prolonged for years 1,1
Thus, the traditional position when Heads of States or
of Governments and their "entourage” were totally immune
from civil or criminal prosecution and where the only form
of redress open to the wronged State was either the demand
for reparation or the termination of diplomatic relations,
inevitably began to alter. The 1919 Commission on the
Authors of War felt that "the conscience of mankind" would
be shocked if it was upheld that the immunity of the
Sovereign applies even when it is proven that he has
committed the "gravest outrages against the laws and
customs of war and the laws of humanity".2
The Commission recommended that individuals alleged to
have committed violations of the laws of war should be
tried by a specialised independent tribunal. It did not
feel, however, that a similar proceedure should be extended
to those whose acts provoked war. The reason was that in
this case the evidence raised complex proceedural issues
thought to be "more fit for investigation by historians and
statesmen than by a tribunal appropriate for the trial of
offenders against the laws and customs of war".3 Thus, it
implied that the act of provoking war had not yet reached
the stage where it could be considered a criminal offence.4
Notwithstanding, the Commission did suggest, however, that
penal sanctions should in future be provided for such grave
outrages against the elementary principles of international
Cited in Adams, "The American Peace Commission and the 
Punishment of Crimes Committed During the War" 39 LOR 
(1923) 245 at 248.
Report, op.cit., p.116.
Report, op.cit., pp.118-119.
See reservations of the American and Japanese members 
of the Commission, op.cit., pp.127-152.
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law.1
Be this as it may, by virtue of Article 227 of the
Treaty of Versailles the Allied and Associated Powers
proceeded to "publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern,
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against
international morality 2 and the sanctity of treaties".
This charge attracted much debate and criticism,3 largely
because of its unhappy wording.
Some of the architects of the Treaty of Versailles may
have intended to assert personal criminal liability not
only in respect of those who actually violated the laws of
war, but also for those who waged war. When introducing the
Treaty of Versailles to the House of Commons, Prime
Minister Lloyd George spoke of the War:
"There were three alternative methods of dealing 
with Germany bearing in mind her crime. What was 
that crime? Germany not merely provoked, but she 
planned the most devastating war the earth has 
ever seen. I think it is essential, if wars of 
this kind are to be prevented in future, that 
those who are personally responsible for them, 
and have taken part in plotting and planning 
them, should be held personally responsible".4
It is reported that Prime Minister Lloyd George
"wanted to establish a new precedent in international law.
He wanted to establish the principle that national leaders
might be held criminally responsible for their actions,
especially for waging a war of aggression" a. However, the
wording in Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles implies
otherwise, namely the criminalisation of international
See Report, op.cit., p.120.
Emphasis added.
See Brownlie, Use of ForceP pp. 53-54.
See, Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference. 
1920, v.III, p.83.
See Willis, Prologue To Nurembergf 1982, p.73 and 
p. 80.
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morality.1
The American members of the 1919 Commission on the 
Authors of War stressed in their reservations to the Report 
that moral offences, unlike legal offences, however 
"iniquitous and infamous" they may be, "were beyond the 
reach of judicial procedure and subject only to moral 
sanctions".2 Germany did not consider "the criminal 
prosecution (of the former Emperor) to be founded upon any 
legal basis. No law of any of the interested Powers 
threatens with punishment the violation of international 
law of morality or the breach of treaties".3 Brownlie4 also 
tells us that "in so far as it (the Treaty of Versailles) 
attempted to introduce morality into a new sphere it was 
courageous but not in harmony with the spirit of the time". 
At any rate, the former German Emperor escaped to the 
Netherlands where he sought and received refuge from the 
Dutch authorities. The Allied governments requested his 
extradition but this was refused on the grounds that the 
Kaiser's acts were political and thus did not qualify for 
extradition.5
The Treaty of Versailles (Articles 228-229) 
established military tribunals empowered to try and to
*. See Scott, writing in What Really Happened at Paris.
House, E.M., and Seymour, C., (eds.), 1921, p.237.
2. Report, op.cit., p.128.
3. See Temperley, op.cit., v.II, p.304. But see also
Allies' rejoinder, ibid., p.307 :
"The public arraignment against the German 
Emperor under article 227 has not a 
juridical character as regards its substance 
but only in its form. The ex-Emperor is 
arraigned as a matter of high international 
policy, as the minimum of what is demanded 
for a supreme offence against international 
morality, the sanctity of treaties, and the 
essential rules of justice".
See also Garner, 14 AJIL (1920) 91.
4. Use of Force, p.53.
5 See Brownlie, Use of Force, p.54 ns. 2 & 3.
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sentence war criminals. The trials were meant to be 
conducted by Allied tribunals but it was agreed to have the 
accused tried by German courts1. It is reported that out of 
forty-five cases listed for trial only twelve took place, 
six of which resulted in acquittals whereas the other six 
convicted offenders “found it curiously easy to escape”.2
The two leading First World War trials held at Leipsig 
are that of the Dover Castle and of the Llandovery Castle.3 
As with other 1918-1919 trials, both cases are concerned 
with the prosecution of German officers for war crimes and 
not for waging aggressive war. Accordingly, they are 
discussed under the relevant section on war crimes. 
However, their relevance to the criminality of aggresive 
war is outlined below.
In practice, First World War trials were limited in 
their impact. In theory, however, they were significant. 
There was a clear understanding that violations of the laws 
and customs of war were criminal at international law 
engendering criminal responsibility for the individual 
perpetrators. This doctrine of responsibility included the 
act of waging war. More significantly the trial and 
prosecution for war crimes was initiated at the 
international level. Thus, we see that some of the 
principles of law applicable to the crimes discussed in 
Chapter 4 begin to extend to the sphere of armed conflict. 
The principle of individual responsibility for criminal 
actions in international law is constant and the exercise 
of criminal jurisdiction by States begins to modify whereby 
it is accepted that the trial of offenders takes place
See Protocols and Correspondence of the Supreme 
Council and Conference of Ambassadors and Germany at 
Versailles, 1919, paras 20 and 40. Hereafter referred 
to as Protocols and Correspondence.
See Waldock, 106 Hague Receuil (1962) 215.
Decided on 4th June 1922 and 16th July 1921 
respectively. 2 Ann.Dig. (1923-24) at 429 and 436 
respectively.
before domestic courts as well as international tribunals. 
A further interesting factor highlighted by the Treaty of 
Versailles is that persons charged with crimes in 
international law will be prosecuted irrespective of the 
capacity they occupy at the time of committing the offence.
Thus, it can be seen that up until the end of the 
First World War the question of the criminality of 
aggressive war was introduced almost by "slate of hand", 
not on the basis of a firm text (the Treaty of Versailles - 
not really declaring aggressive war a criminal offence) 
but on practice built on that text.
The Inter-War period is pregnant with treaties, 
declarations and resolutions indicating that resort to war 
(and later, the unlawful use of force by States) was to be 
deemed a criminal offence. The 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance1 declared aggressive war an international crime.2 
Lord Cecil3 speaking at the British (later Royal) Institute 
of International Affairs on the scope and meaning of the 
treaty explained that such a description of aggressive war 
had been the result of demands made during the negotiating 
stages of the draft by "a very large and a very honest body 
of opinion in America requesting the condemnation of war". 
A reasonable number of States4 including Germany, Italy and 
Japan5 endorsed the view that war was not only illegal but
See generally: Brownlie, Use of Force. pp.68-69 and
Rifaat, op. cit., p.50.
Article 1. Text at Ferencz, Aggression. v.I, p.77. 
Jnl. BIIA (1924) 51-52.
See replies of governments on the Draft Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance, at Ferencz, Aggression. v.I: 
Finland, p.84; Belgium, p.90; Latvia, p.94; Bulgaria, 
p. 95; China and Portugal, p.105; Spain, p.106; and 
France p. 114. See also Ago, ILC Yrbk. . 1976, v.II
pt.I, p.31 ns.142 & 143.
For replies of these States, see Ferencz, ibid., at 
pp.102, 117, and 123 respectively.
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criminal x. The 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes2 reiterated the 
declaration made by the 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance.
These two instruments are an integral part of a 
process by which the Nuremberg Tribunal found aggressive 
war to be a crime in international law. However, they were 
never ratified, thus allowing jurists to question the 
findings of the Nuremberg Tribunal. Some3 have said that 
"no customary rule can be deduced from resolutions and 
unratified treaties".
A number of significant resolutions were adopted by the 
League of Nations4 and by other regional bodies* denouncing 
aggressive war as an international crime. In 1928 the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy6 was concluded. Though concise in its
See Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security proposed 
by an American Group reiterating the criminality of 
aggressive war: text at Ferencz, Aggression. v.I,
p.124. Cf. Wheberg, op.cit., pp.17-25. Also see LN 
Res. 24th Sept., 1927 adopted by roll call expressing 
the conviction of the Assembly that aggressive war can 
never serve as a means of settling disputes and is in 
consequence an international crime.
1008 LNOJ (1925) 1521, LN Doc.C .606.M.211., 1924.IX. 
Text also reprinted in Ferencz, Aggression. v.I, p. 132 
and in 19 AJIL (1925) 9. See Brownlie, Use of Force, 
pp.69-70 and Rifaat, op. cit., pp.54-56.
Pompe, op. cit., p.246 n.2.
See Brownlie, Use of Force, pp.71-73.
See Resolution of the VI International Conference of 
American States, Final Act, Havana. 1928. Text at 22 
AJIL (1928) 356-7 or at 34 AJIL (S u p p p.200.
94 LNTS 57. The treaty came to be known as the Pact 
of Paris or the Kellog-Briand Pact named after the 
American and French statesmen who sponsored it. See 
Brownlie, Use of Force, pp.74-92 for a full discussion 
of the Pact of Paris. Also see Wright, 23 AJIL (1929) 
96, 27 ibid., (1933) 39? Borchard, 23 AJIL 116?
Gonsiorowski, 30 Am.Pol.Sc.Rev. (1936) 653? Rifaat,
op. cit., pp.64-79 and Wallace, 3 Ency. PIL. p.236.
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provisions1 and originally signed only by a relatively small 
number of States2, it had one principal purpose: to renounce 
war and its use as a means by which States executed their 
international policies. Jurists have described its legal 
value as epoch-making: "for the first time in the history 
of mankind, almost the entire civilised world has condemned 
any war waged by a State in order to promote its selfish 
interests.”3 Its contribution, on the one hand, to the law 
of war and general international law, and to the conduct of 
international relations on the other, continues to be the 
subject of approbative comment.4
It has been said that the Pact of Paris only 
contributed to the formation of a customary norm 
establishing the illegality and not the criminality of war. 
The absence of terms such as "crime”, "international crime" 
and "offence" or "criminal offence", and of provision for 
the prosecution of individuals responsible for waging a war 
before international or national tribunals5 from the treaty 
text, are partly the reason for this assessment. There is, 
however, evidence, even in diplomatic correspondence, 
suggesting that its sponsors considered war to be a 
criminal offence as much as an illegal concept.
It consists of a preamble, two operative provisions 
and a ratification clause.
Initially they totalled 15 including Germany, Italy 
and Japan. For the Japanese interpretation of the 
Pact see: Marsha 11-Brown 27 AJIL (1933) 100. 63 States 
subsequently adhered to it. See Bassiouni, Digest,. 
v.I, p.50. Cf. Brownlie, Use of Force, p.75 n.2.
Gonsiorowski, op. cit., p.680. Also see Waldock, 81 
Hague Receuil (1952) 451 at 471-472 and the I LA Report 
of the Committee on Conciliation Between Nations, ILA 
(1934), p.4.
Wallace, op. cit., pp.238-239 and Brownlie, Use of 
Force, p.91.
See Glueck, 59 HLE (1946) 396 at pp.403 - 406, and 
Kelsen, 1 ILQ (1947) 156.
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In a note1 addressed to the United States Secretary of 
State, the French Ambassador in Washington expressed the 
views of his government when he said that France "has 
always under all circumstances, very clearly and without 
mental reservation declared its readiness to join in any 
declaration tending to denounce war as a crime...” In his 
reply to the French Ambassador, the Secretary of State 
stressed the significance of the resolution adopted at the 
Sixth International Conference of American States which 
condemned and described war as an international crime 
against the human species. Further, the ILA in one of the 
reports at its Thirty-Eight Conference, described the State 
violating provisions of the Pact of Paris as "an offender 
against the law of nations - a criminal against humanity11.2 
Professor (later Sir) Hersch Lauterpacht3 spoke of 
extradition in respect of the crime of initiating the war 
in violation of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War and Verzijl4 stated that "without losing its character 
of an international delinquency in the traditional sense it 
assumed the additional and much graver nature of an 
international crime, exposing the State concerned to 
counter-measures by the community which bore in embryo a 
distinctly penal character".
In 1933 a number of Latin American countries concluded 
a treaty which is considered as the counterpart to the Pact 
of Paris. The 1933 Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and 
Conciliation5 was initiated by the Argentine Minister for
See Shotwell, "The Pact of Paris with Historical 
Commentary", International Conciliation. 1928, p.447.
ILA (1934). p.23. Emphasis added.
21 BYIL (1944) 91.
International Law in Historical Perspective. 1968, 
v.I, p.224.
Signed at Rio de Janiero, 10th October, 1933. Text at 
163 LNTS 393.
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Foreign Affairs, Mr Saavedra Lamas.1 Again the State
Parties undertook to resolve their disputes by peaceful
means, while wars of aggression were condemned.
If the Hague Peace Conferences and the Pact of Paris
were epoch-making at the turn of the century, the
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals in 1945-
1946 are epoch-markers. The Charters of these tribunals,
their judgments and the several decisions delivered under
Allied Control Council Law No.10, 1945,3 are signposts for
the developing corpus of criminal law rules in
international law.3
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter establishes
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal ratione materiae.
i.e. it specifies the "crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal". Sub-paragraph (a) of the
same article defines "crimes against peace" as :
"namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or 
waging of a (declared or undeclared)4 war of
aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, 
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy 
for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing".
Article 6 also provides that there shall be individual 
criminal responsibility for whomsoever commits the crimes 
therein defined.
The majority of publicists have endorsed the 
criminality of aggressive war in their writings.5 However,
The treaty later came to be known as the Saavedra - 
Lamas Pact.
Hereafter referred to as CCL No.10.
See Pompe, op. cit., p.297.
The words in parenthesis are additional in Article 
5(a) of the Tokyo Charter, which is the corresponding 
provision to Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter.
See, among others, Manner, 37 AJIL (1943) 407? Pompe, 
op.cit., at pp. 259, 271, 285, 304, and 318; Keenan 
and Brown, op.cit., at pp.7, 75-82 and 83-85; Gros, 41 
A m .Pol.Sc.Rev. (1947) 205? Glueck, op. cit., p.396 et 
seq.? Appleman, op.cit., p.22 & p.264? Yokota writing
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Article 6 (a) has generated one principal doctrinal
argument: were the practices designated as "crimes against 
peace" actually proscribed as criminal offences at the time 
of their commission or was Article 6(a) in violation of the 
general principle of criminal law nullum crimen sine lege? 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was satisfied that aggressive war 
was a criminal offence in international law in 1945 for 
which there was individual responsibility. Its judgment 
was founded on evidence consisting, inter aliaf of the 
instruments adopted in the inter-war period.1 Jurists, 
however, are divided on this question. Some feel that its 
inclusion in the Nuremberg (and Tokyo) Charter represented 
"an exercise of political power by the victorious nations 
under the cloak of legal proceedings".2 Others 3 felt that 
by 1939 aggressive war was only morally announced as a 
crime, it lacked legal basis in theory and practice. Other 
views are less categoric but equally effective in their 
reservations.4 A number of writers preferred to concentrate
in Festschrift fur J. Spiropoulos. 1957, p.453; Roling 
at: 7 Ind. LR (1953) 11-12; writing in, International 
Law in the Netherlands. v.II, p.188, 1972; 3 Ency. PIL 
p. 136 and 4 ibid., pp.244-245 and, in The Current 
Legal Regulation of the Use of Force. Cassese, A., 
(ed.), 1986, p.385; Starace 153 Hague Receuil (1976) 
283 and De Stoop writing in International Law in 
Australia. 1984, p.159.
See Nuremberg Judgment, Cmd. 6964, pp.38-41.
See Pompe, op.cit., p.237 and especially at n.2 for 
his references to other writings rejecting the 
justiciability of aggressive war before the Nuremberg 
Tribunal. Also see Schick, 41 AJIL (1947) 770 and
Borchard, op.cit., p.107.
See Rifaat, op.cit., p.132 n.23 and at pp.164-180. Cf. 
Brownlie, Use of Force. p.110 and pp.156-157 who 
opines that by 1939 a customary rule had developed 
establishing use of force to be illegal but not a 
criminal offence.
Kelsen, 1 ILO 165, submits that the Nuremberg Charter 
constitutes retrospective legislation only in so far 
as it attached individual criminal responsibility 
where only collective responsibility existed. See also
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on the disadvantaged position suffered by counsels for 
defence at Nuremberg1 and Tokyo.2 Dissent was also 
expressed in judicial opinion. At Tokyo, Judges Pal and 
Roling challenged the illegality of aggressive war.
The Sub-Committee3 of the Legal Committee of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission4 was instructed in 1944 to 
reconsider the question of the criminality of aggressive 
war because when that subject had been discussed by its 
Legal Committee it was only found to be criminal in the 
wider notion of "war crimes". Sir Arnold McNair,5 the 
United Kingdom representative, spoke for the majority of 
the Sub-Committee when he said that as at 1945 acts 
committed in preparation of launching and conducting a war 
of aggression were not criminal offences, i.e. as a war 
crime, in international law [because of the lack of 
judicial or arbitral practice recognising the penal 
liability of States].6 The Czechoslovak representative on 
the Sub-Committee, Dr. Ecer, disagreed with McNair's 
conclusions on the legal status of aggressive war as an
his views at 31 Cal.LR (1943) 530.
See Jescheck, 4 Ency. PIL pp.53-54; Brownlie, Use of 
Force. p.169; Kraus, 13 De Paul LR (1963-64) 248; and 
Rie, 48 AJIL (1954) 470.
Appleman, op.cit., p.237.
This was composed of representatives from the United 
Kingdom, Czechoslavakia, Netherlands and the United 
States. See History. UNWCC. p.180 et seq.
Hereafter referred to as UNWCC.
See Majority Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed to 
Consider Whether the Preparation and Launching of the 
Present War should be considered "War Crimes". Text 
in Ferencz, International Criminal Court. 1980, v.I, 
p.425. Hereafter cited as Ferencz, ICCt.
See also Brownlie, Use of Force, p.69, who indicates, 
inter alia, that the term 'international crime' as 
used for instance in the Draft Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance, 1923, "could at the time only comprehend 
the delictual rather than the criminal liability of 
States".
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unlawful but not as a criminal offence in international
law. He submitted a dissenting opinion.1 Dr. Ecer referred
to excerpts from relevant writings of publicists including
the classical works of De Vattel; international instruments
relevant ratione temporis such as the 1924 Geneva Protocol;
the Pact of Paris including a discussion of the I LA on same
Pact and diplomatic statements issued by Allied Leaders in
1942, as authoritative sources of evidence endorsing the
principle that initiating and conducting an aggressive war
is a criminal offence in international law. For instance,
of the 1924 Geneval Protocol, Dr. Ecer wrote:
“The importance of the Geneva Protocol lies in 
the fact that it expressed clearly, without 
reservations and without clauses confusing the
sense of the words. the legal conviction of the
League of Nations - which was the legal 
conviction of the whole civilised humanity - that 
a war of aggression is an international crime”.a
Despite his endorsement of the criminality of
aggressive war, Dr Ecer, did not lose sight of the
following irredeemable factors: (a) the 1924 Geneva
Protocol had no binding effect because it was never
ratified, (b) the Pact of Paris did not declare the concept
of war a criminal offence as such, and (c) the Covenant of
the League of Nations indeed failed to outlaw war much less
declare it a criminal offence.
Nonetheless, Dr. Ecer concluded, inter alia, that: (i)
the preparation and launching of the 1939-1945 war
constitute crimes against the criminal laws of the invaded
countries and crimes against the whole of mankind according
to the general principles of international law and (ii)
perpetrators of these crimes including Heads of State or
Government may be tried by tribunals of the States where
See Minority Report on the Question whether the 
preparation and launching of the present war should be 
considered as crimes being within the scope of the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission. Reproduced in 
Ferencz, ICCt. v.I, p.414.
Ferencz, ICCt, v.I, p.417. Emphasis has not been 
added by the present writer.
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the crimes were committed, alternatively by an inter-allied 
tribunal distributing international justice over "hostis 
humani generis".1 Dr. Ecer's support for the thesis of the 
criminality of war as and up to 1945 is substantiated by 
properly researched documents and evidence. However, his 
conclusions cannot be accepted as final of the status of 
aggressive war as a crime in international law.2 But, in so 
far as they refer to the doctrine of individual 
responsibility and to the universal justiciability of 
crimes jure gentium f they are certainly indicative of 
juridical indicia which characterise the concept of the 
criminal offence in international law.
Relevant minutes of sessions of the International 
Conference on Military Trials in London in 1945 reveal that 
there was a general understanding among the drafters of the 
Nuremberg Charter that aggressive war was a crime in 
international law prior to the Second World War.3 However, 
due to some reservations on the part of the French 
delegation4 Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter introduces 
three categories of offences "as crimes....for which there 
shall be individual responsibility" which is a diluted 
version of the original (and more categoric) wording: "the 
following acts shall be considered criminal violations of 
international law".5
Ferencz, ICCt, v.I, p.424.
Members of the UNWCC subsequently received 
instructions from their governments to endorse the 
criminality of aggressive war. The UNWCC was 
authorised to place on its list of "war criminals" 
those responsible for launching the war. See History 
UNWCC, pp.184-185.
See Jackson Report, p.299.
This was composed of Mr Justice Falco and Professor A. 
Gros who rejected the notion of aggressive war as a 
criminal offence. Ibid., p.295 and p.335.
See minutes of session, 19th July, 1945 and minutes of 
session, 23rd July, 1945, Jackson Report, pp.295-297 
and p.328 respectively.
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The discussions at the London Conference focused on a 
number of points which too are telling of the features of 
the crime of aggressive war and, indirectly, perhaps also 
of the concept of criminal offence in international law. 
First, aggressive war was seen to be an unlawful practice 
as piracy jure gentium and brigandage,1 i.e. it deserved 
proscription as a criminal offence irrespective of the 
locus delicti.1 Second, a draft list of practices (later to 
be included in the Nuremberg Charter) submitted by the 
United States, consisted of acts which were considered 
criminal offences irrespective of whether they violated the 
lex loci commissi f thus underlining their universally 
illegal character. A third factor emerges from a French 
amendment to a United States draft proposal stating that 
the projected tribunal shall have jurisdiction to try any 
person regardless of his office or rank.3
The transformation of the concept of war from an 
acceptable method of settling international disputes to a 
prohibited practice, indeed a crime, reveals the following 
elements indicative of the nature of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law. The principle of 
individual criminal responsibility in international law 
extends to persons who occupy public office at the time of 
the commission of the offence. As a result of events in 
World War I and especially in World War II, individual 
responsibility is incurred not only by high ranking 
officers and members of government (which is an innovative 
rule in international law by any standard) but includes 
Heads of State and of Government, thus delivering a severe 
blow to the doctrine of "Act of State” in international law
On the relationship between piracy and brigandage, see 
Cowles, 33 Cal. LR (1945) 177.
See Jackson Report, p.48 para 5 et seq. Cf.Shawcross, 
Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors at the Close of the 
Case Against the Individual Defendants. (hereafter 
referred to as Closing Speeches’! . 1946, pp.57-58.
See Jackson Report, p.293.
and its implications of immunity from criminal prosecution 
for the holders of public office. Accordingly, criminal 
responsibility for individuals in international law has 
changed radically since earlier times where its application 
was limited to pirates as common enemies of mankind. 
Further, the establishment of international tribunals by 
the Allies in 1945 (an unsuccessful exercise at the end of 
the 1914-1918 War) to try persons charged, inter alia, with 
preparing, launching and carrying out a war of aggression, 
indicates the passage of yet another criminal practice in 
international law so deserving of universal proscription 
that its justiciability exceeds even the application of the 
universal principle of criminal jurisdiction and is 
elevated to trial by international judicial fora.
B. War Crimes
The concept of war crimes reflects lato sensu a number 
of crimes traditionally proscribed under national criminal 
codes. It is reported by the drafters of the Nuremberg 
Charter that the practices which constitute war crimes have 
been considered criminal offences "since the time of Cain"-1 
However, it is not before 1945 that the first authoritative 
definition (Article 6.b of the Nuremberg Charter) is found 
of war crimes in international law.
A discussion on the definition of war crimes is beyond 
the scope of this work. But, the sub-headings of this 
section on war crimes are examined and considered, as 
aspects most relevant to the task of determining the 
juridical features of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law.
I. Jurisdiction and I riminal Responsibility
Relevant source material is considered under this sub
individual responsibility and on the bases of jurisdiction
heading in order to trace the development of the law on
See Jackson Report, p.50.
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as applied in war crimes trials. It will be considered in 
stages covering the events generated by three periods in 
time: 1914 - 1919, 1939 - 1945 and current practice.
(a) The First World War
Enemy nationals are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
State in whose hands they fall. This is the principle on 
which jurisdiction was exercised in respect of early war 
crimes prosecutions. It is enunciated in the classical work 
of Sir Thomas Holland on the laws of war.1 Article 59 of 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field, issued in 1863 provides that "a 
prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes against 
the captor's army or people, committed before he was 
captured, and for which he has not been punished by his own 
authorities.1,2 This principle came to be regarded as the 
cardinal rule in instruments relevant to war crimes trials 
following cessation of hostilities in 1918. But, even at 
this early stage of the development of the concept of 
violations of the laws and customs of war as war crimes in 
international law, there is evidence that the bases of 
jurisdiction known as the principles of passive 
personality, protectivity and universality were promoted as 
acceptable grounds on which proceedings against war 
criminals may be instituted. Professor Bellot3 cited the 
penal codes of Mexico, Russia and Greece as evidence of the 
applicability of the passive personality principle of 
criminal jurisdiction. Professor Merignhac4 cites a law of 
23rd July, 1913 amending Articles 249 and 266 of the French 
Code of Military Justice providing that all persons
The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten’! r 1908, 
pp.59-60.
General Order No 100. See Manner, 37 AJIL (1943) 407 
at 420.
2 Grotius Trans. (1917) 31 at 44-45.
24 RGDIP (1917) 1 at pp.40-45.
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(nationals and foreigners) are liable to prosecution under 
French law for acts in breach of the 1906 Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armies in the Field.1 Merignhac also refers to 
clause 7 of the French Code d * Instruction Criminelle as 
providing French courts with jurisdiction over war 
criminals regardless of their nationality for breaches 
committed in foreign territory on the basis of the 
protective principle. "No quarter” policies, for instance, 
were considered to be acts against the security of the 
State.
fa.i^ The 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the Treaty of
Versailles and the 1920 Peace Treaties; 
Individual Responsibility
The 1919 Commission on the Authors of War, reporting
on the responsibility of persons guilty of violations of
the laws and customs of war, held that all persons
regardless of rank or authority are personally answerable
for such violations. This broad sweeping statement was
also deemed to be applicable to Heads of State. It was
held that to allow the classical principles of
international law concerning the immunity of Heads of State
to apply in the tragic circumstances of the First World War
would be tantamount to a great injustice. In the words of
the Commission:
”It would involve laying down the principle that 
the greatest outrages against the laws and 
customs of war and the laws of humanity, if 
proved against him [William II of Hohenzollern 
formerly German Emperor] could in no
circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion 
would shock the conscience of civilized mankind."2
The American members of the Commission disagreed. But,
their interpretation of the principle of sovereign immunity
and its application to cases involving crimes committed by
Heads of State are unconvincing and the reasons submitted
in dissent are superficial. They held that a Head of State
1 AJIL (1907) 201.
Report, op.cit., pp.116-117.
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is only politically not legally answerable; that he is
responsible only to his country - to hold otherwise would
mean subjecting him and his country to foreign
jurisdictions to which he owes no allegiance; that he can
only be answerable to the law of his country and
consequently answerable before a tribunal of his country
not before foreign tribunals; that he is not subject to
punishment affixed after the commission of the alleged
crime - nulla poena sine lecre: and finally, that these
principles apply to persons occupying the office of Head of
State/Government and not to persons who have been deposed
from such office. The stongest argument submitted by the
Americans against the Commission's recommendation to hold
Heads of States/Government personally responsible was that
the charge of so-called "violations of the laws of
humanity" may have been in breach of the nullum crimen sine
lege principle.1
None of the penal clauses found in the Treaty of
Versailles and in the 1920 Peace Treaties contain any
reference to or include any wording concerning individual
criminal responsibility for violations of the laws and
customs of war or of humanity. The principle of personal
responsibility for such breaches is implied in common
wording whereby the government of the vanquished nation
recognises the right of the Victors to bring criminal
proceedings against responsible persons. The following
clause appears as standard:
"The (national) Government (of the vanquished 
State) recognises the right of the Allied and 
Associated Powers to bring before military 
tribunals persons accused of having committed 
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.
Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced 
to punishments laid down by law. This provision 
will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or 
prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in 
the territory of her allies".2
Report, op.cit., pp.135-136.
Article 228, Treaty of Versailles, 13 AJIL(Supp.)
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(a.ii.  ^ Jurisdiction Ratione Personae
The 1919 Commission on the Authors of War adopted the
rule that Allied States are entitled under international
law to try captured enemy nationals for violations of the
laws and customs of war and of the laws of humanity before
national military or civil tribunals, purposely
constituted, for the trial of such cases. This rule came
to be accepted as standard-setting. It was followed later
in 1944-1949 war crimes trials. The Commission, however,
listed four exceptions to the above general rule which were
regarded as being candidate for trial by an international
criminal tribunal.1 They are:
outrages and violations of the laws and customs 
of war committed against victims of different 
nationalities;
enemy nationals of authority giving or executing 
orders permitting violations of the laws and 
customs of war to be committed in more than one 
zone of operations?
all ranking personnel, civil or military, 
including Heads of State who ordered or, with 
authority to intervene, failed to prevent the 
commission of violations of the laws and customs 
of war?
and
all other cases which, having regard to the 
character of the crime committed or to the law of 
any belligerent country, it is best to have tried 
before an international criminal tribunal.
The Commission also outlined a draft skeleton of
relevant clauses regulating the establishment of the
(1919) p.250? Article 173, Treaty of St Germain-en- 
Laye with Austria, September 10, 1919, 14 AJIL (1920) 
p.55? Article 118, Treaty of Neuilly-Sur-Seine with 
Bulgaria, November 27, 1919, 14 AJIL (1920) 185 at
p.221? Article 157, Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, 
June 4, 1920, 15 AJIL (1921) 1 at p.48? and Article 
226, Treaty of Sevres with Turkey, August 10, 1920, 15 
AJIL (1921) 179 at 234.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Report, op.cit., pp.121-122.
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proposed international criminal tribunal. The clauses 
relevant to the sacrosant principles nullum crimen sine 
lege and nullum poena sine leae were designed as follows:
(a) Applicable law: "principles of the law of nations, as 
they result from the usages established among 
civilised peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the 
dictates of the public conscience.” This wording is 
taken from preambular paragraph 8 common to Hague 
Conventions (II) 1899 and (IV) 1907.
and
(b) Punishment: such penalties as are imposed by the law
of the country whose representative sits on the 
international criminal tribunal in respect of same or 
similar offences.
The Commission proposed that the jurisdiction of the 
international criminal tribunal, should be supported by 
obliging Allied and Associated governments to adopt 
legislation to ensure the enforcement of the international 
tribunal's decisions.
The dissenting report1 submitted by the American 
representatives on the Commission endorses the basic rule 
that Allied governments are entitled under international 
law to try enemy nationals for war crimes. It also 
endorsed the proposition that an international judicial 
forum takes cogniscance of cases falling, under exceptions
(i) and (ii) above. The American representatives' view 
differed, in this respect, only in so far as they preferred 
to see a mixed military tribunal/commission established 
rather than an international criminal tribunal.
The American delegation, however, had serious 
reservations with regard to the Commission's proposal to 
bring charges for violations of the laws of humanity 
because it felt they would be in breach of the principle 
nullum crimen sine leae. Indeed the wording cited from 
common preambular paragraph 8 of Hague Conventions (II) 
1899 and (IV) 1907 on the law to be applied by the proposed 
international criminal tribunal allows such charges of
Op.cit., Annex II, p.127.
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retrospectivity to be made. That preambular language was 
drafted to serve as an all embracing provision for unlawful 
practices that were not provided for in the so-called 
Realements annexed to Hague Convention (IV) of 1907. Its 
significance is such that one finds it also in Article 1(2) 
of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. It is ironic that the representatives of a 
State so instrumental in the drafting of the provisions of 
the Hague Conventions on the laws of war, were to cite its 
language as being in breach of the nullum crimen sine lege 
rule. Notwithstanding, it is quite proper to question, 
especially in 1918-1919 when the concept of war crimes was 
in its embryonic stages, as to what is the definition of 
the laws of humanity. The American representatives cited 
thinkers of philosophy pointing out the indeterminable 
nature of such concepts, thus emphasising their inadequacy 
to meet the degree of specificity required by criminal law 
for the definition of criminal offences.
The American delegation also objected to (i) the fact 
that there was no precedent for the establishment of an 
international criminal tribunal; and, to a lesser degree,
(ii) for having persons, especially Heads of State and high 
ranking authorities, tried for omissions, i.e. failure to 
prevent the commission of violations of the laws and 
customs of war.
However, there was consensus in the 1919 Commission on 
the Authors of War and, in particular, within the American 
delegation on the following principles of law:
(a) That Allied and Associated governments are entitled 
under international law to try enemy nationals for 
violations of the laws and customs of war.
(b) That these States may establish military tribunals for 
this purpose and may exercise jurisdiction where the 
crimes were committed in their territory or against 
their nationals and property, i.e. application of the 
territorial and passive personality principles of 
criminal jurisdiction.
and
(c) That an international criminal tribunal be established
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for crimes committed in several areas by and against 
nationals of several States.
The Treaty of Versailles reflected a compromise
settlement between American and Commission proposals. Thus
Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the
establishment of a "special tribunal" with representatives
of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and
Japan sitting on it to try the former German Emperor for a
"supreme offence against international morality and the
sanctity of treaties"; wording which again invited charges
of retrospective legislation. The crimes identified by the
Commission as having been committed in circumstances
warranting trial by an international military tribunal were
excluded. The passive personality principle proposed by
the American delegation in a separate memorandum1 to the
Commission features in all of the 1919-1920 instruments by
virtue of a standard clause which reads:
"Persons guilty of criminal acts against the 
nationals of one of the Allied and Associated 
Powers will be brought before the military 
tribunals of that Power."
Further, the idea of establishing an international criminal
tribunal for crimes committed by persons of different
nationalities against persons of several nationalities in
more than one area was abandoned to be replaced by separate
proceedures sponsored by the American delegation namely, to
have them brought before a mixed military tribunal. The
following clause is also standard in the penal provisions
of the Treaty of Versailles and the Peace Treaties:
"Persons guilty of criminal acts against the 
nationals of more than one of the Allied and 
Associated Powers will be brought before military 
tribunals composed of members of the military
Report, op.cit., p.141.
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tribunals of the Powers concerned."
However, the de facto situation which resulted in 
1919-1920 was totally divers to that envisaged by the 
Allies and the Treaty of Versailles. Arguing that 
execution of the penal clauses in the peace treaty would, 
politically and economically, have catastrophic effects in 
Germany, the Germans succeeded in persuading the Allied 
Powers to have alleged war criminals charged before German 
national courts. They offered: (a) enactment of specific
war crimes legislation; (b) repeal of all national laws 
that could prevent enforcement of war crimes legislation?
(c) trials to be held before the highest court of the land 
in Leipsig? (d) direct Allied participation in the 
proceedings; (e) Allied collaboration in the collection of 
evidence? and (f) guarantees of fair and impartial 
proceedings. A law entitled "Law as to Prosecution for War 
Crimes and War Offences" was passed on the 18th December, 
1919.1 It provided the German National Tribunal with 
jurisdiction to try nationals for having committed "war 
crimes"2 against foreign nationals at home and on foreign 
territory. The jurisdictional base of this law, though 
extraterritorial, did not extend beyond a wider reach of 
the application of the traditional principles of criminal 
jurisdiction namely, territoriality and active personality.
The Allied Powers, partly satisfied with German 
guarantees, accepted their plan of action but reserved "the 
right to use, in the degree and in the form they consider 
suitable, the rights which the treaty (of Versailles)
See TS File 26/2, 1919-1920. See also Additional Law 
to the law of 18th December, 1919 in Enclosure No.61, 
Protocols and Correspondence.
The term "war crimes" as opposed to the term 
"violations of the laws and customs of war" is used 
and thus it is conspicuously different to the wording 
in the Treaty of Versailles and the Peace Treaties of 
1920. The same phrase "war crimes" or "war offences" 
also appears in diplomatic correspondence between 
German authorities and the Allied Powers. See 
Protocols and Correspondence, Enclosure No.20, p.19.
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confers on them in this event".1 The Allies followed, but 
did not participate in, the trials held at Leipsig.2
The merits and de-merits of the Leipsig trials are 
several and varied but for the purposes of the present 
study the practice at that time clearly reveals opinions 
favouring the application of the territorial, active and 
passive personality principles of criminal jurisdiction (in 
this order) for practices considered to be more than merely 
unlawful in international law but criminal offences.3 There 
is no concrete evidence showing the universality principle 
of jurisdiction being applied at this early stage in the 
development of war crimes, although the movement in favour 
of establishing an international criminal tribunal for war 
crimes having no particular location committed against 
persons of varied nationalities represents a scenario 
similar to that traditionally associated with piracy 
committed on the high seas.
(b) The Second World War 
■(E>-i.) Diplomatic Statements
As early as 1940-1941 the Allies and governments of 
occupied countries issued declarations that the punishment 
of persons guilty of war crimes would be foremost amongst 
the war aims. The most significant document is the text of 
a Declaration4 adopted in January 1942 by nine governments
Protocols and Correspondence, Enclosure No 40, p.32.
Reports by representatives of HM Government at Leipsig 
on the German War Crimes trials may be found at TS 
Files 15, 16 and 17, 1921.
Doctrinal authority on this point is offered by 
Professor Garner in his leading work on the events of 
this period - International Law and the World War. 
1920, v.II, Ch.XXXVIII, Section 584.
Hereafter referred to as the Inter-Allied 
Declaration.
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paragraph five recalls that international law and in
particular Hague Convention (IV) 1907 prohibit the
commission of violent acts by belligerent forces in
occupied territories. Operative paragraphs three and four
provide that individual responsibility attaches to all
persons irrespective of whether they merely ordered or
actively participated in the commission of war crimes. All
of the heads of governments in exile or their
representatives made statements at the London Conference
adopting the Inter-Allied Declaration. Those of Prime
Minister Sikorski (Poland), of Prime Minister Sramek
(Czechoslovakia), Foreign Minister Bech (Luxembourg) and
Minister Wold (Norway)1 identified, in particular, the
universally unlawful character of war crimes and the common
policy of nations to punish the perpetrators regardless of
their nationality and of the locus delicti.
In August, September and October of the same year,
statements made by Prime Minister Churchill, President
Roosevelt and Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, Molotov, reiterated the Allies' intention to
proceed against war criminals. Prime Minister Churchill
made the following declaration in the House of Commons:
11.......... those who are guilty of the Nazi
Crimes will have to stand up before tribunals in 
every land where their atrocities have been 
committed in order that an indelible warning may 
be given to future ages and that successive 
generations of men may say 'So perish all who do 
the like again'.”2
The Soviet Foreign Minister referred to the trial of war
part document entitled Punishment For War Crimes. 
1942.
Ibid., Part I, pp. 7, 9 and 11 respectively.
Punishment For War Crimes. Part II, p.3. See also pp. 
9-10 for declarations by President Roosevelt.
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criminals by a "special international tribunal".1
In November 1943 the Moscow Declaration2 represents 
perhaps the most authoritative diplomatic statement of the 
Allies' intentions and opinions on the legal position 
concerning war criminals. The Allies declared that war 
crimes trials will be held in States whose territories were 
the scenes of horrific crimes.3 Major war criminals, i.e. 
those whose crimes had no particular geographical location, 
would be punished by a joint decision of the Allies. This 
resulted in the establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
International Military Tribunals.
These statements reflect consistency in legal opinion 
concerning the trial by belligerents of enemy nationals for 
war crimes on the basis of the territoriality and passive 
personality principles of jurisdiction. In addition to 
World War I practice, this source material reveals tacit 
readiness by Allied Leaders in 1945 to apply also the 
active and universality principles of jurisdiction in 
respect of war crimes. War criminals whose crimes
Ibid., p.7.
The text is reproduced in, History UNWCC. op.cit., 
pp.107-108.
HMG Inter-Departmental Correspondence reveals that the 
Foreign Office adopted the view that the Moscow 
Declaration implies more than the application of the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction. The following 
interpretation has been recorded:
"Although it does not say so in so many 
words, we have always interpreted the Moscow 
Declaration on War Crimes as meaning that 
war criminals will be tried and punished by 
the United Nation of which the victim is, or 
was, a national".
This extract is found in correspondence between 
the Treasury Solicitor's Department and the Judge 
Advocate General's Office. See letter dated 13th 
December 1945 in TS File 26/128 sent by the War 
Crimes Branch at the Treasury Solicitor's Office 
to Brigadier Shapcott of the Judge Advocate 
General's Office.
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transcended national boundaries were considered liable for 
trial before purposely established international criminal 
tribunals.
(b.ii.  ^ Jurisdictional Principles Applied In Immediate 
Post War National Legislation
The jurisdictional principle common to post war 
legislation is the passive personality principle, i.e. war 
crimes were deemed justiciable regardless of the 
nationality of the accused and of the locus delicti as long 
as one significant criterion had been met: the victims were 
either nationals of or (in some cases) foreigners resident 
in the prosecuting State.
The legislation adopted in Yugoslavia1, Czeckoslovakia2 
and Poland3 included provision for the protective principle 
of jurisdiction. Great emphasis was placed by these (would 
be totalitarian) States on making certain that persons who 
had collaborated with the enemy and thus threatened the 
security and national insterests of the State would be 
brought to trial. This factor conditioned war crimes 
legislation to such an extent that provision was made for 
the application of the active personality principle, thus 
nationals who may have collaborated with the enemy could be 
tried for war crimes. In this context, the presence of the 
protective and of the active principles of jurisdiction 
seems a natural combination.
Certainly, the territorial principle is applied across 
the board, even though it was not always specifically 
identified in the legislation adopted. For instance, the
Law of 25th August, 1945. See WC Law Rep.. vol. XV, 
p.207.
Decree No. 16 of 1945 as amended by Law No. 22 of 24th 
January, 1946. See WC Law Rep.. vol. XV, p.205.
Decree of 31st August, 1944 Concerning the Punishment 
of Fascist-Hitlerite Criminals Guilty of Murder and 
Ill-Treatment of the Civilian Population and of 
Prisoners of War, and the Punishment of Traitors to 
the Polish Nation. See WC Law Rep.. vol. VII, p.82.
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law adopted by China in 1946 did not specify whether it 
applied only in so far as war crimes committed in its 
territory or in territory subject to its de facto control.
Finally, the British experience merits separate 
comment for the following reasons. First, unlike all other 
samples of national legislation provision for war crimes 
trials is made by Royal Warrant rather than by Act of 
Parliament.1 Second, it contains no provision concerning 
jurisdiction ratione personae. Third, its legal
imperfections have generated effects that currently 
continue to be felt as shown in recent (1990) endeavours to 
introduce new war crimes legislation in the United Kingdom. 
The jurisdictional issues involved in this new initiative 
are discussed below under the following section on Current 
Practice.
Any person could be tried for war crimes committed 
against British and allied nationals in foreign territory 
under the Royal Warrant. A total of 500 war crimes trials 
is reported to have taken place under the authority of the 
Royal Warrant for the period 1945 - 1949.2 But, far from 
being taken as approval of the application of the universal 
principle of jurisdiction by Great Britain, the Royal 
Warrant was enforced by military courts within 
spheres/zones subject to British authority. In a sense, 
this represented a particular mode of giving effect to the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction.
Evidence of great relevance to legal thought in 1943- 
1944 on the principles of jurisdiction applicable in war 
crimes trials is found in HMG Inter-Departmental 
correspondence. A memorandum was submitted concerning the 
proposal to draft a War Crimes Bill.3 The Bill included a
The status of the Royal Warrant is well considered in 
a recent contribution by Col. Rogers in 39 I CLP (1990) 
780.
See Rogers, op.cit., p.795 n.86.
See TS 26/64, 1943. The memorandum is not signed. The 
letter "S" appears at the end. This could well be
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preambular paragraph telling of individual criminal
responsibility for war crimes under international law:
”... whareas there is an undoubted right under 
the law of nations for HM Government and her 
allies to bring to trial and to punish those 
responsible for violations of the laws and usages 
of war.11
Provision was also made for the application of the
universal and passive personality principles: principles of
jurisdiction not traditionally applicable under the common
law system. Moreover, legal advice had it that enactment
of such legislation was not retrospective but in conformity
with international law. During the debate on war crimes,
the Lord Chancellor in 1942 made the following statement in
the House of Lords:
"I take it to be perfectly well-established 
International Law that the laws of war permit a
belligerent commander to punish by means of his
Military Courts any hostile offender against the 
law and customs of war who may fall into his 
hands wherever be the place where the crime was 
committed.
National Courts, in my view, are equally entitled to 
exercise whatever criminal jurisdiction would be 
conceded to them by International Law. The real 
question, in relation to National Courts, is not so 
much whether the domestic law of a particular nation 
has already conferred upon the particular National 
Courts concerned a particular jurisdiction. It may 
not have gone to the full length which International 
Law would recognize and permit. The important 
question is this: what is the ambit of the
jurisdiction which might by International Law be 
conferred upon them, as for example, in the present 
case, by Parliament here actually legislating to 
enlarge, within permissible limits, the jurisdiction 
of our Courts to deal with crimes committed abroad?”1
On the basis of the evidence provided by the experiences 
respecting war crimes trials in the First World War, the 
Lord Chancellor's interrogatories would have been answered 
at the time, in part, by providing for the application of
Brigadier H. Shapcott who at the time was assigned to 
the Judge Advocate General's Office.
See Punishment for War Crimes, Part II, 1942, p.11.
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the passive personality principle of jurisdiction. The 
application of this principle by belligerents in cases of 
war crimes is understandable where nationals are prime 
victims of warfare.
(b.iii.) The 1949 Geneva Conventions and Israel/s 1950 
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishments Law
The provisions concerning repression of "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions mark one of the
major post Second World War developments in multilateral
treaty practice concerning principles of jurisdiction
applicable in respect of war criminals in international
law. The following clause is common to the four
conventions and is also applicable (by virtue of Article
85.1) to the 1977 Additional Protocols.
"Each High Contracting Party shall be under the 
obligation to search for persons alleged to have 
committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before 
its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and 
in accordance with the provisions of its own 
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party concerned, 
provided such High Contracting Party has made out 
a orima facie case."
The option available to High Contracting Parties 
introduces the essence of the principle aut dedere aut 
punire f so prominent in subsequent instruments proscribing 
criminal offences. The obligation is to bring persons to 
trial for war crimes ("grave breaches") and not to 
extradite them. This rule, as we shall see in the crimes 
yet to be discussed in Part III, is inversely stated in 
international instruments.
The fact that High Contracting Parties are obliged to 
search for and to institute criminal proceedings against 
persons regardless of their nationality, and given that it 
is quite possible for "grave breaches" to have been 
committed outside the territory of the prosecuting High 
Contracting Party by non-nationals against non-nationals, 
the Geneva Conventions allow for the exercise of the
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universality principle of jurisdiction in respect of war 
crimes.
1001 States have ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and several have adopted specific legislation to give 
effect to obligations arising under the repression of 
"grave breaches" provisions in the conventions. The status 
of these conventions is authoritative and law-making in 
international law. The substance of the common clause 
cited above has had a pionneering effect in the field of 
international law where justiciability of internationally 
proscribed criminal offences is concerned. But, its 
development and status as a juridical characteristic of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law depends 
upon a fuller assessment of its application vis-a-vis other 
criminal practices. That assessment is determined by the 
discussion of crimes in the following chapters.
The Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 
adopted by the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) in 1950 is 
singular in its content ratione materiae and ratione 
personae. Its evidential value as one of the first peace­
time war crimes legislation following the Second World War 
cannot be overstated. The law defines three types of 
crimes: (i) "crime against the Jewish people" - this is
largely based on the definition of genocide in the Genocide 
Convention but tailored to apply specifically to persons of 
the Jewish faith? (ii) crimes against humanity - this 
largely reproduces the definition found in the Nuremberg 
Charter but excludes the restrictions ratione materiae 
found therein; and (iii) war crimes - the definition is 
again based on that found in the Nuremberg Charter but 
includes minor amendments which suited the Israeli 
legislator.
Any person, national or non-national, may be tried 
under the law for the crimes defined therein as long as
Data as at January, 1990. See Bowman, and Harris, 
Multilateral Treaties. Index and Current Status. 7th 
Cumulative Supplement, 1990.
they were committed within an enemy country, i.e. Germany 
or in any of its Allied States or in any territory, in 
whole or in part, under the de facto rule of Germany or any 
of its Allied States. The law is operative ratione 
temporis as follows: crimes committed in the Nazi regime,
i.e. between 30th January, 1933 and 8th May, 1945 and in 
the Second World War, i.e. between 1st September, 1939 and 
14th August, 1945.
The law received full judicial appreciation in the 
leading case Attorney-General of the Government of Israel 
v Adolph Eichmann.1 Aspects of the Judgment relevant to 
the principles of individual responsibility and 
jurisdiction in international law are enunciated below.
Counsel for defendant Eichmann submitted that it was 
contrary to international law for a State to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction against a person alleged to have 
committed crimes against non-nationals in foreign territory 
prior to the very establishment in international law of the 
State prosecuting the defendant.2 It is unclear whether 
objection to extraterritorial application of jurisdiction 
by Israel was a temporal matter for defence counsel or 
whether the principle per se was objectionable. The Court 
dismissed counsel's plea for lack of jurisdiction by 
declaring that it is bound to give full effect to the 1950 
Law as the law of the land in Israel which has precedence 
over international law even it may be in conflict with it.3
The District Court of Jerusalem further held that the 
crimes defined in the law were crimes under international 
law in addition to being crimes proscribed under Israel 
law. "The jurisdiction to try crimes under international 
law is universal”.* The Court cited classical doctrine
36 ILR 1.
Ibid., p.23 at para 8.a. 
Ibid., pp.24-25.
Ibid., p.26 para 12.
(Grotius and Vattel), contemporary literature, the crime of 
piracy jure gentium and international instruments including 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, CCL No.10, and the 
Genocide Convention as evidence that the crimes defined in 
the law constitute delicti jure gentium.1
In addition, to the universality principle, the 
District Court also held that it could exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of passive personality and 
protective interests. The Court traced the historical 
development of the State of Israel, recorded the fact that 
the accused was charged with mass murder simply because the 
victims were Jews, and on that basis found support for 
invoking the two principles of jurisdiction.2 Again, in 
answer to defence counsel's argument that these principles 
could not be invoked because the State of Israel had not 
yet been recognised as a sovereign entity in international 
law at the time of the commission of the offences, the 
District Court argued [already in 1961 citing Israeli 
judicial practice as precedent] that the interests of the 
State of Israel already existed under Mandatory Palestine
subsists a continuity of law'."3
The Supreme Court of Israel upheld the Judgment 
delivered by the District Court and its dicta are even more 
lucid affirmations . of the relevant principles of
international law on individual criminal responsibility and 
jurisdiction as juridical features of war crimes in
international law.
The Supreme Court considered two basic premises (a) 
the crimes defined in the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law are crimes in international law entailing 
individual responsibility and (b) every State is therefore
Op.cit., p.26 para 13 - p.32 para 16.
2. Ibid., p.49 para 30 - p.55 para 35.
3. Katz-Cohen v Attorney General. cited by the District 
Court at 36 ILR 55 para 38.
"and that 'in spite of the changes in
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entitled to try and to punish those who commit such crimes.1
The Supreme Court endorsed the District Court's 
dismissal of the plea raised by the defence for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, relying on the Judgment 
of the Permanent International Court of Justice in the 
Lotus Case2 and on the opinions of publicists of 
international repute, held that there is insufficient 
evidence in international law to support the theory 
advanced by defence counsel. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
added that even if defence counsel's argument correctly 
reflected international law, the proceedings against the 
defendant by Israel constituted violation of rights 
pertaining to his national State (Germany) and not to the 
defendant personally. It would be for the national State 
to seek remedy for breach of international law and not for 
the individual defendant.3
To support its thesis that the crimes defined in the 
1950 law are crimes under international law the Court 
examined the concept of criminal offence in international 
law. Of the juridical features of this concept it 
declared:
“these crimes constitute acts which damage vital 
international interests; they impair the 
foundations and security of the international 
community? they violate the universal moral 
values and humanitarian principles that lie 
hidden in the criminal law systems adopted by 
civilized nations. The underlying principle in 
international law regarding such crimes is that 
the individual who has committed any of them and 
who, when doing so, may be presumed to have fully 
comprehended the heinous nature of his act, must 
account for his conduct.”4
It arrived at these conclusions on the basis . of an 
assessment of piracy jure gentium, the development of the
36 ILR 287 para 10.
PCIJ Rep. Ser.A.. No.10, 1927. 
36 ILR at p.286 para 9. 
Op.cit., p.291 para 11.(b).
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concept of violations of the laws of war and an early case 
involving an attack upon the person of an ambassador - all 
cited as evidence of the presence of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law.1
There are two key elements to be identified in the 
above passage. The first, is the description of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law as a
universally reprehensible practice contrary to humanitarian 
and moral standards. This element has already been 
referred to supra in Part II Chapter 3 in the writings of
certain publicists concerned with the definition of the
concept of criminal offence in international law. The
second key factor is reference to the principle of 
individual accountability. This principle of international 
law already emerges from the crimes considered so far as a 
salient juridical charateristic of the concept of criminal 
offence in international law.
A third key element, considered separately from the 
other two factors by the Supreme Court, is the 
applicability of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
where international law crimes have been committed. The 
Court reported four schools of thought expressing separate 
and differing views on the applicability of the 
universality principle in respect of crimes in 
international law.2 They are, (i) that which believes that 
the principle applies only where piracy jure gentium has 
been committed? (ii) that which believes that the 
universality principle should be applied within the 
framework of the aut dedere aut punire formula; (iii) that 
which believes that the principle of universal jurisdiction 
applies to all crimes under international law? and, (iv) 
that which believes that "common crimes", in the absence of 
an effective international extradition system, would be 
justiciable before national tribunals regardless of the
Ibid., pp.292-294.
Op.cit., pp.298-299 para 12(a).
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locus delicti and the nationality of the offender and 
victim.
The agrument that whereas in international law the 
principle of universal jurisdiction applies in respect of 
the crime of piracy jure gentium then it certainly applies 
in respect of the concept of crimes against humanity and 
the other crimes defined under the 1950 law, was accepted 
by the Supreme Court as being beyond reproach. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court subscribed to the third 
school of thought listed above.
Defence counsel submitted two grounds on which the 
accused ought to have been tried in the locus delicti. The 
first is that there is an international obligation to 
invoke the aut dedere aut punire rule. In other words 
Israel ought to have offered Eichmann to be extradited to 
Germany. This submission was denied because the Federal 
Republic of Germany had already made it clear that it would 
not be prepared to try Eichmann. Further, the greater part 
of the evidence including witnesses and documents were to 
be found in Israel. That was the forum conveniens. The 
Court did not pronounce itself on the implied suggestion 
made by the defence that there is a customary law 
obligation to invoke the aut dedere aut punire rule. It 
simply stated that it was not applicable in the 
circumstances of the case.1
Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides that 
the competent tribunal to hear genocide trials is that of 
the State in whose territory the crimes were committed. 
This was the second submission of defence counsel to have 
Eichmann's trial in Israel declared null on the basis of 
lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court interpreted 
Article VI of the Genocide Convention as a conventional 
obligation binding between the States Parties to the 
Convention without derogating from the customary law rule 
which permits any State to exercise universal jurisdiction
Op.cit., pp.302-303 para 12(d).
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in respect of delicti jure gentium including genocide.1
The implications of this legal reasoning are discussed in
Chapter 6 below where "Genocide" is considered.
Accordingly, war crimes committed by Eichmann in
foreign territory against aliens including Jews, but non-
Israeli nationals at the time of the commission, were
deemed justiciable in Israel because:
"their harmful and murderous effects were so 
embracing and widespread as to shake the
international community to its very foundations.
The State of Israel therefore was entitled,
pursuant to the principle of universal
jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of 
international law and an agent for its
enforcement, to try the appellant."3
(c) Current Practice
Most recent State practice in the field of war 
crimes legislation is provided by initiatives taken in 
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. In each case the 
legislator's brief was to focus, inter aliar on the 
following set of circumstances: is legislation required, 
and if so what form should it take, to bring criminal 
proceedings against nationals, suspected of having 
committed war crimes in 1940-1945 but who, at the time of 
commission, were themselves aliens, in foreign territory 
against foreign nationals? In other words, was it 
permissible for States to exercise universal jurisdiction 
for war crimes committed between 1940-1945? These
circumstances are almost wholly responsible for drafting 
war crimes legislation close to fifty years after the 
events occurred. The law is intended to serve more 
retrospective rather than, as with normal criminal 
legislation, prospective ends.
In 1987 and 1988 Canada3 and Australia4 respectively
See op.cit., p.303 para 12(e).
36 ILR p.305 para 12 (f).
Criminal Code Amendment Act, 16th September,
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enacted war crimes legislation as recommended by reports of 
government appointed Inquiries.1 In the United Kingdom no 
legislation has been enacted, although a War Crimes Inquiry 
was appointed in 1988 2 and submitted its Report in 1989.3 
(c.i.) Canada4
The ad hoc Canadian Commission on War Crimes adopted 
a schematic approach by first looking at relevant sources 
of existing Canadian and international law and then by 
recommending amendments to be made to its law in order that 
criminal proceedings may be instituted.
As far as national law is concerned the Commission 
identified certain provisions of its Criminal Code, the 
1945 War Crimes Act and the 1965 Geneva Conventions Act.5 
Each source was deemed inapplicable on the basis of the 
following respective grounds: (i) criminal law in Canada
1987. Generally, see Green, 58 BYIL (1988) 217.
War Crimes Amendment Act 1988.
In Canada, see Report of the Commission of Inquiry on 
War Criminals. 1986. Hereafter referred to as Canada 
War Crimes Report. In Australia, see Review of 
Material Relating to the Entry of Suspected War 
Criminals into Australia. 1986. Parliamentary Paper 
90/87. Hereafter referred to as Australia War Crimes 
Report.
Established by Letter of Appointment of the 15th 
Febuary, 1988. The present writer was asked by Sir 
Thomas Hetherington and Mr. William Chalmers, Members 
of the Inquiry, to prepare and to submit papers 
advising the Inquiry on: the status of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide under 
international law; on the question of retrospective 
criminal legislation and other related matters 
concerning deprivation of citizenship and deportation 
of war criminals.
See Cm.744, hereafter referred to as United Kingdom 
War Crimes Report.
Studies of the Canadian legislation are provided by: 
Fenrick, 12 Dal. LJ (1989-90) 256 and Wagner, 29 Va. 
JIL (1988-89) 887.
See Canada War Crimes Report, pp.113-116, 117-122 and 
123-126.
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is territorial. Canadian courts are permitted to exercise
jurisdiction extraterritorially only in exceptional cases
which do not include the present circumstances; (ii) 1945
war crimes legislation is considered out-of-date,
inapplicable in peace time, and would be in breach of the
Canadian Bill of Rights and Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
finally, (iii) the 1965 Geneva Conventions Act applies only
prospectively, excluding, a priori, the exigencies demanded
by the terms of reference of the Commission.
The Commission also looked at the position under
conventional and customary international law.1 The 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1948 Genocide Convention were
the only two sources identified by the Commission under
conventional international law and both were dismissed as
being inapplicable for the purposes of its brief because of
the prospective application of the instruments. The
Genocide Convention was further deemed inapplicable to war
crimes trials ratione materiae. In so far as the customary
law position was concerned, the Commission opined that the
universality principle of jurisdiction was not a well
supported principle in war crimes trials in 1949:
"universal jurisdiction is far from being 
generally recognized and that the practice of 
states is rather lacking in eloquence when one 
embarks upon an attempt at examining the various 
forms which, according to the International Law 
Commission, (ILC Yrbk.r 1950, v.II, pp.368-372) 
state practice can take, namely: treaties,
decisions of international and national courts, 
national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, 
opinions of national legal advisors, and practice 
of international organizations. The poverty of 
those sources is blatant and obviously does not 
meet the standard necessary for the establishment 
of a customary rule at international law."2
However, the Commission's conclusions on the status of
the universality principle in 1945 as customary law, are
much defused, because the Commission stated that a
Op.cit., pp.127-132. 
Op.cit., pp.129-130.
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customary rule of international law is only applicable 
under Canadian law if ratified by statute.
Article 11(g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which reads as follows:
•'Nothing in this article shall prejudice the 
trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was 
committed, was criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of 
nations”
would permit, nonetheless, in the Commision's view, war 
crimes trials to be held in Canada because war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are criminal offences according to 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations 
and as such, therefore, are crimes under international law.
Article 11(g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms clearly reproduces the essence of Article 7(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 15(2) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The Commission examined the travaux preparatoires 
of both of these provisions in some detail including 
relevant judicial practice under the European Convention.1 
It traced the history of the adoption of both clauses and 
neatly summarised the arguments submitted for their 
adoption. Those submitted during the UN Third Committee's 
debate on Article 15(2) of the International Covenant merit 
reproduction because they are wholly relevant to the 
present discussion. The Commission reports that some 
Member States submitted, inter alia, that Article 15(2) is 
necessary because:
a) The provision is designed to avoid doubts 
about the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials?
b) There are still many war criminals to be 
punished?
c) The provision would prevent war criminals from 
escaping justice because their offences were not 
provided for under domestic or international law?
d) Deleting it would absolve persons guilty under 
international law.
The Yugoslav delegate is specifically quoted by the
See Canada War Crimes Report, pp.137-143.
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Commission as having said:
"The question the (Third) Committee should ask 
itself was whether it wished war criminals to be 
punished. If as he was sure it did, there could 
be no objection to inserting in the draft 
Covenants a provision which would ensure that 
that would be done." 1
Armed with this source material and supported by
national parliamentary debates interpreting Article 11(g)
of the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms as
permitting war crimes trials in Canada, the Commission
concluded - erroneously - that this sub-clause
"stands as an exception2 to the principle of non­
retroactivity of penal laws .... and opens the 
way to the prosecution and punishment of those 
guilty of crimes committed during World War II."3
Of all the admirable research and deductive arguments 
presented by the Commission it erred at its most delicate 
point, namely the basis on which it was to build its
recommendations for legislation to the Canadian Government. 
This is evident in the recommendations submitted. The 
basic flaw in the Commission's conclusion is that it failed 
to appreciate "general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations" as a source of international law. The 
dicates of the maxims "nullum crimen sine leae / nulla 
poena sine leae", these too being general principles of 
law, are just as applicable where the legal source is 
unwritten as when it is written. Far from being exceptions 
to these maxims, Article 7(2) of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Article 15(2) of the International
Covenant represent their very affirmation. They were not 
drafted to permit legislation to be enacted retrospectively
Ibid., pp.142-143. The Commission also reproduces 
Canada's explanation of its vote on Article 15(2) in 
the Third Committee which, in the Commission's words, 
was "not glorious". Canada had abstained on the 
motion to delete 15(2) simply "because the majority of 
the (Third) Committee members seemed to wish to retain 
the paragraph".
Emphasis added.
Op.cit., p.141.
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allowing persons to be tried for wrongs which were not 
criminal offences at the time of their commission.
The portrayal of Articles 7(2) and 15(2) as "an
exception" to retrospective criminal legislation, allowed
the Commission to recommend to the Canadian government to
consider legislating retroactively in the sense that Canada
would be able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes by virtue of jurisdictional bases when, at the time
of the commission of the offences, it was not permitted
under international law to invoke those same bases of
jurisdiction.1 The Commission recommended that Canada
adopts legislation to take jurisdiction over persons who,
as aliens in 1940, either committed or were victims of war
crimes and subsequently became Canadian citizens or came to
be present in Canadian territory. If adopted as such,
legislation would be tantamount to applying the active and
the passive personality principles, and the universality
principle of jurisdiction, to a period in time when Canada
was not permitted to apply them.
The Commission's recommendations were thus
retrospective ratione temporis. which is a less acceptable
but equally disagreeable proposition than retrospective
legislation ratione materiae.
The following is the relevant section on jurisdiction
as adopted in the 1987 war crimes legislative amendments to
the Canadian Criminal Code:
"(1.91) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or 
any other Act, every person who, either before or 
after the coming into force of this subsection, 
commits an act or omission outside Canada that 
constitutes a war crime or a crime against 
humanity and that, if committed in Canada, would 
constitute an offence against the laws of Canada 
in force at the time of the act or omission shall 
be deemed to commit that act or omission in 
Canada at that time if,
(a) at the time of the act or omission,
(i) that person is a Canadian citizen or is
See Canada War Crimes Report, p.168.
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employed by Canada in a civilian or military 
capacity,
(ii) that person is a citizen of, or is employed 
in a civilian or military capacity by, a state 
that is engaged in an armed conflict against 
Canada, or
(iii) the victim of the act or omission is a 
Canadian citizen or a citizen of a state that is 
allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or
(b) at the time of the act or omission, Canada could, 
in conformity with international law, exercise 
jurisdiction over the person with respect to the 
act or omission on the basis of the person's 
presence in Canada, and subsequent to the time of 
the act or omission the person is present in 
Canada.111
The 1987 Amendment to the Criminal Code also contained
a definition, ratione temporis, of war crimes which must be
read jointly with section 1.91 above:
” 'war crime' means an act or omission that is 
committed during an international armed conflict, 
whether or not it constitutes a contravention of 
the law in force at the time and in the place of 
its commission, and that, at that time and in 
that place, constitutes a contravention of the 
customary international law or conventional 
international law applicable in international 
armed conflicts.”
As amended the Criminal Code provides Canadian courts 
with the competence to exercise jurisdiction on the basis 
of the active and passive personality principles (just as 
recommended by the Commission) over enemy nationals and in 
cases where the victims were allied nationals. In 
Parliament the Canadian Government declared that these 
bases of jurisdiction are fair because they attach 
jurisdiction due to the persons's status at the time of the 
commission of the offence. They are fairer than the 
Commission's recommendation because they reflect the 
practice as applied by States in 1939-1945. Unlike the 
Commission's proposal the law does not permit jurisdiction 
to be exercised on the basis of the person's subsequent
Section 1 Criminal Code Amendment Act 1987.
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acquisition of Canadian nationality. An additional
safeguard against retrospectivity in the law is the 
requirement that the act constituted a war crime under 
international law and a criminal offence under Canadian law 
at the time of commission.
Finally, the new law also provides for the
universality principle. The same degree of attention
against elements of retrospectivity in the application of 
this ground of jurisdiction was given by the legislator as 
to the personality principles. The presence of the 
qualifying words: "in conformity with international law"
in section 1.91(b) of the Amendment Act is intended 
specifically to ensure that Canada will only exercise
universal jurisdiction in respect of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity if it was permissible for States to 
exercise such jurisdiction under international law at the 
time of commission. The Government's position is 
summarised as follows: depending on the time period in 
history, universal jurisdiction may or may not, exist? 
this will have to be established under paragraph 1.91.b, 
and it is prepared to do so in court where necessary.
The Canadian legislator's efforts to respect the 
jurisdictional principles applicable to war crimes under 
customary law are manifest. The Criminal Code Amemdment 
Act of 1987 on war crimes constitutes a rare sample of 
legislation because, without violating the legality 
principle, it is as retrospective as it is prospective. It 
has withstood its first test in Rea, v Finta.1 It was held 
that the crimes defined in the Amendment Act were not in 
violation of the nullum crimen sine leae principle. The 
court also made an interesting distinction between 
"retroactive" and "retrospective" legislation. The former 
is interpreted in the traditional meaning i.e., a law which 
defines an act as a crime when at the time of commission 
it was not an offence. The latter is interpreted as
82 ILE (1989) 425.
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referring to laws which regulate circumstances which have 
already occured but, without creating new criminal 
offences. Accordingly, the court held the provisions on 
jurisdiction in the Amendment Act to be "retrospective".
But, notwithstanding this curious distinction, the
weaknessess in the interpretation of the Canadian
Commission on War Crimes with respect to the principle laid 
down in Article 7(2) and 15(2) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the International Covenant 
respectively, remain, and as such are, a warning sign for 
other States that wish to draft similar legislation.
(c.ii.) Australia
The foregoing remarks are not as deserving by the 
Australia War Crimes Amendment Act 1988, as its Canadian 
counterpart. Unlike Canada, Australia opted to introduce 
fresh war crimes legislation into the statute book by 
amending its 1945 War Crimes Act rather than fashioning 
separate legislation. Although this approach was possibly 
chosen in order to avoid confusion by having two sets of 
war crimes legislation, Australia has repealed, save for 
its title, the entire content of the 1945 War Crimes Act. 
Accordingly, it has deleted from its statute book the 
generally accepted definition of war crimes in 
international law, previously contained in the original 
1945 Act, and replaced it by the concept of "serious 
crime".
Further, the statutory vehicle chosen by Australia has 
removed altogether the competence of military tribunals to 
try war crimes trials "prodiving instead for their trial by 
civil courts.111
Only Australian citizens and residents are liable to 
be prosecuted under the new law (section 11 of the
See Explanatory Memorandum of the War Crimes Amendment 
Bill 1987 r Parliament of the Commonwealth of
Australia, House of Representatives, 1988,
No.16024/88, Cat. No. 8868660.
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Amendment Act). Unlike the methodology adopted in the 
Canadian Criminal Code there is no list of bases on which 
jurisdiction ratione personae is to be exercised. There is 
no mention of the application of the active and passive 
personality principles and the universality principle. 
These are to be deduced only by implication. The law has 
introduced the following changes.
First, the accused will now be an Australian national or 
a resident whereas under the 1945 Act "any person" could be 
tried for war crimes. This was the practice in 1939-1949 
and Canadian legislation followed that practice.
Second, the term "person" under the new law means: a
national and a resident of Australia, a British subject and 
an allied national. The term is only limited in so far as 
it applies to the accused. This broadly covers the passive 
personality principle and thus follows the Canadian law.
Third, there is no provision concerning the universality 
principle of jurisdiction. But this does not mean that it 
is irrelevant to war crimes trials under the 1988 Amendment 
Act.
There is no evidence either in the travaux 
preparatoires. including the relevant Bills in Parliament, 
or indeed in the law itself which suggests that henceforth 
Australian courts will not be competent to hear trials for 
crimes committed in foreign territory in 1939-1945 by non­
nationals against non-nationals. The question arises 
whether Australian courts enjoyed such jurisdiction in 
1939-1945. The response would probably have been in the 
affirmative had the Australian legislator, like his 
Canadian counterpart, taken the necessary precautions by 
adopting definitions of crimes and bases of jurisdiction 
operative under international law in 1939-1945. However, 
given the content ratione materiae and ratione personae of 
the new law, Australian courts will now exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of the active and passive 
personality principles and on the basis of the universality 
principle in respect of crimes committed forty/fifty years;
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ago by or against persons who were aliens at the time of 
the commission and have since acquired Australian 
citizenship or residency. Thus Australia will exercise 
jurisdiction when it may not have been permissible, at the 
time of the commission of the offences, for it to take that 
jurisdiction under international law.
The Australian Amendment War Crimes Act 1988, as its 
Canadian parallel, does incorporate the redeeming safeguard 
namely that the crimes proscribed become justiciable only 
on condition that, if at the time of commission, they would 
have been punishable as criminal offences under Australian 
criminal law.
Overall, however, Australia has failed where Canada has
succeeded namely, not to allow itself to be exposed to the
comments so well phrased by the Attorney General in Canada:
"We don't care what international law states. We 
don't care whether or not international law will 
permit the prosecution of this person under the 
traditional international bases or under the 
internationally recognised universal jurisdiction 
principle. But if you are a Canadian
(Australian) citizen/resident today you must be 
held accountable for all your past sins committed 
outside Canada (Australia) merely because you are 
a Canadian (Australian) citizen today."1
(c.iii.) The United Kingdom
In comparison to Canada and Australia, initiatives in the 
United Kingdom to legislate for war crimes between 1988- 
1990 2 are almost unique.
In its terms of reference, the War Crimes Inquiry was 
provided with a most peculiar definition of war crimes. It 
included the crime of genocide, and thus the Inquiry felt
Minutes of Proceedings on Debate in House 
"Comparison between Bill 1-71 and the Deschenes 
Commission Report", pp.5-6.
These dates mark the period since the War Crimes 
Inquiry was appointed (15th February 1988) by the Home 
Secretary to report on whether legislation ought to be 
introduced in Parliament and that in which the War 
Crimes Bill was voted down in the House of Lords.
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obliged to consider it at some length. But, quite properly, 
the Inquiry devoted attention to the concept of violations 
of the laws of customs of war/war crimes which is to be 
found in the, still operative, Royal Warrant of 1945. The 
Inquiry studied the historical development of war crimes 
from times preceding the Second World War up to the 
adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 
Additional Protocols. It found substantial evidence 
suggesting that a generally recognised definition of the 
concept of war crimes had been established in 1945 and 
that, at that time, Great Britain and international 
practice generally endorsed various bases of jurisdiction 
on which war crimes became justiciable before national and 
international tribunals, including the right of a 
belligerent to try captured enemy nationals for war crimes.1
Aware of the Canadian and Australian experiences in
providing for the question of retrospectivity, the Inquiry
clearly separated between legislation which would be in
breach of the nullum crimen sine leae principle, from
legislation which would enable the United Kingdom to take
jurisdiction over persons who committed crimes almost half
a century ago, as long as it was entitled to take that
jurisdiction under international law but, for separate
reasons, had failed to do so by Parliamentary Statute. The
only element of retrospectivity in such form of legislation
would be that it is operative vis-a-vis events which have
already occured.
"(The) enactment of legislation in this country 
to allow the prosecution of 'war crimes' in 
British courts would not be retrospective: it
would merely empower British courts to utilise a 
jurisdiction already available to them under 
international law since before 1939, over crimes 
which had been internationally recognised as such 
since before 1939 by nations including both the 
United Kingdom and Germany".2
1. United Kingdom War Crimes Report, para 5.42 p.54 and 
para 6.44 p.63.
2. See United Kingdom War Crimes Reportr pp.63-64
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Accordingly, jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione 
personae must both meet the test of non-retrospectivity in 
any legislation purporting to render 1939-1945 war crimes 
justiciable before national courts in 1990 and thereafter. 
Regrettably, the UK 1990 War Crimes Bill fails this test.
The scope of the Bill ratione materiae provides that 
murder, manslaughter or culpable homicide are justiciable 
if committed between 1st September 1939 and 5th June 1945 
in Germany or in German occupied territory and constitute 
violations of the laws and customs of war. The following 
points are significant.
(a) The War Crimes Bill burdened the Prosecution with the 
onus of proving that the offences constitute, in the 
circumstances of each case, violations of the laws and 
customs of war. In this respect serious difficulties 
are likely to be experienced especially vis-a-vis the 
offence of culpable homicide.
(b) Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, certain 1944-1945 
national war crimes legislation and more recent 
judicial and legislative practice, the War Crimes Bill 
did not define, in any form whatsoever, violations of 
the laws and customs of war.
(c) Again unlike the sources stated above, there is no 
reference in the Bill to the status of violations of 
the laws and customs, of war in international law. 
Indeed, there is no reference to f,war crimes”.
Within this background and given that the scope of the 
Bill ratione personae was to prosecute crimes committed 
only by persons who, on the 8th March 1990 or thereafter, 
have or will have acquired British nationality, the 
following factors must be noted.
(a) Contrary to legislative practice the War Crimes Bill 
hardly gives proper consideration to the traditional 
bases of jurisdiction including the active and passive 
personality principles and their proper application in
para 6.44.
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respect of war crimes under international law by 
national tribunals in 1939-1945.
(b) The broad statement of the active personality 
principle proposed in the Bill necessarily applies 
retrospectively, i.e., not in the sense that it will 
apply in proceedings concerning crimes committed 
before the adoption of the legislation, which is 
inevitable; but that if it were not for the 
application of this principle criminal proceedings 
would not be possible at all. This procedure ignores 
the issue of whether or not Britain was permitted 
under international law to institute same proceedings 
for same offences on the basis of the nationality of 
the offender at the time of the commission of the 
offences and not at the time of legislative enactment.
The drafter of the War Crimes Bill failed to appreciate 
the concern expressed by his Canadian counterpart for this 
form of retrospective application of the active personality 
principle. Furthermore, the legislator, conditioned 
presumably by tradition and desire to restrict as far as 
possible extraterritorial application of criminal law in 
the United Kingdom, underestimated the customary law status 
of the various bases of jurisdiction applied throughout the 
course of the twentieth century in war crimes trials.
II. Superior Orders
1914-1918 source material relevant to the 
applicability of the defence of "superior orders” to war 
crimes in international law is scant. The Report of the 
1919 Commission on the Authors of War, the Treaty of 
Versailles and the 1919-1920 Peace Treaties are all silent 
on the matter. The question did arise, however, in two 
cause celebres before the Leipsig Supreme Court namely, the 
Dover Castle and the Llandovery Castle trials.1
Judgments of both cases are reported in 2 Ann.Dig. 
(1923-24) at pp.429 and 436 respectively. Important 
background information on these and other British
In the first case the accused, a German naval officer 
(Karl Neumann) was charged with committing a violation of 
the law of war as a result of torpoeding a British hospital 
ship. The accused admitted as having been instructed in 
the laws of sea warfare and declared that the explosion of 
the hospital vessel was such that confirmed German 
suspicions of the unlawful use of such ships for the 
transportation of arsenal and explosives. In the 
circumstances he did not think the order to be unlawful.
The Supreme Court accepted the plea of "superior 
orders" because the two criteria identified by the Court 
under German (and not under international) law were not 
applicable. The plea of "superior orders" would be 
inadmissable if: (a) the accused exceeded his order and
(b) if both he and his superior were aware that the order 
constituted a crime at military and civil law.
The facts in the Llandovery Castle case were almost 
identical to that in the Dover Castle except that the 
accused fired upon the sick and wounded immediately after 
the hospital ship was torpoedoed and two of three lifeboats 
carrying survivors were destroyed. The Supreme Court 
considered this action to be an offence against the law of 
nations engendering individual criminal responsibility.1 
It denied the plea of "superior orders" and sentenced the 
accused to four years imprisonment.
Other than this judicial practice, gualified as it 
is, the notion that "superior orders" was considered 
inadmissable in 1914-1918 as a defence to war crimes in 
international law is hardly sustained. The position under 
the then operative British and American military manuals 
did not uphold the view that "superior orders" ought not to 
be accepted as a basis of defence. On the contrary 
Paragraph 443, Chapter XIV Paragraph 443, of the British
Trials at Leipsig are found in HM Treasury Solicitor's 
Files. TS26/16 & 17, 1921.
2 Ann.Dig. 436-437. See also Oppenheim, International 
Law, v.II, p.569 n.2.
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Manual, 1914, read as follows:
"Members of the armed forces who commit such 
violations of the recognised rules of warfare as 
are ordered by their Government, or their 
commander, are not war criminals and cannot 
therefore be punished by the enemy".
This paragraph was amended in 1944 and the background to
that amendment is described presently. However, the
position in 1914-1918 on "superior orders" and war crimes
in international law was very much embryonic. The Supreme
Court of Israel confirmed this in the Eichmann Case.1 The
opinion of publicists expressed after the First World War
is divided on the application or otherwise of "superior
orders" to war crimes.2
The position in Paragraph 443 of the British Manual
was drafted by the eminent authority on international law,
the late Professor Oppenheim. This results from 1943-1944
correspondence between the Judge Advocate General's Office
and that of the Solicitor-General. The British Manual was
in line with Oppenheim's fifth edition of his treatise on
international law. However, during the course of the war
British, American and French practice reveals how State
opinion towards the question of "superior orders" altered.
The correspondence cited above reveals quite clearly
the movement towards prohibiting the plea of "superior
orders" raised in defence. In a letter sent to the
Solicitor-General from the Judge Advocate General's Office
in July 1943 the following view was expressed:
" 'Superior orders' (is) no defence, except 
possibly where an accused was a mere automation 
such as a member of a firing squad who really had 
no discretion and would himself probably be shot 
if he disobeyed the order."3
36 ILR p.315 para 15.C.1.
See Garner 14 AJIL (1920) 70 at 83-94 and in
International Law and the World War. 1920, v.2, p.588. 
See also Oppenheim, International Law. v.II, para 253, 
p.568 n.2.
See TS File 26/64, 1943-1944.
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It is also understood from the same letter that the 
Americans took the same position as Britain.
The Solicitor-General's reply came in early 1944 and 
indicates that after holding conference with the Advocate- 
General Paragraph 443 of the British Manual was to be 
amended to reflect the position advanced by the Judge 
Advocate General. The following points are specifically 
identified in the Solicitor General's reply:
(a) The new version of Paragraph 443 should be 
fashioned along the lines of the opinion 
(then) offered in Oppenheim's sixth edition 
(v.II p.453).
(b) A footnote ought to accompany Paragraph 443 
as amended indicating that the text was 
altered in accordance with Oppenheim's sixth 
edition.
(c) The footnote is also to mention that Oppenheim 
had drafted Paragraph 443 prior to its amendment. 
It is also to be stated that the position in 
practice had been reversed, that this change was 
expressed by publicists in their writings and, 
significantly, that Paragraph 443 as previously 
stated was inconsistent with the Llandovery 
Castle decision.
These suggestions were taken on board by the Judge
Advocate General's Office which drafted an amendment to
Paragraph 443 reproducing almost verbatim Oppenheim's view
on "superior orders" as expressed in the sixth edition of
his treatise and now found in volume II paragraph 253 of
the last edition.1
"The fact that a rule of warfare has been 
violated in pursuance of an order of the 
belligerent Government or of an individual 
belligerent commander does not deprive the act in 
guestion of its character as a war crime? neither 
does it, in principle, confer upon the
perpetrator immunity from punishment by the
injured belligerent  Undoubtedly, a Court
confronted with the plea of superior orders 
adduced in justification of a war crime is bound 
to take into consideration the fact that
obedience to military orders, not obviously 
unlawful, is the duty of every member of the
Oppenhe op.cit., pp.568-569.
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armed forces and that the latter cannot, in 
conditions of war discipline, be expected to 
weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order
received? ....  the question is governed by the
major principle that members of the armed forces 
are bound to obey lawful orders only and that 
they cannot therefore escape liability if, in 
obedience to a command, they commit acts which 
both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and 
outrage the general sentiment of humanity.”1
War crimes legislation adopted in 1944 by the
governments in exile of France and Poland both contain
provision for the non-applicability of the defence of
"superior orders". Article 3 of the French Ordonnance of
28th August, 1944 Concerning the Repression of War Crimes,
following the view stated in Oppenheim, denies the plea to
be made in respect of crimes committed on orders issued by
a belligerent commander. Article 5 of the Polish Decree
makes no mention of orders issued by commanders but simply
states that crimes committed upon issue of orders do not
relieve the accused from responsibility.
The standard set out in Article 8 of the Nuremberg
Charter and in Articles 6 and II.4.b. of the Tokyo Charter
and CCL No.10 respectively, was endorsed in post-war
legislation2 and judicial practice,3 and it was also
Ch. XIV, Para. 627 of The Law of War on Land 
reads:
"Obedience to the order of a Government or 
of a superior, whether military or civil, or 
to a national law or regulation, affords no 
defence to a charge of committing a war 
crime but may be considered in mitigation of 
punishment."
Part III of the British Manual of Military Law, HMSO, 
1958.
See Regulation 15 attached to the 1946 Canada War 
Crimes Act, Article 5 of the Norwegian law of 13th 
December, 1946; and Regulation 9 of the US 
Mediterranean Regulations, in WC Law Rep.; vol.IV, 
p.129; vol.Ill, p.85? and vol.I, p.120 respectively. 
See also Netherlands' Decree No.45 of 1946 applicable 
to its territories in the East Indies, ibid., vol. XI, 
pp. 98-99. China's law of 1946 is silent on the 
question of "superior orders", ibid., vol. XIV, p.157.
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formulated as a principle of international law by the
United Nations General Assembly-1 Article 8 of the
Nuremberg Charter provides:
"The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to 
order of his Government or of a superior shall 
not free him from responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment, if the 
Tribunal determines that justice so requires."
The Nuremberg Judgment held this provision to be in
conformity with international law and that the true test of
mitigating punishment for war crimes committed in pursuance
of "superior orders" is whether moral choice is possible to
the offender at time of commission.2
Generally see the decisions reported in WC Law Rep.. 
15 vols. 1947-1949. However, the decisions delivered 
in: the Trial of Sawada & Three Others. U.S. Military
Commission, Shanghai, 1946, (ibid., v.V); In re List 
and Others (Hostages Trial). U.S. Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 1948, (ibid., v.VIII); The Trial of Von 
Falkenhorstf British Military Court, Brunswick, 1946, 
(ibid., v.XI)? The Peleus Trial. British Military 
Court, Hamburg, 1945, (ibid., v.I) and the Dostler 
Case. U.S. Military Commission, Rome, 1945 (ibid.). 
The last two decisions are cited as leading 
authorities on the defence of "superior orders" in 
post-World War II trials. They have identified a 
number of elements in applying the principle as stated 
in Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter. In effect the 
elements constitute a resume' of Oppenheim's 
consideration of "superior orders" and they are: (a) 
officers are only bound to follow lawful orders, (b) 
violations of the laws of warfare including general 
sentiments of humanity committed in pursuance of 
orders consitute war crimes and (c) the order does not 
confer immunity from criminal prosecution.
See Nuremberg Principle IV, ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II, 
p.375. A discussion of Nuremberg Principle IV is at 
Chapter 9 infra under the appropriate heading on 
Superior Orders.
Cmnd. 6964, p.42. See also the travaux preparatories 
relevant to Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, 
Jackson Report, pp. 367-368 where it emerges clearly 
that the intention of the drafters was to adhere to 
the international law position on the matter namely, 
to allow the defence of "superior orders" to be 
considered for purposes of mitigation of punishment.
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In United States v Ohlendorf.1 the United States 
Military Tribunal upheld the position enunciated in the 
First World War period, namely that subordinates are only 
bound to follow lawful orders and added that "superior 
orders" may not be pleaded where the order is manifestly 
unlawful. However, the Tribunal introduced, as mitigating 
factors, the elements of imminent, real and inevitable harm 
to which the accused would have exposed himself had he 
refused the order if the circumstances were such that the 
resultant harm to the subordinate would be 
disproportionately greater than that which would have 
resulted from executing the illegal order.
Neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor their 
Additional Protocols of 1977 contain provisions concerning 
the question of "superior orders". Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I is an impressive provision which establishes a 
minimum standard of fundamental guarantees for the 
protection of prisoners of war. Some of its sub-clauses are 
indirectly relevant to the issue of "superior orders" as a 
defence to war crimes.
Sub-clause 4(b) guarantees that a person tried for 
committing a "penal offence (war crimes included) related 
to the armed conflict" should not be convicted except on 
the basis of individual penal responsibility. Sub-clause 
7 adds that in war crimes trials the following two 
principles are applicable: (i) the accused is entitled to 
be tried in accordance with the applicable rules of 
international law and (ii) if the accused does not benefit, 
in his trial, from more favourable treatment under the 1949 
Conventions or Additional Protocol I, the provisions of 
Article 75 remain operative even where the charge is for 
the commission of "grave breaches".
Article 87 of the same Protocol defines duties of 
military commanders and is included in SECTION II of the 
Protocol which provides for States Parties to repress
15 Ann.Dig. (1948) 656 at 665-668.
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breaches (including grave breaches/war crimes) of the 1949
Conventions and Additional Protocol I. Commanders are
required to prevent all officers and persons under their
control from committing breaches of the Conventions and of
the Additional Protocol. They are also required to
suppress and to report such breaches to competent
authorities. Further, Commanders are required to ensure
that such persons under their control are, as commensurate
with their level of responsibility, aware of their
obligations under the Conventions and Additional Protocols.
Article 86 of same Protocol I, also coming within the
parameter of SECTION II of the Protocol, provides for what
is known as the responsibility of superior officers
("respondeat superior”). Article 86.2 reads as follows:
"The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of 
this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does 
not absolve his superiors from penal or 
disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, 
if they knew, or had information which should 
have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing 
or was going to commit such a breach and if they 
did not take all feasible measures within their 
power to prevent or repress the breach."
Jointly read, the following points emerge from the above 
provisions:
(1) Military officers including Commanders are duty 
bound to be learned in the rules regulating armed 
conflict. They ought to know, therefore, what 
constitutes a violation of the laws of war which 
engenders individual criminal responsibility.
(2) The principle of individual criminal 
responsibility is the basis of any war crimes 
trial.
(3) The criminal responsibility, if any, of the 
superior is, subject to the provisions of Article 
86.(2) of Additional Protocol I, always incurred 
and cannot be waived on the basis that the crime 
is committed by a subordinate officer or private 
soldier. Thus, arguing a contrario sensu and on 
the basis of the elements in (1) and (2) above, 
it is reasonable to assume that the inverse of 
the respondent superior rule may equally be 
applied in trials for "grave breaches" under the 
1949 Conventions and the 1977 Additional
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Protocols. The question whether or not Msuperior 
orders" will be accepted as a mitigating factor 
and, if so, in what manner, is to be decided by 
the forum having due regard to the development of 
"superior orders" as a defence in war crimes 
proceedings. This approach would be in 
consonance with the scope of Article 75.7.a of 
Additional Protocol I which seeks to ensure that 
all relevant rules of international law are 
applied in such trials.
A final observation on the defence of "superior 
orders" is the position adopted in recent Australian and 
Canadian legislation. The Australian War Crimes Act 1988 
(Article 14) follows the rules laid down in Article 8 of 
the Nuremberg Charter. Regulation (15) annexed to the 
Canada War Crimes Act of 1946 which reproduces the 
Nuremberg position continues to be operative under Canadian 
law. The Canadian amendment to the Criminal Code does not 
address "superior orders" specifically but it contains a 
general provision which provides that any grounds of 
defence available under Canadian or international law 
either at the time of the commission of the offence or at 
the time of the proceedings may be invoked in a war crimes 
trial.
III. The Political Offence Exception Principle 
Defining the concept of a political offence is problematic 
and it escapes formulation by means of a standard 
definition. The conceptual meaning of a political offence 
has developed from an act committed by one party against 
another in the course of and in furtherance of a political 
struggle as defined in the leading 19th century decisions 
In re Castioni1 and In re Meunier2. to criminal offences 
ordinarily punishable under municipal law but deemed not to 
be extraditable because they are committed for political
[1891], 1 O.B. 149. 
[1894], 2 O.B. 415.
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purposes.1 This is the political offence exception rule.2
In this chapter the question arises whether the 
political offence exception rule is applicable where 
aggressive war (more often than not waged for political 
purposes) and war crimes have been committed. The present 
writer believes that they should not. They ought to 
qualify as exceptions to the political offence exception 
rule.3 The reason is that if crimes in international law, 
like municipal law crimes, are recognised as political 
offences, the perpetrators of the most heinous form of 
criminal activity - a crime against the international 
community - would avoid extradition and possibly 
prosecution by successfully invoking the political offence 
exception rule.4 An early example is that of Emperor 
Willhem II of Hohenzollern who after the First World War 
escaped prosecution for waging a war of aggression by 
seeking political refuge in the Netherlands. Where a 
requested State is of the opinion that an extradition 
request should be refused,5 it ought to institute criminal
R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte 
Kolcynskif 1 All E.R. (1955) 31.
Generally see, Van den Wijngaert, The Political 
Offence Exception to Extradition. 1980, p.95.
In support of this view, see Wijngaert, op. cit., 
p.133 et seq.
See Fawcett, 34 BYIL (1958) 391 and Green, 11
ICLQ (1962) 354.
In re Kahrs, Supreme Court, Brazil, 15 Ann.Dig. 1948, 
301, and in Karadzole v Artukovic. 247 F. 2d. f 1954^ 205 
it was held that an extradition request for alleged 
war criminals will be denied where it seems evident 
that the requested person is either unlikely to 
receive a fair trial in the requesting State or is 
likely to be prosecuted for his political opinions. 
See Wijngaert, op.cit., pp.144-145 and Green, 11 ICLQ 
346-349. Requests made by the USSR to the Federal 
Republic of Germany for the extradition of persons 
alleged to have committed war crimes on Russian 
territory were refused on the ground that the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany prohibits the 
extradition of its own nationals. See, The Times,
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proceedings under its own national law.1
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are silent on the 
applicability or otherwise of the political offence 
exception rule in respect of proceedings for grave breaches 
commissions, but it does provide for the aut dedere aut 
punire principle.2 Additional Protocol I 3 of 1977 slightly 
improves that position whereby the High Contracting 
Parties, subject to certain conditions, are obliged to co­
operate in matters of extradition and to give due 
consideration to the request of the State in whose 
territory the alleged offence occurred.
It has been argued by some4: (a) that there is no rule 
in international law which prohibits aggressive war and war 
crimes committed for political motives from coming within 
the general notion of a political offence and (b) that in 
such cases the perpetrators are not necessarily liable to
11th July, 1987, p.5. Cf. U.K. amendment (UN Doc. 
E/CN4/L.1250) to draft resolution submitted by 
Byelorussian SSR (UN Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1248 - 21st March, 
1973) on "The Question of the Punishment of War 
Criminals and Persons Who Have Committed Crimes 
Against Humanity”.
At the drafting stages of the UN Convention on 
Torture, the USSR submitted an amendment (UN Doc. 
E/1979/36 - E/CN.4/1347) stipulating that where a
person charged with the offence of torture, as 
provided under the proposed convention, is not 
extradited because of fear of being subjected to 
torture practices in the requesting State, he shall be 
prosecuted by the State in whose territory he is 
present if he had committed "crimes against peace or 
mankind", or war crimes. The proposal was not adopted. 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1367, 1980, p.6 para 32.
See Convention I: Article 49, Convention II: Article 
50, Convention III: Article 129 and Convention IV: 
Article 146.
Article 88. (2).
Lauterpacht, 21 BYIL (1944) 91 and Garcia-Mora, 53 KLR 
(1964) 52. See also Wijngaert writing in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law Volume III EnforcementP 
1987, p.89.
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extradition1 as long as their actions were not contrary to 
the laws and customs of warfare. This statement,
especially in view of the declaration made at Nuremberg2 
that aggressive war "is the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole", is very 
curious. It seems contradictory to say that war crimes and 
aggressive war may be accepted as legitimate political 
offences as long as they are not in violation of the laws 
of war when they inherently constitute such violations.
There is a substantial body of evidence which refutes 
the view that war crimes committed under international law 
for political motives should not be comparable to political 
crimes committed under municipal law. Dr. Lachs3 (later 
President of the International Court) provides a succinct 
but most penetrating analysis of the relationship between 
war crimes and the concept of political offences: "the
political offence enjoys three privileges....the privilege 
that the deed is not dishonourable, the punishment is not 
dishonourable and that extradition is not granted.... on 
the other hand we have war crimes". This viewpoint is 
endorsed by other publicists4 and by both international and 
academic bodies.5
1. Cf. Wijngaert, op.cit., p.140, para 3.2.3.
2. Nuremberg Judgment, Cmnd. 6964, p. 13.
3. 56 Jurid. Rev. (1944) 27 at 39.
4. See among others: Morgens tern, 25 BYIL (1948) 382,
Green, 11 ICLO (1962) 329, Glaser, RDPCrim. (1948) 766 
and Garcia Mora, 9 Wavne LR (1963) 269.
5. A resolution on Extradition adopted by the Institute 
of International Law at its Oxford Session in 1880 
provides guidelines for States in determining whether 
acts for which extradition is demanded are of a 
political character. The resolution implies that 
certain acts are not to be considered political 
offences if they run counter to customs of war. See 
Scott, Resolutions of the Institute of International
Law, 1916, p.44.
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In the Asvlum Case1 Judge Alvarez2 opined that crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and the waging of 
war "cannot be qaulified as political offences". It has
The Cambridge Commission on Penal Reconstruction and 
Development recommended that war criminals should not 
be treated as political offenders and that neutral 
States should not grant them asylum. See also draft 
article 5 para.l. of the IAPL Draft International 
Criminal Code, 52 RIDP (1981) 172.
The second report submitted by J. Spiropoulos, ILC 
Rapporteur on the Draft Code of Offences between 1950- 
1954, contained a draft text of articles which 
included a provision (Draft Article IV, ILC Yrbk.. 
1951, v.II, p.60), rendering inapplicable the poltical 
offence exception rule vis-a-vis the crimes defined 
therein which included war crimes. Draft article IV 
read:
"Crimes defined in this Code shall not be 
considered as political crimes for the 
purpose of extradition.
The States adopting the Code undertake to 
grant extradition in accordance with their 
laws and treaties in force."
The draft article was supported in principle, although 
there was some debate concerning the wording (ibid., 
v.I, p.82 para. 25 - p.86 para. 69 and p.86 para. 73 
p.87 para 91, and p.244 para 112 - p.245 para 134). 
However, the draft article was not adopted (ibid., 
p.247 para 1 - p.248 para. 18) because it was felt 
that it gave rise to procedural issues better dealt 
with in discussions concerning the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court. The ILC has not, so 
far, adopted in its current work on the Draft Code (as 
at its Forty-First Session [1989]) a provision similar 
in scope to the draft provision quoted above.
A Draft Convention on Extradition drafted by a team of 
Harvard University Research Scholars (29 AJIL (1935) 
p. 15) neither admits exceptions to the political 
offence exception rule nor restricts States from 
determining the political character of the offences. 
But the drafters stated that violations of the laws of 
war are recognised as exceptions to the political 
offence question (op. cit*, p.115).
ICJ Rep.. 1950.
Diss. Op., ibid., p.298.
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also been held in municipal decisions1 that war crimes do 
not qualify as political offences.
Since the 1942 Inter-Allied Declaration which affirmed 
that acts of violence inflicted upon civilian populations 
have nothing in common with acts of war and political 
offences as understood by civilised nations/ there has been 
a steady growing movement in treaty law to ensure that the 
political offence exception rule does not apply to war 
crimes.
In the 1975 Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Extradition3 we find that violations of the 
laws of war and the 'grave breaches' specified in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions form part of the exceptions to the 
political offence exception rule. Similar provisions are 
found in other regional instruments. For instance 'acts of 
terrorism' are excluded from the application of the 
political offence exception rule in an Extradition 
Agreement concluded between member States of the Arab 
League.4 The phrase "acts of terrorism" is controversial. 
It gives rise to many problems of definition and for that 
reason ought to have been avoided, but certainly war crimes 
and aggressive war may take on the guise of acts of 
terrorism. The 1981 Inter-American Convention on
Re Extradition Act 1870. 1 WLR (1962) 12 and at 55 ILR 
(1979) 550? R v Wilson ex parte Witness T . 135 CLR 
(1976) 179, see especially, Murphy J. at p. 189 et
seq.? In re Coleman. 14 Ann. Dig (1947) 139 and In re 
Spiessens. 16 Ann. Dig. (1949) 275, where persons
charged with spying and collaborating with the enemy 
during the war could not plead the political offence 
exception rule.
Operative Paragraph 1, Punishment For War Crimesr Part
I. See also History UNWCC. pp.89-90.
ETS No.86: Article 1(b) and (c).
Article 4, LASTS p.27. Also at 159 BFSP 606 and in 
Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab LeagueP v.2,
p.106, 1962. See reservation made by Egypt.
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Extradition1 does not specifically exclude acts from the 
applicability of the political offence exception rule, but 
in Article 5 we find a blanket provision broad enough to 
cover crimes in international law. It stipulates that 
extradition proceedings may be carried out where 
extradition is regulated by a treaty or convention in force 
between the requesting and the requested State and "whose 
purpose is to prevent or repress a specific category of 
offences and which imposes on such States an obligation to 
either prosecute or extradite faut dedere aut punire) the 
person sought". Such a provision is also included in 
bilateral extradition agreements.2
Further, we find that the 1951 UN Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees3 denies persons seriously believed 
to have committed crimes against the peace, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity4 any rights or benefits which 
accompany refugee-status and may also be liable to 
"refoulement".5 The purpose of these provisions is to 
prevent perpetrators of the most heinious crimes against 
the international community from taking advantage of rules 
designed to protect those persecuted for their political 
beliefs.6
IV. The Principle of Statutory Limitation
Another factor which concerns war crimes prosecutions
20 ILM 723. Not yet in force.
See Article V para 2 in Extradition Treaty between the 
United States and Italy. See 24 ILM (1985) 1529.
189 UNTS 137. Generally see Goodwin Gill, The Refugee 
in International Law. 1983.
See Article 1(F) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Article 33(2).
Article 42, ibid., and Article VII of the 1967 UN 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 
267. State Parties are prohibited from making 
reservations to the relevant provisions.
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and which is telling of the nature of such crimes in
international law, is the question of the application of
statutes of limitation.1 The relevant principal instruments 
are: the 1968 UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity2 and the 1974 European Convention on the Non- 
Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes.3 The casus foederis in both 
treaties is that persons charged with war crimes (and 
crimes against humanity) should be prosecuted regardless of 
the lapse of time between the commission of the crime and 
the institution of proceedings against the perpetrator. 
The basis for this principle is that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are among the gravest crimes in 
international law. They are not to be treated like 
ordinary municipal law crimes and benefit from the rule of 
statutory limitation. Indeed both instruments4 oblige States 
Parties to adopt all measures, legislative or otherwise, in 
order to ensure that municipal statutes of limitation do 
not apply to these crimes.
Article 6 of the European Convention on Statutory 
Limitation allows States Parties to extend the reach of the 
treaty's provisions ratione materiae. The European 
instrument is thus wider than its UN counterpart, although 
in the fourth preambular paragraph the UN Convention on 
Statutes of Limitation considers war crimes and crimes 
against humanity to be "among" the gravest crimes in
Generally see Fawcett, 14 ICLP (1965) 627 and Weiss, 
54 BYIL (1983) 163.
754 UNTS 74. Hereafter cited as UN Convention on 
Statutes of Limitation. For further reading see, 
Lerner, 4 Israel LR (1969) 512; Note, in 9 IJIL (1969) 
221 and Drabowa, 4 Pol.YIL (1971) 171.
ETS No.82. Hereafter cited as European Convention on 
Statutory Limitation.
See Article 4 and Article 1 of the UN and of the 
European Convention on Statutes of Limitation 
respectively.
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international law, thus implying that the principle of the 
non-applicability of statutes of limitation is applicable 
in respect of other crimes in international law. These 
treaties have also improved on the position ratione 
temporis and ratione materiae found in Article II.5 of CCL 
No. 10 which suspends applicability of the principle of 
statutory limitation for crimes against peace, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed between 30th January 
1933 and 1st July, 1945. There are no reservation clauses 
in either the European or the UN instruments, but the
former convention is not yet in force and the geographical 
representation of States party to the latter is
conspicuously biased.1
The reluctance of some States to subscribe to these 
instruments, especially that adopted under the auspices of 
the UN, does not necessarily constitute an implied protest 
to the principle of the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitation to criminal offences in international law. But, 
the hesitancy may be explained as a result of other factors 
such as unsatisfactory wording used in the treaty text.2
The principle of the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitation has been adopted by the ILC in its current work
on the Draft Code. A draft article 5 has been inserted in
the "General Principles" section of the Draft Code where it 
is stipulated that "no statutory limitation shall apply to 
offences against the peace and security of mankind, because 
of their nature".3 This provision attracted almost 
unanimous support from the Commission's members,4 although
See Bowman & Harris, op.cit.
See the explanation offered by Lerner, op. cit., 
pp.529 - 531, on the refusal of Israel to ratify the 
UN Convention.
Italics Added. See ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.I, pt.I, p.4. 
Also see Malek, ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.I, pp.74-75 paras. 
34-38.
See, ILC Yrbk. . 1987, v.I: Calero-Rodrigues, p. 15 para 
11? Sreenivasa Rao, p. 18 para 27; Graefrath, p.21 para
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a number of them feel that the qualifying words "because 
of their nature” are redundant and have been deleted.1 The 
qualifying language, however, underlines the very reason 
why crimes in international law deserve to be outside the 
application of statutory limitations. Thus in its own way 
draft article 5 has made its contribution to the 
development of the concept of the criminal offence in 
international law.
The exclusion of the application of statutes of 
limitation to war crimes appears in other proposals de leae 
feranda. These include a Draft Convention on the Non- C
Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity prepared by the IAPL.2 This body 
also prepared a Draft International Criminal Code,3 but 
provided that statutes of limitation would run for a period 
not longer than the maximum penalty attached to a 
particular crime as defined in the code. There would be no 
statutes of limitation where the punishment was life 
imprisonment or death. An almost identical provision 
appears in a similar Draft International Criminal Code
9? Jacovides, p. 22 para 19? Hayes, p. 24 para 33? 
Njenga, p.25 para 46? Yankov, p.27 para 70? Illueca, 
p.32 para 25? Shi, p.33 para 37? Eiriksson, p.34 para 
53? Prince Ajibola, p.37 para 8? Sepulveda Gutierrez, 
p.37 para 19? Ogiso, p.38 para 30? Razafindralambo, 
p.45 para 7? Roucounas, p.50 para 40? Al-Khasawneh, 
p.54 para 27? Diaz-Gonzalez, p.56 para 45 and Koroma, 
p.58 para 66. Draft Article 5 was provisionally 
adopted by the ILC at its thirty-ninth session, ILC 
Yrbk.r 1987, v.I, p.234 paras 30-32.
See draft article 7 adopted by the ILC Drafting 
Committee at its forty-third session, UN Doc. 
A/CN•4/L.459, p.3, 1991. The wording was deleted on 
the basis of suggestions made during the debate by the 
membership at the ILC's thirty-ninth session. 
Further, see Sixth Committee Reports: UN Doc.
A/CN4/L.410, 1987, p.117 paras 603-605 and at UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p. 20 paras 51-57. Also see
Levasseur, 93 JDI (1966) 276.
37 RIDP (1966) 375.
52 RIDP (1981) 230.
/
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prepared by Professor Bassiouni1. Professor Bassiouni's 
work specifically excludes the applicability of statutes of 
limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
In Eichmann, accused pleaded that he could not be 
tried for war crimes between 1939-1945 because during his 
residence in Argentina after the War, Argentine law 
provided for a statutory period of 15 years within which 
criminal proceedings are to be instituted. The defence 
argued that 15 years had elapsed and therefore the case 
against Eichmann must be quashed.
The District Court rejected this plea on two grounds. 
First, it held that the application of Argentine law on 
prescription in Israel was an . "untenable contention". 
Second, Article 12(a) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law,2 under which Eichmann was charged, 
excluded war crimes (and crimes against humanity) from 
Israeli statutes of limitation otherwise applicable to 
ordinary criminal offences. The Court explained that 
"because of the extreme gravity of the crime against the 
Jewish people, the crime against humanity and the war 
crime, the Israel legislator has provided that such crimes 
shall never be subject to prescription.1,3
The question of statutes of limitation and war crimes 
has also arisen in the context of the international 
protection of human rights. It has been argued before the 
European Commission of Human Rights that failure to try a 
person for a criminal offence within a reasonable period of
Bassiouni, International Criminal Code. 1987, p.11.
See generally: Attorney-General v Tarrek. Tel Aviv 
District Court, 14th December, 1951; Attornev-Genera1 
v Eniaster. ibid., 4th January, 1952 and Honicrman v 
Attorney-General, ibid., 23rd March, 1953 all at: 18 
ILR 538 et seq.
36 ILR pp.78-79. Emphasis added. See also UN 
Secretary General's Report on the Question of the 
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc.E/CN4/906, 
1966, p.117 para. 157.
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time constitutes a violation of one's right to a fair 
trial,1 even where the offence in question is a war crime 
or a crime against humanity. The Commission disagreed in 
that it found that what was a "reasonable time” with 
respect to war trials might well be considerably longer 
than in other trials. The Commission further held that 
trials involving such crimes were inherently complex and 
time consuming because of the difficulties in locating 
witnesses and other sources of evidence.2 Thus, "the rules 
of prescription do not apply to war crimes" and, 
furthermore, "the international community requires the 
competent (State) authorities to investigate and prosecute 
these crimes despite the difficulties encountered by reason 
of the long time that has elapsed since the commission of 
the acts concerned".3
C. Aggression
In its conceptual development, aggression has been 
plagued more by problems of definition than by the question 
of its status, i.e. whether or not it is a criminal offence 
under international law. Historically, the term
"aggression" emerged as a substitute for the term "war". 
It appeared in diplomatic correspondence and treaties in 
the inter-war period where State practice sought to outlaw 
war and the use of force.4
2. Cf. Article 6, ECHR.
2. See Application No. 9433/81, Applicant X v 
Netherlands. 27 ECHR Rep.. p.237.
3. Application No.6946/75, Applicant X v Federal Republic 
of Germany. 6 ECHR Rep.. p.116.
4. See: Convention for the Definition of Aggression,
1933, 147 LNTS 69. A sister convention was also
signed in London in 1933 between Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, USSR and Turkey, 148 LNTS 
213. In 1937, a Treaty of Non-Aggression was signed in 
Teheran between the Kingdoms of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the Empire of Iran, and the Republic of Turkey, 190
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Deliberations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
offer early evidence of the concept of aggression 
considered as a criminal offence. Prime Minister Lloyd 
George described Germany's invasion of (neutral) Belgian 
territory as a crime. Such action was "aggression without 
provocation, without any greviance against the country 
attacked, because it was convenient to cross her territory 
and in spite of a solemn engagement treated like a scrap of 
paper, is an indisputable crime".1 President Wilson 
endorsed this assessment but added that there was no legal 
precedent for it. He envisaged, however, the founding of 
the League of Nations as a regime from which rules and 
formulae of international law would emerge and make 
provision for its (aggression) punishment.
The notion of aggressive war also came to form part of 
the concept of aggression. At the 1945 London Conference 
on Military Trials, a US draft definition of aggression2 
reveals that aggression meant aggressive war and more.3 It 
came to imply as Brownlie4 puts it, any "military attack 
not justified by law". Indeed, this is the casus foederis 
of the definition of aggression in the Annex to General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) 1974.5 Gradually a trend of 
thought began to emerge whereby aggression meant unlawful
LNTS 21. The development of the concept of aggression 
under treaty law during the League of Nations period 
is well outlined by Ferencz, Aggression. v.I, pp.6-36, 
and, generally, by Brownlie, Use of Force. pp. 351- 
352.
See Willis, Prologue To Nuremberg, pp.79-80.
See Jackson Report, p.294.
Ibid., at p.273 and at Conference Sessions of July 19, 
1945, at p.298.
Use of Force. p.352.
Adopted without a vote on December 14, 1974.
Hereafter referred to as Resolution 3314(XXIX). Text 
also at UN Yrbk. 1974, pp.846-848 and in Rifaat, op. 
cit., p.321 and Ferencz, Aggression. v. II, p. 14.
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use of force and in turn use of force by States was seen as 
a criminal offence under international law.1
When the ILC had originally been instructed to prepare 
a Draft Code of Offences 2, the text of an initial draft of 
Crime No. 1 prohibited ”... the use of armed force in 
violation of international law...”3 and not aggression. 
This draft had a mixed reception in the ILC. Some members4 
supported it but felt that the wording could be improved 
because it left courts with the task of determining what 
constituted a "violation of international law”. Two other 
formulae were submitted as alternatives: one was
qualificatory - use of force is a criminal offence except 
where it occurs in self-defence or in accordance with a UN 
mandate. The other suggestion associated the use of force 
with the violation of territorial integrity and the 
political independence of States. Both formulae were found 
to be inadequate. The first raised questions concerning 
the concept of self-defence in international law. The 
second was narrow in scope and limited to non-legal 
concepts. A further suggestion,5 also rejected when 
submitted to the vote, proposed that: "resort to violence 
in any form in violation of international law, and in 
particular, the waging of aggressive war", be considered a 
criminal offence.
The final text of the Draft Code of Offences adopted 
by the ILC in 1954 presents aggression and unlawful use of 
force almost as synonymous concepts, namely:
See History UNWCC. pp.185-186.
See GA Res. 177(1), 1947.
See Report (UN Doc.A/CN.4/25, 1950) by J. Spiropoulos, 
ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.261 para 57. Pella (ibid., 
v.I, p.165 paras 120-127) also included 'use, threat 
and preparation of use of force' in his proposed list 
of offences to the ILC.
See ILC Yrbk.. v.I, pp.108-110.
See ILC member Yepes (Colombia) ibid., p.116 para. 2.
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"Any act of aggression, including1 the employment 
by the authorities of the State of armed force 
against another State for any purpose other than 
national or collective self-defence or in 
pursuance of a decision or recommendation of a 
competent organ of the United Nations.1,2
In its observations, the United Kingdom government3 was not 
in favour of such a lengthy provision, but preferred 
simply:
"The following acts are offences against the 
peace and security of mankind: (i) any act of
aggression".
In explanation it was submitted that "a satisfactory 
definition of aggression is extremely hard to find".4 Along 
with its work on the Draft Code of Offences, the ILC was 
entrusted5 with the specific task of defining aggression. 
In the course of this work a number of proposals and 
memoranda again assimilated the notion of aggression with 
use of force,6 whereas others7 maintained that aggression 
was beyond legal definition.
Thus began to surface the real issue which prevented 
the codification of rules relating to the concept of 
aggression; i.e. whether aggression ought to be defined or 
whether it is indeed capable of definition. At any rate, 
it is not proper to portray aggression and the concept of 
use of force as twin rather than as related concepts. Not
See objection for the use of this word by the 
Government of Bolivia, UN Doc.A/CN4./85, 1954, p. 13 
para(b).
ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v. II, p.151. Also see, ibid., v.I, 
pp.125-126 paras 33-45 and p.127 paras 51-52.
UN Doc. A/CN.4/85, p.13 para, (b).
This was the view also taken by ILC Rapporteur 
Spiropoulos, op.cit., ibid., p.13 paras, c and d.
By virtue of GA Res. 378 B(V), 1950.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, pp.28-42.
Spiropoulos, ibid., p.60 and at p.69 paras 165-170.
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every action involving use of force amounts to aggression
and acts of aggression may very well occur without
involving use of force. Professor Higgins explains:
"low level coercion is an illegality rather than 
an aggression: it is not an international crime,
but an international tort (and) certainly it is 
arguable that aggression can take place without 
any use of force, and must be considered, even 
where the methods are solely economic bv nature. 
as too major to be a mere illegality - that is to 
say a tort.”1
The difficulties encountered by the ILC in defining 
aggression were such that it was eventually decided to 
postpone consideration of the matter including the 
preparation of the Draft Code of Offences.2 In 1952 a UN 
Special Committee3 had been established to deal with the 
question of aggression. Thereafter the concept was to be 
studied by a series of UN General Assembly appointed 
Special Committees.4 Only three decades later, when a 
formal definition of aggression had been fashioned, would 
the ILC resume its work on the Draft Code.5
The architects of the definition of aggression had 
three formulae to choose from, each had its own 
difficulties:6
The Development of International Law Through the 
Political Organs of the United Nations. 1963, pp.175- 
176 (emphasis added).
ILC Yrbk., 1951, v.I, pp. 120-121 paras 74-86. Also 
see GA Res. 897 (IX) 1954.
Established by GA Res. 688 (VII). Cf. Sixth Committee 
Report UN Doc. A/2322, 1952.
A summary of the work carried out by these committees 
is outlined by Ferencz, Aggression. v. II, pp. 4-13. 
Also see Rifaat, op. cit., p.222 et seq.
See GA Res. 36/106, 1981.
See generally: Waldock, 81 Hague Receuil (1952) 508- 
510, Pal, 3 Ind. YIA. (1954) 348 et seq., Roling, NILR 
(1955) 171-172, Higgins, op. cit., p.171 n. 19; and 
Brownlie, Use of Force. p.355. Also see ILC 
Rapporteur Thiam, Third Report bn the Draft Code, ILC
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(i) The enumerative approach, i.e. the listing of certain 
acts deemed to constitute aggression. This approach 
immediately lends itself to the charge: enumerations are 
inherently either restrictive or inexhaustive and thus 
inconclusive.
(ii) The general formula approach. This can be ambiguous 
and open to various interpretations as much as it appears 
"safe” and all-embracing.
(iii) The mixed approach is a compromise between the above 
possibilities and it now appears in Resolution 3314(XXIX).
Some officials and government representatives1 felt 
that there was no particular need to define aggression? 
whereas a considerable number of States and non­
governmental bodies2 continued to believe in aggression 
defined. Professor (later Sir) Humphrey Waldock's 
assessment of the matter is as valid today as when it was 
written in 1952:
"although an unsatisfactory definition would be 
worse than none at all, there is a case for 
continuing the attempt to clarify, if not define, 
the crime of aggression. Otherwise we may end up 
by blurring completely the line between 
international wrongs and international crimes."3
Yrbk.f 1985, v.JI, pt I, p.72 paras 82-87.
Fitzmaurice, 1 I CLP (1952) 137, Roling, op. cit.
p.167, and at 7 Ind.LR (1953)8, and Spiropoulos, ILC 
Yrbk., 1951, v.I, p.89 para 121.
A number of draft resolutions have been submitted by 
States emphasising the positive contribution which a 
definition of aggression would give to the development 
of international criminal law: Syria, (UN Doc.
A/C6/L215)? Afghanistan, Iran, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Netherlands, Peru 
and Yugoslavia (UN Docs: A/C6/265 & Rev.l, A/C6/L268, 
A/C6/L269/Rev.1, A/C6/L270)? Iran & Panama (UN Doc. 
A/C6/L335, 336 and 334/Rev 1)? and the replies of
USSR, Sweden and France (UN Doc. A/2689), 6th August 
1954 and 18th October 1954 respectively. Aggression 
appears as the first criminal offence in the Draft 
International Criminal Code prepared by the IAPL. See 
also Bassiouni, International Criminal Code, p. 121.
81 Hague Receuil (1952) 514.
195
In a period spanning almost over two and half decades 
when the concept of aggression was being studied by the 
various UN Special Committees the number of draft 
proposals, resolutions, memoranda, and diplomatic 
statements (a) recognising the criminal character of 
aggression and (b) designating it by labels such as Man 
offence against the peace and security of mankind” and a 
"crime against humanity”, is impressive.1
In the 1972 Special Committee2 three drafts, thought 
fit to describe aggression and its legal consequences, were 
put forward for consideration:
(i) "Aggression, as defined herein, constitutes a crime 
against international peace giving rise to responsibility 
under international law."
(ii) "A war of aggression constitutes a crime against 
peace, for which there is responsibility under 
international law."
(iii) It was suggested that the provision defining 
aggression would in its initial wording introduce the 
concept as a crime against peace.
It was also reported3 that States agreed in orincipio
See, inter alia, statements made by the following 
States: Colombia, UN Doc. A/C6/L210, 11th January,
1952; Egypt, UN Doc. A/C6/L213, 17th January, 1952; 
Mexico cited in the Sixth Committee Report, UN Doc. 
A/2087, 29th January, 1952; USSR Draft Resolution, op. 
para. 5, GAOR, 24th Session, Supp. No. 20, UN Doc. 
A/7620; Working Papers submitted by China, UN Doc. 
A/AC•66/L4/Rev.3 and UN Doc. A/AC.66/L7/Rev.2; 
Uruguay, GAOR, 28th Session, Supp. No. 19, UN Doc. 
A/9019, 1973. Further see: Siage (Syrian Arab
Republic) and Kolenski (USSR) GAOR, 29th Session, 
Supp. No. 19, UN Doc. A/9619, Members 1974 Special 
Committee; Sixth Committee Report 1973, UN Doc. 
A/9411, p.13; and thirteen nation draft resolution (UN 
Doc. A/AC134/L16 and Corrl.) concerning designation of 
aggression.
See Report, GAOR, 27th Session, Supp. No. 19, UN Doc. 
A/8719, p.17.
See Sixth Committee Report, UN. Doc. A/8929, 1972, p. 
8 para 36.
on the criminality of aggression and on establishing
individual responsibility for acts of aggression. However,
these factors are certainly not evident in the final text
adopted. Thus Article 5 paragraph 2 of Resolution
3314(XXIX) reads as follows:
11A war of aggression1 (as opposed to aggression) is 
a crime against international peace. Aggression 
gives rise to international responsibility.”2
This wording, with its reference to a war of
aggression, is a clear departure from the notion of
declaring aggression simplicity. criminal. Some members
of the final (1974) UN Special Committee3 objected and were
generally discontent with the final outcome. As the
Yugoslav representative4 put it:
"The provision, as now formulated, would permit 
the absurd interpretation that aggression might 
not be a crime against international peace and 
that a war of aggression might not give rise to 
international responsibility”.
The views of representatives who supported the final 
wording are significant because though few in number they 
reflect legal thought in the principal political systems of 
the world. The United Kingdom representative5 was only 
prepared to conceed to that recognised by international 
law, namely, the criminality of aggressive war and not of 
aggression. Sir Lawrence McIntyre (Australia)6
categorically stated that international responsibility for 
acts of aggression should not be construed as implying
Italics added.
For an analysis of this section, generally see 
Ferencz, AggressionP v. II, pp. 43-45 and Rifaat, op. 
cit., pp. 275-276.
GAOR, Supp. No. 19, UN Doc. A/9619, Annex I.
Ibid., p.26.
Mr Steel, ibid., p.31.
Ibid., p.33.
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individual responsibility.1 Moreover, the Mexican member2 
explained that "the fact that the text did not expressly 
say that aggression was a crime against the peace could not 
be construed as authorising a contrario interpretation".3
In practice States have been denounced as aggressors 
in inummerable resolutions, diplomatic statements and other 
official declarations.4 However, the occasions in which 
State conduct, that qualifies as aggression, has been 
referred to as criminal, are exceptional5.
It is interesting to note that although reference to 
State delictual responsibility is clearly intended by 
the Australian representative, he does not rule out 
the concept of State criminal responsibility. In its 
report to the Sixth Committee, the 1974 UN Special 
Committee explained that its use of the term 
"international responsibility" was without prejudice 
to the scope of that concept. See also Oehler, 52 
RIDP (1981) 416.
UN Doc.A/9619, p.38.
Similar remarks were made by: Spain, ibid., p. 18?
France, p.22? US, p.24? and Bulgaria, p.29.
See diplomatic correspondence between the US and USSR 
in Whiteman, Digestr v. 5, pp. 795-808, 816-819 and 
838-843. Also see Rifaat, op. cit., pp. 96-99 and 
208-216 and Higgins, op. cit., pp. 222-224, who all 
provide succinct but rich expositions of LN and UN 
practice concerning the question of aggression. 
Generally, see Whiteman, ibid., v. 12, pp.141-142, 
814-816, and 817-820. More recent citations include: 
GA Res. 38/10, 1983 on the situation in Central
America? SC Res. 573, 1985 on the Israeli attack
against Tunisian territory? and see the response of 
the Islamic Repuglic of Iran to SC Res. 598, 1987
concerning immediate termination of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq. Text also at 26 ILM (1987) 
1481.
See: 1939 diplomatic correspondence between Finland 
and USSR, in Ferencz, Aggression, v. I, pp. 275-284? 
Colombia, Statement at the League of Nations on the 
proposed expulsion of the USSR, LN Doc. A.48., 1939, 
VIII 13th December 1939? Statement by Prime Minister 
Macmillan concerning British troops sent to Jordan in 
1958, see Whiteman, Digest. v.12, pp.221-225. 
Generally, also see White, 21 Jnl. Int. Affs. (1967) 
123, and Falk, The Vietnam War and International Lawr 
1968, p.523.
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The general trend in State practice is confirmed by 
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2nd, 1990. The 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the period 
August - December 1990 do not include wording which: (a)
subsequent annexation of Kuwait territory as acts of 
aggression and, much less, (b) that unlawful conduct of 
that degree by Iraq engenders implications of the criminal 
law for the individuals responsible.
From the resolutions adopted during the period stated 
above, the following points emerge as relevant to the 
status of the concepts of aggression and of the criminal 
offence in international law:
(i) The annexation of Kuwait by Iraq is without 
legal validity.1
(ii) Acts of violence and other unlawlful conduct 
directed against foreign diplomats and 
internationally protected persons in Kuwait 
by Iraq:
"constitute aggressive acts and a 
flagrant violation of (Iraq's) 
international obligations which 
strike at the root of the conduct 
of international relations in 
accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations."2
(iii) Iraq's treatment of civilians in Kuwait as well 
as in its own territory may constitute "grave 
breaches" under 1949 Geneva Convention IV on the 
Protection of Civilians in Time of War and thus 
engender individual criminal responsibility for 
whomsoever is responsible for that treatment.3
(iv) Iraq incurs international responsibility and 
becomes liable to pay compensation for all 
damages caused to property and in lieu of 
personal harm suffered by non-nationals as a 
result of its unlawful conduct directed against
See SC Res. 662 adopted on 9th August 1990.
See SC Res. 667 adopted on 16th September, 1990.
See SC Res. 674 adopted on 29th October, 1990.
specifically the invasion, occupation and
Kuwait.1
Accordingly, despite an ever-developing commitment by 
States to define by way of international agreement a number 
of practices as criminal offences triggering the 
application of a specific regime of criminal law rules and 
principles in international law, State practice reveals 
that aggression continues to fall short of this category of 
particularly heinous, but internationally proscribed, 
unlawful practices.2
Sources de leae fer^nda concerning the status of 
aggression as a criminal offence are found in the context 
of the ILC's current projects on State Responsibility and 
the Draft Code. In the Commission's Draft Article 19 on 
State Responsibility, we find that an international crime 
may result from "a serious breach of an international 
obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, such as that prohibiting 
aggression".3 During the debate4 on the draft article 
(numbering 18 at the time) aggression was unmistakably 
identified as one of the gravest crimes in international 
law.5 This was also the view taken in the Sixth Committee.6
See SC Res. 674A adopted on 29th October, 1990.
Statements by President Bush and Prime Minister 
Thatcher to the effect that Iraqi President, Saddam 
Hussein, and other persons under his command, could be 
dealt with in the same manner as the Major German War 
Criminals at Nuremberg, in 1945 were made with 
reference to the ill-treatment of civilians and the 
practice of hostage-taking by Iraq and not with 
reference to the actual invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.
ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.95.
Ibid., v.I, p.239 et seq.
ILC Yrbk.r 1976, v.II, pt.II: Castenada, p. 242 para 
31; Yasseen, p.243 para 38? Tabibi, p. 244 para 52; 
Reuter, p. 245 para 62; Njenga, p. 246 para 78; 
Ramangasoavina, p.247 para 3; Sir Francis Vallat, p.
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Aggression is found in the forefront of a number of 
acts considered candidate by the ILC for inclusion in the 
Draft Code.1 At the ILC's thirty-seventh session (1985) 
some members supported the adoption of aggression as 
defined in Resolution 3314 (XXIX) either in a verbatim form 
or by reference to that instrument.2 A few were either 
indifferent or expressed no definite opinion on the 
methodology to be adopted*3 Others4 could not subscribe to 
the adoption of Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in toto and some5 
even opposed the inclusion of aggression in the Draft Code, 
principally for the following reasons:
(i) no international criminal code could function properly 
where the UN Security Council had overriding discretionary 
powers in determining aggression. The presence of the 
Veto-Powers6 in that organ would indirectly weaken the
248 para 12; Calle y Calle, p.250 para 30; and Ago, 
(Rapporteur) p.252 para 42.
UN Doc. A/31/370, 1976, pp.44-46 paras 130-132 and pp. 
58-59 paras 165-166, and p.61 para 171.
See Third and Sixth Reports on the Draft Code 
presented by Rapporteur Thiam, ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.II, 
pt.II, p. . and UN Doc.A/CN.4/411, 19th February, 
1988, respectively.
ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.I: Jacovides, p.14 para 14, Malek, 
p.19 para 49, Njenga, p. 48 para. 5, Ogiso, p. 44 para 
22, Calero Rodrigues, p.16 para 33 and Yankov, p. 58 
para 12.
Ibid., Diaz-Gonzale2 , p. 59 para 26; Roukounas, p. 69 
para 57 and Sucharitkul, p.38 para 29.
Ibid., Arangio-Ruiz, p.66 para 33; Balanda, p. 34 para 
29; Barboza, p. 51 para 26; Huang, p. 64 para 12;
Lacleta Munoz, p. 73 para 25; Mahiou, p. 31 para 13;
Tomuschat, p. 71 para 12 and Razafindralambo, p. 46
para 38.
Ibid., Sir Ian Sinclair, p. 24 paras 17-18.
It is interesting to note that amendments to the crime 
of aggression suggested by ILC members McCaffrey (USA) 
and Ushakov (USSR) did not seem to address the
Security Council issue but rather were phrased in a 
way as to allow the Security Council a "say” in
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independence of the proposed code.
(ii) A list of acts constituting aggression, always open to 
further supplement, as that found in Resolution 3314(XXIX), 
would expose the code to the charge that it violates the 
nullum crimen sine leae principle.
This state of opinion remained unchanged in the Sixth 
Committee.1
Common to the various formulae discussed by the ILC
for a definition of aggression as a crime, are the
following introductory words:
"The commission by the authorities of a State of 
an act of aggression".
This wording clearly indicates the intention to classify
aggression as a crime that can only be committed by States,
i.e. by individuals acting on its behalf.
At its fort(]^et) session (1988), however, the ILC U  ^
provisionally adopted a differently worded provision on
aggression, one which clearly reflects its intention to
attach individual criminal responsibility to all acts
proscribed under the Draft Code irrespective of the
offender's capacity.2 Thus the introductory paragraph of
the relevant provision on aggression read:
" Any individual to whom responsibility for acts 
constituting aggression is attributed under this 
Code shall be liable to be tried and punished for 
a crime against peace".3
determining whether aggression had been committed or 
not. See, ibid., p.54 para 48 and p.61 para 44 
respectively.
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, p.21.
A full discussion of the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility under the Draft Code is found 
in Part IV Chapter 9 infra.
The full text of the article is reproduced in the 
ILC's Report to the General Assembly on its work at
The evidence in support of the concept of aggression 
as a criminal offence in international law is substantial. 
It is a developing corpus but as yet it is premature to 
certify that there is sufficient State practice and "opinio 
juris" which accj^|ts aggression as a crime jure gentium. 
Indeed the debate within the ILC1 and the Sixth Committee2 
remains very much divided on a number of issues of which 
finding an acceptable definition of the concept is 
foremost.
Of the various international texts and documents 
adopted, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) will undoubtedly continue 
to feature as a prominent contribution to the development: 
of aggression. The attention which this concept receives 
especially in the context of the ILC's Draft Code is an 
equally important factor in the formation of its juridical 
character as a criminal offence. However, its status as a 
crime in international law will be determined by 
considerations other than its inclusion in an international 
code of crimes. Unlike some other offences such as 
genocide and war crimes (also to be included in the Draft 
Code) the status of aggression would in part depend on the 
reception given to the Code by States.
Aggression will always be "quasi" political in nature 
and accordingly continue to be a source of concern for the 
architects of an effective international prosecuting 
system. It is essentially a "State-Crime", i.e. committed 
largely by persons acting in a public capacity. However, 
much as the present writer^appreciates^ja form of individual
its fortieth^ession, (see GAOR, Supp. No.10, A/43/10, 
p.186 and pp.187-190 for ILC Commentary.). See also 
draft article 15, which is the latest version adopted 
by the ILC's Drafting Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 459, 
1991.
2. See summary records of the ILC Debates at Meetings 
2053 - 2061 and at Meeting 2085 (p.291 para 23), ILC 
Yrbk.f 1988, v.I.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.443, 1990, p. 17.
criminal responsibility in international law which does not 
discriminate between the capacity of one offender and that 
of another, it is unlikely that the forseeable future will 
offer successful convictions for aggression1 outside the 
aftermath of armed conflict and without the rhetorical 
invective: "the punishment of the vanquished by the
victors” .
D. The Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries
The principal texts relevant to the status of 
mercenary activities as criminal offences in international 
law may be divided as follows: on the one hand we have the
Organisation of African Unity2 Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa 3, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on Aggression and the recently 
adopted International Convention Against the Recruitment, 
Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries4. On the other 
hand, we have proposals de leae fer/nda which include a 
provision on mercenajism m  the ILC's Draft Code .
The sources also include a substantial body of 
municipal legislation6 which consider the recruitment, use,
Cf. Waldock, 81 Hague Receuil 506.
Hereafter referred to as OAU.
Hereafter referred to as the OAU Convention on 
Mercenaries.
Adopted by GA Res. 44/34, 4th December 1989. Text 
also at 29 ILM (1990) 89. Hereafter referred to as UN 
Convention on Mercenaries.
Draft article 23 adopted by the ILC Drafting Committee 
at the forty-third session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459, 
1991, which is based largely on the definition of 
"mercenary” in the UN Convention on Mercenaries.
A detailed and thorough examination of national 
legislation concerning mercenary activities is found 
in a thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the University of London by A. Layeb 
entitled The Development of International Law in
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financing and training of mercenaries as criminal offences. 
The prevention of these mercenary practices is also 
contained in bilateral agreements.1 In addition a number of 
UN General Assembly resolutions,2 some not directly 
concerned with the question of mercenary activities3, have 
declared the use of mercenaries a criminal act, described 
them as outlaws deserving only of criminal punishment and 
called upon States to enact legislation proscribing their 
recruitment as punishable offences. In particular, General 
Assembly Resolution 34/140, 1979, which initiated the
drafting of the UN Convention on Mercenaries, recognised in 
the second preambular paragraph that "mercenarism is a 
threat to international peace and security and, like 
murder, piracy and genocide, is a universal crime against
relation to the Legal Status of Mercenaries. 1986.
See Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good 
Neighbourliness (known as the Nkomati Accord), signed 
between Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa, 
March 16th, 1984. Text at 23 ILM (1984) 282.
Generally see Stein, 10 S. African YIL (1984) 1.
See: Res. 2465 (XXIII), 20th December 1968, op. para. 
8, p.5? Res. 2548 (XXIV), 11th December 1969, op. 
para. 7, p.6? Res. 2708 (XXV), 14th December 1970, op. 
para. 8, p. 8. The voting pattern for these 
resolutions is telling. Most Western States including 
China and Japan abstained. Great Britain, US, 
Australia, South Africa and Portugal voted against, 
whereas a large number of African States voted in 
favour. Records of votes are at UNPV 4355, 17th 
December 1970 and ibid., at 4940, 19th December 1973 
at p.308. The same voting pattern is also found with 
regards to GA Res. 3103 (XXVIII), 12th December 1973 
concerning "Basic Principles of the Legal Status of 
the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien 
Domination and Racist Regimes", op. para. 5. Also, 
cf. Razafindralambo, ILC Yrbk.r 1984, v.I., p.12 para 
43.
Some resolutions address the question of granting 
independence to colonial peoples, and others, address 
the policies of apartheid in Southern Africa. As 
examples see, GA Resolutions: 31/6(1), 1976; 31/34,
1976? 32/14, 1977? 33/24, 1978? 35/35, 1980? 36/9,
1981? 37/43, 1982? 38/17, 1983? 39/17, 1984? 40/25,
1985? 41/101, 1986.
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humanity.” And, preambular paragraph three of the UN 
convention now reiterates this thinking and declares that 
the States Parties affirm that the practices proscribed by 
the convention are "considered as offences of grave concern 
to all States and that any person committing any of the 
offences should either be prosecuted or extradited.”
Other international bodies1 have made similar 
statements and passed resolutions condemning mercenaries 
and their practices. The mercenary has also been described 
as an enemy of all mankind.2
Preambular paragraph four of the OAU Convention on 
Mercenarism refers to the various UN resolutions where 
mercenary practices are condemned and to "statements of 
attitude and the practice of a great number of States 
indicative of the development of new rules of international 
law making mercenarism an international crime." Article 3 
of the same convention adds that any person, natural or 
juridical, who commits the crime of "mercenarism" has 
committed a crime against peace and security in Africa. 
These provisions are evidence of regional thinking on the 
character and status of "mercenarism" developing as a 
criminal offence in international law.
In response to General Assembly Resolution 34/140, 
1979, a substantial number of States3 representing various
World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, 
Nigeria, 1977, see UN Doc. A/Conf. 91/9, v.I, p. 33, 
para. 15. See also Political Declaration of the VI 
Conference of Heads of State and Governments of Non- 
Aligned Countries, Havana, 1979; Second World 
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 
Geneva, 1983; and Res. AHG/112 (XIX) adopted at the 
19th Ordinary Session, OAU, Addis Ababa, 1983.
Chief Akinjide, ILC Member, speaking to postgraduate 
students at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, June 1986.
See, among others, Argentina, Austria, Barbados, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, Roumania, 
Suriname, Sweden, Great Britain, German Democratic 
Republic, Nigeria, Ukrainian SSR, USSR and 
Byelorussion SSR, Finland and Hungary. UN Doc. 
A/35/366/Add.2.
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political and legal systems expressed, (a) support for a 
multilateral instrument outlawing mercenaries and 
proscribing their activities and (b) the view that these 
practices are criminal in character, describing them as 
forms of "international terrorism”, "crimes against 
humanity" (GDR) and "grave international crimes" (Ukrainain 
SSR). Other governmental replies1 acknowledged the unlawful 
character of mercenaries and their activities but made no 
reference to their criminal nature? whereas other 
governments2 had greater difficulties with General Assembly 
Resolution 34/140, even though it was adopted without a 
vote.
The US delegate expressed objection to some of the 
expressions contained in the resolution and in particular 
the French and Italian delegates categorically rejected the 
terms used to describe mercenarism. Furthermore, even 
though mercenary activities continued to be indentified in 
the various meetings3 of the UN Ad Hoc Committee 
established4 to draft the UN Convention on Mercenaries and 
in the UN General Assembly's Sixth Committee5 as a "crime 
against the peace and security of states and of mankind", 
States such as Japan believed no such crime existed. 
Brazil felt that since no international criminal code was
See ibid., Costa Rica, Czechoslavakia, India, Liberia, 
Libyan Arab Republic, Mexico, Venezuela and the 
Philippines.
See UN Doc. A/34/PV. 104, p.188.
Ad Hoc Committee Report, 1984, GAOR, Supp. No. 43 
(A/39/43) pp.7-8 paras. 21-23? and ibid., 1985 Report, 
GAOR, Supp. No. 43.(A/40/43) p.22 para. 105.
By GA Res. 35/48, 1980.
See UN Docs.: A/C.6/35/SR20: Clark (Nigeria), p.8
para. 28? ibid., SR/21: Sallam (Yemen), p.2 para. 2, 
Clark (Canada), p. 7 para. 30 and 31, Economides 
(Greece), p.14 para. 53, Ordzkonikidze (USSR), p.16 
para. 61? and ibid., SR/22: Mussa (Somalia), p.9 para. 
32, Sincar (Bangladesch) p. 11 para.42, El-Banhawi 
(Egypt), p.13 para. 52, Dramou (Guinea), p.15 para. 65 
and Quentin-Baxter (New Zealand), p.16 para. 68.
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in force these labels have very little meaning, and 
Ireland, speaking on behalf of the member States of the 
European Community, considered them to be controversial.1 
Notwithstanding such reservations, a draft article 7 
appeared in a set of draft articles entitled Third Revised 
Consolidated Negotiating Basis2 offered in 1988 by the Ad 
Hoc Committee designating the use,, recruitment, and 
financing of mercenaries as a "crime against the peace and 
security of mankind".3 In addition, Cuba submitted a set
UN Doc. A/AC.207/L.23, pp.27-30 paras. 90-104. Also 
see Ad Hoc Committee Report 1984,, op.cit., para. 22 
and, Ad Hoc Committee Report for 1985, paras. 103-104. 
Cf. Ad Hoc Committee Report for 1988, GAOR, Supp. 
No.43, (A/43/43), pp. 6-7 paras. 27-29.
GAOR, Supp. No.43, (A/43/43), 1988, p.29.
Draft article 7 was initially placed in parenthesis 
indicating that the Ad Hoc Committee had not yet taken 
a decision whether to adopt it or not.
And although the Ad Hoc Committee decided in 1989 to 
delete it, some members plainly indicated that a 
clause worded as follows ought to be included in the 
convention:
"Nothing in this Convention shall be 
construed in any way as derogating from the 
principles relating to the criminal 
responsibility of individuals under 
international law."
See Ad Hoc Committee's Report, GAOR, Supp. 43. 
(A/44/43) p.9 paras 48-50.No.offences.
The text of the convention is equally silent. It 
contains no descriptive labels of the practices it 
seeks to proscribe other than that already cited above 
in its preambular provisions. However, the operative 
clauses of the convention make it perfectly clear that 
the proscribed practices are considered as criminal 
offences. Cf. draft preambular paragraph 4 of the 
draft text of the convention drafted by the Ad Hoc 
Committee and reproduced in its Report for 1989 (GAOR, 
Supp. No. 43 (A/44/43), p.10). The preambular
provision read as follows:
"Considering that the resolutions of 
the Security Council and General 
Assembly of the United Nations are 
indicative of the development of new 
rules of international law making 
mercenary activities international
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of draft articles1 of which article 1 declared mercenarism
to be a "crime against international law".2
The significance of these characterisations may be
more than stylistic. The labelling of offences are
indications of State opinion especially when coupled with
statements such as:
"It (the proposed UN Convention) should embody 
the principles of international criminal law 
discussed during the Nuremberg Tribunals, namely 
the need for offenders to be prosecuted and 
judged by any State where they were captured.
Such a provision is necessary because mercenarism 
is a crime against humanity."3
Other statements4 recommended that an international
convention on mercenary activities ought not to rest with
"criminalising" such activities at the international level
but ought also to oblige State Parties to enact criminal
legislation under their respective municipal laws. This
recommendation is now binding upon State Parties in Article
5 (3) of the UN Convention on Mercenaries. In addition, it
has been suggested that mercenarism has the force of ius
cogens in international law: the use of mercenaries is "a
criminal act and a serious violation of fundamental norms
of contemporary international law".5
The question of political offences has also been
offences".
The articles were entitled "Convention Against The 
Recruitment. Use. Financing and Training Of 
Mercenaries". Hereafter referred to as the Cuba 
Draft. See Annex in GAOR, Supp. No.43, (A/40/43).
Of the various descriptive tags, the proposal in the 
Cuba Draft is the most neutral - based on article 1 of 
the Genocide Convention.
Balanda (Zaire), UN Doc. A/C6/35/SR22, p.4 para. 9.
Adjoyi (Togo), UN Doc.A/C.6/35/SR21, p.6 para.22; 
ibid./SR22, Makarevich (Ukrainian SSR), p.7 para.22 
and Dramou (Guinea), p.16 para.67.
See Mickiewicz (Poland), UN Doc. A/C6/35/SR22 p.14, 
para.58 (italics added), and at p.7 para. 21 in the 
Ad Hoc Committee Report for 1984.
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raised during the drafting stages of the convention.1 It
was suggested that mercenary activities should not in
principle be considered political crimes. The relevant
draft provision (Article 18) on extradition in the proposed
text of the convention contained a separate sub-clause (5)
fashioned along the lines of Article VII of the Genocide
Convention a, i.e. designed to render inapplicable the
political offence exception rule in the matter of
extraditing mercenaries. This read as follows:
"For the purpose of extradition between States 
Parties, the offences .... shall not be regarded 
as political offences.”3
The view had also been submitted that the non-applicability
of the political offence exception rule ought to extend to
cover circumstances where the offender had received some
form of material compensation for his 'services'.4 However,
the Ad Hoc Committee opted, as is the case with several
other multilateral instruments covering a number of
practices such as unlawful seizure of civilian aircraft,
hostage-taking, torture and crimes committed against
internationally protected persons, to delete sub-clause 5.
The jurisdictional provisions (Articles 9 and 12)
contained in the UN Convention on Mercenaries are modelled
along the lines of parallel clauses contained in treaties,
contemporaries of this most recent of instruments,
concerned with the international proscription of unlawful
practices as criminal offences. These treaties are
discussed under the appropriate sections in the following
chapters of Part III. Some of them have emerged as
standard-setting in the international effort to define
criminal offences. The adoption by the drafters of the UN
\ See Makarevich (Ukrainian SSR), UN Doc. A/C6/35/SR22, 
p.7, para. 23.
2. The Genocide Convention is discussed infra in Chapter 
6.
3. See GAOR, Supp. No.43, (A/43/43), p.32.
4. Ad Hoc Committee Report 1984, p.20 para. 87.
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Convention on Mercenaries of some of the rules found in 
these treaties, such as those which render the particular 
crimes justiciable before national courts by virtue of a 
number of jurisdictional bases, constitutes a reaffirmation 
of a developing treaty practice that is telling of the 
juridical nature of the concept of criminal offence in 
international law.
The salient elements in the jurisdictional clauses of 
the UN Convention on Mercenaries are the following:
(a) States Parties are obliged to take all necessary 
measures to establish jurisdiction over the offences 
defined in the convention.
(b) States Parties will take jurisdiction over the 
offences that are committed on their territory 
(territorial principle) and where the offender is a 
national of the State Party (active personality 
principle). Jurisdiction taken over stateless persons 
on the basis of their habitual residence in the 
territory of a State Party is increasingly becoming 
popular among drafters of such international 
instruments.1 Such a base of jurisdiction is included 
in the mercenaries convention.
(c) Finally, jurisdiction on the basis of universality may 
be exercised by States Parties. However, the 
application of this principle is dependent upon the 
either extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut ounire  ^
formula (Article 12), now also featuring as a standard 
provision in treaties the casus foederis of which is 
to render certain acts criminal offences.2 In other 
words, a State Party will try a person solely on the 
basis of his presence in its territory if it decides 
not to extradite him to another State Party which may 
have been entitled to exercise jurisdiction on the 
principles indicated in (a) and (b) above.
With regard to the question of individual
responsibility the UN Convention on Mercenaries is
See Article 6.2. a. of the IMO Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation.
The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for 1989, GAOR, 
Supp. No. 43, (A/44/43) p. 6 para 30 confirms that
Article 12 of the convention was based on the 
corresponding provision of the UN Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages. A discussion of this 
convention is found below in Chapter 7.
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dissimilar to some of the "law making" treaties which 
feature in the crimes discussed in this chapter such as the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, including other authoritative 
instruments yet to be addressed in Part III such as the 
Genocide Convention. These instruments all precede the UN 
Convention on Mercenaries, and yet it contains no provision 
which enunciates in crisp and categoric terms the principle 
of individual criminal responsibility. The concept of 
individual responsibility under the UN Convention on 
Mercenaries is implied; in almost all of its substantive 
provisions.
However, the Cuba Draft contained provisions (Articles 
II, III and V) which, read jointly, provided for both 
individual and State responsibility. The Cuba Draft 
distinguished between individual responsibility incurred by 
persons acting in a private capacity and individuals acting 
on behalf of a State. Notwithstanding this two-tier form 
of individual criminal responsibility, the Cuba Draft also 
provided that certain State conduct such as, permitting the 
use of territory for mercenary activities and providing 
facilities to carry out same activities, engenders criminal 
responsibility for the State representatives / agents 
involved.
At the drafting stages it was suggested1 that a 
provision on State criminal responsibility, i.e. a form of 
penal liability other than the penal responsibility of 
individual offenders acting in a public capacity, ought to 
be included in the convention. It was also considered to 
be beneficial to general international law. However, this
See, Correia (Angola), UN Doc. A/C6/35/SR21, p.5 para. 
14. Cf. article 2 of a draft text of an International 
Convention Against the Activities of Mercenaries 
submitted by Nigeria, UN Doc.A/25/366/Add.1. 
Hereafter referred to as the Nigeria Draft. Also see 
Clark (Canada), UN Doc. A/C.6/35/SR21, p.8 para.33 and 
Wentzel (Federal Republic of Germany), p.12 para.50 at 
UN Doc. A/55/35/SR22.
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suggestion was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee.1 The
drafters of the convention finally opted to avoid any form
of provision on criminal responsibility. They chose,
however, to include a clause (Article 16) which, in part,
states the obvious:
"The present Convention shall be applied without 
prejudice to:
(a) The rules relating to the international 
responsibility of States".
The ILC has devoted some attention to the question of
mercenary activities. In the context of the 1954 Draft
Code of Offences we find proscribed as criminal offence:
"The organisation, or the encouragement of the 
organisation, by the authorities of a State, of 
armed bands within its territory or any other 
territory for incursions into the territory of 
another State, or the toleration of the 
organisation of such bands in its own territory, 
or the toleration of the use by such armed bands 
of its territory as a base of operations or as a 
point of departure for incursions into the 
territory of another State, as well as direct 
participation in or support of such incursions."2
There was some doubt as to whether "armed bands"
included mercenaries, but the position has now been
clarified by virtue of Article 3(g) 3 of Resolution 3314
(XXIX) which in its definition of aggression includes:
"the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts 
listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.114
See its Report for 1985, para. 103.
Draft Article 2 (4). See ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v. II, p. 
150. For further reference, ibid., 1950, v.II, p.262 
Crime No. II; ibid., v.I, pp.117-122; ibid., 1951, v. 
II, p.135, article 2.4., and ibid., 1954, v.II, p.117 
para VII.
For commentary on the specific sub-clause, see 
Ferencz, Aggression. v. II, pp.39-41.
See Nicaragua Case. ICJ Rep.. 1986, p.103 para.195.
Cf. Judge Schwelb, Diss. Op., ICJ Rep.. p.345 paras
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In the course of the ILC's current work on the Draft 
Code, mercenarism was discussed as its thirty-seventh 
(1985) and fortieth (1988) sessions.1 The practice was 
considered at both sessions within the context of the 
concept of aggression as defined in Resolution 3314 (XXIX). 
That definition of aggression stood to be adopted in toto 
by the ILC and its relevant sub-clause 3(g) on mercenaries 
was considered sufficient by the ILC Rapporteur to cover 
the crime of mercenarism in the Draft Code. ILC opinion on 
this aspect was much divided at the thirty-seventh session,2 
but it has been provisionally adopted as such by the 
Commission.3 In addition, the ILC is in the process of 
drafting a separate provision on the recruitment, use, 
financing and training of mercenaries.4 At its forthy-third 
session (1991) the ILC's Drafting Committee presented for 
consideration a draft provision which contemplates, on the 
one hand, the crime of recruiting, using, financing and
169-171.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1985, v.II, pt.I, p.80 and UN Doc.
A/CN.4/411, 19th February, 1988.
See relevant contributions made during the debate by 
the following members (ILC Yrbk. . 1985, v.I.): Mahiou, 
p.32, para 18? Balanda, p.34, para 36; Sucharitkul, 
p.38, para 30? Flitan, p.42, para 9? Razafindralambo, 
p.48, para 40; Njenga, p.48, para 9; Barboza, p.52, 
para 30? McCaffrey, p.55, para 56? Yankov, p.58, para 
18? Diaz Gonzalez, p.60, para 31? Ushakov, p.62 para 
49; Huang, p.64, para 19; Lacleta Munoz, p.74, para 
30; Jagota, p.77, para 57. See also Sixth Committee 
Report, UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, p.25 paras 98-101.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1988, v.I, p.291 et seq., and ibid., 
v.II, pt.II, pp.71-73.
See draft article 23 presented by the Drafting 
Committee at the ILC's forty-third session, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.459, 1991, p.6. This is a refined 
version of an earlier attempt at drafting a 
provision at the forty-second session. See GAOR,
Supp. No. 10 (A/45/10) pp.64-67. See also Sixth 
Committee views in UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.456, 1991, p.
19.
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training mercenaries. This, according to the ILC Drafting 
Committee can only be committed by persons acting on behalf 
of a State. On the other hand, it is also proposed to have 
individuals punished for acting as mercenaries. The 
definition of mercenary is taken from the relevant 
provision (Article 1) in the UN Convention on Mercenaries 
and thus individuals who have no connection whatsoever with 
the parties to an armed conflict, i.e. who are neither 
nationals nor residents nor members of the armed forces of 
either the State sending them or the State in whose 
territory the conflict occurs, will be punished. It is 
here where the presence of the universality element is felt 
in this particular practice and which thus may permit it to 
be considered candidate for the delicti jure gentium class.
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CHAPTER 6
Human Rights Violations as Crimes
A. Crimes Against Humanity1
The concept of crimes against humanity was designed to 
reach crimes committed, principally, in the course of the 
Second World War, but which fell outside the customary law 
definition of war crimes and which were directed against 
non-Allied nationals in occupied territory.2 Certainly, 
there is a degree of overlap between the concepts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The latter unlike the 
former may be committed in time of peace as well as in time 
of war.
I. Juridical Nature of the Concept
Were it not for the impact which the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters have had in international law,3 the term 
"crimes against humanity" would reflect a vague notion 
rather than a developed legal concept of international 
significance. The reason is that, per se. this phrase may 
embrace a wide variety of activities: legal and non-legal.
See generally: Pella, Memorandum, UN Doc. A/CN4/39, 
1950, ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II, pp.346-348. See also
History UNWCC. op. cit., pp.188-220; Schwelb 23 BYIL 
(1946) 178; Glaser, Droit International Penal
Conventionnel. 1970, v.I, paras. 76-79, and Bassioni 
writidfng in International Crimeimal Law Volume III 
Enforcement, 1987, p.51. A German perception of the 
concept of crimes against humanity is found in: 
Statement of Dr. Jahreiss, Trial of German Maior War 
Criminalsf HMSO, v.18, pp. 80-120 and in Kraus, 13 De 
Paul LR (1964) 233 at 241.
See Schwelb, op.cit., pp.183-187 and Cassese, 
International Law in a Divided World. 1986, p.290 
para.169.
GA Res. 95(1), 11th December 1946, Affirming 
Principles of International Law Recognised by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. See also Brownlie, 
Use of Force. p.185 et seq., and at, Principles. 
p.562.
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In re Altstotter & Others4 genocide was cited by the US 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as the "prime illustration 
of a crime against humanity under CCL No.10, which by 
reason of its magnitude and international repurcussions has 
been recognised as a violation of common international 
law". In the Asylum Case5 Judge Alvarez interpreted the 
concept of "crimes against humanity" lato sensu. i.e. broad 
enough to include the act of waging war. At one stage 
during its work on the preparation of a Draft Code, the ILC 
adopted "Crimes Against Humanity" as a very broad heading 
comprising such practices as "apartheid" and damage to the 
environment, practices whose status as criminal offences in 
international law is hardly established.6 Unlawful seizure 
of aircraft too has been described as a "crime against 
humanity".7 Accordingly the phrase may be used 
indiscriminately. It lends itself to various, and possibly 
conflicting, interpretations." It must be employed with 
caution and qualification if it is to reflect practices 
recognised as criminal offences in international law.
The authoritative definition of the concept of crimes 
against humanity in international law is contained in 
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter. Sub-clause (c) thereof 
reads as follows:
"CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
14 Ann.Dig. 279 at p. 285.
ICJ Rep.f 1950, p.298.
See draft article 14 proposed by Rapporteur Thiam in 
his Seventh Report, UN Doc.A/CN.4/419, 1989, p.9 para
30. See also ILC Report to the GA on its work at its 
forty-first session, GAOR, Supp. No. 10 (A/44/10) p. 
147 et seq.
See Plawski, p.139 n.78.
See: Schwelb, op.cit., p.195; Roling, 100 Hague
Receuil (1960) 346 and Thiam, Fourth Report on the
Draft Code, ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.56 paras 
12-15 and p.57 paras 20-27. Cf. ILC Member Balanda, 
ILC Yrbk.r 1986, v.I, p.107 para 30.
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other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war;1 or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious2 
grounds [in execution of or in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
3] whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated”.
This definition includes practices which for long have 
been recognised as criminal offences, under municipal law. 
They were new in 1945 not in the sense that they were not 
formerly considered criminal offences, but rather for the 
first time the international community considered itself 
authorised to concern itself with criminal acts committed 
against a State's own nationals "because the crimes
This semi-colon was replaced by a comma. See Berlin 
Protocol, 6th October, 1945. See also Schwelb, 
op.cit., pp.187-188.
Reference to persecutions on religious grounds is not 
included in the parallel provision (Article 5.c.) of 
the Tokyo Charter. See Schwelb, op.cit., p.214 et 
seg.
The words placed in parenthesis restrict, ratione 
materiae, the justiciability of the crimes before the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. But that limitation 
does not apply in Article (II.I.e.) of CCL No.10. 
This change in the definition of the concept of crimes 
against humanity has been interpreted by Schwelb 
(op.cit., p.218 para.4) as an indication to allow 
persons to be tried for these crimes committed after 
formal termination of hostilities in June 1945. 
Schwelb's assessment (ibid., p.206) of crimes against 
humanity as "the cornerstone of a system of 
international criminal law equally applicable in times 
of war and of peace, protecting the human rights of 
inhabitants of all countries, against anybody, 
including their own States and governments", 
inapplicable in the context of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters, is certainly valid under CCL No.10.
Recent State legislative practice follows the CCL 
No.10 type of definition, i.e. it excludes 
restrictions of any form on the justiciability of 
the concept of crimes against humanity before 
national tribunals. See for example, Article
1.96 of the Canada Criminal Code Amendment Act 
1987.
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surpassed in magnitude and savagery any limits of what was 
tolerable".1 This is endorsed by a proposal made by the US 
Representative on the Legal Committee of the UNWCC. The US 
representative2 explained that the concept was designated 
as "crimes against humanity" because they were crimes 
against the foundation of civilisation, irrespective of the 
place and the time of commission, and irrespective of the 
question as to whether or not they constitute violations of 
the laws of war.
From 1939 to 1945 the concept of crimes against 
humanity was the result of a callous policy which took the 
form of a "systematic, wholesale, consistent action, taken 
as a matter of deliberate calculation."3
The elements of organisation and premeditation in mass 
murder, "extermination"4 in the words of Article 6(c) of 
the Nuremberg Charter, are the features which distinguish 
most the concept of crimes against humanity and the class 
of crimes discussed in this chapter in general. These 
elements have been emphasised in the writings of publicists5
Roling, 100 Hague Receuil. pp.345-346 (italics added), 
and also writing in International Law in the 
Netherlands. v.II, p.191. Cf. Bassiouni, writing in 
International Criminal Law Volume III Enforcement, 
op.cit., p.61.
See History UNWCC. p.175.
Sir Hartley Shawcross, Closing Speeches. p.60. See 
also Nuremberg Judgment, Crad. 6964, p.65. Cf. Lemkin,
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 1944, p.90.
See generally Schwelb, op. cit., p.192 para.(g).
M. Champetier de Ribes, Closing Speeches p.140;
Nuremberg Judgment, pp.44-45; cf. IXth common 
preambular paragraph of Hague Conventions (II) 1899 
and (IV) 1907 respectively. Also see: Doc. XXXIX,
Jackson Report, p.312 entitled: "Proposed Revision of 
Definition of 'Crimes'" - later to emerge as Article 
6 of the Nuremberg Charter, submitted by the British 
Delegation, July 20th, 1945, where Article 6(c) in
embryonic form read as : "systematic atrocities
against or systematic terrorism or ill-treatment or 
murder of civilians"; Keenan and Brown, op. cit., 
pp.117-118; Roling, 100 Hague Receuilf p.347; History
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and in the decisions of post-1945 military tribunals.1
The concept of crimes against humanity is recognised 
in international law as illustrating norms considered to be 
peremptory. The status of the practices as delicti jure 
gentium is accepted2 and endorsed, in part, by virtue of 
the following words common in the relevant provisions of 
the Nuremberg, Tokyo Charters and CCL No.10: "whether or 
not (committed) in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated". Accordingly, the locus delicti 
as well as the nationality of the offender and the capacity 
in which he acted at the time of the commission are 
irrelevant in so far as the status of crimes against 
humanity in international law is concerned. Crimes against 
humanity are crimes whose proscription and prevention are 
of universal concern.3 Indeed, four decades on they remain 
one of the most serious and grave crimes in international
UNWCC, op. cit., p.179, para, (iii) c? Ferencz, 8 
Ency.PIL, 107? and ILC Members: Yrbk.. 1986, v.I,
Ogiso, p. 113 para 24; McCaffrey, p. 119 para 7; 
Mahoiu, p. 127 para 9; Riphagen, p. 131 para 43, and 
Koroma, p.134 para 77. Contra : Balanda, p.107 para
31. See also Seventh Report on the Draft Code, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/419, pp.16-18. See also ILC Report to GA 
on the work of its forty-first session (1989), GAOR, 
Supp No.10 (A/44/10) p.151 para 150 - p.153 para 158, 
and draft article 21 entitled "Systematic or mass 
violations of human rights" adopted by the ILC 
Drafting Committee at the ILC's forty-third session 
(1991). See UN Doc. A/CN4/L.459/Add.1, p.5.
See In re Altstotter and Others (The Justice Trial1) . 
1947, 14 Ann.Dig. 285 and In re Ahlbrecht as cited in 
Roling 100 Hague Receuilr p.348.
See Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights. 
p. 35.
See History UNWCC. op. cit., pp.178-179 and Prof. 
Gros, Jackson Report, p.360. At the time of drafting 
the Apartheid Convention, the Director of the United 
Nations Human Rights Division expressed the view that 
once "apartheid" was to be designated a crime against 
humanity under international law, the perpetrator may 
be punished by any future State Party independently of 
his nationality. See UN Doc. A/C3/SR2004, p. 145
para.26.
law 1 and continue to be a focus for drafters of national 
legislation and ad hoc government appointed inquiries.2
II. Individual Responsibility, Justiciability and the 
defences of: "Superior Orders", the Political Offence
Exception and Statutory-Limitation
As has been stated, the 1945 concept of crimes against 
humanity supplemented the war crimes category defined under 
the Nuremberg Charter and, given the limitations placed 
upon the Nuremberg Tribunal in its consideration of the 
concept, much of the rules and principles of law identified 
under the relevant headings of Individual Responsibility, 
Jurisdiction, "Superior Orders", the Political Offence 
Exception and Statutory-Limitation in the War Crimes 
section of Chapter 5 apply mutatis mutandis to the present 
category of crimes. With regards to the various bases of 
jurisdiction applied in 1945-1949 war crimes trials, these 
too are identifiable in trials involving charges for crimes 
against humanity. However, the removal of restrictions 
ratione materiae on the justiciability of the concept under 
CCL No.10 permitted the application of the universality 
principle of jurisdiction in trials where charges of crimes 
against humanity were considered. But, notwithstanding 
that improvement in the definition of the concept, 
decisions delivered by US Military Tribunals in pursuit of 
CCL No.10, reveal a degree of inconsistency in judicial
Other than in the context of the ILC's project on the 
Draft Code the concept of crimes against humanity is 
found in the following projects de leae ferahda: 
Draft Article V of the Draft International Penal Code 
prepared by the IAPL, 52 RIDP (1981) 130 and Draft
Article IV of the Draft International Criminal Code, 
prepared by Bassiouni, op.cit., 1987, p.141.
See Canada War Crimes Report. pp.167. The United 
Kingdom War Crimes Inquiry was not instructed by H.M. 
Government to consider the concept of crimes against 
humanity, but decided nevertheless to have the present 
writer submit considerations on the concept and 
included in its report. See United Kingdom War Crimes 
Report. pp. 48 and 52.
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interpretation. In re Flick and Others1 the requirement to 
have the concept of crimes against humanity linked with the 
Nuremberg Charter definition of either war crimes or crimes 
against peace, was held to be equally applicable under CCL 
No.10. Subsequently, however, the same tribunal, In re 
Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzaruppen Trial) 2 declared that 
under CCL No.10 crimes against humanity were justiciable 
regardless of the nationality of the accused and of the 
victim, or the locus delicti. or of any limitation ratione 
temporis. in 1961, the Jerusalem District Court in
Eichmann endorsed the Einsatsaruppen Trial interpretation, 
but it was admitted that in the circumstances of the case 
most of the practices with which Eichmann was charged were 
all committed during the Second World War or in connection 
with it.3
During the course of the Second World War, allied 
governments in exile had resolved that the criminal
practices committed by Germany against civilian populations 
in the course of its conduct of an aggressive war, which 
include mass deportations, executions and massacres of 
hostages, are not considered as political crimes.4
Publicists,5 have put forward the view that the concept of 
crimes against humanity as defined at Nuremberg should not 
be recognised as political crimes even if committed for 
political motives.
*. Decided December 22, 1947. 14 Ann.Dig. 266 at p.272.
2. Decided April 10, 1948. 15 Ann.Dig. 656 at p.664.
3. See 36 ILR p.49 para.29.
4. Operative Paragraph 1, International-Allied 
Declaration, 1942.
5. For views endorsing the non-applicability of the
political offence exception vis-a-vis crimes against 
humanity see, among others, Garcia-Mora, 62 Mich. LR 
(1964) 927; Bassiouni, International Extradition and 
World Public Order. 1974, p.420 and Reiss, 20 Cor. ILJ 
(1987) 281 at 308 et seq. See, however, Wijngaert, 
writing in Bassiouni International Criminal Law Volume 
III Enforcement, 1987, p.91 et seq.
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Further there is some evidence which indicates that 
States consider the prosecution of offenders for crimes 
against humanity as not being subject to statutes of 
limitation. France1 and Israel2 have passed legislation 
specifically to this effect. The principle has been upheld 
in recent judicial decisions delivered by tribunals in both 
countries.3 In Handel v Artukovic4 the District Court of 
California has held that the United States "appears to 
recognise the principle that a statute of no limitation 
should be applied to the criminal prosecution of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity".
B. Genocide
Genocide has been declared to be the "crime of crimes" 
and "older that civilisation itself".5 But notwithstanding 
these approbative descriptions genocide is generally 
recognised as a category of criminal practices whose origin 
lies in the Nuremberg Charter concept of crimes against 
humanity. There is substantial source material which 
endorses this view,6 although some writers are of the
Law No. 64-1326, December 12th, 1964.
20 LOSI (1966) 8.
See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes 
Resistants et Patriotes and Others v Barbie r 78 ILR
(1985) 125 and Eichmann, 36 ILR 79.
601 F .Supp. 1421 (1985) 1430.
See Drost in the Introduction to his work, The Crime 
of State r v.II, 1959. See also Statement of US 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, before the United 
States Senate Sub-committee of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Whiteman, Digest, v.II, p.858.
See Preamble to a set of draft articles submitted by 
the UN Ad Hoc Committee (hereafter referred to as Ad 
Hoc Committee) established by ECOSOC Res. 117(IV), 3rd 
March, 1948, to formulate an international instrument 
defining and proscribing genocide as a criminal 
offence. In particular, see French proposal to
include reference to the Nuremberg Judgment in the Ad 
Hoc Committee's Preamble, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR23, p.5
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opinion that genocide existed as a criminal offence in 
international law quite separately from the concept of 
crimes against humanity prior to World War II x, indeed 
prior to the adoption of the Genocide Convention.2
Certainly, genocide and crimes against humanity, 
though related, are separate criminal offences in 
international law. The_status of genocide as a crime in < 
international law is beyond reproach. The declaration to • 
this effect Tn Article 1 of the Genocide Convention 
reflects customary law. Considerable evidence in support 
of this view is to be found in the travaux preparatoires of 
the convention,3 in General Assembly resolutions4, in 
doctrine and in ILC debates.5 Like crimes against humanity,
and statement by French Representative Ordonneau on 
the Ad Hoc Committee confirming the work of the 
committee as the second stage in the development of 
the concept of crimes against humanity. UN
Doc.E/AC.25/SR 7, pp.7-8. See also Memorandum
entitled: "The Basic Principles of a Convention on
Genocide" submitted by the USSR to ECOSOC, UN 
Doc.E/AC.25/7, 7th April, 1948.
See Bryant, 16 HILJ (1975) 687 n.12 and Weiss, 54 BYIL 
(1983) 195. Cf. Handel v. Artukovic. 601 F . Supp. 1421 
(1985) at 1428-1429.
See Mr Gross, Statement for Applicants, S.W. Africa 
Cases, ICJ Pleadings. v.9, pp.355-356, 1966; Lador-
Lederer, 4 Israel YHR (1974)101; Plawski, op.cit., 
p.74 and Eichmann, 36 ILR p.35 para.21.
See summary records of the Ad Hoc Committee, UN Docs. 
E/AC.25/SR1-28; draft articles submitted by UN 
Secretariat, UN Doc.E/447; draft articles submitted by 
China, (Ad Hoc Committee member), UN Doc. E/AC.25/9, 
16th April, 1948; and GA Res. 180(11) entitled "Draft 
Convention on Genocide" adopted 21st November 1947.
GA Res. 96(1) adopted unanimously 11th December, 1946 
recommending the drafting of a convention on the crime 
of genocide. Also see more recent resolutions such as 
GA Res. 40/142, 13th December, 1985 and Res.42/133, 
7th December 1987.
Generally see summary records of ILC debates at its 
thirty-eight session, ILC Yrbk.f 1986, v.I, Meetings 
1958-1963. The following ILC Members, in particular, 
emphasised the distinction between the concepts of
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genocide may be committed in time of peace as well as in
time of war and the policy of mass-murder, a characteristic
common to both crimes, places it squarely within the
concern of the international community and international
law. Roling has written:
"In essence they (genocide and crimes against 
humanity) form one concept of internationally 
recognised criminality: systematically
encroaching upon vital rights of groups, 
threatening the existence of one of the groups of 
which mankind is composed. They constitute as 
such an unbearable mass violation of human 
rights. That is the title of the right which 
mankind has to be entitled to intervene."1
The principles of individual responsibility, criminal
jurisdiction, justiciability and "superior orders" in
international law as they apply to genocide are discussed
below within the framework of the Genocide Convention which
was adopted, in the words of the French Representative on
the Ad Hoc Committee, to state precisely what constitutes
an international crime.2
In Article IV we find one of the Nuremberg Charter's
legacies - the non-acceptance of the plea of 'Act of State'
as a defence. It provides that constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals
are personally responsible for acts of genocide including
those who conspire, incite, attempt and participate in its
commission. Thus Article IV reaffirms the principle of
individual responsibility for crimes committed under
international law. Support for this principle was constant
throughout all the stages of the treaty's drafting history.3
crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, 
ibid., Sir Ian Sinclair, pp.104-105; Mr.Balanda, p.107 
para 34; and McCaffrey, p.119 paras 6-8.
Roling, 100 Hacrue Receuil. p.350.
See UN Doc.E/AC.25/SR6, p.11.
The principle was put forward in a Draft Convention by 
the UN Secretariat (see Drost, op. cit., p. 12 para. 
15). It was endorsed by governments in their replies 
to the UN Secretariat's draft articles (ECOSOC Res.
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However, the division in Article IV between 
'constitutionally responsible rulers' and 'public 
officials' may allow States to contract out of their 
obligations under this provision by pursuing academic 
arguments in order to establish, for instance, that a Head 
of State is neither a 'public official' nor a 
'constitutionally responsible ruler.”1 Wording to the 
effect that all physical persons2 may incur responsibility 
for the commission of genocide is a more suitable 
arrangement: it enunciates clearly the principle of
individual rsponsibility, it is less prone to 
misinterpretation and thus becomes more effective.3
The Genocide Convention contains no provision which 
declares that acting in pursuit of "superior orders" is not 
an admissible ground of defence for the commission of 
genocide. The UN Secretariat's set of draft articles 
contained such a clause in draft article V,4 but the Ad Hoc 
Committee6 resisted suggestions to include the provision on
77 (V), August 6th 1947. See also Drost, op. cit., 
pp.22-23). It was also included in various drafts and 
memoranda submitted by government delegations, e.g. : 
USSR, UN Doc.E/AC.25/7 and China, UN Doc.E/AC.25/9. 
The principle was also adopted by the Ad Hoc 
Committee, UN Docs. E/AC.25/SR4 p.3-5, E/AC.25/W1
Add.l, p. 4 draft article 4, and E/AC.25/W4, p. 14, 
draft article 5.
E.g. see Paragraph 1 of the declaration made by the 
Phillippines. See UN Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary General. Status as at 31st 
December, 1989, 1990, p.100.
Some governments, influenced by the Nuremberg 
Judgment, expressed the view that organisations should 
also be deemed criminally responsible, Drost, op.cit., 
p.24.
See UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR18, cf. Drost, op.cit., 
pp.92-94.
See Drost, op.cit., pp.12-26 and 97-99.
See UN Docs. E/AC.25/Wl/Add.1, p.4 para.2 - p.5, 
and E/AC.25/W4, pp.14-15.
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the basis that such a principle ran counter to the cardinal 
rule of complete obedience expected from members of armed 
forces and the civil services. The Russian and Polish 
delegations on the Ad Hoc Committee1 found its exclusion to 
be one of the Committee's most regressive steps. Drost2 
acknowledged it as Ma serious failure of the Convention".
Furthermore, the Genocide Convention does not regulate 
instances where genocide is committed in a State whose law 
does not provide for its punishment. Thus perpetrators 
captured outside the locus delicti could plead "command of 
the law" in their defence. The UN Secretariat's Draft 
Articles contained a provision denying offenders the 
possibility of invoking this defence. The Draft Articles 
had been influenced by the Nuremberg Charter definition of 
crimes against humanity which were deemed justiciable 
irrespective of whether or not they violated the lex loci 
delicti commisi. The principle that "command of the law" 
is no justification for the perpetration of criminal 
practices under international law has been affirmed by the 
UN General Assembly3 and formulated by the ILC.4 Further, 
Article 1(b) of the UN Convention on Statutes of Limitation 
stipulates that genocide shall not be subject to the 
principle of statutory limitation even if it "does not 
constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country 
in which it was committed". Genocide, for instance, is 
considered to be an extraditable crime under Article 3(2) 
of the Ireland Genocide Act and Article 2(1) of the UK 
Genocide Act even if it was not considered as a criminal 
offence under the law of the lex loci delicti commisi.
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR26, p.15.
Op. cit., p.26. See also Shaw, writing in Essays 
in Honour of Shabtai Rosennef p. 813.
Res. 95(1), 11th December, 1946.
See Nuremberg Principle II, ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II 
p. 192. Discussion of Principle II by the ILC, 
ibid., v.I, pp.37-39.
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The Genocide Ccj^fention's silence on the question of 
"command of the law" can perhaps be explained for the 
following reason. The drafters of the convention 
attributed a great deal of importance to the obligation 
committing High Contracting Parties to enact legislation1 
implementing the convention's provisions and making them 
part of domestic law.2 It may have seemed redundant, 
therefore, to include a statement similar to that contained 
in the definition of crimes against humanity in the 
Nuremberg Charter3 or to Article 1(b) of the UN Convention 
on Statutes of Limitation.
The Genocide Convention has been ratified by 100 
States.4 The rules proscribing genocide practices as 
criminal offences are customary law,5 and recognised as
Some examples of national legislation include, the UK 
Genocide Act 1969; the Australia Genocide Convention 
Act 1949; US, Genocide Convention Implementation Act 
of 1987; Spain, Article 137b of the Penal Code 1971; 
Federal Republic of Germany, Article 220A of the Penal 
Code; Netherlands, The Implementation of the Genocide 
Act, 1964, Stb No.243; Monaco, Ord. No.351 
Implementing the 1948 Genocide Convention, Laws of the 
Principality of Monaco 093- f.22; Ireland, The
Genocide Act 1973; and Israel, The Crime of Genocide 
(Prevention and Punishment) Law, 1950.
Article V of the Genocide Convention. See UN Docs. 
E/AC.25/W1 Add.2 and E/AC.25/ W4, p.16, and Principle 
VIII (b), USSR Memorandum, UN Doc.E/AC.25/7, p.3.
See Drost, op. cit., pp.95-97.
Data as at January, 1990. See, Bowman and Harris, 
op.cit. The United States Senate has only recently 
given its advice and consent to ratify the Genocide 
Convention. 86 US Dept. Bull., pp.89-91. See 
Statement of Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, US Dept. Bull.. 
Nov. 1984, p.66.
See Reservations to the Genocide Conventionf Ad. Op., 
ICJ Rep.f 1951, p.23. Also see, Rosenne, ILC Yrbk.. 
1963, v.I, p.74 para 9; Hannikainen, op. cit., p. 456 
et seq., and Shaw, op.cit., p.800.
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peremptory norms in international law.1 Genocide is a
criminal offence of the same calibre as war crimes and
piracy jure gentium. It is a crime which transcends
national boundaries. It deserves punishment whenever and
wherever it is committed. For this reason Article VI of
the Genocide Convention is disappointing because it
provides that:
"persons charged with genocide shall be tried by 
a competent tribunal of the State in the 
territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting 
Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction".
In one clause the Genocide Convention establishes the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction at two levels: national 
and international. The significance of this two-tier 
system vis-a-vis the crime of genocide and the concept of 
a criminal offence in international law is discussed below.
I. Jurisdiction 
(a) Municipal Level
States ought to ensure that perpetrators of criminal 
practices under international law are prosecuted and to 
this end provision ought to be made to ensure that 
prosecution of the offender takes place even on the basis 
of his presence alone in State territory. Accordingly, the 
absence of the active and passive personality principles 
and particularly that of the universality principle of 
jurisdiction from Article VI of the Genocide Convention is 
conspicuous.
M. Akoul, Lebanon's representative on the Ad Hoc
The Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Co. Ltd Case 
(Second Phased. ICJ Rep.. 1970, p.32, paras. 33 & 34. 
Brownlie, Principlesr p.513; Sinclair, op.cit., p.217; 
Roling writing in International Law in the 
Netherlandsf v.II, p.192; Beres writing in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law Volume 1 Crimes. p.279. Cf. 
Oppenheim, International Law. 1954, v.I, p.740 n.3, 
and Article 6.3 of the International Covenant. But 
contra see: Friedlander, 15 Case Western (19831! 22.
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Committee, stated that once universal punishment for 
'international infringements' such as piracy is accepted as 
a common law prin|i,jS]?le, then it must equally apply to 
genocide.1 Other writers2 have opined that failure to 
include the universality principle in the Genocide 
Convention has undermined its scope, purpose and object,
i.e. to effectively prevent and to punish authors and 
sponsors of these type of discriminatory practices. This 
is especially true in view of the absence from the 
convention's text of a provision catering for the 
obligation of States Parties either to extradite or to 
prosecute perpetrators.3
The territorial principle in Article VI is cause for 
concern because the perpetrators of genocide may remain 
unprosecuted, unpunished or both. The fact that genocide 
practices are in most cases likely to be committed or 
abetted by individuals holding public office,4 the more it 
seems unlikely that criminal proceedings would be 
instituted against the perpetrators by the authorities 
responsible for the administration of justice in the locus 
delicti.
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR8, p.10. Contra, see USSR delegate, 
ibid., p.9.
Jescheck, 8 Ency.PIL 256.
The aut dedere aut punire principle featured in a 
Memorandum (UN Doc. E/AC. 25/8, 14 th April, 1948)
submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide.
State participation in the commission of genocide is 
not an absolute requirement. This was the final 
position taken by the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention, see Drost, op.cit., p.66 para. 78. There 
was some division of opinion, however, in the Ad Hoc 
Committee. The Chinese representative (UN
Doc.E/AC.25/SR4, p.5) opined that "a crime need not be 
committed with the complicity of a government in order 
to fall within the presence of international law". 
The French delegate disagreed. Genocide was only an 
international crime if committed by the authorities of 
the State, otherwise it could only be considered a 
municipal crime. (UN Doc.E/AC.25/SR7, pp.7-8).
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In the Preamble and in Draft Article VII of the UN 
Secretariat's Draft1, in the debates of the Ad Hoc 
Committee2 and in the discussions of the UN Sixth 
Committee3, we find support for adopting the universality 
principle in the Genocide Convention. Judicial decisions 
and the writings of publicists4 endorse the view that the 
crime of genocide demands the application of a universal 
principle of jurisdiction. Samples of municipal
legislation illustrate that States, including States 
Parties to the Genocide Convention, are not prepared to be 
restricted by the territorial principle contained in 
Article VI of the Convention, and are prepared to exercise 
jurisdiction on other bases, including the universality 
principle. Thus, Article 5 of the Israel Crime of Genocide 
(Prevention and Punishment) Law5 establishes that any person 
who committed genocide outside Israel will be prosecuted as 
if the crime was committed in its territory. ' A similar 
provision applies to perpetrators of genQcide under Article 
6(1) of the German Penal Code.* On the basis of the travaux 
preparatoires of the Convention, the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee considers the active and passive 
principles of jurisdiction to be applicable under Article 
VI. In recommending ratification of the Genocide
Convention the Foreign Relations Committee reported:
"The negotiating history makes it clear, however,
that this is not the only place (locus delicti^
See Drost, op. cit., pp.9-13.
See Rudinski (Poland), Lin (China), UN Doc. E/AC25/SR3 
p.4? and Perez-Perozo (Venezuela), Azkoul (Lebanon) 
ibid., /SR8, p.2 and p.8 respectively. Also see Drost 
op. cit., p.34 para. 48 and p.46 para. 63.
See Drost, op.cit., p.100 paras. 100-101.
See among others: Drost, op. cit., p.13; Lemkin, op. 
cit., p.90; Jescheck, op. cit.; Beres op. cit., p.279, 
and Wagner, op.cit., p.908 n.106.
4 LOSI 101.
STGB, 1987.
where trial may be had. The state of which is 
the individual is a national or the state against 
whose nationals the act was committed may also 
exercise jurisdiction.111
In its Advisory Opinion on the Genocide Convention2 the 
International Court recognised but stressed the "universal 
character both of the condemnation of genocide and of the 
co-operation required" to suppress it.
In Eichmann3 defendant was charged, inter alia, with 
so-called "Crimes against the Jewish People" under the 1950 
Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law. This class 
of crimes is defined in terms almost identical to the 
definition of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Thus 
the District Court of Jerusalem discussed the concept of 
the crime of genocide in international law.4
The Court noted5 General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 
1946 which stated that "punishment of the crime of genocide 
is a matter of international concern" and "affirmed that 
genocide is a crime under international law". The Court 
further considered the International Court's Advisory 
Opinion on the Genocide Convention paying due regard, in 
particular, to the International Court's reference to the 
universal scope of the convention and its underlying 
principles "which are recognised by civilised nations as 
binding on States even without any conventional 
obligation".6
On the basis of this evidence the District Court held: 
(a) the crimes of genocide committed against Jewish people 
and other peoples during the Nazi regime were crimes under 
international law, therefore, (b) "in accordance with
2. 28 ILM (1989) 765.
2. ICJ Rep.f 1951, p.23.
3. 36 ILR 5 at p.8.
4. 36 ILR p.32 para.17 - p.39 para.25.
5. Ibid., pp.32-33.
6. ICJ Reo.. 1951, p.23.
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accepted principles of international law the jurisdiction 
to try such crimes is universal".1 The Court also proceeds 
to explain how this assessment of the status of the crime 
of genocide and the application of the universal principle 
of jurisdiction are tenable in view of Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention.
The Court submits the following thesis.2 On the one 
hand, the Genocide Convention codifies customary law by 
virtue of Article I which provides: "the Contracting
Parties confirm3 that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international 
law". The District Court noted once again the
International Court's statement that the underlying 
principles of the Genocide Convention (namely the criminal 
character of the practices which constitute genocide; the 
criminal responsibility of rulers and public officials and 
the absence of any "political" character of the crime for 
the purposes of extradition) are recognised 4 by civilised 
nations as binding on States without any conventional 
obligation.5 The Court6 concluded that the words "confirm" 
(in Article I of the Convention) and "recognised" (present 
in the International Court's Advisory Opinion) "indicate 
confirmation and recognition ex tunc; that is, the said 
principles were already part of customary international 
law" before the adoption of the Genocide Convention.7
On the other hand, the Genocide Convention has 
created, prospectively, international obligations for the
Op.cit., p.34 para.19. 
Op.cit., p.34 para.21 et seq.
i
Emphasis added.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Op.cit., p.35 para.21.
Ibid., p.35 para.21.
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Contracting Parties. Inter alia. States Parties are
required (Article V) to enact legislation "in particular to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide". The Court noted that an "invitation" to this
extent had already been made to all Member States of the
United Nations by General Assembly Resolution 96 (I). It
was held that Article V gave substance to an undertaking
made in the latter part of Article I where States Parties
commit themselves to prevent and to punish the crime of
genocide. Thus, in the Court's opinion Article VI
constitutes yet another obligation for States Parties in a
chain of obligatory provisions intended to secure
punishment of the crime of genocide. The best assessment of
Article VI, however, is found in the Judgment and deserves
to be reproduced:
"It is clear that Article 6  is intended for
cases of genocide which will occur in the future 
after the ratification of the treaty or the 
adherence thereto by the State or States 
concerned. It cannot be assumed, in the abscence 
of an express provision in the Convention itself, 
that any of the conventional obligations, 
including Article 6, will apply to crimes which 
had been perpetrated in the past.... Article 6 
.... is a purely purposive provision, and does 
not presume to affirm a subsisting principle.
[It is] a special provision undertaken by the 
contracting parties with regard to the trial of 
crimes that may be committed in the future.... It 
constitutes no part of the principles of 
customary international law, which are also 
binding outside the conventional application of 
the Convention.111
The Court further declared:
"Moreover, even with regard to the conventional 
application of the Convention, it is not to be assumed 
that Article 6 is designed to limit the jurisdiction 
of countries to try crimes of genocide by the 
principle of territoriality."2
In support of this interpretation of Article VI, the
36 ILR p.36 para.22. 
Ibid., para.23.
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Court1 submits, as corroborating evidence, the Report sent 
by the UN Sixth Committee to the General Assembly prior to 
the adoption of the Convention stating, inter alia, that 
Article VI does not prejudice the right of any State to 
bring to trial its nationals for acts committed outside the 
State. The Court also cited the writings of learned 
publicists reporting that there was no settled opinion in 
the Sixth Committee on the interpretation of Article VI. 
Other writers stated by the District Court opined that 
Article VI did not exclude application of principles of 
jurisdiction permitted under international law, including, 
and especially in the case of genocide, the principle of 
universality.2
The District Court admitted that the absence of the 
universality principle in Article VI is a "grave defect". 
But the territorial principle contained therein is only a 
"compulsory minimum". There is no rule against the 
principle of universality of jurisdiction with respect to 
the crime in question. Article VI is not exhaustive.3
The District Court of Jerusalem thus held, that genocide 
was a crime under customary international law prior to the 
adoption of the Genocide Convention and the jurisdictional 
bases for crimes under international law certainly include 
the universality principle. Israel was no t ' therefore 
impeded from exercising either "legislative authority" or 
"judicial jurisdiction".4 The Supreme Court (sitting as
x. Ibid., p.37 para. 23 et seq.
2. Op.cit., p. 37.
3. Op.cit., p.39 para.25.
4. The District Court Judgment makes it perfectly clear 
that the universality prinicple applied in Eichmann 
was neither based on Article 5 of the 1950 Crime of 
Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, because that 
law "does not apply with retroactive effect", nor on 
the basis of its interpretation that reference to the 
territorial principle in Article VI of the Genocide 
Convention does not exclude other principles of 
jurisdiction for State Parties. The application of
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Court of Criminal Appeal)1 endorsed the District Court 
ruling:
"Not only do all the crimes attributed to the 
appellant bear an international character, but 
their harmful and murder^ous effects were so 
embracing and widespread as to shake the 
international community to its very foundations.
The State of Israel therefore was entitled, 
pursuant to the principle of universal 
jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of 
international law and an agent for its 
enforcement, to try the appellant".
The exercise of the universality principle by national 
courts in respect of crimes in international law was also 
recognised by the United States Court of Appeals in the 
more recent case Demianiuk v. Petrovsky.2 The Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States - Third Restatement3 
reports that while the Genocide Convention "provides for 
trial by the territorial State .... universal jurisdiction 
to punish genocide is widely accepted as a principle of 
customary law". But more than a re-affirmation of the view 
held by the Courts in the Eichmann case, i.e. that genocide 
was a crime even prior to the drafting of the convention, 
the Third Restatement may suggest that genocide has passed 
into customary international law since the adoption of the 
Genocide Convention and is recognised as such.
At any rate, the more frequent the application of the 
universality jurisdiction principle to criminal offences 
under international law the greater is its promotion as one 
of the features characteristic of the concept of criminal 
offence in international law.
the universality principle by the Court was based on 
the "basic nature of the crime of genocide as a crime 
of the utmost gravity under international law." 
Op.cit., p.39 para.25.
36 ILR 277 at p.304.
776 F.2d. 571 (1985).
Edited by the American Law Institute, 1987, v.I, 
p.256.
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(bl International Level
The question whether the position concerning territorial 
jurisdiction in Article VI is satisfactory and the 
reference to an "international penal tribunal" in the same 
clause are singly and jointly relevant to the understanding 
of the concept of a criminal offence in international law. 
The travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention reveal 
that the question whether jurisdiction was to be restricted 
to the territorial principle or whether it was to have been 
broader and include, for example, the universality 
principle, depended very much on what shape and form would 
the international criminal jurisdiction formula take if 
indeed it were to be included.1
Some of the members2 of the Ad Hoc Committee were in 
favour of accepting the universality principle per 
principio, but opposed it on the grounds that they could 
not allow their nationals to be tried by foreign courts 
because they may not benefit from the same constitutional 
guarantees as they would under the lex patriae.3
Several drafts of the international criminal 
jurisdiction clause were submitted: See China,
Memorandum, draft article III, UN Doc.E/AC.25/9; Ad 
Hoc Committee's draft article VII, UN Doc. E/794 and 
amendments submitted by Uruguay, UN Doc. A/C.6/209, 
United States, UN Doc. A/C6/235 and France UN Doc. 
A/C6/211. Also see Sohn, Cases and Other Materials on 
World Law. 1950, p.1024.
France, UN Doc. E/AC25/SR8, p.10? Venezuela, ibid. 
p.3, Lebanon, ibid., p.3; USA, ibid., p.11 and China, 
UN Doc. E/AC25/SR7, p.17.
In their comments on the UN Secretariat's set of draft 
articles which included the exercise of jurisdiction 
on the universality principle, some governments felt 
that the principle could be "abused by claiming 
jurisdiction over aliens on the grounds of genocide 
whilst the real purpose would be nothing but political 
retribution". See Drost, op. cit., p.26. Cf. 
amendments submitted by the United Kingdom, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/L.1250, 23rd March, 1973 to the Draft 
Resolution of the Byelorussian SSR (UN 
Doc.E/CN.4/L.1248, 21st March, 1973) on the "Question 
of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who 
Have Committed Crimes against Humanity".
Unfortunately Article VI of the Genocide Convention does 
not diminish this cause of concern for governments because 
it does not prevent national courts from trying non­
nationals. At any rate, the drafters preferred to include 
a reference to some form of an international criminal forum 
which represents independence and impartiality rather than 
admit a wide form of territorial jurisdiction. M. 
Ordonneau1 declared: "France might be prepared to forego the 
right which she derived from the principle of national 
sovereignty in favour of an international jurisdiciton, but 
she could not do so in favour of a foreign jurisdiction.11 
Other States2, however, claimed that the setting up of an 
international criminal court was not in conformity with 
reality and violated the most basic principle of 
international law, i.e. State sovereignty.
The reference to an international penal tribunal in 
the Genocide Convention is certainly foward looking and de 
lege fer/fnda. But, it is also more than that. Draft 
article IX of the UN Secretariat's Draft and Governments' 
views expressed in the UN Sixth Committee reveal a very 
purposeful and practical meaning behind the two-tier system
States may, for a variety of reasons (political or non­
political), find it more convenient to have offenders tried 
by an international tribunal than by their own national 
courts. The Netherlands3 argued that individuals ought to 
be tried at the national level and States should be held 
responsible at the international level. It was also 
suggested that those offenders who held public office or 
acted in a public capacity at the time of the commission of
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR8, p.10.
See Venezuela, Poland and USSR, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR7, 
p.4; and USSR Declaration, UN Doc. E/AC.25/W5, p.13. 
Also see views of these States in the Sixth Committee: 
UN Docs. A/C.6/SR97-99. Reproduced in Sohn, op.cit., 
pp.1026-1034.
found in the Genocide Convention
A/C.6/SR97-99, loc. cit., pp.1027-1028.
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the offence should be tried before an international rather 
than a national court.1 For this reason the Czechoslovak 
Representative2 too supported the establishment of an 
international criminal court. The French Representative3 in 
the Sixth Committee stressed the need for a competent 
international criminal court: once the criminal
responsibility of public officials had been accepted, law 
enforcement could not be expected to remain at the national 
level.
The notion of an international criminal tribunal is 
more relevant in the overall context of crime prevention 
and punishment in international law than it is to a 
discussion of the features typical of the concept of a 
criminal offence in international law. However, the need 
felt by treaty drafters to include a reference to an 
international penal tribunal in an international instrument 
such as the Genocide Convention, indicates that crimes in 
international law cannot, per principio. be totally 
separated from some form of international criminal 
jurisdiction.4
II. The Political Offence Exception Question
There was general agreement at the various drafting 
levels of the convention that under no circumstances would 
genocide be sanctioned on political grounds. The proposal5 
to stipulate that genocide "shall not be considered a 
political offence for the purposes of extradition” was 
adopted unanimously6 in the Ad Hoc Committee7 and now
*. Drost, op. cit., p.14.
2. See Sohn, op. cit., p.1031.
3. M. Spanieu, ibid., p.1029.
4. Cf. ILC discussion on the Draft Code of Offences, ILC
Yrbk.f 1951, v.l. p.82 para 25 - p.86 para 68.
5. Submitted by Poland in UN Doc. E/AC.25/W5, p.20.
s. The USSR was in favour of the non-applicability of the
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appears in Article VII of the Convention. It also appears 
in municipal legislation1 and in other texts de lege 
feranda.2
Article VII of the Genocide Convention in original
form read as follows:
"Genocide and the other acts in Article IV3 shall not 
be considered as political crimes and therefore shall 
be grounds for extradition".4
The Convention contains a similar provision except
that it reads as:
"Genocide and the other acts enumerated in
Article III shall not be considered as political 
crimes for the purpose of extradition.1,5
The Ad Hoc Committee's Draft Articles, unlike the
Convention, contained two separate statements :(i) a
declaration that genocide is not and may not be considered
a political crime, and (ii) that it is an extraditable
offence. In turn the Genocide Convention embodies one
principle, namely that in so far as extradition
political offence exception with respect to genocide. 
See UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR7, p. 15. However, see the 
United States reservation (ibid.) declaring that an 
extradition request for genocide could only be 
entertained once genocide was a criminal offence under 
domestic law as requried by Article V of the 
Convention.
UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR23, p.12.
See: Ireland, Genocide Act 1973 Article 3(1); UK,
Genocide Act 1969 Article 2(2) and Israel, Crime of 
Genocide Law 1950 Article 8.
See Draft Article IV(1) of the International Criminal 
Code drafted by IAPL, 52 RIDP (1981) 172. Cf.
Bassiouni, International Criminal Code, p.190.
This article referred to 'attempt', 'complicity', 
'conspiracy' and 'incitement'.
See UN Doc. E/AC.25/W5, p.20.
The position is similar under the 1957 European 
Convention on Extradition (ETS_No.24) as supplemented 
by virtue of Article la of Additional Protocol 1975 
(ETS No.86) to the convention.
proceeedings are concerned the political offence exception 
rule shall not apply. The Ad Hoc Committee's version, 
unlike the Convention, underlines the fact that regardless 
of the question of extradition proceedings or the motives 
for which it was committed, genocide will under no 
circumstances whatsoever be considered a political offence. 
In some cases municipal legislation reflects the 
Convention's text and not the position in the Ad Hoc 
Committee's draft article IX. It may well be argued that 
the political offence exception to extradition ought not to 
apply to genocide. But it cannot be said that this is a 
generally accepted principle in practice. States may 
accept a political offence exception plea in extradition 
proceedings where genocide is concerned, or they may not, 
but still fail to prosecute especially in the absence of 
the aut dedere aut punire principle in the convention. For 
instance the Philippines continue to reserve1 their position 
on the question of the political character of genocide 
until domestic legislation is enacted in accordance with 
their constitutional procedure.
III. Applicability of the Rule of Statutory Limitation
With regard to the question of statutory limitation
the Genocide Convention is silent but there are two other
sources on the subject: international treaties and State
practice. The principle of statutory limitation does not
apply to genocide according to Article 1(b) of the UN
Convention on Statutes of Limitations. An identical
reference is found in Article 1(1) of the European
Convention on Statutory Limitation. In a list of criminal
practices including, inter alia, hostage-taking, apartheid,
unlawful seizure of aircraft and the "grave breaches"
provisions under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, genocide is
/
singled out as the crime in respect of which statutes of 
limitation will not apply. This proposal de leae ferafada is
See Paragraph 2 of Philippines Reservation, op.cit.,
p.100.
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found in a Draft Protocol I to the Statute for an 
International Criminal Court and to the Statute for an 
International Commission of Criminal Inquiry drawn up by 
the I LA*1
States have enacted legislation implementing the 
principle of the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitation to genocide.3 Israel is not a party to the UN 
Convention on Statutes of Limitation but it recognises the 
non-applicability of the principle in respect of crimes in 
international law.3 In 1966 Israel passed a law entitled 
"Crimes against Humanity (Abolition of Prescription) Law"4 
providing that there shall be no time-limits for the 
prosecution of offences coming within the Crime of Genocide 
(Prevention and Punishment) Law and the 1950 Nazis and Nazi 
Collaborators (Punishment) Law.
In the Federal Repbulic of Germany a curious series of 
events has occurred. In 1979, the Bundestag amended the 
Penal Code to ensure that murder, genocide and war crimes 
as laid down under the 1949 Geneva Conventions are exempt 
from the application of statutes of limitation.5 However, 
the amendment applies only to genocide acts committed since 
the entry into force of the Genocide Convention (12th 
January, 1961). Any such crime committed during Hitler's 
regime, for instance, falls outside the amendment. Two 
significant implications have been drawn from this: (i) the 
Federal Republic of Germany does not recognise the 
existence of genocide prior to the Genocide Convention. 
The crimes committed within that time-frame will have to be
ILA (1984). p.298.
See UN Doc. E/CN4/906, 1966.
Possible reasons for Israel's non-accession to the UN 
Convention on Statutes of Limitation are given by 
Lerner, 4 Israel LR (1969) 533.
20 LOSI (1966) 8.
A thorough review of the relevant legislation is given 
by Weiss, 54 BYIL (1983) 163.
considered as ordinary murder rather than as criminal 
offences under international law. (ii) The Federal Republic 
of Germany felt it had no obligation under customary 
international law to prosecute war crimes and crimes 
against humanity ('lato sensu'), regardless of any time­
limits, when it was not a party to the Genocide Convention.
The principle of the non-applicability of statutes of 
limitation with regard to crimes such as genocide continues 
to be applied. States seem to show no indiciation which 
suggests any hesitation on their part to invoke the 
application of this principle especially where fugitive 
offenders, alleged to have committed offences such as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity during the Second World 
War, remain unapprehended. The value of this principle as 
a feature characteristic of the nature of crimes in 
international law will certainly increase through its 
continued application in respect of various criminal 
practices in international law.
C . "Apartheid"
Xprirna facToZl^artheid f which means "separation of the 
races" in the Afrikaans language,1 does not^a fortiori)carry 
unlawful connotations as does for instance the crime of 
genocide2, i.e. the concept of the killing of races. In 
principle, there is nothing illegal or criminal about 
peoples living and developing, perhaps with the assistance 
of, but separate from, others.3 The non-coercive separate
x. In Webs^ter's Third New International Dictionary. 
apartheid is defined as "separateness: separation of 
the races: racial segragation." In practice, the term 
has also been used interchangeably with the concept of 
'separate development'. See E. Gros, Agent for 
Applicants, S.W. Africa Cases. 1966, ICJ Pleadings. 
v.8, p.113.
2. The term, which is a combination of the Greek for race 
or tribe ('genos') and the Latin for killing 'cide', 
was coined by Prof. Lemkin, op.cit., p.79.
3. Cf. the principle of self-determination, UN Charter, 
Article 1, para. 2, and Article 55; Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
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development of a group of people is not, per se, an illegal 
policy much less subject to criminal sanction.1 If, 
however, separate development is imposed2 upon a group or 
groups of peoples by another group, implemented by racial 
domination and discrimination, and supervised by virtue of 
a constant, systematic policy of human rights violations, 
then apartheid (the separation of the races) immediately 
begins to assume a different juridical nature. It may then 
be considered unlawful,3 and in certain circumstances may be 
viewed as a criminal practice.
The evidence that is submitted for consideration below 
including an analytical consideration of relevant 
provisions of, the Apartheid Convention reveals that 
apartheid is an unlawful act under international law, but
Peoples, 1960, preambular para. 2 (for background 
comment on the Declaration see Brownlie, Basic
Documents on Human Rights. p.28); and Declaration of 
Punta del Este, 1961, (also see Brownlie, ibid.,
p.388). The right to self-determination is provided 
for in: Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, And Cultural Rights, 1966; in 
article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966; and in Article 20 of the 
African Charter on Human Rights, 1981. Generally see, 
Brownlie, Principles. Chapter XXIV, 9, pp.595-598.
Cf. Judge Van Wyk, Sep. Op., S.W. Africa Cases. 1966, 
ICJ Rep.r pp.173-193, especially at p.188 para. 35.
11 'Separate but equal'(development) is 
possible so long as it is a matter of 
choice by both parties; legally imposed
by one, it must be regarded by the
other as a humiliation "
The Director, Institute of Racial Relations, London, 
cited by the President of the International Court in 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa1) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276(1970  ^. Ad. Op., ICJ Rep. . 1971, p.63. Also see
McKean, Equality and Discrimination under
International Law, 1983, pp.260-263.
Cf. Brown v Board of Education of Topeka. US Supreme 
Court, May 17th, 1954, 98 L.Ed. 873.
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that its status is increasingly looked upon as a criminal 
offence.
In the S.W. Africa Cases1. Ethiopia and Liberia claimed
that the Union of South Africa practised apartheid in the
form of practices having defined legal consequences2 namely,
where individuals' rights, duties and opportunities were
determined and distributed "on the basis of race, colour
and tribe, in a pattern which ignores the needs and
capacities of the groups and individuals affected, and
subordinates the interests and rights of the great majority
of the people to the preferences of a minority.”3
By the President's casting vote, the International
Court found that the applicants had failed to establish
”any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the
subject-matter of the present claims”. Accordingly, the
Court did not address the legal status of apartheid.
However, some of its members found little difficulty in
this regard. Judge Tanaka,4 whose dissenting opinion has
been described as "probably the best exposition of the
concept of equality in existing literature”,5 stated:
"The policy of apartheid or separate development 
which allots status, rights, duties, privileges 
or burdens on the basis of membership in a 
group,class or race rather than on the basis of 
individual merit, capacity or potential is 
illegal whether the motive be bona fide or mala 
fide, oppressive or benevolent."
Judge Padilla Nervo6 echoed Tanaka's support for the
See Submission 2 and 4, ICJ Rep.. 1966, p.15.
ICJ Pleadings. 1966, v.8, p.113.
Ibid., v.l, p.108 para.2, and also at p.161 para 189. 
See also Application by the Government of Ethiopia, 
ibid., p.6, para.4(b).
ICJ Rep.. 1966, p.309.
Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights r p.440. See 
also McKean, op. cit., p.263.
ICJ Rep.f 1966, p.457. See also Judge Wellington Koo, 
Diss. Op., ibid., p.235, Judge Forester, Diss. Op.,
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general principle that "all men are by nature equally free 
and independent", and that this principle "has conquered 
solemn recognition in the basic law of many nations and is 
today in one form or another - customary declaration, norm 
and standard in the constitutional practice of States."
Less than a decade later the International Court was 
faced once more with issues concerning South Africa and its 
presence in Namibia. In its Advisory Opinion,1 the Court 
concluded that apartheid as employed by South Africa in 
Namibia represented a governmental policy intended to 
achieve:
"a complete physical separation of races and 
ethnic groups in separate areas within the 
territory, [by means of] limitations, exclusions 
or restrictions for the members of the indigenous 
population groups in respect of their 
participation in certain types of activities, 
fields of study or of training, labour or 
employment and also submit them to restrictions 
or exclusions of residence and movement in large 
parts of the Territory. [Such measures were held 
to be inconsistent with South Africa's 
obligations under the UN Charter, and to] 
constitute a denial of fundamental human rights 
...a flagrant violation of the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter".2
In a Separate Opinion, Judge Ammoun,3 Vice-President of the
International Court, opined that "one right which must
certainly be considered a pre-existing binding customary
norm which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
codified is the right to equality". This right "naturally
rules out racial discrimination and apartheid". Judge
Padilla Nervo4 reiterated the position he took in the S.W.
Africa Cases.
ibid., p.483, and Judge Mbanefo, Diss. Op., ibid., 
pp.489-490 para, (c).
ICJ Rep.. 1971.
2
• ICJ Rep. , ibid., p.57 paras 130-131.
3
• ICJ Rep. P ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p.108 and p.123.
After the Nairjpia Case it is clear that the 
International Court found apartheid to be unlawful in 
international law. But, it has never had occasion to 
address the question of the criminality of such 
unlawfulness. The following source material is relevant to 
its status as a crime.
Before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
adopted in 1948, the UN General Assembly had already passed 
resolutions1 declaring that matters of racial persecution 
and discrimination do not conform to the letter and spirit 
of the UN Charter. For a period of over four decades
(1946-1990) the General Assembly has almost annually2
adopted a resolution which, in one form or another, 
'noted' , 'considered', 'affirmed', and 'reiterated' this 
principle.3 The General Assembly4 has also called upon
governments to enact legislation rendering racial
discrimination and segregation punishable as criminal 
offences under domestic law.
Since 1965 5 a significant change occurred in the 
wording of relevant General Assembly resolutions. For more 
than twenty years (1965-1990) two resolutions, on average,
GA Res. 44(1), December 8th, 1946 and GA Res. 103(1), 
November 11th, 1946.
It seems that between 1947 and 1949 and in 1956 and 
1964 there were no resolutions adopted denouncing 
(directly or indirectly) racial discrimination and/or 
apartheid.
See, among others, GA Res: 616(VII)(B), December 5th, 
1952; Res. 1016(XI), 30th January, 1957; Res. 
1883(XVIII), 14th October, 1963; Res. 2054(XX)(A), 
December 15th, 1965; Res. 2646(XXV) November 30th,
1970; Res. 34/175, December 17th, 1979; and Res.
39/17, November 23rd., 1984.
GA Res. 1698(XVI) December 19th, 1961; and GA Res.
1850(XVII) December 19th, 1962.
GA Res. 2022(XX) November 5th, 1965; and GA Res. 2074 
(XX) December 17th, 1965.
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were adopted every session1 (even after the General Assembly 
adopted the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid in 1973 2) designating 
racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid as one of 
the following: "a crime against humanity”3? "an offence
against human dignity"4; "a crime against the conscience and 
dignity of mankind"5 and "a criminal affront to the 
conscience and dignity of mankind."6 However, the value of 
these resolutions as indicative of international law is 
conditioned by the General Assembly's voting pattern, which 
is telling of State opinion. 'Western' and other States 
including Australia, New Zealand and Japan have generally 
abstained or voted against the resolutions? whereas a large 
number of African Republics, certain Latin American States, 
some Arab countries and East European nations including the 
Soviet Republics, have been responsible for the 
overwhelming support which these resolutions attracted in 
the General Assembly.7
There were four resolutions (Numbers: 2145, 2202, 2142 
and 2144) adopted at the twenty-first session, 1966? 
and five resolutions (Numbers: 39/72(a), 39/15, 39/17, 
39/19 and 39/21) adopted at the thirty-ninth session, 
1984.
GA Res. 3068(XXVIII) November 30th, 1973.
This phrase appears in no less than 36 resolutions 
from GA Res. 2022(XX), 1965 to GA Res. 45/90, 1990.
GA Res. 2142 (XXI), October 26th 1966.
GA Res. 2764(XXVI) November 9th, 1971 and GA Res. 
33/183(L), January 24th, 1979.
GA Res. 2784 (XXVI) December 6th, 1971. Apartheid was 
also equated to slavery in GA Res. 31/6(1), November 
9th, 1976 and to genocide in GA Res. 40/27, November 
29th, 1985 and GA Res. 42/56, November 30th, 1987.
The use of the term "crime" in GA Resolutions 
concerning apartheid. is, according to Dr. Lador- 
Lederer, "due rather to political tactics than to 
sound penological thinking." 4 Israel YHR (1974) 109. 
See also Professor Sperduti, UN Doc.E/CN.4/SR 1197,
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For their greater part, the resolutions address 
governmental racial discrimination policies employed in 
Southern Africa and in non-self governing territories. 
However, much as it is unavoidable to speak of apartheid 
without reference to South Africa, if it is to be 
considered a criminal offence contrary to the interests of 
the international community, apartheid does not benefit 
from "regionalisation".
Article II of the Apartheid Convention, for instance, 
stipulates that apartheid includes "policies and practices 
of racial segregation and discrimination as practiced in 
Southern Africa". This wording serves more harm than good. 
It contributes to an already very weak definition1 of 
apartheid and perpetuates its image as a 'regional7 
criminal practice with global implications, rather than as 
a criminal offence of universal interest. 2
Resolutions designating apartheid a 'crime against 
humanity7 have been adopted by other international 
(regional) bodies such as the OAU3, the League of Arab
p.101. But contra see Graefrath, 11 German Foreign 
Policy, (1972) at p.396.
See p.16 infra.
There has been a strong movement to delete reference 
to Southern Africa, as it appears in the Apartheid 
Convention definition, by the ILC in its effort to 
draft a definition of the crime of apartheid. See ILC 
Report, GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/44/10), 1989, p.157 para 
164. See also Sixth Committee views on that Report, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L/443, 1990, p. 32 para.89. Draft
article 20 entitled "Apartheid" adopted by the ILC7s 
Drafting Committee at the ILC7s forty-third session, 
does not include reference to Southern Africa. UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 1991, p.5.
See CM/Res. 821 (XXXV), 35th Ordinary Session, Council 
of Ministers, 1980, UN Doc. A/35/463; CM/Res 
854(XXXVII) Ibid., 37th Ordinary Session, 1981, UN 
Doc.A/36/534; AHG/Res. 112(XIX), 19th Ordinary
Session, Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 
1983, UN Doc. A/38/312; CM.Res. 936(XL), 40th Ordinary 
Session, 1984, UN Doc. A/39/207; and CM/Res. 
1052(XLIV)/Rev., 44th Ordinary Session, 1986, UN 
Doc.A/41.654.
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States,1 the Non-Aligned Movement,2 non-governmental
organisations3 and other regional conferences.4 The ILC5 and
Political Declaration of the First Joint Conference of 
Heads of State and of Government of the Organisation 
of African Unity and of the League of Arab States, 
para. 5, UN Doc.A/32/61, 1977.
Political Declaration of the Vlth Conference of Heads 
of State or Government, Havana, 1979, paras. 75,80,99 
and 254. UN Doc. A/34/542.
International NGO Conference of Action Against 
Apartheid and Racism, Geneva, 1983, Declaration: 
paras. I and VI. UN Doc.A/38/309.
Xth Islamic Conference for Foreign Ministers, Morocco, 
1979, Res.l2/10-P, UN Doc. A/34/389; Latin American 
Regional Conference for Action Against Apartheid, 
Caracas, 1983, Declaration: paras. 1,3 and 9, UN Doc. 
A/38/451; Conference of Arab Solidarity with the 
Struggle for Liberation in Southern Africa, Tunis, 
1984, Declaration, UN Doc. A/39/450; International 
Seminar on Racist Ideologies, Attitudes and 
Organisations Hindering Efforts for the Elimination of 
Apartheid and Means to Combat Them, Hungary, 1985, UN 
Doc. A/40/660-S/17477; and Vth Islamic Conference, 
Kuwait, 1987, Final Communique, Declaration and 
Resolutions, 12/5-P(IS), UN Doc. A/42/178-S/18753. 
The North American Regional Conference for Action 
Against Apartheid, Declaration, New York, UN Doc. 
A/39/370—S/16686, 1984. Canada and US participated as 
observers and while condemning apartheid practices, 
failed to make any reference to it as a criminal 
activity.
It was proposed to have the crime of apartheid in the 
Draft Code forming part and parcel of a category of 
practices known as Crimes Against Humanity. See 
Rapporteur's Seventh Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/419, 1989. 
Apartheid appears in draft article 14(2) as a verbatim 
reproduction of definitional Article II of the 
Apartheid Convention. Draft article 14 was not 
adopted by the ILC at its 1989 session, but was 
referred to the Drafting Committee which has adopted 
a draft provision. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 
1991. The ILC reported that a substantial majority of 
ILC members continued to endorse the presence of this 
practice in the Draft Code. See ILC Report to the GA, 
GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/44/10), 1989, pp.155 - 158. The 
position in the Sixth Committee (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.443, 
1990, p.32) was similar to that in the ILC. However, 
some members expressed serious reservations concerning 
the inclusion of apartheid as a 'crime against
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the IAPL1 both include apartheid in their respective 
projects: the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind2 and the International Criminal Code.
Two international seminars3 organised by the UN on 
apartheid and racial discrimination concluded that these 
practices violate human rights,the UN Charter and 
constitute "crimes against humanity" in "terms of the 
general principles of international law".4 However, 
participants from Scandinavia, Japan, Venezuela, Canada and 
the US reserved their positions on the Conclusions 
accompanying the 1967 Zambia Seminar Report because they 
raised serious questions concerning the interpretation of 
the UN Charter and international law. The Proclamation of 
Teheran5, also refers, en passant. to the condemnation of 
apartheid as a crime against humanity.
Further, the phrase "inhuman acts resulting from the 
policy of apartheid" found in Article 1(b) of the UN
humanity' in the Draft Code, see ILC members: ILC
Yrbk.. 1986, v.l, Sir Ian Sinclair, p.105 para 13? Mr 
Balanda, p.108 para 37; Mr Tomuschat, p.115 para 38; 
and Mr McCaffrey, p.119 para 9.
See also Sixth Committee Report on the ILC's work for 
that session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 1987 pp.103 and 
125 paras 511 - 512 and 654 - 655 respectively.
52 RIDP (1981) 131. See also Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Code, 1987, p.144.
See also ILC Draft Article 19 (3c) on State
Responsibility, ILC Yrbk.f 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.95.
See Seminar on Apartheid. Brasilia, UN Doc. St/TAO/HR 
27, 1966, and Report of the International Seminar on 
Apartheid. Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in 
Southern Africa, Zambia, UN Doc. A/6818, 1967.
See Brasilia Seminar Report, p. 11 para. 30 and p. 13 
para. 35 and Res. No.5, p.42 para.98(c) and p.52 
para.123 (I), of the Zambia Seminar Report.
Adopted by the International Conference on Human 
Rights, Teheran, May 13th, 1968. See UN Doc. A/Conf. 
32/41, para 7.
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Convention on Statutes of Limitation is partly responsible 
for the non-ratification of that convention by certain 
States.*
The evidence considered so far, reveals a marked 
tendency to place apartheid (compulsory racial separation) 
on the same level as racial discrimination in international 
law, i.e., to identify it as an unlawful and a prohibited 
practice.2 The principal reason behind this development is 
that apartheid is a doctrine of racial prejudice and its 
implementation involves a broad range of human rights 
violations. Further still, the various sources reveal a 
concerted international effort, displayed by the use of 
such terms as 'crime against humanity' to present apartheid 
as a criminal practice.3
However, if apartheid falls within the wider notion of 
racial discrimination, why should apartheid rather than 
racial discrimination be singled out as a criminal offence? 
The answer lies partly with the form generally taken by 
apartheid in practice, and partly with the way opinio juris 
has developed concerning apartheid. racial discrimination 
and their inter-relationship over the last three decades.
On specific occasions the UN General Assembly4 viewed 
the racial policy of apartheid comparably with that of
See, Statement by France in the Third Committee's 
debate on the Draft Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, UN Doc. 
A/C3/SR2008, p.169 para. 51? and Uruguay, UN Doc. 
A/C3/SR1573, p.8. Cf. Statement by Netherlands in the 
UN Human Rights Commission, NYIL, 1973, p.336.
Cf. Article 1(3) UN Charter; Article 2 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant. Also see, Judge Tanaka, S.W. 
Africa Cases. Diss. Op., ICJ Rep.. 1966, p.284 et seq.
See Bassiouni, 9 Yale JWPO (1982) 202, who write that 
criminalising apartheid is protecting a variety of 
human rights including freedom from arbitrary arrest, 
torture, freedom of movement, religion, opinion, and 
association.
4 Res. 2438(XXII) 1968 and Res. 2787 (XXVI), 1971.
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'nazism' and denounced both as criminal doctrines. The 
policies of Pretoria are similar to those of Hitler's 
Nazism, reports the Brazilia Seminar.1 The Declaration of 
the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial 
Discrimination2 considers 'racism', racial discrimination 
and apartheid to be crimes against the conscience and 
dignity of mankind, and UN Special Rapporteur, Santa Cruz,3 
writes that "systematic and large-scale application of the 
policy of apartheid against the immense majority of the 
population (S. African), amounts to genocide."
In their efforts to establish the existence of a norm 
of non-discrimination under customary law, applicants in 
the S.W. Africa Cases4 drew parallels between genocide and 
apartheid. The wording of statements for Applicants is 
also significant because reference is made to "an offender5 
(presumably S. Africa) allowed to avoid legal condemnation 
of his action by stating a protest."6 Ugandan 
Representative, Mr Okia, speaking in the UN Third 
Committee's debate on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination, declared that "apartheid as practiced in 
South Africa was a form of genocide."7
Op. cit., p.13 para.35.
Adopted at Geneva, 1978. UN Doc. A/33/262.
Study on Racial Discrimination prepared for the Sub- 
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities. Revised version, UN 
Publication, 1977.
ICJ Pleadings. v.9, pp.351 and 354-356.
Emphasis added.
ICJ Pleadings. 1966, v.9 Respondent's comments on
Applicants' assimilation of apartheid to crimes in 
international law such as genocide were directed to 
the question of customary rules and their formation in 
international law. Respondent neither admitted nor 
denied the validity of Applicants' argument. Ibid., 
V.10, pp.21 & 23.
GAOR, 27th Session, Meeting 1922, p.92 para. 23.
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This body of opinion reveals that apartheid is
considered to be a practice which shares its origins with 
other racially discriminatory practices such as genocide, 
representing the harshest and most dangerous manifestation 
of racial hatred. Their impact on international relations 
is such that they demand the specific attention of the 
international community, principally, because of the 
"systematic element", namely a series of unlawful actions 
organised, premeditated, and inflicted on a widespread 
scale (often as part and parcel of an ideology or 
government policy). This element has been identified in
genocide and the Nuremberg concept of crimes against
humanity. Jurists1 and governments have also identified it 
in the practice of apartheid. This "systematic element" is 
a characteristic common to certain criminal offences in 
international law.
Austria2 and Cyprus3 have focused on the "collective" 
and "systematic" negation of human values typified by 
apartheid. Egypt4 considers it to be a crime more serious 
than piracy and international terrorism. The Libyan Arab 
Republic 5 expressed its firm conviction that apartheid is 
a crime against humanity. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic6 expressed similar sentiments as did Algeria,7
See Graefrath, 11 German Foreign Policy (1972) 395; 
Butcher, 8 HR Ortly (1986) 411; Delbruck, 8 Ency PIL 
p.38; and Ermacora, Study Concerning the Question of 
Apartheid from the point of view of International 
Penal Law. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1075, 1972, p.69 paras. 146 
and 147.
UN Doc. A/33/262, 1978.
UN DOC. A/Conf.91/9, 1977.
UN DOC. A/33/262, 1978.
UN DOC. A/8768, p.11, 1972.
Ibid., p.14.
UN Doc. A/Conf. 91/9, v.II, p.20.
254
Bhutan,1 Jamaica,2 Mongolia,3 Indonesia4 and Gabon5. 
Australia6 and Canada7 have condemned apartheid without 
actually making any reference to its nature as a crime. 
Turkey* and Yugoslavia* have taken a broader outlook by 
focusing on racial discrimination and the denial of basic 
human rights rather than specifically on apartheid as a 
"crime against humanity, against the human conscience, and 
against human dignity”.
I. The Apartheid Convention
Initial State Comment
The Apartheid Convention originates from the text of 
a Draft Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid10 which was submitted by Guinea and the 
USSR in 1971 during the International Year for Action to 
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Introducing the 
Draft Text in the Third Committee, the USSR representative11 
announced that the purpose of the preparatory document was 
to "affirm in juridical and concrete terms the rules of 
international law under which apartheid was denounced as a 
crime against humanity."
1 Ibid., p . 21.
2 Ibid., p . 36.
3 Ibid., p . 39.
4 Ibid., p . 35.
5 Ibid., p . 29.
6 UN Doc. A/33/262, Annex,
7 A/Conf. 91/9, p . 22.
8 A/Conf. 91/9, p . 45.
9 Ibid., p . 50.
Hereafter referred to as Draft Text.
GAOR, 26th Session, 5th November, 1971. UN Doc. 
A/C.3/1859, p.230 para. 13.
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The Governments of Poland,1 Romania,2 Chile,3 and Libya4 
considered the Draft Text a major step forward for 
international criminal law. It marked a further move in 
the process (commenced in the Nuremberg period) of 
establishing norms of international law for the prosecution 
and punishment of "crimes against humanity". Hungary5 and 
the German Democratic Republic6 considered the Draft Text as 
an international instrument that would supplement existing 
treaties such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.7
However, these views are not typical of general State 
reaction to the Draft Text and its raison d'etre. Sweden 
and Norway expressed a view shared by other States namely, 
that a convention will not "in practice add any new 
substance to the protection against racial discrimination 
already given by existing international agreements".8
China9 and Austria10 stressed the need for caution and
attention when drafting technical and delicate legal texts
such as the proposed instrument on apartheid. Madagascar11 
feared that a convention intended to proscribe a practice
3. UN Doc.A/C3/SR. 1860, p.235, para. 3.
2. Ibid., meeting 2004, p.144 para.7.
3. Ibid., p.143 para. 1.
4. UN DOC. A/8768, p.11, 1972.
5. UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.2005, p.149 para. 4.
6. Ibid., meeting 2003 p.142 para. 28. See also 
Graefrath, op. cit., p.402.
7. 660 UNTS 195.
8. UN Doc. A/8768, p. 13. See also Morocco, UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.2003, p.141 para.23.
9. Ibid., meeting 2007, p.159 para.36.
10. UN Doc. A/8768, p.7.
11. Ibid., p.11. Madagascar ratified the Apartheid 
Convention on May 26th, 1977.
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largely rife in one part of the world, is likely to become 
a political document rather than a legal instrument.
II. Provisions of the Apartheid Convention Relevant to the 
Concept of the Criminal Offence and its Juridical 
Features
The Apartheid Convention is accused of being in 
violation of the nullum crimen sine lecre principle because 
Article II defines apartheid, inter alia, by reference to 
practices of racial discrimination as occur in Southern 
Africa. Such broad language reveals attempts to render an 
act a criminal offence not on the basis of precise 
juridical terms but rather on the basis of a "geographic" 
reference to undefined policies and practices found in one 
corner of the globe.1
As long as this weakness in the Apartheid Convention 
remains the less is the convention likely to attract a body 
of signatories geographically representative of the 
international community. The less representative is the 
convention of the international community, the more its 
credibility suffers and the value of its contribution to 
the development of rules of international law concerning 
criminal offences becomes more questionable.
fa) The Question of Apartheid as a "Crime against Humanity" 
One of the issues which has attracted much debate
See, Clark writing in Bassiouni, International 
Criminal Law Volume 1 Crimes. pp.302-307; Booysen, 2
S.African YIL (1976) 58; and Bassiouni and Derby, 9 
Hof. LR (1981) 534 para. 27. See also objections
raised by government delegations during the discussion 
of the Apartheid Convention in the UN Third Committee: 
Papademas (Cyprus) UN Doc. A/C3/SR2003, p.143, October 
22nd, 1973; Wilder (Canada) ibid. /SR2008 p.165,
October 26th, 1973; Pardos (Spain) ibid., p.164; Cao 
Pinna(Italy) ibid., p.166 para. 30; and Absolum (New 
Zealand) ibid., p.167 para. 37. Also see declarations 
made by Chile and Uruguay expressing support for the 
moral content of the Apartheid Convention but finding 
difficulty with apartheid as defined in the 
convention. See, World Conference to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination. UN Doc. A/33/262, 1978.
among States is the declaration that aparthied is a crime 
against humanity. In the Apartheid Convention this 
declaration appears in Article I. This form of designating 
criminal offences has a specific meaning in international 
law, namely that which was laid down in the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters. Subsequently the concept of crimes against 
humanity was affirmed as a principle of international law 
by the UN General Assembly and later formulated as such by 
the ILC. Outside the parameter of its Nuremberg definition 
(the question whether that same definition requires 
revision is a separate issue), the concept of crimes 
against humanity ceases to be a juridical concept, i.e. a 
set of defined criminal offences in international law. It 
becomes a term of art capable of including any act or 
meaning which its employer wishes it to convey.1 Thus, 
stricto sensu. the concept of "crimes against humanity" is 
defined and specific. Lato sensu it is abstract and 
vague.
The declaration of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity in the convention seems to reflect more the latter 
(lato sensu) rather than the former (stricto sensu) 
meaning. There are certain reasons which would support 
this conclusion. First, the convention contains no 
reference to the Nuremberg/Tokyo Charters. Second, there 
is no specific evidence suggesting that apartheid is a 
crime against humanity in the Nuremberg sense, although it 
is possible to argue that the definition of apartheid in 
the convention consists of practices which are in essence 
"murder, enslavement, deportation, political, racial and 
religious persecution,and other inhuman acts" i.e. crimes 
against humanity as defined in Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter. Finally, there is little evidence in 
the travaux oreparatoires and in other State declarations 
that apartheid was declared a crime against humanity within 
the meaning of the term as defined in 1945.
See Section A oncrimes Against Human-ity supra.
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Several State' representatives in the UN Third 
Committee expressed reservations to apartheid being 
declared a crime against humanity in the Draft Text. The 
United States,1 the United Kingdom,2 and Italy3 affirmed that 
apartheid was an "abhorrent practice" and a "travesty of 
human rights", but they could not subscribe to the notion 
of apartheid as a crime against humanity.4 Such a notion 
defies the established and specialised meaning of "crimes 
against humanity" in international law. Mexico5 also
subscribed to this school of thought and similar
reservations were made at the 1978 World Conference on 
Racism by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the 
EEC, by Greece and Portugal (at the time non-EEC members), 
by Switzerland, Sweden and Finland.
The description of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity weakens the significance of the concept of crimes 
against humanity, which has some of its origins in the post 
First World War period and subsequently developed as a 
principle of international law. The liberal use of the 
term "crime against humanity" confuses rather than
separates, on the one hand a set of recognised criminal 
offences under international law and on the other hand, any 
number of practices which may be considered by some to be 
more than illegal under international law.
Accordingly, the plain wording used in the Genocide 
Convention: "a crime under international law" most
certainly remains a more valid alternative for drafters of 
international instruments designed to proscribe specific 
practices as criminal offences.
UN Doc.A/C.3/SR. 2003, p.141 para.12.
Ibid., meeting 2008, p.165 para.20.
Ibid., p.167 para. 33.
See also Statement by the Netherlands, NYIL (1973) 
335.
UN DOC. E/CN.4/SR 1235, p.305.
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(b’l Jurisdiction
Objections have been raised against the manner in 
which the Apartheid Convention deals with matters of 
criminal prosecution. The trial of individuals for acts 
recognised as criminal offences under international law is 
a sensitive issue. A balance must be found between two 
vital interests for States: on the one hand, there is the 
protection of nationals and their fundamental guarantees 
abroad and on the other hand, there is a commitment to 
ensure that justice is done and that the offenders do not 
escape prosecution. It is difficult to find a formula 
which strikes a fair balance.
The traditional rule is that perpetrators of acts 
recognised under international law as criminal offences are 
considered hostis humani generis and therefore liable to be 
prosecuted wherever their presence is secured. One of the 
valid arguments in support of the application of the 
universality principle of jurisdiction is that it seeks to 
reduce "safe havens" for those who commit acts recognised 
as criminal offences under international law. However, the 
universality principle does not dispel States' concern that 
in certain jurisdictions the offender's right to a fair 
trial is unlikely to be guaranteed.1 The institution of 
criminal proceedings against nationals in foreign 
territories could be politically rather than legally 
motivated.
This apprehension is expressed by some States,2 in
Note, for example, the objections raised by Pakistan 
in response to claims by Bangladesh authorities to 
prosecute Pakistani nationals for "crimes against 
humanity" and acts of genocide allegedly committed 
during the India/Pakistan conflict in 1971. See, Case 
Concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of Warr ICJ 
Pleadings. 1976, p.6 para. 10 and pp.42-43.
See: Finland on behalf of the Nordic Countries,
A/C3/SR2007, p.159 para. 34; Turkey, ibid., para. 39; 
Belgium, ibid., para.44; Spain, A/C3/SR2008, p.164 
para. 10; Canada, ibid., p.165 para 15; Brazil, ibid.;
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particular the US1 and the UK,2 reluctant to become parties
to treaties such as the Apartheid Convention where the
universality principle is adopted.3 Criminal offences in
international law must be defined in as precise juridical
terms as possible before any principle of jurisdiction,
much less the universality principle, can be applied.
States would properly be reluctant to apply the universal
principle or to undertake international obligations which
would allow foreign tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over
nationals, in the absence of any link between the accused
(other than his presence) and the forum State, for
allegedly having committed manifestly ill-defined criminal
offences. The Netherlands Representative at the United
Nations, speaking on behalf of EEC member states during the
debate in the Third Committee on the adoption of the Draft
Text of the Apartheid Convention, stated:
MWe wish to confirm in particular our 
reservations with regard to the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction in respect of acts and 
offences, imprecisely defined, committed outside 
the territory (of Contracting States) by persons 
who are not their nationals, even where there is 
no other significant contact between the offence 
and the forum State. Our reservations in this , 
respect are especially strong in view of the 
imprecise manner in which the criminal offences 
have been defined".4
The Apartheid Convention raises another issue in 
matters concerning the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
Italy, ibid., p.167 para.31; New Zealand, ibid., para. 
36; and France, ibid., p.169 para. 51. Cf. Clark, op. 
cit., p.314 n.56.
See UN Doc. A/PV2185, p.12.
Ibid., pp.23-25.
Only State Parties to the Apartheid Convention may 
exercise the universality principle in respect of the 
crime of 'apartheid', but they may exercise it over 
nationals (including stateless persons) of any State 
party or non-party to the Convention. See Article V.
4 NYIL (1978) 216.
The issue is raised by reference in the treaty text to a 
separate international judicial body. Article V of the 
convention allows an "international penal tribunal” to 
exercise jurisdiction over perpetrators of apartheid in 
respect of States Parties recognising its competence. This 
provision de leae feretnda is the "twin” provision to an
1/
almost identical clause in the Genocide Convention. The 
presence of such a provision in international treaties is 
to underline the severity of the nature of the acts they 
seek to proscribe as criminal offences under international 
law and to emphasise the need for a universal system of 
prosecution for those who perpetrate such offences.
States such as the USSR1 and the German Democratic 
Republic,2 which traditionally have found the idea of an 
international criminal court empowered to sentence 
individuals convicted for criminal offences under 
international law, alien to their understanding of 
international law, seemed to have changed their position by 
1973 and expressed support for a system of universal 
prosecution of apartheid practices.3
Western European nations, Scandinavian countries, the 
US, Brazil, Canada and other Commonwealth countries find 
difficulties involved in the exercise of the universality 
principle of jurisdiction for the reasons outlined above. 
However, their position vis-a-vis the concept of an 
international criminal court is neutral not negative.4 Most
UN Doc.E/CN.4/SR 1198, p.107.
UN Doc. A/C3/SR2003, p.142 para. 48.
See statements made by Guyana UN Doc. A/C3/SR2004, 
p.145 para. 18; Iraq, ibid., p.146 para. 27? Nigeria, 
UN Doc. A/C3/SR1860, p.235 para. 6? and Cyprus, UN 
Doc. A/C3/SR1862, p. 244 para 15. Cuba, UN Doc. 
A/C3/SR1860, p.236 para. 11 reiterated its 
understanding of an international tribunal exercising 
criminal jurisdiction as a limitation upon State 
sovereignty.
See: Denmark, UN Doc. A/8768, p.9? USA, UN Doc. A/C 
3/SR 2003, p.140 para.12 and the Netherlands, UN Doc.
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are indeed State Parties to the Genocide Convention which 
admits of the establishment of an international criminal 
court•
(c^ Individual Criminal Responsibility
The principle of individual criminal responsibility is 
laid down in Article III which stipulates that all persons, 
including members of organisations, institutions and 
representatives of States who commit the crime of apartheid 
shall be punished "irrespective of motive” and regardless 
of whether they are resident in the locus delicti or "in 
some other State".
Article III embraces three important issues which are 
relevant to the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility and to the concept of the criminal offence 
in international law. First the term "representatives of 
States" is too broad and may include the Executive, the 
Legislature, the Judiciary and others in public service. 
It has raised questions of interpretation for some States.1 
The Representative for Honduras2 in the UN Third Committee 
declared that it excludes diplomatic personnel accredited
E/CN.4/SR. 1196, p.94 and at UN Doc. A/8768 Add.l. p.2.
In the Case Concerning Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of 
War. ICJ Pleadings. 1976, p.43, Pakistan had expressed 
its readiness, in the absence of an international 
penal tribunal agreed upon by the parties concerned 
and functioning on neutral territory, to constitute a 
judicial tribunal "of such character and composition 
as will inspire international confidence" to try 
persons alleged to have committed genocide and other 
criminal offences under international law.
See Australia, UN Doc. A/C3/SR2004, p.144 para. 12, 
cf. p.148 para. 59, and Canada, UN Doc. A/C3/SR2008, 
p.167 para. 37.
UN Doc. A/C3/SR2008, p.168 para. 43. Contra. see 
Guyana UN Doc. A/C3SR/2004, p.144 para. 15. Cf. Clark, 
op. cit., p.310, and, for a South African 
interpretation see Booysen, op.cit., p.65.
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overseas. But a restrictive interpretation of the term 
such as this would, indirectly, constitute a reservation to 
the principle of individual responsibility which is the 
essence of Article III. It would, furthermore, detract 
force from the intention of Article III to remove the "Act 
of State" doctrine as a defence for those who commit 
criminal offences under international law as enunciated at 
Nuremberg.
Second, Article III reiterates the strong commitment 
expressed by the convention in favour of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by stressing that perpetrators of 
apartheid shall be punished regardless of the place where 
the crime is committed. The Representative of Guyana1 
compared those who commit apartheid to war criminals and 
pirates: hostis humani generis.
Third, the conspicuous qualification in Article III, 
namely, that the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility shall apply to apartheid as defined in the 
convention "irrespective of the motive involved,"2 would 
seem to suggest that no ground would excuse the crime of 
apartheid. If this be the case, then the phrase may be 
interpreted to imply that even where apartheid is committed 
in furtherance of political motives, the political offence 
doctrine and the political offence exception rule in 
extradition proceedings shall be inadmissable if invoked. 
The position is made clear in Article XI(1): apartheid as 
defined in the convention shall not be considered a 
political crime for the purposes of extradition.
Thus, in so far as it forms part of a larger effort to 
proscribe apartheid as a criminal offence under 
international law, the significance of Article III is its 
support for principles which are also applicable to a
A/C3/SR2004, p. 145 para. 18.
The phrase was inserted at the suggestion of Mali, UN 
Doc. A/C34/SR2005, p.150 para. 19. No official 
explanation was given for the amendment. Cf. Clark, 
op.cit., pp.307-308.
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number of other acts recognised as crimes under 
international law. It stipulates that individuals shall be 
personally responsible? that this responsibility shall be 
incurred regardless of the capacity in which the offender 
acted at the time of the offence; that he shall be liable 
to capture and prosecution wherever he is found? and that 
no motive, political or otherwise, will excuse or justify 
his conduct.
(d) Superior Orders
The Apartheid Convention, following in the footsteps 
of the Genocide Convention, is silent on the question of 
"superior orders" as a ground of defence. Some indication 
may perhaps be inferred from the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility, as described above, which applies 
across the board in Article III.1 The question whether the 
non-applicability of "superior orders" as a defence for 
crimes committed under international law applies in the 
case of apartheid f depends partly on whether this principle 
is recognised as customary law, and partly on the status, 
so far undetermined, of apartheid as a criminal offence 
under international law.
III. Apartheid and Jus Coaens
There is division of opinion on whether apartheid
represents violation of legal rights protected by ius 
cogens rules, even though the principle of non-racial
discrimination and the crime of genocide are recognised as 
the "least controversial examples of the class"2 of ius 
cogens rules. Certain lawyers are of the opinion that at 
present no proof can be given of apartheid to be in 
violation of a norm of international ius cogens.3 Grounds 
submitted in support of this view, include: (a) the
1. See Clark, op. cit., pp.308-309.
2. Brownlie, Principles. p.513.
3. Stein, 10 S.African YIL (1984) 12.
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statement that apartheid has no definable content; and (b) 
in the S.W. Africa Cases Judge Tanaka objected in part and 
not in toto to the policy of apartheid.1 A different 
position is adopted on this issue by the ILC. Though there
is some division of opinion among its membership on the 
eligibility of apartheid as a candidate for the Draft Code, 
the ILC2 seems generally inclined to recognise that the 
prohibition against apartheid is a peremptory norm of 
international law.
The well-being and development of peoples (concepts 
which apartheid violates and denies) have been recognised 
by the International Court as a "sacred trust of 
civilisation"3 generating obligations eraa omnes
independently of any specific treaty text.4 Human rights
and their protection form part of this sacred trust5 and 
enjoy the force of ius coaens.6 Accordingly, if apartheid 
represents, as currently practised and understood, the 
(concurrent) violation of a substantial number of 
individual rights and freedoms, it is not unreasonable to 
argue that apartheid may form part of the ius cocrens class.7
See Booysen, op. cit., pp.90-93.
ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.II, pt.II, p.15 para 53. See also 
ILC Report on the work of its forty-first session, 
GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/44/10), 1989, p.158 para 168.
ICJ Rep.f 1950, p.7.
Ibid., p.9, and see also Judge Alvarez, ibid., p.181, 
part VI(2).
ICJ Rep.. 1970, p.32.
Judge Tanaka, Diss. Op., ICJ Rep.. 1966, p.298. Cf. 
Schachter, 178 Hague Receuil (1982) 339.
See Declaration of the Seminar on the Legal Status of 
the Apartheid Regime and Other Legal Aspects of the 
Struggle Against Apartheid. UN Doc. A/39/S/16706, 
1984, p.10.
266
IV. Apartheid and Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions
The concept of apartheid has entered within the scope
of the rules of law concerning armed conflict by virtue of
Article 85 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. Article 85(4)(c) provides:
"In addition to the grave breaches defined in the 
preceding paragraphs and in the Conventions, the 
following shall be regarded as grave breaches of 
the Protocol, when committed wilfully and in 
violation of the Conventions or the Protocol: 
practices of 'apartheid' and other inhuman and 
degrading practices involving outrages upon 
personal dignity, based on racial 
discrimination.1,1
The Geneva Conventions provisions relating to the 
repression of "grave breaches" are supplemented by 
Additional Protocol I [Art.85(l)]. Thus, the
permissibility of the application of the universal 
principle of jurisdiction and of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle operative under the Geneva Conventions now extend 
to apartheid when committed within the scope of application 
of the Conventions as well as (by virtue of Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol I) during armed conflict situations 
arising as a result of the exercise of the right to self- 
determination recognised in the UN Charter and in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States. Moreover, 
"grave breaches" under the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocol are by virtue of Article 85(5) of same 
Protocol declared "war crimes".
Experience and practical application may, in time, 
reveal whether Article 85 will contribute to the developing 
status of apartheid as a criminal offence under
The provision was proposed by Tanzania and Uganda. UN 
Doc. CDDH/I/313. See generally: New Rules for Victims 
of Armed Conflicts - Commentary on the Two 1977 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. Bothe, M. , (ed.), 1982, p.518 para.2.21; and
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8th June. 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12th August. 1949. 
Pi1loud, C., (ed.), 1987, p.1001 paras. 3510-3515.
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international law. However, it is already clear that:
(a) Article 85(4)(c) does not define apartheid. State 
representatives at the Diplomatic Conference 
complained that this provision did not meet the 
standards of clarity in penal legislation applied to 
the other grave breaches. No improvement has been 
made, therefore, since the adoption of the Apartheid 
Convention.
(b) In view of the qualification of apartheid as a "war
crime” within the scope of the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I, the following difficulties may 
arise. It would seem that apartheid is at times a war 
crime and at other times a crime against humanity by 
virtue of the Apartheid Convention. Thus, when
apartheid qualifies as a war crime, is it also 
possible that it concurrently constitutes a crime 
against humanity? Furthermore, is apartheid a crime 
against humanity in the sense of the term as defined 
in 1945, or in the lato sensu meaning as stipulated in 
the Apartheid Convention? Furthermore, is there any 
conflict between apartheid a war crime and apartheid 
a crime against humanity? If so, which of the two 
forms of apartheid as a criminal offence will prevail?
D. Torture
Torture is an unlawful act in international law and 
this statement is supported by an impressive body of 
evidence consisting of treaty provisions, 1 judicial
See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 
(Article 5); European Convention on Human Rights, 
1950, (Article 3); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 1966, (Article 7); American 
Convention on Human Rights, 1969, (Article 5); 
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (Hereafter cited as 
Declaration on Protection from Torture.) 1975? and 
African Charter on Human Rights, 1981, (Article 5). 
The First International Conference on the Protection 
of Human Rights in the Islamic Criminal Justice System
decisions,1 national legislation2 and doctrine.3 The present
declared that torture "constitutes a serious and grave 
violation of Sctfjfriah Law, international human rights 
law, and the generally accepted principles of 
international law”. For text of resolution see 
Bassiouni, 74 AJIL (1980) 629-630.
See, inter alia. The Greek Case. 12 Yrbk. ECHR (1969)? 
Ireland v U.K. ibid., 19 (1976) 82, text of judgment 
also at 17 ILM (1978) 680; Filartiaa v Pena-Irala. 630 
F. 2d. 878 (1980). Hereafter cited as Filartiaa. The 
contribution of this judgment vis-a-vis the status of 
torture as a crime, is discussed below. However, it 
represents one of the first judicial interpretations 
of the general status of torture in international law, 
committed during peace time, by a municipal court. 
Also see decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee, 
GAOR, A/39/40, 1981, Communication Nos: 83, 85, 103, 
109, 110 and 123.
Torture is prohibited in the Constitution of almost 
every State in the civilised world. A table of the 
relevant constitutional provisions was drawn up in 
1978 by Ackerman 11 Vand. JTL at p.691, Appendix I. 
Hereafter cited as Ackerman. Since 1978 a number of 
amendments have been made to the Constitutions of the 
following countries in order to provide for the 
prohibition of torture. Unless otherwise indicated 
the citation refers to the relevant provision in the 
Constitution: Bahrain, 19(d); Barbados, 15? Belize,
7? Burundi, 10? Canada Constitutional Act 1982, 
Schedule B, article 12? Cape Verde, 31(3); China, 38? 
Congo, 7? Democratic Peoples7 Republic of Kampuchea, 
35? Commonwealth of Dominica, 5? El Salvador, 27? 
Equatorial Guinea, 20(1); Ethiopia, 43(1)? Guatemala, 
19? Guinea-Bissau, 32(2)?Guyana, 141? Haiti, 25; 
Honduras, 68? Iran, 38? Kiribati, 7? Republic of 
Korea, (South), 12(2); Kuwait, 31? Liberia, 21(e)? 
Malta, 36(1) and The European Convention Act, 1987? 
Monaco, 20? Nauru, 7; Netherlands, 11? Nicaragua, 36? 
Nigeria, 31(1)(a); Philippines, 10? St Christopher & 
Nevis, 7? St Lucia, 5? St Vincent, 5? Sierra Leone, 
10? Soloman Islands, 7? Somalia, 27? Spain, 16; Sri 
Lanka, 11? Sudan, 29? Suriname, 3? Sweden, 5? Turkey, 
17? Tuvalu, 19? Viet-Nam (Socialist Republic), 69? 
Zaire, 13? Zimbabwe, 15? and Yemen, 45.
Ad Hoc legislation has been enacted by:
Barbados, German Democratic Republic, Jordan, Portugal 
and the USSR, See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, 1978, p.2 para 
6? Hungary, UN Doc. A/39/499, 1984, p. 8; Greece,
Panama and Spain, ibid., /Add.l? and Thailand, ibid., 
/Add.2, p .2.
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section,, however, will consider the status of torture as a 
criminal offence in international law particularly since 
the entry into force of two multilateral conventions1 
designed to prevent torture by applying rules of criminal 
law.
I . International Instruments 
(a.i.) The 1919 Paris Peace Conference
The origins of the international proscription of 
torture as a criminal offence date back to the period 
following the First World War. On the basis of documentary 
evidence supplied by Britain, France and other delegations 
at the 1919 Preliminary Peace Conference at Versailles, the 
Commission on the Authors of War, identified a number of 
charges committed by Turkish and German authorities 
against, among others, Turkish subjects.2 The list includes 
the torture of civilians and the ill-treatment of prisoners 
of war. The Commission described such practices as 
"outrages against the laws and customs of war and of the
See Ackerman, op. cit., p.690? Klayman, 51 Temp. LO
(1978) 449 at 513, and Draper, AJ (1976) 221. The
following authors have discussed the recent UN and OAS 
instruments defining torture as a criminal offence but 
have not expressed views on its status as a crime in
international law. See, Lerner, 16 Israel YHR (1986)
126? Donnelly, 33 NILR (1986) 1, Skupinski, 15 Pol. 
YIL (1986) 163, Macdonald, writing in Essavs in Honour 
of Shabtai Rosenne. p.385, and NOTES by: J.G.S., 59 
Aust.LJ (1985) 402 and Botterud, 8 ASILS-ILJ (1984) 
67.
See: (i) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Adopted 
by GA Res. 39/46, 1984. Entered into force 26th June, 
1987. Text at 23 ILM 1027. Hereafter cited as UN 
Convention on Torture, (ii) Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture. OAS TS No.67. Adopted by OAS Res. 783 
(XV—0/85), 9th Dec. 1985. Text at 25 ILM (1986) 519. 
Hereafter cited as OAS Convention on Torture.
See Report at 14 AJIL (1920) 95. Also see, Schwelb, 
23 BYIL (1946) at p. 181.
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laws of humanity”1 and that they engender personal criminal 
responsibility.2
This finding provides: (a) one of the earliest
international recommendations which argues that torture 
committed in time of war should be punished as a criminal 
offence; (b) gives concrete meaning to the provisions of 
international treaties in force at the time, inter alia, 
the Hague Conventions (II) 1899 & (IV) 1907, which
stipulated that prisoners of war must be treated humanely3 
and that ”lives of persons"4 must be respected by the 
occupying Power; and (c) has contributed to the development 
of the concept of war crimes and, to that which in 1945, 
came to be known as "crimes against humanity".
(a.ii.} The Nuremberg Charter and CCL No. 10. 1945
Torture was widely practised by the Nazis and the 
Japanese during World War II, but it is not specifically 
listed under any of the groups of crimes stipulated in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. Articles 6(b) and 5(b) of 
the respective Charters speak of the "ill-treatment" of
civilians and of prisoners of war as war crimes. Articles 
6(c) and 5(c) refer to "inhumane acts" as a crime against 
humanity committed against the civilian population. 
Records of the International Conference on Military Trials 
held in London in 1945 offer no evidence or indication that 
the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter had torture
specifically in mind, i.e. that they intended to include it
as a separate criminal offence. Equally, there is no
Report, op. cit., pp.113-115. But see Reservations 
submitted by the American Members who found exception, 
not with the Commission's conclusion that torture, as 
an unlawful practice is contrary to the laws and 
customs of war, but that it violated the so-called 
laws of humanity. The US Representatives preferred to 
think of torture as a violation of the "principles of 
humanity". Report, op.cit., p.134.
Ibid., p.117.
Common.Article 4.
Common Article 46.
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evidence which suggests the contrary, namely that the 
concepts of war crimes and crimes against humanity were 
meant to exclude the practice of torture. Count Four of the 
Indictment at Nuremberg alleged that civilians in Germany 
were tortured whilst in concentration camps.1
There was consensus at the London Conference that 
"ill-treatment” and "inhuman acts" were not merely unlawful 
practices but that they were considered "criminal 
violations of international law"2 However, the United 
States delegation to the Conference insisted that no matter 
how atrocious and repugnant the atrocities committed by 
Germany before or during the War against Jews, against its 
nationals and against aliens present in its territory, 
criminal proceedings could only be instituted if it can be 
established that they were committed as part of the plan to 
wage an illegal war. Mr Justice Jackson,3 Head of the US 
Delegation, was convinced that unless there was a "war 
connection", exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the 
Allies would be without foundation at law. This position 
prevailed and found expression in Article 6(c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter which allowed the International Military 
Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity only if they had been committed "in execution of 
or in connection with" war crimes and the waging of an 
illegal war (crimes against peace).
The Nuremberg Tribunal acknowledged that prisoners of 
war had been "ill-treated, tortured and mutilated, not only 
in defiance of the well-established rules of international 
law, but in complete disregard to the elementary dictates 
of humanity. Civilian populations in occupied territories 
suffered the same fate".4 The Court5 cited evidence given
x. Cmnd. 6696, pp.30-31.
2. See Minutes of Conference Session held on 23rd July,
1945, Doc. XLIV, Jackson Report, p.335.
3. Jackson Report, pp.331 and 333.
4. Cmnd. 6964, p.45 (emphasis added).
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by General Rudolph Hess confirming that torture was 
widespread; but it adhered to the provisions of the 
Nuremberg Charter and declared that it had not been 
satisfactorily proven that acts before 1939 were committed 
in execution of or in connection with crimes against the 
peace or war crimes and thus did not constitute crimes 
against humanity as required under Article 6(c) of the 
Charter.1
It is immaterial whether torture was considered to be 
"ill-treatment" under war crimes or an "inhuman act" under 
crimes against humanity. It is certain, however, that 
torture either as a war crime or a crime against humanity, 
or as both, was not considered to be a criminal offence for 
which there was individual criminal responsibility under 
international law if committed by a State against its own 
nationals not in pursuance of a plan to wage war or outside 
the conduct of hostilities. Therefore, if a repressive 
government practised torture against its own nationals or 
non-nationals present in its territory without violating 
the laws of war, and/or such practices did not form part of 
a plan to wage aggressive war, it seems that in 1945 there 
was insufficient international consensus to consider such 
practices to be the concern of the family of nations and 
thus to be subjected to penal sanctions (individual or 
otherwise) under international law. The position since 
1919 had not changed.
Significant changes occurred with the enactment of CCL 
No. 10. This contained a definition of crimes against 
humanity different, in two fundamental respects, from the 
definition of same concept in the Nuremberg Charter: (i)
the qualification ratione temporis ("before or during the 
war") found in the Nuremberg provision was not reproduced. 
Further, jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was not 
restricted ratione materiae. i.e. that they had to be
Ibid., p.63.
Op.cit., p.65.
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committed in connection with or in execution of war crimes
or crimes against the peace; and (ii) torture is
specifically included as a crime against humanity. In re
Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzcrrunpen Trial’I a US Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg held:
"The Allied Control Council, in its Law No. 10, removed 
this limitation (ratione materiae^. [The jurisdiction 
of the present tribunal] is not limited to offenses 
committed during war, it is also not restricted as to 
nationality of the accused or of the victim, or to the 
place where committed....
Torture, and similar crimes which heretofore were
enjoined only by the respective nations now fall
within the prescription of the family of nations".1
In another decision, it was also held that the crimes
defined under CCL No. 10 "were crimes under existing rules
of international law - some by conventional law and some by
customary law".2 Several convictions for torture, and for
other crimes, were secured by military tribunals under CCL
No. 10.3
It seems ironic, given the position taken by the US at 
the London Conference in 1945, but the decisions delivered 
by US military tribunals in 1948 suggest that international
law concerned itself with crimes such as torture even if
committed in time of peace, within the territory of any 
State, not necessarily in pursuit of a policy to wage 
aggressive war or in connection with the commission of war 
crimes, by nationals against fellow nationals and/or non­
nationals present in that territory.4 There is a stark and
15 Ann.Dig. 656 at 664. Emphasis added.
In re List and Others, ibid., at p.634.
See, among others, In re Von Leeb and Others (German 
High Command Trials . 15 Ann Dig, p. 376? In re List 
and Others. ibid., p. 632 and In re Griefelt and 
Others, ibid., p.653.
Contra see, however, the decision delivered by same US 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg In re Flick and Others. 
1947. Cf. Prof. Gros, Chef du delegation, London 
Conference on Military Trials, Minutes of Session of 
July 24, 1945, Doc. XLVII, Jackson Report, p.360.
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bold implication in the decisions delivered under CCL No. 
10, namely that torture was seen to be in that class of 
criminal offences under international law for which there 
is individual criminal responsibility regardless of when, 
where or by whom they are committed; where the universality 
principle of criminal jurisdiction is applicable; and where 
the perpetrators are considered hostis humani generis. The 
formulation of the status of torture as a criminal offence 
under international law, in time of peace, dates from the 
immediate post 1945 period. As a result of the changes 
made in CCL No. 10 and subsequent judicial practice this 
would seem to be a correct understanding of the legal 
position as at late 1945 to 1948 were it not for a 
significant development in the codification of the concept 
of crimes against humanity in international law.
In 1950 the ILC, as directed by General Assembly 
Resolution 177(H),1 formulated the Nuremberg Principles.2 
The ILC followed the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment 
slavishly. The ILC adopted the Nuremberg Charter 
definition of crimes against humanity and therefore 
required them to be committed in execution of or in 
connection with crimes against peace or war crimes.3 This 
occurred, notwithstanding advice to the contrary submitted 
by Professor Pella.4 The ILC also ignored the changes made 
in CCL No. 10 and, further still, it did not take into 
account the contribution made by the then recently adopted 
1949 Geneva Conventions. The contribution made by these 
conventions vis-a-vis torture is considered presently. 
However, while they do not indicate that torture is a crime
Adopted on 21st November, 1947.
See, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I.
Ibid., v.II, p.377. See the dissenting views of two 
distinguished members of the Commission: Professors 
Scelle (ibid., v.I, p.55 para.90) and Brierly (ibid., 
p.57 para. 117).
Memorandum, op. cit., p.347.
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against humanity as defined under CCL No.10, or that, when 
committed outside armed conflict, torture is a criminal 
offence under international law, they do reveal that 
torture is a prohibited practice for which there is 
personal criminal responsibility. The conventions do not 
require that torture must be committed as part of a larger 
criminal action such as waging aggressive war. This 
unfortunate regressive approach adopted by the ILC in 1950 
constitutes a serious qualification to the general body of 
evidence concerning the legal status of torture.
The ILC's work on the Draft Code between 1950 - 1954 
and subsequently since 1981 is also relevant to the 
practice of torture. During the first period the ILC 
debated three Reports on the Draft Code of Offences 
submited by Rapporteur Spiropoulos1. But in none of these 
Reports is torture specifically mentioned.
In the second phase of the ILC's consideration of the 
Draft Code, the Declaration on Protection From Torture was 
listed together with 23 other instruments concerning 
practices which, prior to the Second World War, "fell 
within the sphere of the exclusive sovereignty of States"3 
but currently are of concern to the international 
community. To date, the ILC has not provided for torture 
by way of a seperate provision within the Draft Code. At 
its forty-third session, the ILC Drafting Committee 
specifies torture as one of several practices constituting 
"systematic or mass violation of human rights". Comments 
by members to the effect that the concept of "inhumane 
acts", being part and parcel of the ILC definition of 
crimes against humanity, includes acts of physical violence
First Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/25, ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II 
p.253; Second Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/44, ibid., 1951, 
v.II, p.43 and Third Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/85 ibid., 
1954, v.II.
Second Report by Prof. Thiam, UN Doc. A/CN.4/77. ILC 
Yrbk. , 1984, v.II, pt.I. p.94 paras 43 and 44. In 
particular see Ni, ibid., v.I, p.16 para 23 and Sir 
Ian Sinclair, ibid., p.29 para 10.
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which degrade the human being, are the only clues by virtue 
of which torture may remotely be considered as coming 
within the Draft Code.1
(a.iii.) The 1949 Geneva Conventions
The concept of "humane treatment” is basic to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.2 The conventions provide a network of 
provisions designed to safeguard the moral and physical 
integrity of the human being in times of international3 and 
non-international4 armed conflict. Torture is considered to 
be a grave breach of the conventions.5 The universality 
principle of jurisdiction becomes applicable under the 
conventions where a "grave breach” has been committed. 
State Parties may also extradite rather than prosecute the
See draft Article 21 UN Doc. A/CN.4 .L.459, 1991, p.5. 
For background information see also Seventh Report 
submitted by Rapporteur Thiam, UN Doc. A/CN.4/419, 
1989, p. 13 paras 44-46. At the time of writing, a 
summary of the ILC's debates at its forty-first 
session (1989) have not been published. But, the 
Report to the GA on the ILC's work for that session 
(GAOR, Supp. No. 10, A/44/10, p.127) does not reveal 
that torture was identified by members as an inhuman 
act constituting a crime against humanity in the Draft 
Code. Op.cit., pp.163 - 168.
ICRC, Commentary - The Geneva Conventions of August 
12th. 1949f Pictet, J., (ed.), v.I, p.52.
See: Article 12 common to Conventions (I) and (II); 
Article 13, Convention(III) and Article 27, Convention 
(IV).
See common Article 3 to the four conventions.
See Article 50, Convention (1); Article 51, Convention 
(II); Article 130, Convention (III) and Article 147, 
Convention (IV). These common articles originally 
formed part of a set of articles drafted in the first 
instance by a small team of government experts 
requested to consider the question of "war crimes” by 
the ICRC. In their Draft Article II entitled "Grave 
Violations" they listed a number of punishable acts, 
but torture was not included. Reference was made, 
however, to "great human suffering, serious injury to 
body or health, and a derogation from the dignity due 
to the person". See Pictet, op.cit., p.358.
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perpetrator of a "grave breach". The conventions thus
allow for the aut dedere aut ounire principle,1 but States
are not obliged to apply this principle and its
effectiveness is accordingly considerably weakened.2
Perpetrators of "grave breaches" will be punished along
with others who order them to be committed.
L 1 intention du leaislateur is reported3 to have been in
accordance with the following:
"The universality of jurisdiction in cases of grave 
violations justifies the hope that such offenders 
will not be left unpunished; and the obligation 
to extradite will help to make their repression 
general".
In their original draft form, the "grave breaches" 
provisions of the conventions were described as "crimes 
against the law of nations".4 In so far as it is committed 
in the sphere of armed conflict, this description is true 
of torture. By virtue of Additional Protocol I of 1977 to 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this is also true of torture 
in so far as it is committed in armed conflicts "in which 
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination."3
(b. i .) Declaration on Protection from Torture6
Article 7 of the Declaration obliges States to render 
torture a criminal offence under municipal law. Article 2
See Article 49, Convention (I), Article 50, Convention 
(II), Article 129, Convention(III) and Article 146, 
Convention (IV).
See Draper, 114 Hague Receuil (1965) 159 and at 161. 
Pictet, op. cit., pp.359-360.
Ibid., p.359 n.l.
Article 1 (4). See also Rodley, The Treatment of
Prisoners under International Law. 1987, p.58.
Generally, see Rodley, op.cit., pp.25-35, 41-42 and
61-62.
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describes torture as an "offence to human dignity”, as a
denial of the purposes of the UN Charter and as a violation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
By virtue of these provisions the Declaration, adopted
in 1975, marks perhaps the earliest official statement made
by the UN implying that the practice of torture, other than
as provided for under the law of armed conflict, is not
merely illegal but may also be considered a criminal
offence. The requirement made by Article 7 has been
referred to as "an obligation"1 and "an embryonic legal
obligation".2 However, the Netherlands Representative3 who
introduced the Draft Declaration prepared by the Fifth UN
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders (1975)4 declared in the Third Committee:
"(The Declaration) should be regarded as a political
document Without purporting to impose a legal
obligation, the declaration imposed a moral obligation 
on States to ensure that their national legislation 
conformed."
The Representative for Sweden5 also mentioned that the text 
is not legally binding. These statements are typical of 
the correctly cautious mood predominant among States when 
efforts are undertaken at the international level to 
proscribe certain practices as criminal offences.
The Declaration strengthens the prohibition of torture 
under international law. Professor Brownlie6 suggests that
*. Rodley, op.cit., p.31.
2. Draper, AJ (1976) 229.
3. Mr Speekinbrink, GAOR, UN Doc. A/C3/SR2160, 1975,
p.268 para.5. Emphasis added.
4. See Rodley, op.cit., p.27 et seg.
5. Mr. Larsson, GAOR, UN Doc. A/C3/SR2165, p.306 para.56. 
See also, Mr. Wensley. (Australia), ibid., p.306 para. 
54.
6- Basic Documents on Human Rights. 1981, p.35 Cf.
Draper, op.cit., p.230 and Klayman, op. cit., pp.487- 
488.
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it "constitutes evidence for the view that the prohibition 
of torture is an existing principle of international law". 
Further, by providing a sound juridical definition of 
torture (Article 1); by urging States to enact criminal 
legislation (Article 7); by stressing the importance of 
guidelines for law enforcement officials (Articles 5 and 
6)? by recommending implementation measures designed to 
prevent torture (Article 4); and by acknowledging the need 
to compensate victims of torture (Article 11), the 
Declaration certainly does not weaken the case for torture 
(committed outside armed conflict) as a criminal offence 
under international law.1
(b.ii.) UN Convention on Torture
A preambular paragraph in Draft International 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel. Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment submitted by Sweden2 
expressed the desire to convert the principles of the 
Declaration on Protection from Torture into binding treaty 
obligations and to adopt a system for their effective 
implementation.3 Judging by initial State response4 to the 
Swedish Draft, that text represented a conscious effort to 
proscribe torture not merely as an unlawful act but 
specifically as a criminal offence. Clearly, there was a 
significant change since 1945-1949 in the policy of
The Declaration is cited as part of a body of evidence 
which strongly suggests that torture should be 
considered an "international crime" as the term is 
defined by the ILC in its Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. Note in 17 Rev.ICJ (1976) 46.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1285, 23rd January 1978. Hereafter 
referred to as Swedish Draft.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1427, 1980, p.2 draft para.6. See the 
statements made by Austria and Denmark, UN Doc. 
E/CN. 4/1314, 1978, p. 3 paras. 11 & 12? and cf.
Belgium, UN Doc. A/39/499, 1984, p.4 para.3; Canada, 
ibid., p.5 para.l? and the Netherlands, ibid., p. 12 
para. 4.
See UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, pp.3-4.
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governments concerning torture and its legal status. The 
notion of torture as a criminal offence committed outside 
armed conflict had begun to attract a wider audience and 
its acceptance, in principio. by States as such increased.1
The sub-headings which follow represent the most 
significant contributions made by the UN Convention on 
Torture vis-a-vis the proscription of torture as a crime 
and to the understanding of the concept of a criminal 
offence under international law.
(b.ii.1.) Jurisdiction
The Genocide and the Apartheid Conventions, though 
they do not exclude othei: grounds of jurisdiction, focus 
respectively on the territorial and universality principles 
of jurisdiction. In contrast the present convention
(Article 5.1) offers State Parties a number of possible 
grounds on which jurisdiction may be exercised. Listed in 
the following order the grounds include: (a) the
territorial principle? (b) the active personality principle 
- i.e. based on the nationality of the offender? (c) the 
passive personality principle - based on the nationality of 
the victim? and (d) the universality principle. An almost 
identical set of jurisdictional principles is found under 
the OAS Convention on Torture.
The intention of the drafters was to ensure that
torturers would not, as far as possible, benefit from "safe
havens". There was a clear unqualified consensus on this 
principle within the Working Group responsible for the 
drafting of the convention, within the UN Human Rights 
Commission and among States as reflected in their comments
In response to the Swedish Draft, the Swiss Government 
declared:
"It might be appropriate, on the 
occasion of the drawing up of a 
Convention against Torture, to extend 
the regime (of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions) to all situations; this 
would be an important development in 
international law relating to criminal 
penalties".
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.8 para. 42.
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on the Draft Convention. The US position is typical of 
this consensus: "torture is an offence of special
international concern and should have broad jurisdictional 
bases".1 There were, however, reservations made in the 
negotiating stages of the convention by States which could 
not accept the various principles of jurisdiction as they 
appeared in draft form. The comments made by States are 
evidence of the development of "opinio juris" concerning 
the application of principles of jurisdiction to emerging 
criminal offences under international law, and as such are 
relevant to the juridical characteristics of the concept of 
the criminal offence in international law.
The Principles of Jurisdiction
The territorial principle is recognised as a general 
principle of law and is accepted by States as a valid 
ground on which criminal jurisdiction may be exercised. It 
met with no difficulties in the drafting of the convention.2
By virtue of Article 5(1)(b) a State Party can 
exercise jurisdiction when the offender is its national, 
even though the offence occurred in the territory of 
another State Party. It was suggested that the word 
"national" ought to be substituted by "public official" or 
"employee of that State".3 This would reflect and support 
the position in Article 1 of the convention which contains 
a definition of torture and suggests that, principally, 
torture is committed by public officials or agents of the 
State. The prevailing view was that the term "national" 
is a generally accepted concept in international law in 
connection with the establishment of jurisdiction.4 The
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.15 para. 69.
See Working Group Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1367, 1980, 
p.7 paras: 39-41. Hereafter referred to as 1980 WG 
Report.
Ibid., p.8 para. 42.
1980 W.G. Report, p.8 para.43.
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proposed amendment was not adopted, thus permitting the 
suggestion that the liability of the offender under the UN 
Convention on Torture is not necessarily limited to 
practices committed by persons in an official capacity 
notwithstanding the definition ratione personae of the 
crime of torture.
State Parties may also exercise jurisdiction, where 
the victim is a national if they consider it appropriate. 
The US proposed the deletion of this particular ground of 
jurisdiction declaring that it was "not widely accepted in 
international law".1 It explained that State Parties could 
still exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality 
of the victim if the principle was allowed under 
international law.2 The USSR3 expressed reservations in 
respect of the passive as well as the active personality 
principles of jurisdiction. It questioned their validity 
under international law.
Where a State Party does not offer to extradite an 
alleged torturer it shall be obliged to prosecute him under 
its own law. This obligation is imposed by virtue of 
Articles 5(2) and 7(1). The accused may be a national of 
the requested State and in accordance with traditional 
governmental policy it may refuse to extradite its own 
nationals regardless of whether or not the lex loci delicti 
is the same as that of the lex fori. The requested State 
may refuse to proceed with an extradition request purely 
for policy reasons. In any event, the (requested) State 
Party is obliged to prosecute if it does not extradite the 
accused. This is the aut dedere aut punure principle. In 
the event that other possible grounds of jurisdiction are 
not exercised by a State Party, this principle, under the
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.3 para.15 and p.15 para.70.
This suggestion was made in view of article 8(3) of 
the Swedish Draft which specifically catered for this 
eventuality. An identical provision now appears in 
Article 5(1) of the Convention.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.4 para. 22.
UN Convention on Torture, must be applied. The position in 
other treaties concerned with providing international penal 
sanctions for violations of human rights is more relaxed. 
There is no provision for the application of the aut dedere 
aut puip/re principle in the Genocide and in the Apartheid 
Cement ions. High Contracting Parties to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions mayr if they so decide, apply the principle in 
respect of persons alleged to have committed "grave 
breaches" under the Conventions.
The aut dedere aut plj^u^e principle first appeared in 
the UN Convention on Torture in embryonic form in the 
Swedish Draft.1 It was subsequently re-modelled and 
eventually adopted on the basis of a separate amendment 
introduced by the US.2 The purpose of the amendment was 
twofold: (a) to ensure that application of the principle
would be obligatory and thus reduce as far as possible the 
opportunities for State Parties to circumvent its 
application; and (b) to secure a universal system of 
prosecution for offenders. In the words of the US 
Government: "the creation of an obligation to prosecute or 
extradite (is) one of the most effective means of deterring 
torturers".3 The amendment was well received.4 There was 
general consensus among the drafters (at times implied and 
subject to some reservation) that it was necessary to 
tighten the net for perpetrators of torture. Prima facie 
evidence of this approach is when the aut dedere aut punire
Cf. draft articles: 8(2),11 & 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1285. 
There was no corresponding provision in the Draft 
Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of 
Torture submitted by the IAPL. UN Doc.
E/CN.4/NGO/213, 1st February, 1978. Hereafter cited as 
IAPL Draft.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.17 para.79. The amendment had 
been influenced by a similar provision in the UN 
Convention on Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons Including Diplomats (Article 3.2).
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.3, para. 15.
See France and Switzerland, ibid., paras: 81 & 82.
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principle results in the application of universal 
jurisdiction.
Where a State Party refuses an extradition request;
where neither the victim nor the offender are its
nationals; and where the offence did not occur on its
territory, it is obliged to prosecute. This is the
position under the UN Convention on Torture and it reflects
the classical application of the principle of universal
jurisdiction. It has been described as "the most striking
provision of the Convention.”1
Both the Swedish and the IAPL Drafts provided for
universal jurisdiction. Unlike the Swedish Draft, the IAPL
Draft did not limit the exercise of universal jurisdiction
to instances where a State Party had decided against
extraditing the offender. Initial State response to this
aspect of both Drafts was generally favourable - that of
the US was most explicit:
"the US believes (that) in addition to 
jurisdiction based on the territoriality and 
nationality (of the offender), universal 
jurisdiction should exist for acts of torture. 
Universal jurisdiction is appropriate since 
torture, like piracy, may well be considered an 
offence against the law of nations11.2
The UK3 maintained its traditional position on matters
concerning the application of criminal jurisdiction. It
reiterated its almost unqualified loyalty to the
territorial principle. The UK Government's response to the
provisions on jurisdiction in the Swedish Draft is as
equally revealing of the status of torture, though
different, as that of the US.
"The United Kingdom considers that in 
contrast with offences of a more 
obviously international character, such 
as hijacking and attacks on
Donnelly, op. cit., p.4.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.14 para. 69. Emphasis added.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314/Add.1, p.3 paras.13 and 14. 
Emphasis added.
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internationally protected persons, the 
exceptionally wide extra-territorial 
jurisdiction conferred by Article 8 
(now Article 5 of the UN Convention^ in 
respect of torture goes beyond what is 
practical. The United Kingdom would 
find it difficult to breach the 
territorial principal and to accept 
even a limited degree of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.1,1
The adoption of the universal principle of
jurisdiction developed from an initial position of mixed
reaction within the Working Group to one of almost
universal support among governments. The principal
argument submitted in favour of universal jurisdiction was
that it constitutes a significant contribution to the
prosecution of torturers; that it has been included in
similar international treaties such as those concerned with
the unlawful seizure of aircraft, hostage-taking and
attacks against internationally protected persons; and that
therefore torturers belong to that class of outlaws known
as the enemies of all mankind.2
The objections against universal jurisdiction covered
a wide range of concerns for governments and their
policies. The objections ranged from the procedural -
difficulties in the transfer of evidence from one State to
another; to the substantive - universal jurisdiction would
be invoked for political purposes which may result in the
violation of the right to a fair trial for the accused.
Some felt that:
"the system of universal jurisdiction is not 
appropriate to deal with a crime that is not 
international in its nature, like those dealt 
with in treaties on hijacking and attacks upon
But see Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
which allows British Courts to apply universal 
jurisdiction over persons charged with committing 
torture.
See: 1980 W.G. Report, p.9 para.51; UN Human Rights 
Commission Report, 1981, p.57 para.25; 1982 W.G.
Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4./1982 L.40, p.6 para. 22; and 
1983 W.G. Report, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/63, p.5 para 21.
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diplomats". [It was also claimed that] "the 
intention of a State to prosecute a case of 
torture on the basis of universal jurisdiction 
could be interpreted by the State where the crime 
had been committed as a demonstration of lack of 
trust in its own judicial system, a violation of 
its sovereignty and even as an interference in 
its internal affairs."1
In response to the objection that the application of 
universal jurisdiction is at any rate academic in view of 
the fact that torture is generally committed by public 
officials with government consent (tacit or otherwise) and 
that, therefore, the likelihood of their prosecution is 
remote, it has been submitted that it is neither unknown 
nor hypothetical for official torturers to be found outside 
the locus delicti, or if different, outside the sphere of 
the lex paj^triae.2
The balance of opinion shifted significantly in favour 
of universal jurisdiction in the course of the work carried 
out between 1980-1984. The change occurred as a result of 
important measures introduced specifically to dispel some 
of the causes of concern expressed by governments. The 
call to render the aut dedere aut punire principle 
obligatory and to render the application of universal 
jurisdiction dependent upon this principle, were some of 
the measures adopted. As a result government
representatives expressed readiness to support the 
principle.3
The effect of this amendment, and its impact upon 
State response, is most pertinent in assessing current 
State opinion concerning the application of the universal 
principle of jurisdiction in international law. Universal 
jurisdiction is acceptable if made part and parcel of a
1982 W.G. Report, p.7 para. 25.
1982 W.G. Report, p.7 para. 26.
1980 W.G. Report, p. 9 para. 50; UN Human Rights 
Commission Report, 1981, p.56 and 57, para. 25? 1982 
W.G. Report, p.7 para.62.
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State Party's refusal to extradite,1 In other words 
universal jurisdiction is seen as a measure of last resort. 
Indeed universal jurisdiction becomes operative only where 
the offender is not extradited either to the State Party on 
whose territory (including aircraft and vessels registered 
therein) the crime was committed or to the State Party 
whose national was the offender/victim. The position under 
the OAS Convention on Torture (see Article 14) does not 
circumscribe the application of the universal principle in 
this manner, although it remains dependant on the aut 
dedere aut punire principle. Accordingly, this removes any 
tacit element, present in the UN instrument, of a 
hierarchical order of jurisdiction among States Parties.2 
Extradition was seen by the drafters of the UN Convention 
on Torture and by some State Parties as a first option, and 
it would seem that an extradition request would most likely 
be granted to the State where the offence occurred, i.e. 
preference is given to any opportunity where, in fine, the 
territorial principle would apply. Indeed, during the 
course of the debate on jurisdiction it was suggested that: 
"an alleged offender should normally be tried by the State 
in whose territory the offence is committed.1,3 However, 
this suggestion was not adopted.
Nonetheless, the concept of universal jurisdiction is 
widely indicative as a characteristic feature of criminal 
offences under international law. The controversy has been 
not whether the concept of universal jurisdiction is a
This is the understanding of the applicability of the 
universality principle by the Netherlands. See, 19 
NYIL (1988) pp.341 & 342.
It was suggested that the various grounds of 
jurisdiction in Article 5 of the convention would be 
exercised on the basis of a hierarchical system 
whereby the territorial principle would have 
preference over the others and the universal principle 
would be invoked last. See Uruguay, UN Doc. 
E/CN/4/1984/SR33, p.11 para. 37 and China in 1984 W.G. 
Report, p.5 para. 34.
1982 W.G. Report, p. 5 para. 144.
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principle of international law, but whether a particular 
practice is recognised as a criminal offence in respect of 
which universal jurisdiction may be exercised. This was 
the difficulty for States in the context of "apartheid11 
and, to a lesser extent, in so far as torture is committed 
in time of peace.
Other measures which have been inserted as a result of 
objections to the application of universal jurisdiction 
include, a guarantee that where the universality principle 
is applied the forum state shall apply the same standards 
of evidence as would ordinarily apply to crimes under
national law and fair treatment shall be extended at all 
stages of the proceedings.1
Once these measures were adopted a number of States
which had opposed universal jurisdiction were prepared to
accept it.2 There was a kinetic reaction. States3 
supported universal jurisdiction for torture in order not 
to stand in the way of consensus and this was almost
unanimous after the UN Human Rights Commission adopted the 
Draft Convention.4 One writer5 has said of universal
Article 7(2) and (3). See UN Human Rights Commission 
Report, 1981, p.58 para. 30 - p.60 para. 38? and 1982 
W.G. Report, p.7 para. 27 - p.9, para. 36.
See: 1982 W.G. Report, p.6 para. 23; Argentina, 1984 
W.G. Report, p.5 para. 27 and Brazil, ibid., p. 6 
para. 31? Canada, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR32, p. 13 para. 
68, France, ibid., /SR33, p.3 para. 5, Senegal, ibid., 
p.7 para. 21.
See for e.g. Australia, Uruguay and China, 1984 W.G. 
Report, p.5 paras. 28 and 29.
Government replies are at UN Docs. A/39/499,/Add.1 and 
/Add.2. The following States tacitly accepted 
universal jurisdiction: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Burundi, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Panama, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Kingdom, 
Yugoslavia and Venezuela. The following accepted it 
explicitly and unreservedly: Greece, France,
Netherlands, Norway and the USA.
Skupinski, op.cit., p.183.
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jurisdiction in the UN Convention on Torture that it 
represents "the fundamental principle of the Convention".
(b.ii. 2) Superior Orders
There were two original draft provisions concerning 
"superior orders". The provision in the Swedish Draft1 
read:
"an order from a superior officer or a public 
authority may not be invoked as a justification 
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment."
In the IAPL Draft2 the relevant provision read:
"the fact that a person was acting in obedience 
to superior orders shall not be a defence to a 
charge of torture."
In the Swedish Draft, the guestion of "superior 
orders" is presented within the wider notion of 
excusability. The IAPL effort is more specific in terms of 
principles of criminal law. It focuses on denying the use 
of "superior orders" as a defence to presumably a criminal 
charge, whereas in the Swedish Draft the emphasis is on the 
general notion of torture as a non-justifiable unlawful 
practice rather than necessarily as a criminal offence. 
However, the term "public authority" in the Swedish format 
is a positive step. It prevents any official including 
high-ranking public officers, such as Cabinet Ministers, 
from invoking the "Act of State" doctrine.
It had been suggested3 that "superior orders" may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so 
reguires. The amendment was not adopted,4 but the phrase is 
borrowed from Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter and is 
evidence of an attempt by some of the drafters to apply to
*. Draft article 2, see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1285, 1978.
2. Article V, UN Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/213, 1978.
3. See UN Human Rights Commission Report, 1979, p.40 
para. 35.
4. UN Human Rights Commission Report, 1981, p.53 para. 
185 (sub-para 13).
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torture rules that had already been applied to acts 
recognised under international law as criminal offences. 
The corresponding provision (Article 4) in the OAS 
Convention on Torture which reads - "the fact of having 
acted under orders of a superior shall not provide 
exemption from the corresponding criminal liability" - was 
inserted on the advise of the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee because it reflects a principle of international 
law recognised and defined "when the Nuremberg Statutes 
were promulgated.1,1
The IAPL Draft provision, unlike the Swedish Proposal, 
contributes to the notion of torture as a criminal offence. 
The position under the OAS Convention on Torture is 
unambiguous. At any rate, State reaction to the provision 
on "superior orders" in the UN instrument, which followed 
the Swedish model, cannot be described as negative.2 Some 
States have specifically included provision for "superior 
orders" in their legislation on torture3 and some writers4 
offer the view that the non-applicablilty of the defence of 
"superior orders" applies to torture as a general principle 
of international law.
(b.ii.31 The Non-Deroaable Nature of Torture
Article 2 of the UN Convention on Torture stipulates 
that "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever" including a 
state of war, the threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency may be invoked as
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G., CP/doc. 1061/80. 19 ILM 630.
2. See Netherlands7 reply, UN Doc. A/39/499, p. 12 
para. 5.
3. See Greece, ibid., p.7, Panama, ibid., p.10, and
the U.K. Criminal Justice Act 1988, Section
134(4) and (5). See also criticism on national
legislation offered by Boulesbaa on Article 2.3
of the UN Convention on Torture in 12 HR Ortly 
(1990) 53 at p.91.
See Boulesbaa, op.cit., p.93.
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a justification for the practice of torture. A similar but 
more detailed provision is found in the OAS Convention on 
Torture. This includes, other than the cases listed in 
Article 1 of the UN convention, a state of seige, domestic 
disturbances or strife, suspension of constitutional 
guarantees, and disasters (which is broad enough to cover 
anything from a financial crisis to the most horrific 
natural catastrophe). Some of these circumstances have 
been specifically listed because of the particular 
political climate which prevails in Latin America. An 
interesting addition in Article 5 of the OAS Convention is 
that "neither the dangerous character of the detainee or 
prisoner, nor the lack of security of the prison 
establishment" shall justify torture. It was included by 
the drafters in order to ensure that the convention 
complied with the legislative practice of some OAS Member 
States where the principle is part of national law. No 
similar clause appears in the UN instrument.
The freedom from torture provision in: the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on 
Human Rights and the International Covenant is entrenched 
as non-derogable. In its decision in Ireland v United 
Kingdom,1 the European Human Rights Commission confirmed 
that the non-derogable rule prohibiting torture is absolute 
and knows no exception.2 A more recent judicial affirmation 
of this principle is made in Filartiaa by the US Court of 
Appeals: "there are few, if any, issues in international 
law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the 
limitations on a State's power to torture persons held in 
its custody".3 Most States would subscribe to the view that 
torture committed in time of armed conflict and in time of
19 Yrbk. ECHR (1976) 750.
Cf. Rodley, op. cit., pp.77-78. See, intervention by 
Cocks, UK delegate Council of Europe, European 
Consultative Assembly, Debates 1st Session (Part II), 
1949, 594, and, Klayman, op. cit., p.513.
630 F .2d. 876 (1980) 881.
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peace is an unlawful, prohibited, non-derogable practice. 
Writers1 have suggested that the prohibition of torture is 
a norm of ius cocrens.
It is most disappointing to find, therefore, that 
torture is not included with slavery, genocide and 
"apartheid1' by the ILC, in its Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility,2 as a serious breach of essential importance 
for safeguarding the human being? considered by the ILC to 
be typical illustrations of a breach of an international 
obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that it 
constitutes an "international crime".
(b.ii.4} Torture - A Political Offence
Torture is inexcusable even if committed for instance 
as a measure to avoid a planned attack on innocent 
civilians. A submission that torture is committed for 
political motives will be unacceptable. This flows not 
only from the evidence in the foregoing sub-heading but 
also from the "travaux preparatoires" of the UN Convention 
on Torture. IAPL Draft Article XII specified that torture 
was not to be considered a political offence for the 
purpose of the convention. Neither the Swedish Draft (and 
the Convention as adopted) nor the OAS Convention contain 
any provision specifically dedicated to the guestion of 
torture and its status as a political crime. In its reply 
to the Swedish and IAPL Drafts, Switzerland3 suggested that 
it was necessary to provide for the non-applicability of 
the political offence exception principle in the case of 
torture, and this notwithstanding the general provision 
stipulating that torture is inexcusable whatever may have 
been the motive/purpose for its commission. Switzerland
Rodley, op. cit., p.70, and Hannikainen, op.cit., 
p.499 et seq.
Article 19, ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.95.
UN Doc. E/CN4/1314, p.19 para. 90.
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commended the IAPL Draft Article XII and France1 supported 
the Swiss position.
(b.ii.S’l The Status and Criminal Responsibility of the 
Torture
The Swedish and IAPL Drafts included definitions which
provided that torture is a crime which may be committed
either "by or at the instigation of a public official"2 or,
under Draft Article II of the IAPL Draft, by any other
person "for which a public official is responsible". In
other words, the travaux preoaratoires to the UN Convention
on Torture qualified the definition of torture ratione
personae. This position now obtains in Article 1.1 of same
convention which provides, inter alia, that:
" 'torture' means any act .... inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other 
persons acting in an official capacity".
The position under the OAS Convention on Torture is
similar, its definitive Article 2 does not refer to public
officers. But, Article 3 provides that the following
persons shall be held responsible for the crime of torture:
"a. A public servant or employee who acting in 
that capacity orders, instigates or induces 
the use of torture, or who directly commits
it or who, being able to prevent it, fails
to do so.
b. A person who at the instigation of a public 
servant or employee mentioned in 
subparagraph (a) orders, instigates or 
induces the use of torture, directly commits 
it or is an accomplice thereto."
This pattern in operative treaty provisions seems to
suggest the following: notwithstanding the principle that
there is individual criminal responsibility for crimes
proscribed under international law regardless of the
capacity (public or private) in which the perpetrator acts
UN Doc. E/CN.4/314, p.19 para. 89.
This wording is common to both Drafts.
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at the time of the commission of the offence, the torturer 
(under conventional law) incurs responsibility only when 
acting in an official capacity or when ordered to torture 
by a person acting in such a capacity. This position is 
also found under national law1. However, it is only proper 
and accurate to point out that there was some evidence 
present during the drafting stages of both the UN and OAS 
Conventions endorsing the more tenable view that individual 
criminal responsibility for torture in international law 
should be incurred regardless of whether or not the 
perpetrator acts in a public capacity at the time the 
offence is committed.
For instance, Barbados 2 in its reply to the Swedish 
and IAPL Drafts, suggested that reference to "public 
officials" in the definitive articles should be removed and 
the definition of torture not limited ratione personae. 
Similar recommendations were made by States in the UN 
Commission on Human Rights debating the draft convention3. 
Article 2 of a Draft Convention on Torture submitted by the 
Inter-American Juridical Committee 4 provided that 
regardless of whether a person is a public official or 
employee, those who commit, instigate, induce the use of, 
or, directly use, torture, or, may have had the obligation 
and the possibility to prevent it but failed to do so, 
incur criminal responsibility. The Inter-American
Juridical Committee submitted that this provision was 
necessary "in view of the unfortunate events that
Greece: Article 137a, Penal Code, see UN Doc.
A/39/499/Add/l; Canada: Section 245.4, Penal Code
amended by Act of 14th April, 1987; Thailand: Article 
200, Penal Code, see UN Doc. A/39/499/Add.2; Panama: 
Article 160, Penal Code, Spain: Article 204 bis,
Penal Code; and U.K., Section 134(1) and (2) Criminal 
Justice Act, 1988.
UN Doc.E/CN.4/1314/Add.4 p.3, para.9.
See UN Human Rights Commission Report, 1978, p.31 
para.13 and ibid., 1979, p.37 para.17.
Text at 19 ILM (1980) 619.
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frequently occur in a number of American States where
persons or groups have tortured others for any reason,
causing public disturbances or social unrest, which makes
such occurrences international in nature".1 However,
notwithstanding this background, which may also be said to
exist in certain other regions of the world, the argument
which seems to have convinced the draftsmen of the UN2 and
OAS Conventions on Torture was that which considered acts
of torture committed by public officials to be different in
nature from, and inherently more serious than, that
inflicted by private individuals.
Although the correct understanding of the UN and OAS
Conventions on the question of individual criminal
responsibility would appear to be that only persons acting
in a public capacity incur responsibility for torture,
Article 4 of the OAS Convention on Torture states that:
"The fact of having acted under orders of a 
superior3 shall not provide exemption from the 
corresponding criminal liability."4
The reference to "orders of a superior" rather than to 
the orders of a "superior officer or official" is not 
fortuitous. L 7intention du lecrislateur. which, in this 
case, remained unaltered throughout the drafting stages of 
the OAS Convention, was to have Article 4, unlike Article 
3, unqualified ratione personae thus rendering the non- 
acceptance of the defence of "superior orders" applicable 
to all torturers and not solely to those acting in an
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc. 1061/80. 19 ILM
(1980) at 629.
For instance, the only concession, the US was prepared 
to make, in this respect, consisted in an amendment 
suggesting that the wording of the convention should 
cover civil and military officials. UN Doc. 
E/CN4/1314.
Emphasis added.
See 25 ILM (1986) 521. The draft provision of Article
4 in the text submitted by the Inter-American
Juridical Committee (19 ILM 1980 at 620) was left
largely unaltered.
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official capacity. This "oversight" in the drafting of the
OAS Convention does not appear in the UN Convention on
Torture and Article 2.3 thereof provides:
"An order from a superior officer or a public 
authority may not be invoked as a justification 
of torture."
Further evidence concerning the status and
responsibility of the torturer is found in the leading case
of Filartiqa. There the US Court of Appeals (2nd Cir.)
found that "torture committed by a State official against
one held in detention violates established norms of the
international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations".1 The Court having examined international
instruments concerned with the protection of human rights,
including inter aliar relevant provisions of the UN
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
American Convention on Human Rights, the International
Covenant, the European Convention on Human Rights, and
other instruments directly relevant to the prohibition of
torture such as the UN Declaration on Protection From
Torture, found that "official torture is now prohibited by
the law of nations".2 Neither the UN nor the OAS
Conventions on Torture had been adopted at the time of
Filartiqa. but Article 1 of the UN Declaration on
Prevention From Torture defines torture as a practice
committed by or at the instigation of a public official.
In a subseguent judgment, Forti v Suarez-Mason3
delivered in 1987, the North District Court of California
reaffirmed the Filartiqa ruling on the prohibition in
international law of "official torture" and added:
"purely private torture will not normally 
implicate the law of nations, since there is 
currently no international consensus regarding
630 F. 2d. 876 (1980) at 880.
Op.cit., at p.884, emphasis added. But see pp.881- 
883.
672 F. SUPP. 1531 (1987).
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torture practiced by non-state actors."1
On this point, Forti v Suarez-Mason referred to a 
pronouncement made in 1984 in Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab 
Republic,2 namely that the "(lack of) consensus on non­
official torture (does not) warrant an extension of 
Filartiga".3 The question of whether or not there is 
individual responsibility for torture by "non-state actors" 
arose in Tel-Oren because there motion for damages was 
brought by and on behalf of victims of a terrorist incident 
in Israel committed by members of, inter alia, the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation, whose status as a 
subject of international law was seriously doubted by the 
Court.4
Of the three Appellate Judges in Tel-Oren. Judge 
Edwards, addressed the question whether torture like piracy 
engendered responsibility for the individual in 
international law. He examined, as had been done 
previously by the Court in Filartiqa. relevant instruments 
and travaux oreparatoires on the prohibition of torture, 
i.e. the draft text of the proposed UN Convention on 
Torture and the Declaration on the Protection from Torture, 
which both defined torture as a practice committed by or at 
the instigation of public officials. "Against this 
background"5, Judge Edwards concluded that there is 
insufficient evidence in international practice to extend 
the principle of individual responsibility for torture in
Ibid. at p. 1541. It should be noted that 
international responsibility may still be 
incurred by a State in international law for 
failure to provide a remedy for torture committed 
by individuals acting in a private capacity.
726 F. 2d. 774 (1984).
Ibid., Judge Edwards, at p.795.
All three Judges concurred on this point. See Judge 
Edwards, p.791; Judge Bork, pp.805-806 and at p.819 
and Judge Robb, p.825.
Op.cit., p.795.
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international law committed by non-public officials.
The joint contribution of these three judgments to the 
status and individual responsibility of the torturer in 
international law is circumscribed ratione temporis and by 
virture of the facts particular to each case. Their 
contribution must be assessed in that light.
In both Filartiqa v Pena-Irala and in Forti v Suarez- 
Mason the persons alleged to have practiced torture acted 
in a public capacity at the time the offences were 
committed. In the former case Pera-Irala was Inspector 
General of Police in Ascuncion Paraguay. In the latter 
case Suarez-Mason was a General (Commander 1st Army Corps) 
in the Argentine Military Forces. The position in Tel-Oren 
was slightly different with members of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation being involved in the criminal 
practices. Furthermore, the sources available to the Court 
in Filartiqa and Tel-Oren concerning the prohibition of 
torture in international law were either silent on the 
question of individual responsibility for "private" 
tortureres or referred only to torture committed by "public 
officials". In Filartiqa (1980) and Tel-Oren (1984) the 
Courts could plead unavailability of the travaux 
preparatoires to the UN Convention on Torture in order to 
explain their decisions as formulated. But this reason is 
certainly not valid vis-a-vis the Forti (1987) case.
The principle governing international responsibility 
for perpetrators of torture, ideally, would be the 
following: torturers, either as private individuals or as
public officials, acting singly or jointly under the 
supervision of public officials, incur criminal 
responsibility. The evidence submitted in this section 
appears to suggest otherwise. Least support is found in 
the judicial decisions reviewed above and it is unhelpful 
to argue (especially with regards to Tel-Oren1: had the 
evidence in the travaux preparatoires reviewed by the 
Courts been otherwise a different conclusion may have been 
reached. This approach is unhelpful because in Tel-Oren.
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where the question of responsibility for "privately
practiced torture" had been formulated for decision, Judge
Edwards remarked:
"while I have little doubt that the trend in 
international law is toward a more expansive 
allocation of rights and obligations to entities 
other than States, I decline to read Section 1350 
(Alien Torts Act) to cover torture by non-state 
actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court on 
the Statute's usage of the term 'law of 
nations'1."2
Furthermore, even if judicial pronouncement on individual 
responsibility for privately practiced torture was 
forthcoming, responsibility under 28 USC 1350 can only be 
civil and not criminal.
Accordingly, the US Courts have yet to address the 
question whether (a) torture committed by private persons 
is contrary to international law and (b), if so, whether in 
addition to civil liability, criminal responsibility may 
also be incurred. It is interesting to see how judicial 
practice on this point will develop especially if an 
American Court and, it is not an unlikely possibility, were 
seized of an action brought by relatives of former hostages 
against aliens (such as hostage-takers not enjoying 
belligerent status) present in the US for committing 
torture.
The position of the US Government on the question of
the status of the torturer in international law is
disappointing and rather restrictive. It is contained in
the reply to the original draft text of the UN Convention:
"When there is no public official involvement of 
any kind it is highly probably that a torturer 
will be apprehended and punished under national 
laws. In this context an international 
convention is unnecessary."3
Cf. Judge Robb, at p.827.
Op.cit., p.795.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1314, p.6 para.29.
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(b.iii.) OAS Convention on Torture
The concept of torture as conceived in the Swedish 
Draft (on which the UN Convention was modelled) differs 
significantly from that as perceived by the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee which was responsible for drafting the 
OAS Convention on Torture. The Committee described torture 
an "international crime" - this being the key phrase. In 
article 1 of the IAPL Draft torture was defined as a crime 
under international law and States1 argued that such a 
declaration should be included in the UN Convention because 
"the practice of torture was shocking to the conscience of 
mankind". Writers2 have also argued the case that, given 
its proscription in international instruments, in General 
Assembly resolutions and in submissions made by
international non governmental bodies, torture cannot but 
be considered an "international crime".
The Inter-American Juridical Committee felt that it 
was necessary to define torture an "international crime" if 
the relevant rules in the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on 
Human Rights were to be given proper effect. The Committee 
drafted Article 1 so as to provide that "Contracting States 
confirm that torture is an international crime".3 The 
Committee further decreed (Draft Article 4) that "all acts 
of torture or any other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment shall constitute an offence against 
human dignity". This is the only remaining
characterisation of torture which now appears in the second 
preambular paragraph of the OAS Convention. All references 
to either "international crime" or "crime under
international law" in the OAS (and in the UN) Convention
Austria, UN Doc. E/CN4/1314, p.8 para. 40? Barbados, 
ibid., para. 41? and the Holy See, UN Doc. 
E/CN4/1314/Add.3, p. 2 para. 5. See UN Human Rights 
Commission Report, 1978, p.30 para. 9.
17 Rev.ICJ (1976) 46-47.
19 ILM 619.
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have been omitted. State Parties are obliged to enact 
legislation rendering torture a criminal offence.1
Some argue that, on account of these obligations, and 
since the "criminalisation" takes place at the domestic 
level, there is evidence which suggests that torture is not 
considered a criminal offence under international law.2
Further evidence in support of this argument is found 
in Article 7(2) of the UN Convention. It is provided that 
when State Parties submit cases for prosecution, after 
electing not to extradite the offender, the competent 
authorities shall treat a case of torture as they would 
"any ordinary3 offence of a serious nature” under their own 
laws. The language is borrowed from corresponding 
provisions in the Hague and Montreal instruments on 
suppression of unlawful acts against aircraft and the 
unlawful seizure of civilian aircraft. However, the use of 
the phrase "ordinary offence" does not correspond to, or 
promote, the exceptionally grave nature of acts 
traditionally considered to be criminal offences under 
international law.4 Accordingly, it seems to neutralise the 
position reflected by the drafts of the convention 
concerning the nature of torture.
However, the Inter-American Juridical Committee 
confirmed that it considered torture to be delicta jure
See Article 6.
D'Zurilla, 56 Tul. LR (1981) 186 at p.207. It is 
important to remember that D'Zurilla's conclusions 
were reached on the basis of source material as at 
1981.
Emphasis added.
See Iraq, UN Doc. A/39/466/Add 1. p. 8 para. 5. 
Suggestions to include reference to "ordinary offence" 
in a parallel provision in the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomats 
met with stern opposition from members of the ILC 
which was entrusted with preparing the first draft 
text. See, for e.g. Ustor, ILC Yrbk. r 1972, v.I, 
p.221 para 36.
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gentium. Accordingly, it thought it necessary that the 
convention ought to include specific provisions tailored 
for the prevention and suppression of such acts in 
international law. This is the explanation for the 
presence of the aut dedere aut punire principle; of the 
application of the universality principle; and of the non- 
acceptance of "superior orders" in the OAS Convention.
In their replies to the UN Draft Convention, OAS 
member States1 acknowledged and supported the declaration of 
torture as "a crime under international law" which appeared 
in the OAS Draft Convention. Coupled with the remarks made 
by States in the provisions already considered under the UN 
Convention, the evidence in toto suggests that despite the 
absence in both the UN and OAS Conventions of a categoric 
declaration of torture as a crime under international law, 
there is sufficient reason to believe that most State 
Parties hold torture in this regard.
II. Judicial Decisions and Municipal Legislation
(a^ Judicial Decisions
Chapter 28 USC Para 1350 provides:
"The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States."
Of the many actions brought under this inconspicuous,
oft-forgotten, provision few have been held to be
admissable2 by US Courts as constituting violations of the
See UN Doc. E/CN4/1984/SR33: Colombia, p.6 para.
17 and Argentina, p.12 para.42.
These include causes relating to:
(i) the unlawful seizure of a vessel and its 
disposition as a prize;
(ii) the seizure of neutral property upon the ship of 
a belligerent;
(iii)unjustified seizure of alien's property in a 
foreign country by a US officer;
(iv) failure to accord comity to ships of foreign 
countries; and,
(v) concealment of a child's true nationality coupled 
with the wrongful inclusion of that child on
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law of nations for the purposes of Section 1350.1 Torture 
committed by a person in a position of official authority 
has been added to the list by virtue of the decisions in 
FilartiqaP Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic and Forti v 
Suarez-Mason.
The District Court in Filartiqa acknowledged the 
strong arguments made by plaintiffs that torture is an 
unlawful practice under international law, but it did not 
consider torture practiced by one person against another 
person of the same nationality met the Lopes test by which 
admissability of violations of the law of nations under 
1350 is determined.2 The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
reversed the judgment and found for appellant on the basis 
of the following evidence.
It considered the relevant provisions of the UN 
Charter and those of a host of international instruments 
concerned with the protection of human rights including 
specifically the Declaration on the Prevention from 
Torture. It paid due attention to "expert" evidence 
submitted by Professors Falk, Franck, Lillich and McDougal
another's passport.
See Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder 225 F .Supp■ 292
(1963) at 296.
The minimum standard by which subject-matter 
jurisdiction becomes operative for violations of the 
laws of nations under 1350 was defined in Lopes v 
Schroder. The Court defined the phrase "in violation 
of the law of nations", as meaning
"at least a violation by one or more 
individuals of those standards, rules 
or customs. (a) affecting the 
relationship between States or between 
an individual and a foreign State, and 
(b) used by those States for their 
common good and/or in dealings inter 
se"■ (op. cit., p.297)
This ruling was followed in ITT v Vencap Ltd. 519
F. 2d. 1001 (1975) and in Dreyfus v von Finck. 534
F.2d. (1976).
Rickard, 30 Am. ULR (1981) 807 at pp.809 and 818.
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submitted in a Memorandum1 for the United States Department
of State which appeared as amicus curiae. The Memorandum
submitted that States are obliged under international law
to respect the fundamental human rights of their citizens
and that torture is a violation of international law.
"While some nations still practice torture, it 
appears that no State asserts a right to torture 
its nationals. Rather, nations accused of 
torture unanimously deny the accusation and no 
attempt is made to justify its use. That conduct 
evidences an awareness that torture is 
universally condemned".2
The Court concluded that the duty to prohibit torture 
committed by a public official existed under conventional 
and customary international law. It felt that nations had 
made it "their business" through international and 
unilateral action to be concerned with domestic human 
rights violations which include torture. The Filartiqa case 
was therefore justiciable.3 In addition, the Court also 
held (a) it is dubious whether action by a State official 
in violation of the Constitution and of the laws of his 
country and wholly unratified by his government, could be 
considered an "Act of State"; and (b) "for the purposes of 
civil liability the torturer has become like the pirate and 
the slave-trader before him - hostis humani generis. an 
enemy of all mankind".4
The Filartiqa pronouncement on the international law 
rule prohibiting torture committed by a public official was 
endorsed first in Tel-Oren V Libyan Arab Republic and 
subsequently in Forti v Suarez-Mason5. Of the three 
Appellate Judges in Tel-Oren. Judges Edwards and Bork
Reproduced in 19 ILM (1980) 585.
Ibid., p.598.
Op. cit., at pp. 884 & 889.
Ibid., p.890 (emphasis added).
Judge Jensen, 672 F . Su p p . 1531 at 1541.
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excluded extending the principle to non-official torture.1
In all three cases appellants/plaintiffs had no need to
formulate their case that torture was a criminal offence
under the law of nations. It sufficed for them to mount
the hurdle of 28 USC 1350 by showing that torture was
contrary to international law. However, it may be argued
that, tacitly, they did consider torture to belong to the
class of unlawful acts in international law known as
delicti jure gentium by virtue of the fact that they
claimed punitive damages in addition to compensatory
damages for torture. In Tel-Oren. Judge Edwards observed
that reference to pirates and hostis humanis generis.
language employed in Filartiqa. was not "fortuitous”:
"The inference is that persons may be suceptible 
to civil liability if they commit either a crime 
traditionally warranting universal jusidiction or 
an offence that comparably violates current norms 
of international law."2
Accordingly, the evidence afforded by the foregoing 
judicial practice reveals:
(a) that torture committed by a State official or person 
acting under "colour of the State" is a violation of 
international law; (b) that "official" torture gives rise 
to individual civil responsibility, and in that respect, 
places the "State" torturer in the same class of offenders 
as the pirate and the war criminal. Presumably, this means 
that, at least in theory, he becomes tortiously liable 
wherever present, regardless of his nationality or that of 
his victim and of the lex loci delicti? and (c) the "Act of 
State" doctrine cannot be invoked where torture is 
committed or ordered to be committed by a public officer 
simply on the basis of (i) his position and (ii) when the 
conduct is not ratified by Government.
In particular, Filartiqa. being the decision which 
triggered recent human rights motions under Paragraph 1350
See Judge Edwards, 726 F.2d. 774 (1984) at 795 and
Judge Bork, ibid., at p.806 ff.14.
726 F.2d. (1984) 781.
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has been well received.1 It is acclaimed by some as a cause 
celebre.2 Others have identified the judgment as a 
revolutionary contribution to the traditional position of 
the individual in international law.3 Certainly, Filartiaa 
has made a significant impact on the international legal 
status of torture4. But, it leaves to others many'
unanswered questions. For instance, it remains to be seen 
whether an action under 28 USC 1350 will be admitted where 
torture is committed by an "official" acting with 
Government consent (tacit or otherwise) and where the lex 
loci delicti is silent on the prohibition of torture. It 
is also to be decided whether an action will be admissable 
for torture committed by a private individual and if 
individual responsibility is incurred what form will it 
take.5 Furthermore, the question of torture as a criminal 
offence in international law remains very much unaddressed 
and the judicial practice cited here hardly begins to 
answer the question of individual criminal responsibility 
for torturers, although there may be a stronger case for
The literature generated by this decision has been 
considerable. See generally: Rickard, op. cit. ,
p.807? Barenblat, 16 Tex.ILJ (1981) 117; Rosen, 75
AJIL (1981) 149; Danaher, 33 Stan. LR (1980-81) 353? 
Symposium on Filartiaa: 11 Ga.JICL (1981) 307
hereafter cited as Symposium. Cf. D'Zurilla, op.cit., 
p.202 et seq.
Rohlik, writing in Symposium, op. cit., p.330. Contra, 
see Rusk, ibid., p.311 and Hassan, 32 ICLP (1983) 250 
at 256.
Barenblat, op. cit., pp.135-136, and Sohn, Symposium, 
op.cit., p.309.
Rickard, op. cit., p.831, hails Filartiaa as a 
"decision based on the sound legal conclusion that a 
new custom prohibiting torture has emerged as part of 
customary international law".
In Tel-Oren (op. cit., p.793) Judge Edwards would not 
venture further than acknowledging that support for 
individual responsibility in the "private arena" under 
international law is considerable and the arguments 
compelling.
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this type of liability being incurred where the offender 
acts in a public capacity.
Filartiaa and subsequent judicial affirmations are 
evidence of US judicial interpretation of the development 
of international law concerning torture. Alone they do not 
establish torture a criminal offence under international 
law.
(b) Municipal Legislation
Canada,1 France,2 Austria,3 and Great Britain,4 have 
enacted legislation in pursuance of their obligations under 
the UN Convention on Torture incorporating, inter alia, the 
Convention's definition of torture, rendering torture a 
crime justiciable before their national tribunals even if 
committed outside their territory and removing the 
applicability of the defence of "superior orders". In some 
cases the legislation was drafted/ enacted prior to the 
entry into force of the convention. Such legislative 
practice represents a sincere commitment, independent of 
conventional obligations, by States to punish torture as a 
criminal offence.
Significant changes in legislation have occurred also 
in Latin American States. In 1984 representatives of the 
non-military Government of Argentina5 reported the enactment 
of a law making it a criminal offence for all who either
See Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 14th April, 1987.
Law No.85/1407, 30th December, 1985. See article 689(
2) Code Penal Procedural.
Stuck 1982, Bundesgesetzblatt, 1987. But as early as
1945, Austria, by virtue of Constitutional Act of 26th 
June 1945, Concerning War Crimes and National 
Socialist Crimes (Stuck 10, No.32), punished members 
of the armed forces or any other person who committed 
acts of torture on the basis of political or racial 
hatred.
Section 134 Criminal Justice Act, 1988.
UN Doc. E/CN4/1984/SR33, p.12 para. 43.
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commit or fail to prevent or to denounce torture. Police 
officers, non-civilian personnel, judges and doctors are 
specifically included as likely "candidates" to incur 
responsibility in the course of their duties. Torture is 
also a criminal offence under Article 279 of the Penal Code 
of Colombia1 and Article 160 of the Penal Code of Panama2. 
Thailand3 also reported that torture is a criminal offence 
under Article 200 of its Penal Code. It considered torture 
to be an extraditable offence, implying that the political 
offence exception principle would not be entertained under 
current Thai extradition practice. The application of the 
aut dedere aut nunire principle in cases of torture is also 
in accordance with Articles 4-11 of the Thai Penal Code.
x. Ibid., p.6, para. 17.
2. UN Doc. A/39/499/Add.1, p.10 para. 5.
3. UN Doc. A/39/499/Add.2, p.3.
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CHAPTER 7
Crimes Affecting the Political and Economic Interests of 
the International Community
A. "Air Law Crimes"
The concept of crimes committed on board aircraft; of 
the crime of unlawful seizure of aircraft; of unlawful acts 
committed against the safety of civil aviation, and, more 
recently, of the crimes of violence at airports serving 
international civil aviation, are provided for in 
international law by the following instruments adopted 
under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation1: (1) Convention on Offences and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 1963;2 (±i)
Convention For the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft,3 Hague, 1970; (iii) Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against The Safety of Civil Aviation,4 
Montreal, 1971; and (iv) Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International 
Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, Montreal, 1988.5
It is not easy to group all the offences defined in 
the above instruments under one heading, but it is 
convenient. Often they are referred to by journalistic and 
imprecise legal headings such as "hijacking", "aerial" / 
"air" "piracy". In this section they are referred to as 
"air law crimes", a phrase which may also be open to
1. Hereafter cited as ICAO.
2. 704 UNTS 219, UKTS No. 126, 1969. Hereafter cited as 
Tokyo Convention.
3. 860 UNTS 105, UKTS No.39, 1972. Hereafter cited as 
Hague Convention.
4. 974 UNTS 177 UKTS No. 10, 1974. Hereafter cited as
Montreal Convention.
5. UKTS. Misc. No.6 (1988); Cmnd.378. Hereafter cited as 
Montreal Protocol.
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criticism on the basis that it is generic, but it has been 
coined for two reasons. First, the law concerning civil 
aviation (air law) is recognised as a specialised field in 
public and private international law. Second, the crimes 
discussed in this section all affect the safety of civil 
aviation in one form or another.
These instruments and their travaux preparatoires 
including other relevant source material such as draft 
proposals de leae ferztnda adopted by academic bodies, e/  
municipal legislation, decisions of national tribunals, and 
doctrine, are examined under three headings relevant to the 
determination of the substance of the concept of criminal 
offence in international law: (a) the relationship between 
"air law” crimes and piracy iure gentium, (b) jurisdiction 
and (c) extradition - the political offence exception.
I. Analogy with Piracy Jure Gentium
Of the various crimes defined under the Tokyo, Hague 
and Montreal Conventions, the analogy with piracy jure 
gentium principally occurs vis-a-vis unlawful seizure of 
aircraft, popularly known as "hijacking" or "aerial 
hijacking". The analogy takes place on two levels: on the 
one hand there is the question of designation, i.e. 
assimilation of the two crimes simply by referring to one 
as the other. On the other hand, the rules regulating 
piracy iure gentium are systematically analysed by writers 
in order to see whether they are applicable, in particular, 
to unlawful seizure of aircraft.
(a) Question of Designation
The Council of Europe adopted resolutions1 and made 
recommendations2 endorsing the adoption of the Hague 
Convention describing unlawful seizure of aircraft as "a 
crime against humanity" and a crime of air piracy. The I LA 
submitted a draft resolution for adoption at its Fifty-
Res. 450 (1970). 
Recommendation 613 (1970).
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Fourth Hague Conference in 1970. The draft resolution made 
a broad reference to piracy iure gentium (sea and air) but 
it was not adopted. At the Diplomatic Conference which 
adopted the Hague Convention, Ghana,1 Greece,2 and Costa 
Rica,3 respectively, (a) requested that the offence of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft in the Draft Hague Convention 
be given a specific name: "air piracy" or "aircraft
hijacking"? (b) considered "the pirate in the air" to be 
extradited or prosecuted in all circumstances? and, (c) the 
aircraft hijackers deserved to be treated as "offenders of 
mankind".
At the drafting stages of the Montreal Convention, the 
observer for the International Federation of Airline Pilots 
Association? expressed the desire that the future convention s
k
"shall provide for the concept of international crimes that 
would be adequately punishable anywhere in the world."5
States Parties to the Hague Convention which have 
enacted legislation to make unlawful seizure of aircraft a 
specific crime under their domestic laws, such as the 
United States,6 the United Kingdom7 and India8, have called 
such legislation the Hijacking Act or The Anti-Hijacking 
Act. Under the India Tokyo Law Act (No. 20) 1975, Section 
6(1) thereof provides that any court having jurisdiction in 
respect of piracy committed on the high seas shall also 
have jurisdiction in respect of offences committed on board
See SA Doc No. 8, in ICAO Doc. 8979, 1972, LC/165-2, 
p.33.
See SA Doc No. 40, ibid., p. 91.
See SA Doc. No. 53, ibid., p.108.
Hereafter cited as IFAPA.
See ICAO Doc. 8936 - LC/164, 1970, v.l, p.5 para. 18. 
Public Law No.93 - 366, August 5th, 1974.
Chapter 70, 1971.
Indian Parliament Act No. 64, 1982.
aircraft wherever the locus delicti may be.
Endorsing the conclusion of the Hague Convention,
President Nixon declared1:
"most countries, including the United States, 
found effective means of dealing with piracy on 
the high seas a century and a half ago. We can - 
and we will - deal effectively with piracy in 
the skies today".
Writers have adopted the terms "air piracy", "aerial
piracy" and "hijacking" frequently to refer to the crime of
unlawful seizure of aircraft and often used them as
convenient headings for learned articles on the subject.2
One,3 in particular, described legislation enacted by Japan4
in view of its obligations under the Tokyo Convention as
"Anti-Air Piracy Law". At times these references to
unlawful seizure of aircraft as "aerial piracy" or
"hijacking" may simply reflect stylistic expediency. But
in certain circumstances references to piracy iure gentium.
such as within drafts de leae ferafada submitted at
international fora, may be employed purposely to portray a
specific juridical meaning.
.(.*>) Piracy Jure Gentium and Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
Those* that have taken the definition of piracy
63 US Dept. Bull.. 1970, p.342.
See, among others, Friedlander, writing in Bassiouni, 
International Criminal Law Volume 1 Crimes. p.455? 
Dinstein, 7 Israel LR (1972^ 193; Poulantzas, Ned.
Juris. (1970)? Jacobson, 5 Cor. ILJ (1972) 165.
Yamamoto, 15 JAIL (1971) 70.
Law Concerning Punishment for Unlawful Seizure of 
Aircraft and Similar Crimes (Law No. 68 of 1970).
See, inter alia. Yamamoto, op. cit., p.77? Galicki, 3 
Pol. YIL (1970) 181? Dinstein, op. cit., p.197? and 
Van Panhuys, 9 Col. JTL (1970) 7? Schwarzenberger, 24 
CLP (1971) at 260? Schubber, Jurisdiction Over Crimes 
on Board Aircraftr 1973, pp.187-188, and at 43 BYIL 
(1968-69) 199. See also majority views submitted by 
members of the 18th Commission of the Institute of 
International Law in response to questionnaire on
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contained in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 
and applied it to the concept of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft as defined in the Tokyo and Hague Conventions, 
have all reached the conclusion that unlawful seizure of 
aircraft is not piracy iure gentium; principally for the 
following reasons:
1. The "external" requirement under Article 14 
of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas namely 
that an attack is to be made by one vessel or 
aircraft against another, is almost invariably 
missing in current incidents of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Only one aircraft is usually 
involved.
2. Piracy under the Geneva Convention must be 
committed for private ends. In cases of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft this usually occurs for non­
private, i.e. for "political", purposes.
3. Piracy must be committed on the high seas, 
whereas unlawful seizure of aircraft, more often 
than not, occurs over the territory of at least 
one State.
4. Piracy is committed by private persons 
whereas under the Tokyo and Hague Conventions 
unlawful seizure of aircraft may be committed by 
any person.
Oppenheim1 defined piracy iure gentium on the basis of
international practice, i.e. as incorporating acts
considered to be piratical even though not falling within
the strict meaning of piracy committed animo furandi by one
private vessel against another. Thus Oppenheim postulated
the following definition of piracy:
"every unauthorised act of violence against 
persons or goods committed on the open sea either 
by a private vessel against another vessel or by 
the mutinous crew or passengers against their own 
vessel".
This definition, coined in 1954 prior to the adoption 
of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, has been
hijacking of aircraft. 54 Annuaire (1971) 559. 
International Law. v.I, p.609.
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employed by some writers1 in order to argue the case for 
unlawful seizure of aircraft to be considered a crime in 
international law, in respect of which, like piracy iure 
gentium. the universal principle of jurisdiction is 
applicable. This thesis is supported on a number of 
grounds.
First, Oppenheim's definition does not necessarily 
require more than one vessel for piracy to be committed. 
Second the 1958 Geneva Convention includes aircraft along 
with vessels in defining piracy. Third, Article 11(1) of 
the Tokyo Convention obliging States Parties "to take all 
appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to 
its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the 
aircraft", has been interpreted as "constituting a general 
authority to all parties to exercise jurisdiction - a 
limited type of piracy".2 This interpretation is based on 
the following facts: (i) the Tokyo Convention does not
specify the application ratione loci of State Parties' 
obligation to preserve and restore control of the aircraft 
and (ii) given that a State Party may not, without consent, 
intervene in the territory of another State, such right may 
be exercised only on the high seas or over terra nullius.3 
Fourth, the Hague Convention has broadened, ratione loci. 
the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft under 
conventional international law. Its inclusion of the aut 
dedere aut punire principle provides for the application of 
a broad jurisdictional base. The fifth, and final ground, 
is that in view of the fact that unlawful seizure of 
aircraft is a common feature of international civil 
aviation, "the case for granting international jurisdiction 
over hijacking is today as compelling as the case for 
granting similar jurisdiction over piracy on the high 
seas". The raison d'etre here is the following:
x. Jacobson, op. cit., p.169.
2. Shubber, op. cit., pp. 186-187, and at 43 BYIL pp.203.
3. Contra see Poulantzas, op. cit., p.570.
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"The picture of the traditional pirate is that of 
'a professional robber who sails the sea in a 
pirate ship to attack and plunder other ships.... 
such ships are a menace to the interests of every 
state which has access to the sea'. If 
professional 'pirates' carry out their acts in 
the air, do they not provide an equal menace to 
every state?.... Thus, should not airspace, 
regardless of the territory beneath it, be
equated in cases of piracy with the high seas and
therefore justify the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction?1,1
Certainly, there are elements common to piracy jure gentium 
and unlawful seizure of aircraft. Nonetheless it is best
to keep the two concepts separate. Analogies may have been
drawn between piracy iure gentium and unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and these certainly played a major role in 
drafting the Hague Convention. But the status of unlawful 
seizure of aircraft has developed quite independently from 
the already existing crime of piracy iure gentium as a 
crime under international law.
II. Jurisdiction
(a.} Juridical Nature of the Crime
Several comments have been made by government and non­
government representatives declaring the offences under the 
three principal conventions "international crimes". This 
label was mainly addressed to unlawful seizure of aircraft 
defined by the Tokyo Convention and which obliges States 
Parties to take all appropriate measures to take and 
restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or 
to preserve his control. As we have seen, some2 have 
interpreted this obligation as a sui generis type of piracy 
implying the applicability of universal jurisdiction by 
State Parties. Others3 have criticised the Tokyo Convention
Jacobson, op. cit., p.165.
Schubber, op. cit., pp.186-187.
Memorandum on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft submitted 
by the International Transport Workers' Federation, 
ICAO Doc. 8939 - LC/164, v. II., p. 69 para. 8 and at
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for failing to declare unlawful seizure of aircraft
"a specific and internationally recognised 
criminal offence.... The only worthwhile 
deterrent against the hijacking of a civil 
aircraft can be provided by its recognition by 
the world community as an international crime, 
which should be universally punished with maximum 
severity.”
At the Hague Diplomatic Conference, the Austrian
delegate1 held that "hijacking is an international crime and
it seemed reasonable to argue that all States involved by
any act of hijacking should claim the right to prosecute
offenders". The I LA2 also called for the
"internationalisation" of criminal offences committed on
board aircraft, including unlawful seizure of aircraft and
explained that an -
"offence is 'international' if national laws 
punish it irrespective of the place where the 
criminal act has been committed or if the courts 
of all States are competent to prosecute the 
presumed perpetrator of the offence, without 
regard to the place where the offence was 
committed."
The United Nations Under-Secretary General for Legal 
Affairs3 and some States4 expressed the desire to extend the 
notion of "international criminal offences" to unlawful 
acts against international civil aviation.
(bl Bases of Jurisdiction
The following are instances in which States Parties to 
the three conventions may exercise jurisdiction. Some are 
common to all three. These are: (i) the State of
registration of the aircraft on board which the offence is
p.70 para.10.
ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 -1., p.71 para. 40.
ICAO Doc. 8877, 1970 - LC/161 - I, p. 159.
ICAO Doc. 8877 - LC/161, v.I, p. 173.
In particular see LC Working Draft No. 786, para 2. 
submitted by Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. ICAO Doc. 
8936, 1970, LC/164 - 2, p.232.
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committed. In the Montreal Convention this jurisdictional 
ground is also extended to crimes committed against the 
aircraft itself. In the Hague and Montreal Conventions 
jurisdiction is also exercisable, where the aircraft is 
leased without crew, by the State in whose territory the 
lessee has his principal place of business or permanent 
residence. (ii) Jurisdiction may be exercised in 
accordance with national law.
Other bases of jurisdiction are either common to the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions or particular to the Tokyo 
Convention. Each is discussed in the light of preparatory 
material relevant to the particular convention.
The Tokvo Convention1
This convention, based on a draft text proposed in 
1958 in Montreal and adopted in 1959 in Munich, addressed, 
principally, offences committed on board aircraft. The 
criminal law of some States covered such offences but 
others did not. The intention of the drafters was to 
provide uniform rules concerning exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. It was felt that it will 
serve a useful purpose to formulate a statement of an 
internationally agreed principle.2 This resulted in 
acknowledging that the State of registration of the 
aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction and States 
Parties to the Tokyo Convention are obliged to take 
measures to establish their jurisdiction in this respect. 
However, the travaux preparatoires of the Tokyo Convention 
indicate that it did not establish the principle of extra­
territorial jurisdiction for States in respect of offences 
committed on board aircraft registered under their flag. 
Thus Professor Cheng3 has written:
*. See generally ICAO Doc. 8111, 1959, LC/146, vols. I 
and II.
2. Ibid., v.II, p.21 para.5.
3. Writing in Contemporary Problems in International Law:
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"what one finds is that under international law 
a State is entitled to quasi-territorial 
jurisdiction over all aircraft bearing its 
nationality and all persons and objects on board 
wherever they may be, but that many States have 
singly omitted to exercise that jurisdiction in 
their domestic laws by failing to extend their 
laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to 
their aircraft, when they are outside the 
national boundaries, and to all persons and 
objects on board. What the contracting parties 
to the Tokyo Convention have done in its Article 
3(2) (obliging States Parties to establish 
jurisdiction in respect of offences committed on 
board aircraft bearing their nationality) is 
merely to undertake to exercise a right which 
they already enjoy under international law. It 
would be wrong, in the writer's opinion, to see 
in this article a conferment by the treaty on the 
contracting parties of a right which the 
contracting parties did not previously possess; 
for this would mean that those States which 
exercise such jurisdiction prior to the treaty or 
without being parties to the treaty would be 
infringing international law. This is not so."
The drafters of the Tokyo Convention also considered
various texts de lecre feraCnda providing for various */
applicable bases of jurisdiction.
The Comite Juridique International de 1'Aviation1
meeting first at Geneva in 1912, later in Prague in 1922
and in Rome in 1924, drew up an International Code of the
Air which laid down that jurisdiction ought to be exercised
by the following States: (i) the subjacent State where acts
endanger its public order and (ii) in all other cases, by
the State of registration including offences occurring over
the high seas. At its 1930 session in Budapest, the Comite
Juridique reported that these principles of jurisdiction
were not exclusive.
In 1922, and, in amended form in 1924, the I LA2 laid
down a number of principles establishing that the aircraft
Essays in Honour of George Schwarzenberaer. 1988, p.33 
(hereafter cited as Contemporary Problems^.
ICAO Doc 8111—146/LC—II, p.97.
ICAO Doc. 8111—LC/1460—II, p. 107.
is subject to the jurisdiction of the State of its 
registration when flying over the high seas or over terra 
nullius. In 1937 the Institut de Droit International1 
provided the following list of jurisdictional bases: (a)
the subjacent State, (b) the State of registration, (c) the 
State on whose territory the crime has effect and as a 
subsidiary base, (d) the State where the aircraft lands. 
The passive and active personality principles were added to 
this list in a Draft International Convention On Competence 
In Cases of Extraditable Offences Committed In An Aircraft 
In Flight, prepared by the International Criminal Police 
Commission.2
Other drafts de leae ferdnda included variations of 
the above bases of jurisdiction: some expressing a general 
preference for the State of registration3 while others laid 
down concurrent jurisdiction for the State of registration 
and the subjacent State, submitting passive and active 
personality principles as subsidiary bases of jurisdiction.4 
There were few recommendations endorsing the universal 
principle of jurisdiction. The IAPL made one such 
recommendation at its Congress in Athens in 1957 vis-a-vis
Ibid., p.109.
Ibid., p.111.
See, Draft Convention on Nationality of Aircraft. 
1929, prepared by Professor Schrieber for the 
International Chamber of Commerce; Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: 1952, prepared by 
Professor Cooper for the I LA at its session in 
Lucerne; The Harvard Research Draft Convention on 
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime. 1935; Draft 
Convention on Penal Offences Committed on Board 
Aircraft, prepared by Professor Zlatonic, 1957 for the
VII International Congress of Penal Law. See ICAO 
Doc. 8111 - LC/146 - II, pp. 121, 123, 117 and 137 
respectively.
See Draft Conventions Regarding Penal Offences 
Committed on Board Aircraft. 1957, prepared by
Professors Chauveau and Meyer, respectively, for the 
VII International Congress of Penal Law, Athens.
ICAO Doc. 8111 - LC/146 - II, pp. 131 and 133.
"infractions which seriously compromise the security of 
aerial navigation11.1
On the basis of this source material ICAO's Legal 
Committee accepted the general principle of the law of the 
"Flag State" and this appears in Article 3(1) of the Tokyo 
Convention: "the State of registration of the aircraft is 
competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed 
on board". In addition, members2 of the Legal Committee 
submitted a number of other jurisdictional bases to be 
included, almost as an exception to the general principle] 
of the Flag-State rule:
1. Where the offence has effect on the
territory of a State ("objective" 
territorial principle).
2. Where the offence is committed by or against
a national of the State (active and passive 
personality principles).
3. Where the offence is against the security of
the State (protective principle).
4. Where the offence is a breach of air-
navigation rules and
5. Where jurisdiction is to be exercised in
accordance with obligations stipulated in an 
international agreement.
This proposition was adopted, in principle. and 
appears in the form of Article 4 in the Tokyo Convention. 
It reflects a compromise between two views aired during the 
drafting debates. On the one hand, it was expected that 
the State in whose territory the aircraft was flying at the 
time of the offence would forego its claim to jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, some considered the airspace of that 
State as the proper locus delicti and therefore that State 
rather than the State of registration was entitled to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial 
principle. In addition, this formula had the added
1. Ibid., p.180.
2. See Norway and Federal Republic of Germany, ICAO Doc.
8111 - LC/146 - I, pp.88-89.
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advantage of including a number of traditional bases of 
jurisdiction in international law? subsequently to be 
included in international instruments proscribing criminal 
offences.
Although, neither the final text of the Tokyo 
Conference nor its travaux preparatoires reveal, as do 
those of other treaties discussed in this Part III, that 
the casus foederis of the instrument was to render 
perpetrators of crimes committed on board aircraft akin to 
hostis humani generis by such measures as the 11 aut dedere 
aut punire" rule, the adoption of a number
recognised bases of jurisdiction confirm th
The jurisdictional bases in the Hague Convention 
number four. States Parties may exercise jurisdiction when 
the offence is committed on board the aircraft registered 
in their territory and when an aircraft lands in their
favourably received in the ICAO Legal Committee. Barbados2 
added a further ground of jurisdiction. It proposed that 
jurisdiction should also be exercised by the State whose 
nationality the lessor of the aircraft enjoys, or by the
of business.
Austria3 and IFAPA* both submitted separate, but not 
unrelated, amendments extending the sphere of jurisdiction
See comment by Spain's representative in the Legal 
Committee who said that the provision on jurisdiction 
"alone would justify the existence of the (Tokyo) 
Convention". ICAO Doc. 8302 - LC/150 - v.I, p.52.
ICAO Doc. 8979-LC/165-2, p.35, SA Doc No. 9.
See SA Doc. No. 42 in ICAO Doc.8979-LC/165 - 2, p. 94 
and ibid., LC/165 -1, pp. 74 -75.
The Hague Convention
Convention, in fine, adheres to the no 
approach.1
■ i ti- A
"safe haven" I
1P7
territory with the offender on board. These were
State in whose territory the lessee has his principal place
SA Doc. No. 29, ibid., p.73.
322
to allow for the application of universal jurisdiction. 
They differed in so far as Austria's amendment qualified 
the application of this principle by virtue of the aut 
dedere aut punire principle. These proposals were 
formulated in view of the grave nature of the practice of 
unlawful seizure of aircraft, which is of concern to the 
whole of the international community. Switzerland,1 the 
United Kingdom,2 the I LA3 and the United Nations Under­
secretary General for Legal Affairs4 endorsed universal 
jurisdiction which may become operative under the terms of 
Article IV(2) of the Convention.
The Montreal Convention
The Montreal Convention largely follows the Hague 
Convention. It includes provision for universal
jurisdiction which was supported by the same delegations as 
at the Hague Diplomatic Conference.5 But with regards to 
jurisdiction ratione materiae the Montreal Convention 
differs from the Hague Convention in that it is not 
particular to one offence, but general to unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation.
A number of writers6 have concluded that the effect, 
particularly of the Hague and Montreal Conventions, has 
been to "internationalise" the offences they proscribe. By 
this they mean that they have rendered certain unlawful 
practices criminal offences under international 
conventional law. One of the factors which identifies this
ICAO Doc 8979 - LC/165 - 1, p.75 para. 15.
Ibid., Para. 18.
ICAO Doc. 8877 - LC/161, 1970, p.159.
Ibid., pp.173-174.
See also ICAO Doc. 9081 - LC/170-1: Switzerland, p.40, 
and Japan, p.55.
Quintana, 30 Int. RCP (1972) 28 and Van Pauhuys,
9 Col. JTL (1970) 16.
proscription process consists of an expansive 
jurisdictional regime consisting, in part, of traditional 
principles of jurisdiction and, in part, other bases of 
jurisdiction necessitated by the scope ratione materiae of 
the convention concerned.
The universality principle and the aut dedere aut 
punire regime in the Hague and Montreal Conventions, now 
also applicable to unlawful acts of violence committed at 
airports serving international civil aviation by virtue of 
the Montreal Protocol1, are invariably singled out in the 
literature as the key features which have helped to render 
these practices crimes in international law for States 
Parties.2
The applicability of these jurisdictional principles 
to "air law” crimes was considered in a recent decision of 
the District Court of Columbia in US v Junis3. Defendant, 
a national and resident of Lebanon was charged, inter alia, 
with crimes committed against aircraft and the taking of 
hostages. The charges related to the hijacking of a Royal 
Jordanian Airlines aircraft in 1985. Defendant was 
captured in 1987 by US Federal Agents in international 
waters, arrested and taken to the United States. The only 
connection between the lex fori and the defendant, other 
than his presence in US territory, is the fact that a 
number of the passengers taken hostage were US nationals. 
The Court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of 
universality and passive personality principles provided 
for under legislation enacted in pursuance of treaty 
obligations contracted by the United States as party to the 
UN Convention on Hostage-Taking and the Hague and Montreal
Article III.
See Cheng, Contemporary Problems. p.35; Shubber, 22
I CLP (1973) at 713-714? Address by Mr. Malmborg at 
ASIL Meeting on "New Developments in the Law of 
International Aviation: The Control of Aerial
Hijacking", 65 AJIL (1971) at 77.
681 F. Supp. 896 (DDC 1988).
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Conventions1
The Court rejected defendant's motion that the
universality and passive personality principles do not
apply to hostage-taking and "aircraft piracy" on the basis
that these practices, like piracy iure gentium. are not
crimes in international law in respect of which the
doctrine of universal jurisdiction applies, and
furthermore, that the United States does not recognise the
passive personality principle as a legitimate ground of
jurisdiction in international law. On the contrary, the
Court having considered international treaties, doctrine,
judicial practice and municipal legislation, including
Congressional debate, concluded that the universality and
passive personality principles are recognised bases of
jurisdiction under international and domestic law. The
Court stated that in relying on these principles:
"the United States is (not only) acting on behalf 
of the world community to punish alleged 
offenders of crimes that threaten the very 
foundations of world order, but the United States 
has its own interest in protecting its 
nationals".2
(c) Priority of Jurisdiction
This question arose largely during the deliberations 
of the Tokyo Convention which was actually intended to 
remedy rather than create conflicts of criminal 
jurisdiction for States Parties. It occupied much time in 
the discussions and has received due attention in the 
relevant literature.3
In 1958 the ICAO Legal Sub-Committee discussed the
See 18 USC Para 1203 (Hostage-Taking Act (1986) and 
Para 32 (Destruction of Aircraft Act 1956).
Op.cit., at p.903. See also Clarizio writing in 83 
AJIL (1989) 94 at p.99.
See generally, Boyle and Pulsifer 30 Jnl. ALC
(1964) 311 et seq.
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question of priority of jurisdiction.1 One proposal 
suggested that the State of registration would have sole 
jurisdiction in specified circumstances, while the State in 
whose airspace the offence is committed will have 
jurisdiction over offences committed under other specified 
circumstances. The scope was to prevent offences going 
unpunished while other States would have renounced 
jurisdiction. Another proposal suggested that a system 
would be set-up ranking States which would exercise 
jurisdiction. Should an offender be found in a State 
ranking lowest that State would refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction until States of a higher rank had decided 
against taking jurisdiction. Both proposals contain traces 
of the aut dedere aut punire principle. Both were rejected 
by the Sub-Committee2 as well as by the Legal Committee.3
The basis on which a priority system of jurisdiction 
was rejected is summed up in a Note4 drawn up by the 
Chairman of the Sub-Commmitee. It was reported that any 
system of priority will result in undesirable circumstances 
alienating rather than attracting signatories to the 
proposed convention. Under a "ranking" system of priority 
the State which has presence of the offender is obliged to 
wait for a request from higher ranking States before it can
Among the texts de lecre ferafnda before the sub­
committee, a DraftConventionsubmitted by the 
International Criminal Police Commission (8111- 
LC/146—v.II, p.Ill) included a provision on priority 
of jurisdiction. It contemplated the following 
ranking of States:
(1) the State whose security or public order interests
have been affected; (protective principle).
(2) the national State of the victim (passive
personality principle).
(3) the subjacent State (territorial airspace).
(4) the State of registration (law of the flag).
(5) the national State of the offender (active
personality principle).
ICAO Doc. 8111 - LC/146—II, p.22 paras 6. and 6.1. 
ICAO Doc 8111 - LC/146—II, p.7. para. 5.
Ibid., pp. 183-188.
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prosecute. Where it receives several extradition requests, 
it may not be in a position to extradite because, either 
all but the "ranking” State would yet have to submit an 
extradition request, or because there may be no extradition 
agreements between the various States concerned. Thus the 
proposed convention would have to have a full set of rules 
on extradition, addressing such issues as the extradition 
of nationals and the political offence exception question. 
The Note examined each proposed system of priority and 
found fault with each as follows:
a) that which places first the State whose
security has been threateneddefinition of 
offences against a State's security may not 
be recognised as such by others thus 
providing a gap in the punishment of 
offenders, consequently delivering a severe 
blow to the scope of the convention.
b) that which places first the territorial
State: there may be many States claiming to 
be the territorial State where the elements 
of an offence occur on board an aircraft 
flying over several territories.
c) that which places first the Flag State:
this prejudices the subjacent State such as 
when an aircraft is destroyed by explosives 
while flying in territorial airspace killing 
persons in its territory.
d) that which places first the State of
landing: difficulties arise because there
may be no connection between the State where 
the aircraft lands and the locus delicti.
In addition, the offence may not be
punishable under the law of the State of 
landing and furthermore it may be difficult 
to determine which shall be the State of 
landing where the aircraft has stopped in 
more States than one.
e) that which places first the national State
of the offender or of the victim:
difficulties immediately arise where there 
are persons of various nationalities on 
board.
In the Legal Committee's debates Mr (later Lord)
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Wilberforce1 for the United Kingdom said that "any priority 
system invariably led to difficulties in connection with 
processes of extradition and, without a procedure for 
extradition, a priority system became meaningless." 
Generally, there was a negative response to the idea of a 
priority system of jurisdiction.2 But some delegations did 
attempt to submit concrete proposals.
The US Representative3 expressed favour for a priority 
system of jurisdiction ranking the State of registration 
and the territorial State (i.e. the territorial airspace 
within which the offence is committed) as having concurrent 
primary jurisdiction. Argentina4 endorsed this general view 
and added that "where the State of first landing is the 
same as the State in whose territorial airspace the offence 
took place, the priority is prima facie beyond question”. 
Spain5 first proposed that the State of registration had 
priority, second place went to the State of first landing 
and finally the State in whose airspace the offence was 
committed. A joint proposal was finally submitted and 
voted upon.6
The Legal Committee rejected the concept of a system 
of priority of jurisdictions. The Tokyo Convention 
reflects this position. But it contains in Article 3 
affirmation of the principle that the State of registration 
is competent to exercise jurisdiction. The drafters
ICAO Doc. 8111 - LC/146-I, p. 85.
See, ICAO Doc. 8302 - LC/150, v.Is Italy and Portugal,
p.54; Sweden, p.55; Denmark, p.63; Netherlands, pp.55 
and 65, and at v.II p.31; and ibid., Australia, p. 67 
and Federal Republic of Germany, p.70.
ICAO Doc 8111 - LC/146, p. 87. See also Doc. 8302 - 
LC/150 - II, p.65 para 2 and ibid., v.I, p.56.
ICAO Doc. 8111 LC/146 v. II, p.45.
ICAO Doc. 8302/LC 150 v.I, p.54. See subsequent draft
amendments by Spain, ibid., p.94.
ICAO Doc. 8302 - LC/150 v.II, pp.70 - 71.
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specifically point out that recognition of this principle
does not imply in any manner exclusive jurisdiction of the
law of the flag.1
The question of priority of jurisdiction did not
trouble the Diplomatic Conference at the Hague as it did at
Tokyo. The matter was not addressed as a separate issue,
although there was talk from some delegations2 of universal
jurisdiction as a "subsidiary” means of jurisdiction.
In matters of extradition the United States3 submitted
that where several requests were submitted to a State
holding the offender preference should be given to the
State of registration. A general endorsement of this
principle is found in a USSR proposal amending the draft
aut dedre aut punire provision to read:
"if the State of registration of the aircraft 
declares its denunciation of its right to 
exercise jurisdiction over the criminal, it shall 
be obliged to submit the case to its competent 
authorities for prosecution".4
Similar statements implying a preference for the State 
of registration of the aircraft to be the first to exercise 
jurisdiction, were made during the drafting of the Montreal 
Convention.5 The view that universal jurisdiction should be 
considered as a subsidiary basis of jurisdiction was also 
expressed.6
None of the three Conventions contain any provisions 
purporting to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction. Certain 
writers7 have submitted that Article 4 of the Hague
ICAO Doc. 8111—LC/146 v.I, p. 86 and v.II, p. 29 para. 
6.3.
See Austria, ICAO Doc. 8979-LC/165-1, p.74 para. 10. 
ICAO Doc. 8979 - L/165 V.2, pp.74-75.
ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.2, p. 79 para. 7.
See Canada, ICAO Doc. 8939 - LC/164 v.I, p. 8 para.2. 
Spain, ICAO Doc. 9081-LC/170-2, p.93.
Dinstein, op. cit., pp.201-204.
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Convention constitutes a system of priority whereby the 
State of registration, the State in which the aircraft 
lands, and the State of the operator, rank first, followed 
by the State which has presence of the offender 
(universality principle). Finally, jurisdiction may be 
exercised in accordance with national law. Others1 have 
refuted such interpretations on the basis of the lack of 
any supporting evidence in the treaty text and relevant 
travaux preoaratoires. Indeed, the evidence reveals a 
volatile approach among the drafters and the final texts 
would seem to indicate two general principles: (i) States 
give first preference to the territorial principle. (ii) 
State participants at the Hague and Montreal Conferences 
looked upon the universal principle of jurisdiction as a 
means of last resort.
(d) The Aut Dedere Aut Punire Principle
The "extradite or prosecute” obligation appears 
principally in the Hague and Montreal Conventions, although 
it was included, in embryonic form, in the travaux 
preoaratoires before the Tokyo Conference. Switzerland,2 
for instance, had proposed that where the State, which has 
been handed the offender by the aircraft Commander does not 
have or does not wish to exercise jurisdiction, it shall 
enquire into whether the offence which he is alleged to 
have committed is extraditable and shall seek to extradite 
him. This is the converse of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle. The United Kingdom3 submitted a similar draft 
provision to the effect that the offender would be set free 
on the expiry of seven days from his arrival in the landing 
State unless that State charges him with an offence, or, a 
request for his extradition is made. But it was the United
Feller, 7 Israel LR (1972) 208.
ICAO Doc. 8302 - LC/150 - II, p. 62. See also 
Netherlands, ibid., p.49 para 10.
Ibid., p.100.
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States which singly, and later, jointly with Venezuela, 
clearly outlined an “extradite or prosecute" formula at 
Tokyo.1 The United States draft would have made it possible 
for any Contracting State to prosecute the offender, if 
either the State of registration or the State in whose 
airspace the offence was committed, after receiving 
notification by the State which captured the offender, 
declined to exercise jurisdiction. The joint United 
States/Venezuelan draft proposal limited the right to 
prosecute to the State having custody of the offender.
In the Hague and Montreal Conventions the "extradite 
or prosecute" principle is central to the scope of the 
instruments. A draft preamble2 to the Hague Convention 
considered that it is necessary to take appropriate 
measures to facilitate prosecution and extradition of 
offenders in order to deter commission of these offences of 
"grave concern".3
In draft form the aut dedere aut punire provision 
would oblige the Contracting State which had presence of 
the offender, to submit, "if it does not extradite the 
alleged offender, the case to its competent authorities for 
their decision to prosecute him". The spirit of this 
clause finds its origin in Article 6.2 of the European 
Convention on Extradition4 which stipulates that if the 
requested State Party does not extradite its nationals it 
shall, at the demand of the requesting State Party, submit 
the case to this competent authorities "in order that 
proceedings may be taken if they are considered
Ibid., p.102.
See ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.2, p.15 and Doc. 8877 - 
LC/161, p.12.
But neither the Hague nor the Montreal Convention 
contains any preambular language refering, explicitly 
or implicitly, to extradition and/or prosecution of 
offenders.
ETS No. 24.
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appropriate".1
The wording in the European Convention is less 
categoric than the draft submitted at the Hague Conference 
in that it does not purport to oblige State Parties to 
prosecute. Some States2 took exception to the Hague Draft 
because of the mandatory language used. Others, such as 
the United Kingdom,3 Italy4 and Indonesia5 endorsed the 
extradite/prosecute concept, even though this would mean 
exercising jurisdiction on the universality principle. 
This is acceptable because of the extreme gravity of the 
offence. Spain6 considered the convention to be a "dead 
letter" if the extradite or prosecute formula was excluded.
An amendment to the draft provision submitted by the 
Legal Committee was made by a large number of delegates 
substituting the words "for their decision to prosecute 
him" by "for the purpose of prosecution". This wording 
neither creates an obligation to prosecute nor necessitates 
that the case results in criminal proceedings being 
instituted. This is the compromise described by some as 
both "beneficial and inimical"7 in that offenders who are 
not extradited are not necessarily prosecuted. Thus, the 
possibility of non-prosecution remains for States which 
harbour perpetrators of these "politically" oriented
See France, ICAO Doc. 8877 - LC/161 v.I, p. 69 para. 
33.
ICAO, Doc. 8979 - LC/165, v.2, Tanzania, p.83;
Malaysia, ibid., p.133 para 3 and France, ibid.
ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165, v.I., p.75 para. 18.
ICAO Doc. 8877 - LC/162, v.I., p.16 para 4.
Ibid., para 5.
ICAO Doc.8979 - LC/165 v.I., p.75 para 17.
See Abramovsky, 13 Col JTL (1974) 398. In vol. 14, 
ibid., p.294, same writer submits that common Article 
7 (incorporating the aut dedere aut punire rule) of 
the Hague and Montreal Conventions, "substantially 
weakens" their scope.
crimes.
However, the sponsors of the amendment included, inter 
alia, that the submission of the case to the competent 
authorities shall take place "whatever the motive for the 
offence and whether or not the offence was committed in its 
territory".1 The sponsors also added that the decision to 
be taken by the competent authorities shall be made as 
required when a serious offence is committed under domestic 
law.
The sponsorship of the amendment was largely composed 
of Western European and American nations, Uganda being the 
only African nation in that group. The phrase "whatever 
the motive for the offence" proved extremely unpopular 
among African nations2 because, it was submitted, that 
unlawful seizure of aircraft is a crime to be considered on 
its own merits according to the circumstances in which it 
is committed. It was suggested that this phrase should be 
substituted by the words "without exception whatsoever".3 
Proposals to delete the wording introduced by the multi­
state sponsored amendment were rejected in the Commission 
of the Whole.4 But at the plenary meeting the suggestion to 
have the phraseology altered found general support and was 
adopted as such.5 The phrase "whether or not the offence 
was committed in its territory" was retained.
In his end of conference statement, the United States
See S.A. Doc. No. 72 in ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.2, 
p.75.
See, ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.I, Kenya, p.130 para 
45; Tanzania, ibid., para 47; Congo, ibid., para. 48; 
Cameroon, ibid., p.131 para. 52 and Zambia, ibid., 
para 51.
United Arab Republic, ibid., p.131 para 53 and Kenya, 
ibid., p.177 para 8.
ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.I, p. 1. p.136.
ICAO DOC. 8979 - LC/165 V.I, pp.177 - 182.
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delegate1 at the Hague specifically identified the extradite 
or prosecute formula as an "emphatic obligation - applying 
whatever the motivation of the hijacker"? and argued, that 
on the basis of this and other criteria, among them 
provision for the universal principle of jurisdiction, the 
Hague Convention recognises unlawful seizure of aircraft as 
a serious crime in international treaty law.
At the Montreal Conference the mood concerning the aut 
dedere aut pun ire rule was very similar to that at the 
Hague. Typical of that mood is a comment made by IFAPA2 
stating that the extradite/prosecute formula need be 
included in a convention on unlawful acts committed against 
civil aviation "in conformity with the principles 
established in the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft". The United Kingdom3 included 
the aut dedere aut punire principle in a Draft Convention 
submitted in preparation of the Montreal Convention.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2645 (XXV) 
on Aerial Hijacking4 called upon states "to take all 
appropriate measures to provide for the prosecution and 
punishment of persons who perpetrate (unlawful acts against 
civil aviation), or, for the extradition of such persons 
for the purpose of their prosecution and punishment." The 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended5 
that the Committee of Ministers considers taking up 
sanctions against States which have refused to either 
extradite or prosecute aircraft hijackers and perpetrators 
of offences against civil aviation.
Endorsement of the aut dedre aut ounire rule is also 
made in the vast literature which the Tokyo, Hague and
*. ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 V.I, p.136, ibid., p.203.
2. ICAO Doc. 9081 - LC/170 v.2, p.67 para 3.
3. ICAO Doc. 8936 - LC/164 v.2, p.117.
4. Adopted 30th November 1970.
5. Para 9. II. Recommendation 613 (1970).
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Montreal Conventions have generated. Some1 have described 
the "extradite/prosecute" provisions in the Hague and 
Montreal Conventions as "key11 clauses. One writer2 in 
particular submits that as a result of this provision: 
11 just as the 'high seas pirate' is considered by 
international law to be hostis humani generis, the enemy of 
all mankind, the hijacker is deemed to be the enemy of all 
those nations who ratify the Hague Convention". Professor 
Cheng3 opines that this provision has contributed, to a 
substantial degree, in rendering the crimes which form the 
scope of the various conventions criminal offences in 
international law.
The aut dedere aut ounire principle and the question 
of priority of jurisdiction (especially where several 
extradition requests are involved), once again, generated 
discussion during the drafting of the 1988 Additional 
Protocol to the Montreal Convention. Member delegations of 
the Legal Committee stressed that the State of occurrence,
i.e. the airport where the offence is committed should have 
primary jurisdiction because, clearly it is most closely 
connected with the offence: "it bears the major brunt of 
the consequences; has the responsibility for the security 
and has most of the evidence".4 The Netherlands even 
proposed that the State in whose territory the offender is 
present "should not be obliged to exercise its jurisdiction 
if the State primarily concerned, i.e. the State of 
occurrence, does not request extradition."5 Such a proposal
Jacobson, 5 Cor. ILJ (1972) 181, White, Rev. ICJ
(1971) No. 6. p.39, and 12 HILJ (1971) at p.67.
Abramovsky, 13 Col.JTL (1974) 397.
Contemporary Problems, p.35. See also Zotiades, 23 RH 
(1970) 20 et seq.
ICAO Doc. 9502 - LC/186, pp.4-5, 1987. The USSR (pp. 
4-19 para.4:62) proposed that where there are several 
extradition requests preference should be given to the 
State of occurrence.
Ibid., pp. 4-19 para 4:61.
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was not acceptable because it departed from principles in 
the Hague and Montreal Conventions and in other treaties 
which have come into force since that time. The Committee 
adhered to this approach and refused to consider a system 
of priorities not to upset "the delicate balance" between 
the extradite and prosecution formula, a cornerstone of the 
Hague and Montreal Conventions.1
III. The Political Offence Exception to Extradition
The crimes which the drafters of the Tokyo Convention 
addressed were largely ordinary crimes under municipal law 
committed extraterritorially. The traditional rules of 
extradition apply to the offences under the Tokyo 
Convention and these include the political offence 
exception question. However at the Hague and in Montreal 
several representatives2 submitted draft proposals on the 
lines of Article VII of the Genocide Convention which 
denies the applicability of the political offence exception 
rule. Israel,3 USSR,4 Ireland,5 Spain,6 Brazil,7 Singapore,5 
and non-governmental organisations,9 all submitted comments 
to the effect that the conventions should clearly reflect
ICAO DOC. 9502 -LC/186, p.4-20 para.4:63.
Hague Convention: see Ghana, S.A. Doc. No. 8 p.34 in 
ICAO Doc. 9879 - LC/165, v.2; United States, S.A.Doc. 
No. 28 p. 69, ibid; Paraguay, S.A. Doc. No. 75, p.135, 
and the Montreal Convention: see IATA, ICAO Doc. 8936
- LC/164, v.I, p.7 para 1 and in ICAO Doc. 9081 - 
LC/170—1, p.52.
ICAO Doc. 8877 - LC/161 v.I, p.180.
ICAO Doc. 8979 - LC/165 v.I, p.64 para. 49.
Ibid., v.2, SA Doc. No. 18, p. 53.
Ibid., SA Doc. No. 61, p.117.
ICAO Doc. 8939 - LC/164 v. I, p.88 para. 4.
ICAO Doc. 9081 - LC/170 v.I, p.45.
ICAO Doc. 9936 - LC/164 v.II, p.71 para 14.
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the position in the Genocide Convention. Notwithstanding 
these proposals the Hague and Montreal Conventions fail in 
this respect. But such a provision appears in Article 1 of 
the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism:1
"For the purposes of extradition between 
Contracting States, none of the following 
offences shall be regarded as a political offence 
or as an offence connected with a political 
offence or as an offence inspired by political 
motives:
a. an offence within the scope of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 
16 December 1970?
b. an offence within the scope of the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971.”
As already recorded above the phrase "whatever the
motive” in the aut dedere aut punire clause was deleted at
the drafting stages of the conventions, although some
States have submitted that its substitute: "without
exception whatsoever" means that the political offence
exception rule is not applicable when Contracting Parties
submit cases for prosecution to their competent
authorities.2 In addition, common Article 8 of the Hague
and Montreal Conventions provides that the offences are to
be deemed extraditable implying that they are to be treated
as common and not as political crimes and that Contracting
States are obliged to include them in any extradition
agreement concluded between them in the future. This
provision together with common Article 7 are the principal
clues in the operative provisions of these conventions
ETS No. 90.
See Metsalampi writing in Essays in Honour of Erik 
Castren, 1979, p. 46 at p.53. But contra see 
Mankiewicz, 37 Jnl. ALC (1971) 205 who argues that
notwithstanding the qualificatory language in common 
Article 7, prosecuting authorities in Contracting 
States may still accept the political offence plea, as 
they would in respect of other municipal law crimes of 
a serious nature. See also White, op. cit., p.43.
revealing a preference among the drafters for the exclusion 
of the applicability of the political offence plea.
This view finds a good deal of support among writers.1 
The ILA2 and members of the Institut de Droit International. 
endorsed this view in response to a Questionnaire on 
Highjacking of Aircraft.3
B. Crimes Committed Against Internationally Protected 
Persons and Diplomats
The concept of crimes committed against interna­
tionally protected persons and diplomats is a development 
of the broader regime of rules in international law which 
extend legal protection to a specific class of persons 
entrusted with the delicate duty of conducting 
international relations and diplomacy.
The origin of the concept of these crimes ratione 
personae may be traced in the following sources: (a) in the 
writings of classical jurists in international law. De 
Vattel4 wrote,
"Whoever does violence to an ambassador or to any 
other public minister attacks the common safety 
and welfare of all nations and renders himself 
guilty of a gi(e^6us crime against all nations."
(b) In early judicial opinion it was held that an attack 
upon the person of an ambassador hurts the common safety 
and well-being of nations. The offender becomes guilty of
Green, 22 Chitty/s LJ (1974) 135; McMahon, 38 Georatwn 
hJ (1970) 1136; Malik, 9 IJIL (1969) at 70, and
Zotiades, op. cit., p. 23.
Draft Resolution on Piracy, ILA (1970^. p.709 para.
5.
54 Annuaire (1971) 562-563.
The Law of Nations, or the Principles of Natural Law: 
Applied To The Conduct And To The Affairs of Nations 
and of Sovereigns. Ch VII, Sec. 80, 1916, (Trans.)
Gregory, G .D .
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a crime against the whole world.1 And, (c), proscription of 
the crime in early 19th century national penal codes.2 
Islamic law, too, provides for the prohibition and 
punishment of crimes against internationally protected 
persons.3 But the most recent and constructive contribution 
to this particular class of crimes has been made by the 
adoption and entry into force of two multilateral 
instruments: (1) Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts 
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and 
Related Extortion that are of International Significance4 
and (2) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents.5 Relevant provisions of these 
conventions, their travaux preparatoires. diplomatic 
statements and legislative practice, reveal standards and 
measures which have been considered necessary by States for 
the proscription of acts as criminal offences under 
international law. They are, therefore, directly relevant 
to the question of the juridical features of the concept of 
criminal offence in international law.
I. Designation of the Concept
A draft set of articles presented to the ILC, which
Respublica v De Longchamps, Dallas 1 in 1 US 
Sup.Ct.Rep. (1784). See also Moore, op.cit., v.IV,
p.627, 1906. Cf. Eichmann. 36 ILR 293.
Spain: Articles 260, 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the 1822 
Penal Code; Portugal: Articles 159 and 160 of the 1886 
Penal Code; and Brasil: Article 76 of the 1830 Penal 
Code. See Saldana, 10 Hague Receuil (1925) 314
para.3.
Bassiouni. 74 AJIL (1980) 609.
OAS Doc. AG/doc. 88 Rev.l, Corr.l, 1971. Text also 
at: 10 ILM 255. See, Inter - American Juridical
Committee, Statement of Reasons, at 9 ILM 1250. 
Hereafter cited as OAS Convention on Internationally 
Protected Persons.
1035 UNTS 168. Hereafter cited as UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons.
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was entrusted with the formulation of the UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons, declared the present 
category of offences: "international crimes".1 The general
view within the ILC was one which considered the crimes to 
be delicti jure gentium. The nebulous meaning of the term 
"international crime", however, created a number of 
difficulties and several members requested its deletion, 
although some2 interpreted it by reference to criminal 
offences under international law such as piracy jure 
gentiumf slavery or "hijacking". To this extent, the term 
"international crime" indicated the regard in which the 
concept of crimes against internationally protected persons 
was held. Other ILC members3 suggested "crimes of 
international significance", "crimes of international 
concern" or simply "crime" as alternative terms.
The ILC decided against the use of "tags" to describe 
the scope of the draft articles ratione materiae. But this 
view was not shared by some States4 in their replies to the 
ILC Draft Articles. In its consideration of same Draft 
Articles, the Sixth Committee reported that a number of 
government representatives considered the crimes to be of 
such a serious nature as to equate them with "crimes 
against the peace and security of mankind."5 Writers6 have 
described the concept as international crimes against 
humanity punishable regardless of the locus delicti.
See Working Paper submitted by R. Kearney, UN Doc., 
A/CN.4/L. 182, ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.II, p.201. Hereafter 
cited as Kearney Draft.
See ILC Yrbk. , 1972, v.I, Ago, p. 11 para 26 and 
Yasseen, p.12 para 39.
See ibid., Nagendra Singh, p. 19 para 15 and Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, p.18 para 6.
See Jamaica and Japan, ibid., v.II, p.339.
UN Doc. A/8892, 1972, p.18 para 119.
Brach, 10 Col.JTL (1971) 409.
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II. Jurisdiction
The ILC had before it the Kearney Draft, a working 
paper submitted by Uruguay1 and a further Draft Convention 
submitted by Denmark.2 Collectively these travaux 
preoaratoires would provide States Parties with the 
possibility of exercising criminal jurisdiction on the 
basis of territoriality and of the nationality of the 
victim, i.e. the passive personality principle (Rome 
Draft), and the universality principle (Kearney Draft). In 
the Rome Draft the universality principle could only be 
invoked in cases where the offender, being present in the 
territory of a State Party, was not to be extradited either 
to the State Party on whose territory the crime was 
committed or to the State Party whose national was the 
victim. The Uruguay Draft did not include a provision 
specifically stipulating that States Parties may exercise 
or establish jurisdiction. It did provide, however, (Draft 
Article 9) that for the purposes of co-operation in the 
prevention and punishment of same crimes, States Parties 
would be obliged to include them as punishable offences
under their criminal laws.
The aut dedere aut punire principle was common to 
all the draft texts placed before the ILC, but each 
provision was worded in terms which differed significantly 
from one text to the other. The Kearney Draft contained a 
general statement to the effect that the State Party in
whose territory the offender may be found shall either
detain him or take such measures as may be necessary to 
ensure his presence for trial or extradition. The Rome 
Draft followed the formula coined in the Hague and Montreal 
treaties discussed in Section A above, in other words, a 
State Party which does not extradite the offender would be
UN Doc. A/8410, 1971. Hereafter cited as Uruguay
Draft.
UN Doc. A/8710/Rev.l, 1971. (Known and hereafter
cited as the Rome Draft). Text also at ILC Yrbk. f 
1971, v.II, p.335.
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obliged "without exception whatsoever and whether or not 
the offences were committed in its territory" to submit the 
case to its competent authorities for the purposes of 
prosecution. In terms of the concept of the criminal 
offence in international law the principle as formulated, 
and included in the Rome Draft, underlines as universal and 
non-derogable the concept of crimes committed against 
internationally protected persons. In sharp contrast, the 
Uruguay Draft resembled more an extradition agreement 
rather than the draft basis for a convention proscribing 
criminal offences in international law. The Uruguay Draft 
was clearly influenced by the OAS Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons. The emphasis there is 
principally on extraditing the offender. Indeed, the 
relevant "either extradite or prosecute" provision (Draft 
Article 5) of the Uruguay Draft is worded in almost 
identical terms as the operative Article 5 of the OAS 
instrument.1
The text of the relevant provisions are reproduced 
for comparative reasons:
Uruguay Draft
"Where a person whose extradition is 
sought in respect of one of the crimes 
specified in article 1 is not 
extraditable because he is a national 
of the State applied to or because of 
some other constitutional or legal 
obstacle to extradition, the State 
applied to shall be required to refer 
the case to the competent authorities 
for prosecution as if the act in 
question had been committed in its own 
territory. The decision rendered by 
the said authorities shall be 
communicated to the applicant State."
OAS Convention
"When extradition requested for one of 
the crimes specified in Article 2 is 
not in order because the person sought 
is a national of the requested State, 
or because of some other legal or 
constitutional impediment, that State 
is obliged to submit the case to its
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The final version adopted by the ILC (Draft Article 6)
differed again from the travaux preoaratoires. It read as
follows:
"The State Party in whose territory the alleged 
offender is present shall, if it does not 
extradite him, submit, without exception 
whatsoever and without undue delay1, the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance 
with the laws of that State.”2
The obligation to prosecute "without exception
whatsoever” was retained but reference to "whether or not 
the offence is committed in its territory" was deleted on 
the basis that the draft articles already provided for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. The phrase "without undue 
delay" was inserted in order to ensure that alleged 
offenders would not be kept in detention for an 
unreasonable period of time before being brought to trial.3 
The ILC reported that the aut dedere aut punire principle 
embodied in Draft Article 6 was basic to the whole set of 
Draft Articles.4 This view was endorsed by most ILC 
members. Mr. Elias5, in particular, described it as the most 
important provision in the Draft.
ILC Draft Article 6 was adopted unamended by the Sixth 
Committee6. Some States7 favoured deletion of the phrase
competent authorities for prosecution, 
as if the act had been committed in its 
territory. The decision of these 
authorities shall be communicated to 
the state that requested extradition
II
• • • •
Emphasis added.
ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.II, p.318.
See ILC Commentary, ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.II, p.318 para
3.
Ibid., para 1.
Ibid., v.I, p.208 para 33.
UN Doc. A/9407, 1973, p.13 para 76.
"without exception whatsoever" because it was ambiguous and 
it would prove unworkable if, for instance, both the 
offender and the victim were internationally protected 
persons. The USSR, the United Kingdom and Panama spoke in 
favour of the article as drafted.1 The Brazilian 
representative3 applauded the ILC for including the phrase 
"without undue delay" for it improved upon the parent 
treaty sources: the Hague and Montreal Conventions. The 
Sixth Committee adopted Draft Article 6 by 72 votes with 
none against and 32 abstentions.3
In replies preceeding and following the ILC's Draft 
Articles, States representing a wide political spectrum 
including Denmark, . Jamaica, US, Japan, Morocco, USSR, 
Israel, Rwanda, Oman, and Yugoslavia expressed a firm 
belief in the aut dedere aut punire principle and its 
inclusion in a convention on crimes committed against 
internationally protected persons. The principle was 
preferred by these and by a substantial number of other 
States to the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction simplicitur because, as submitted by Italy, 
"it has been adopted in recent conventions on the 
repression of international criminal acts and is now 
accepted by the international community".4 The universality 
principle would only be acceptable if its application is 
rendered part and parcel of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle.
Article 3 of the UN Convention on Internationally 
Protected Persons provides:
"1. Each State Party shall take such measures as
7. See Nigeria, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR1419, 1973, p.107 para 8 
and Jamaica, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR1437, 1973, p.213 para 7.
\ UN Doc. A/C•6/SR1437, 1973, p.214. See also Unired
Kingdom reply, ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.II, pp.344-345.
2. UN Doc. A/C.6/SR1419, 1973, p.106 para 3.
3. See UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1437, 1973, p.215 para 23.
4. UN Doc. A/9127, 1973, p.31.
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may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction 
over the crimes set forth in article 2 in the 
following cases:
(a) when the crime is committed in the territory 
of that State or on board a ship or aircraft 
registered in that State;
(b) when the alleged offender is a national of 
that State?
(c) when the crime is committed against an 
internationally protected person as defined in 
article 1 who enjoys his status as such by virtue 
of functions which he exercises on behalf of that 
State.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over these crimes in cases where the 
alleged offender is present in its territory and 
it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 
to any of the states mentioned in paragraph 1 of 
this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal 
jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal 
law.,r
Thus, the territorial, active and passive personality 
principles are included in the convention. The passive 
personality principle does not apply stricto sensu because 
a State Party may exercise jurisdiction on the basis that 
the victim enjoyed the status of an internationally 
protected person by virtue of his appointment as such 
rather than by virtue of his status as a national of that 
State Party. The universality principle forms part and 
parcel of the aut dedere aut punire principle and, as in 
the UN Convention on Torture, it becomes operative where 
extradition to the States Parties which may take 
jurisdiction under the convention, does not take place.
Again, the circumscription of the universality 
principle by reference to the States Parties identified in 
the relevant jurisdictional clause, in part, reiterates the 
tacit presence of some hierarchical order among the various 
bases of jurisdiction. State opinion and travaux 
preoaratoires endorse this assessment.
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Priority of Jurisdiction
In the case of several requests for extradition, the 
request of the State in whose territory the crime was 
committed is most likely to succeed. The territorial 
principle is almost invariably placed at the top of any 
list ranking bases of jurisdiction.
Thus, during the drafting of the UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons, the Netherlands 
distinguished between the State which has presence of the 
offender from other States closely connected with the crime 
as having primary jurisdiction and as such "have a moral 
duty to request extradition”.1 It2 supported a hierarchical 
system for jurisdictional bases designed to resolve 
conflicts among States wishing to take jurisdiction. The 
Netherlands proposal placed the jurisdictional bases in the 
order as that which largely appears in Article 3 of the 
convention. The proposal included the passive personality 
principle even though Dutch law does not permit exercise of 
jurisdiction on that basis.3
The Kearney Draft contained a provision which ranked 
extradition requests in order of preference. First 
preference was given to the State where the crime was 
committed if it submitted an extradition request within 
three months of receipt of notification of the offender's 
presence in the requested State. Second preference was 
given to the State whose national was the victim of the 
crime (passive personality principle).
Such a system does not appear in the OAS Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons.
The provisions on jurisdiction in the UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons have set standards which
UN Doc. A/PV2202, 1973, p.30 para 308. Emphasis added.
5 NYIL (1974) 246.
See Explanatory Memorandum, NYIL (1985) 370-371. See 
also Japan, ILC Yrbk., v.II, 1972, p.339 and Jamaica, 
UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1417, 1973, p.99 para 33.
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have been followed by the drafters of subsequent treaties 
concerning practices such as the taking of hostages and the 
prevention of torture. The Chairman1 of the ILC's Working 
Group on the Draft Articles stressed that provision for
revolutionary but reinforced existing rules and principles 
of international law. ILC members reiterated that the 
question of universality and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
formed the casus foederis of the proposed convention. In 
their explanation of vote in the UN General Assembly, 
States have highlighted the obligation to prosecute the 
offender, if he is not extradited, as forming the object 
and purpose of the UN Convention on Internationally 
Protected Persons.2 A reservation to the relevant clauses 
would according to some violate Article 19 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Writers3 have 
acknowledged the aut dedere aut punire principle as being 
the "key provision" of the convention.
Jurisdiction under the OAS Convention
The position concerning the exercise of jurisdiciton 
under the OAS Convention on Internationally Protected 
Persons is similar but significantly not identical to that 
under its UN counterpart. The OAS convention does not list 
a number of bases upon which States Parties may take 
jurisdiction. It does, however, incorporate the aut dedere 
aut punire principle, but that provision (Article 5) is 
worded in a way as to imply that States Parties ought, in 
the first place, to extradite the offender and only when 
serious legal grounds render extradition impossible such as
1. M r .Tsuruoka, ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.I, p.196 para 3.
2. See UN Doc. A/PV 2202, 1973: Canada, p. 21 para 209;
Italy, p.23 paras 230-232 and the Netherlands, p.29 
para 304.
3. Wood, 23 ICLP (1974) 910-811 and Friedlander writing
in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law Volume 1
Crimes, p.487.
extraterritorial the draft text was not
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where the offender is a national of the requested State, 
shall criminal proceedings be instituted in the forum 
State. The explanation offered by the Inter-American 
Juridical Committee1 encourages this interpretation of 
Article 5:
11 if the state to which the extradition request is 
directed cannot for some reason deliver the
person concerned, it has the international 
obligation to try him in its own territory, just 
as if the crime had been committed there."
The Committee did not consider the concept of crimes
committed against internationally protected persons,
including diplomats an "international crime, as genocide".
The Committee did not elaborate on the meaning of this
statement but only cared to admit that these type of crimes
violate accepted norms and standards of international law.
Further evidence submitted by the Committee suggests that
it viewed crimes against internationally protected persons
as a separate class of criminal offences under
international law. The evidence included, inter alia.
writings of prominent Latin-American jurists such as
Professor Quintilliano Saldana2 who recognises crimes
committed against internationally protected persons as
crimes against the law of nations; and relevant
international practice acknowledging the non-applicability
of the political offence exception to crimes committed
against Heads of State and Government including other
internationally protected persons. The Committee also
recognised that these crimes constitute a form of
terrorism and that terrorist acts are traditionally
accepted as delicti jure gentium.
Ill. Legislative Practice
States Parties have enacted legislation in fulfilment
See Statement of Reasons for the Draft Convention on 
Terrorism and Kidnapping, 9 ILM 1268. Hereafter 
referred to as Committee.
10 Hague Receuil (1925) pp. 227
/
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of their obligations under the UN and OAS instruments. The 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have all 
passed legislation which allows for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, inter alia, on the basis of the presence of 
the offender in their territory. The UK 1978
Internationally Protected Persons Act requires the act 
committed overseas to be also recognised as a criminal 
offence under English law and ignorance of the victim's 
status is not a defence; whereas, under Section 9 of the 
Australia 1976 (Internationally Protected Persons) Act such 
lack of knowledge constitutes an acceptable defence. Under 
the relevant US provisions (18 USC Paragraph 1116) 
jurisdiction over crimes committed against foreign 
officials, official guests and internationally protected 
persons may be exercised on the basis of the universality 
principle irrespective of the locus delicti or the 
nationality of the offender. Jurisdiction in the United 
States may also be taken on the basis of the nationality of 
the offender (active personality principle) and of the 
victim (passive personality) even though these two 
jurisdictional bases are not specifically stipulated in 
Paragraph 1116. This was held by the District Court of 
California in US v Lavton.1 where defendant was charged with 
having conspired, aided and abetted in the murder of US 
diplomats in Guyana. It was submitted that the Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because all events 
occured outside United States territory. The Court found 
the legislative history of Paragraph 1116 to be 
unequivocal, namely that Congress intended for jurisdiction 
to exist in all circumstances including those pertinent to 
this case.
IV. The Crimes as Political Offences
Crimes committed against internationally protected
509 F . Supp. 212 (1981).
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persons and diplomats are extraditable crimes. The Uruguay 
Draft (Article 1) and Article 2 of the OAS Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons consider them to be 
"common” and not political crimes. The Kearney Draft 
(Article 1), and the ILC Draft Articles excluded the 
application of the political offence exception rule.1 Some 
ILC Members2 explained that the phrase "without exception 
whatsoever" in the aut dedere aut punire clause is intended 
to exclude this very rule. States3 supported this position 
and included it in their legislation4 and extradition 
treaties.5 The understanding that a crime is not accepted 
as a political offence when committed either against a Head 
of State or of Government or a member of Government has its 
origins in the so-called "attentat" clause in extradition 
practice.6 The "attentat" clause excludes from the 
political offence exception crimes committed against 
persons who hold public office. The OAS and the UN 
Conventions on Internationally Protected Persons have 
widened the sphere of application of the "attentat" clause
The phrase: "regardless of motive" was included by the 
ILC in its Draft Article 2 obliging States Parties to 
legislate for the criminal offences defined in the 
Draft Articles. See UN Doc. A/9407, 1973, p.5. The
Sixth Committee deleted the phrase. See UN Doc. 
A/9407, 1973, pp.7-8.
ILC Yrbk.. 1972, v.I: Elias, p.208 para 35 and
Ushakov, ibid., p.209 para 42.
ILC Yrbk., 1972, v.II: Canada, p.332, Japan, p.339, 
Yugoslavia, p.346, and Brazil and Greece, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/SR.1421, 1973, p.120 paras 13-15, and Portugal, 
UN Doc. A/PV2202, 1973, p.29 para 298.
See for example: UK 1978 Internationally Protected 
Persons Act, Section 3(1).
United States - United Kingdom Supplementary 
Extradition Agreement, 1985, (Article 1) and United 
States - Canada Extradition Treaty, 1971, (Article 
4(2)(i)). See also Draft Single Convention on the 
Legal Control of International Terrorism, I LA (1980*1 . 
p.497
6 See Van den Wijngaert, op.cit., p.135.
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to crimes committed against all internationally protected 
persons including diplomats. The exclusion of the
political offence exception rule to this class of offences 
constitutes the casus foederis of the 1977 European 
Convention on Terrorism.1 Some2 have even submitted that 
under contemporary international law no motive, political 
or otherwise, will excuse crimes committed against 
internationally protected persons. It has been suggested 
that States, regardless whether Parties to relevant 
treaties, are under a generally binding obligation to deny 
the "political offence" remedy to perpetrators of such 
crimes and may incur international responsibility if they 
fail to prosecute or to extradite the offenders. In the 
Iran Hostages Case3 the International Court concluded that 
the Iranian authorities were fully aware of their
international obligations to protect foreign diplomats in 
their territory; that they had the means to provide such 
protection? that they failed to do so4 and thus incurred 
international responsibility. But, the International
Court, having decided not to consider whether Article 13 of 
the UN Convention on Internationally Protected Persons 
constituted a basis for jurisdiction, did not entertain the 
US claim that Iran was under an international obligation to 
prosecute or extradite the "authors of the US Embassy 
invasion and jailors of the hostages". The International 
Court did not address the question whether the "jailors" 
had committed criminal offences in international law, much 
less what form and shape international responsibility
Article 1(c), ETS No.9.
See: Mr. April (Canada) UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1432, 1973, 
p. 190 para 18? Przetacznik, Protection of Officials of 
Foreign States According to International Law. 1983, 
p.103, and at 9 RBDI (1973) 465 et seq. , also see, 
Lador-Lederer, 4 Israel YHR (1974) 132. Cf. Rozakis, 
23 ICLP (1974) 52.
ICJ Rep.. 1980.
Ibid., p.32 para 68.
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engendered by same offences would assume.
C. The Taking of Hostages
The status of the practice of the taking of hostages 
(hostage-taking)1 as a criminal offence in international law 
has, like torture, developed within two regimes: that which 
operates in time of war and that which operates in time of 
peace.
The UN has adopted an international instrument2 to 
provide for the proscription of hostage-taking as a 
criminal offence in time of peace. But it is not operative 
where the offence is committed within the territory of a 
single State, i.e. where both the hostage and hostage-taker 
are nationals of that State and same hostage-taker is 
found, after the commission of the offence, in the 
territory of that State.3
The Hostages Convention has been described 
approbatively as "a remarkable achievement in the 
development of international criminal law".4 Relevant 
provisions of the convention shall be examined in order to 
verify whether they subscribe to, differ from, or, weaken, 
rules applied to similar practices by virtue of other 
conventions. Thus, we may assess the development of norms 
which regulate the commission of certain internationally 
proscribed criminal offences, and, at the same time, 
continue to identify the features characteristic of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law.
The two terms are used interchangeably in this 
section.
International Convention Against The Taking of 
Hostages, adopted by GA Res. 34/146, 17th December, 
1979. Also at 18 ILM 1456. Hereafter cited as 
Hostages Convention.
See Article 13.
Kapoor, 21 IJIL (1981) 253 at 258.
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I. In Time of War
There was no general consensus on the existence of a 
rule prohibiting the taking of civilians hostage during 
armed conflict until the immediate post World War II 
period. During the First World War Germany practiced 
hostage-taking of civilian population in the occupied 
territories of France and Belgium on a widespread and 
unprecedented scale.1 There was some inconsistency in 
military manuals in force at the time on the subject of 
taking of civilians as hostages. The French Manual forbade 
hostage-taking in all circumstances. The practice was also 
forbidden in the Manual on Laws of Naval Warfare prepared 
by the Institut de Droit International. The British Manual 
of Military Law (1914), however, stipulated that hostage- 
taking is legitimate in order to ensure proper treatment of 
wounded and sick and members of armed forces captured by 
enemy belligerents. Provision concerning hostage-taking was 
also included in the Instructions for the Government of 
Armies in the Field issued by the United States (1863).2 
Hostage-taking is reported, as shown by diplomatic history, 
to be a method by which States attempted to secure
international law and observance of treaty obligations.3 At 
the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd 
George is reported to have attempted to persuade President
Wilson to agree to the holding of important German
prisoners of war hostage in order to ensure surrender of 
war criminals by Germany to the Allies for trial on
violation of the laws and customs of war in accordance with 
Articles 228 and 220 of the Treaty of Versailles.4
See Garner, International Law and the World War. 1920, 
v.I., p.298 para 195; p.301 para 196 and p.303 para 
197.
See Verzijl, International Law in Historical 
Prospective. v.IX, Ch. Ill, Section 9, p.166.
Roxburgh, 14 AJIL (1920) 35.
Willis, op.cit., p.82.
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Some writers have condemned the practice. In 
particular Professor Garner1 described it as a practice 
"contrary to the most elementary notions of humanity and 
justice", which is also totally in "disregard of the well- 
established distinction between the rights of non- 
combatants and those of lawful belligerents".
The 1919 Commission on the Authors of War reported on 
the "arrest2 and execution of hostages"3, but its list of 
violations of the laws of war specified "putting hostages 
to death" rather than hostage-taking? although there was 
also mention of "internment of civilians under inhuman 
conditions". The Report, including the list, are evidence 
of what constitutes violations of the laws of war. But the 
Commission noted that the list was not an exhaustive 
statement of these violations. The Commission further 
recommended that there should be individual criminal 
responsibility for breaches of the laws of war. These 
practices and recommendations were incorporated in domestic 
law by some countries after the Second World War.4
Hostage-taking did not appear as a war crime under 
conventional law until 1949. The Hague Conventions of (II) 
1879 and (IV) 1907 contained no provision on the taking of 
civilians as hostages. The Nuremberg Charter specified 
"killing" and not "taking" of hostages as a war crime in 
Article 6(b). At the London Conference on Military Trials 
the United Kingdom Delegation submitted imprisonment of 
nationals of occupied countries in concentration camps and 
prisons, as examples of atrocious breaches of the laws and
Op. cit., pp.308-311.
Emphasis Added.
14 AJIL (1920) at pp.113-114.
See, for example, The Australia War Crimes Act 1945 
before its amendment by the 1988 War Crimes Amendment 
Act.
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customs of war.1 But there is no record of a discussion on 
the practice of hostage-taking per se at the Conference.2 
The Indictment3 at Nuremberg cited both "taking" and 
"killing" of hostages as war crimes. It also stated that 
both practices were in breach of Regulations attached to 
the 1899 (II) and 1907 (IV) Hague Conventions. Further, the 
Indictment stated that these practices constituted conduct 
which was contrary to general principles of criminal law as 
derived from the criminal laws of all civilised nations 
including the internal penal laws of the countries in which 
they were committed and Article 6(b) of the Charter. This 
is a clear statement endorsing hostage-taking as a criminal 
offence. But the fact that all references including facts 
and figures appear in the Indictment under the heading 
"killing of hostages" weakens the authority of that 
statement.4 In turn, the Nuremberg Judgment acknowledged 
that "hostages were taken in very large numbers from the 
civilian populations in all the occupied countries, and 
were shot as suited the German purposes."5 This, and further 
references in the Judgment to hostage-taking are all bound 
with the loss of life resulting from that very same policy. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal considered this to be a war crime as 
defined in Article 6(b) of its constituent Charter being 
declaratory of the laws of war. But it is unclear whether 
the Court treated hostage-taking distinct from hostage- 
killing as a war crime and thus a criminal offence in 
international law.
See Draft Indictment of the German Major War 
Criminals, Jackson Report, p.260.
Other than in the Nuremberg Charter, "killing of 
hostages", appeared in a US Draft on Definition of 
War Crimes, Doc. LVI, 31st July, 1945, Jackson Report, 
p.395.
Cmd. 6696, p.22.
See History UNWCC. p.225.
Cmd. 6964, p.45.
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Other sources equally reveal inconsistency on the 
question of hostage-taking as a crime. The International 
Law Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development1 did 
not specify "taking” but only "killing" of hostages as war 
crimes. However, the Legal Committee of the UNWCC 
recommended "indiscriminate mass arrests for the purpose of 
terrorising the population, whether described as hostage- 
taking or not" to be considered as a war crime. The UNWCC 
accepted the recommendation.2 There is also some support in 
the literature for the taking of hostages as a criminal 
offence. Melen3 has written that taking hostages in order to 
maintain order in occupied territory is contrary to 
international law. This view is based on three grounds: 1) 
the practice is at variance with the position under 
customary law. The practice of hostage-taking to keep order 
in occupied territory is said to have disappeared at the 
end of the 18th century. It was resorted to only during the 
First and Second World Wars and it was unilaterally 
introduced by the Germans. 2) It violates certain rules
contained in the Hague Convention (IV) 1907, and, 3) it is 
contrary to general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations. These grounds were fully endorsed by 
Lord Wright.4 Others took a different view. Hammer and 
Salven9, Readers in Politics and Government at Columbia 
University and Barnard College respectively, wrote at the 
time, that "the taking and killing of hostages is not per 
se illegal. Under ordinary wartime circumstances where the
Established by Resolution II at the Conference Between 
Allied Governments and the Department of Criminal 
Science in the University of Cambridge, 1941. See 
proceedings ed. by L. Radzinowcz and J.W. Cecil 
Turner.
History UNWCC. p.172.
24 RDI Sc.Dip.Pol. (1946) 17-25.
WC Law Rep.. vol.VIII, 1949, pp.ix-x. Cf. Lord Wright,
25 BYIL (1948) 298.
38 AJIL (1944) 20.
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occupant has violated no legal duty to the civilian 
population, hostages may legitimately be taken, and if 
necessary, killed, to maintain order”. The writers admitted 
that the practice of hostage-taking as practiced by the 
German forces during World War II assumed illegal 
proportions but it could not be abandoned as a legal 
instrument of war.
Shortly after the Nuremberg Judgment was delivered a 
number of important decisions relevant to the question of 
hostages were delivered by military tribunals under CCL 
No. 10. The leading case is US v List and Others1. The 
accused, high-ranking German officers in command during the 
occupation of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania and Norway, were 
charged, inter alia, with issuing and executing orders to 
have 100 hostages shot for every German soldier killed and 
50 hostages shot for every German solider wounded. The US 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1947-48) distinguished 
between, on the one hand, the taking of hostages by one 
nation to compel another to comply with the laws of war, 
and, on the other hand, the taking of innocent civilians 
in occupied territory hostage as a guarantee against 
attacks and acts of sabotage by unlawful resistance forces. 
The Tribunal addressed itself to the second purpose of 
hostage-taking and held such practice to be lawful in 
international law when certain conditions and preliminary 
measures are taken by the occupying forces. The necessary 
conditions include: (a) hostage-taking should only be a
measure of last resort; (b) it may be carried out as a 
matter of military expediency; and (c) the civilian 
population must be actively or passively involved with the 
acts in view of which hostage-taking is adopted. The 
Tribunal did not define active or passive involvement, but 
required an effective link to be shown between the
WC Law Rep. 1949, vol VIII, p. 34. See also In re
Kesselring, ibid., p.l and In re Holstein and Others 
ibid., p.22.
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population and the activities carried out.1 The judgment 
does not provide any guidance in determining whether or not 
hostage-taking is a war crime. On the contrary it endorses 
the practice given the presence of certain conditions in 
armed conflict.2
In the immediate post-war period the question of 
hostage-taking as a criminal offence in international law 
was discussed by the ILC in the context of two separate, 
though related, draft projects: (i) the 1950 Nuremberg
Principles and (ii) the Draft Code of Offences (1950 - 1954 
and subsequently since 1984).
The ILC debated the candidature of war crimes as one 
of the crimes to be listed in the proposed Nuremberg 
Principles. The question arose whether the definition of 
the concept of war crimes was to take the form of an 
enumerative provision or simply a declaratory one. ILC 
member Francois3 favoured the enumerative approach and this 
was well supported by the other members of the ILC.4 M. 
Francois suggested that the "execution of hostages" should 
be specified as a war crime, but his proposal remained 
unaddressed. The concept of war crimes was defined in the 
Nuremberg Principles as in Article 6(b) of the Nuremberg 
Charter thus excluding altogether any reference to hostage- 
taking.5.
Replying to the ILC's proposal to draft a Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the
Op. cit., pp.78-79.
Lord Wright, WC Law Rep.. vol.VIII, p.viii, criticised 
this decision as not being representative of the law 
on war crimes.
ILC Yrbk.f 1949, p.198 para 78.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1949, v.I: Amado, p.199 para 80; Hsu, 
ibid., para 81? Cordova, ibid., para 82? Brierly, 
ibid., para 83? and Alfaro, ibid., para 86.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1949, v.I, p.199 para 94.
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Government of Pakistan1 declared that "the taking of
hostages (i.e. living pledges for the good behaviour of
third parties) is barbaric and should be included in the
draft code of offences”. This statement was identified by
ILC Member el-Khoury2 who endorsed Pakistan's viewpoint
during the debate on the Formulation of the Nuremberg
Principles. He suggested including hostage-taking as a war
crime. But there was great division on this within the
membership, as can be seen in the voting on the proposal by
Mr. el-Khoury.3
Those who argued in favour of including hostage taking
pointed out that it would be improper for the ILC to
endorse the Nuremberg Charter in excluding the taking of
hostages as a war crime per se; surely the prohibition of
hostage-taking "was one way of preventing hostages from
being killed".4 Other members5 who formed part of this
school of thought felt it incumbent upon the ILC as a body
of draftsmen:
"(who) should accept proposed changes, in order 
to bring harmony into the formulated principles.
The survival of a barbarous practice did not look 
well in the company of principles which declared 
certain acts against peace and crimes against 
humanity to be in the same category as war 
crimes, and made individuals responsible for such 
crimes, irrespective of domestic law, official 
status or superior order".6
Article 34 of Geneva Convention IV of 1949, which
specifically prohibits hostage-taking, was cited in support
of the argument that this is an unlawful and criminal
ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.253.
Ibid., v.I, p.54 para 72.
Five votes were cast in favour, five against and one 
absention. ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.61 para 24.
Cordova, ibid., p.55 para 80.
Ibid., Mr. Hsu, p.60 para 16 and Mr. Yepes, para 16.
See Hsu, ibid., para 16d.
practice.1
A few members adopted a neutral position2. The most 
interesting, and, perhaps accurate, is that taken by the 
eminent jurist Professor Brierly3 who, though endorsed in 
principle the outlawing and criminal nature of hostage- 
taking, was not certain that the practice was considered 
unlawful and a criminal offence in international law at the 
time the Nuremberg Charter was drafted and the Nuremberg 
Judgment delivered. He submitted that on this basis alone, 
it would be improper for the ILC to reflect erroneously the 
current state of international law vis-a-vis the taking of 
hostages. He suggested that the Commission should note, de 
lege ferdTnda. that hostage-taking should be prohibited. 
This indeed is the final position taken by the ILC 
concerning hostage-taking within the framework of the 
Nuremberg Principles. The relevant Nuremberg Principle 
(VI) reproduces the Nuremberg definition of war crimes,
i.e. it excludes hostage-taking.4 The definition was 
accompanied, however, by a footnote stating that during 
discussions the ILC took note and referred to Article 34 
of 1949 Geneva Convention IV.
At the ILC's second session (1950) there was only 
scant reference to hostage-taking as a crime within the 
Draft Code of Offences5. The practice was neither discussed 
at that session nor the subsequent one (1951). The only 
reference to hostage-taking was made by government
See el-Khoury, ibid., p.55 para 81, Hudson, ibid., 
para 86, and Hsu, p.60 para 16a and 16b.
See Sandstrom, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.54 para 76 and 
Mr. Kerno, UN Assistant Secretary - General for Legal 
Affairs, ibid., para 85, who submitted that the term 
"war crimes" was broad enough to include hostage- 
taking.
ILC Yrbk. . 1950, v.I, p.55 paras: 79 & 84 and p.61 
para 18.
ILC Yrbk., 1950, v.II, p.377 para 118-119.
See Mr. Hudson, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.148 para 12a.
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delegates in the UN Sixth Committee responding to the ILC's 
Nuremberg Principles.1 It was reported that the question of 
hostage-taking deserved more consideration than it received 
and some said that it should have been included as a war 
crime. Hostage-taking did not feature in the discussions 
during the ILC's sixth session (1954) in which the Draft 
Code of Offences was adopted. The provision on war crimes 
where hostage-taking, if at all, would have been included, 
read simply: "acts in violation of the laws or customs of 
war" constitute an offence against the peace and security 
of mankind.3
When the ILC re-addressed the question of the Draft 
Code nearly thirty years later, the new Rapporteur, Mr 
Thiam,3 included the offences defined in the Hostages 
Convention among a number of offences to be considered as 
suitable for inclusion in the Draft Code. "The phenomenon 
in question has become so widespread that it is now 
necessary for the taking of hostages to be dealt with in a 
special provision in the draft Code, in cases where it 
contains any international elements".4 Hostage-taking was 
now addressed not simply as a criminal offence separate 
from the concept of war crimes but as a criminal offence 
per se committed in peace time. However, a significant 
number of ILC members, though firm believers in the 
criminal nature of the practice of hostage-taking, were not 
convinced that, in peacetime, at any rate, this practice 
was such as to qualify as an offence against the peace and 
security of mankind.5
See Belgium, ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, p.55 para 115. 
See Draft Article 2, ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.II, p.152. 
See Second Report, ILC Yrbk.r 1984, v.II, pt.I, p.89. 
Ibid., para 54.
ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.I: Ushakov, p.24 para 13; Lacleta 
Munoz, p.26 para 30; Calero Rodriguez, p.32 para 28; 
Quentin Baxter, p.37 para 10; and Yankov, p.50 para 
37.
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Only a few1 expressed opinions in favour of including 
the practice. The position was very similar in the Sixth 
Committee2 when it considered the ILC's Report on its work 
at its thirty-sixth session. Hostage-taking was not 
discussed by the ILC at its subsequent sessions on the 
project of the Draft Code.
The current legal position concerning hostage-taking 
in armed conflict is found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
Common Article 3 prohibits hostage-taking in non­
international armed conflicts. Hostage-taking is also 
prohibited under Geneva Convention IV (Article 34) and this 
applies to all armed conflicts: international and domestic. 
Additional Protocol I of 1977, which extends the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and 
racist regimes, supplements in part Geneva Convention IV 
and reiterates the prohibition of hostage-taking (Article 
75.2.C.). The taking of hostages under Geneva Convention 
IV is considered a "grave breach" and "grave breaches" of 
the Four Geneva Conventions are declared war crimes by 
Additional Protocol II. Hostage-taking is subject to the 
aut dedere aut punire regime applicable under the 1949 
Conventions. The rules regulating war crimes in 
international law now extend to the taking of hostages in 
time of war.
II. In Time of Peace
The practice of hostage-taking committed in peacetime 
increased dramatically over the last three decades.3 There 
were no international legal instruments which addressed 
this emerging problem comprehensively, indeed international
2. See ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.I: Sir Ian Sinclair, p.30 para 
14, Francis, p.37 para 13, and Balanda, p.49 para 28
2. UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.23 para 59.
3. See Nanda, 6 Ohio NULR (1979) 89 at pp.90-91, Shubber, 
52 BYIL (1981) 205 and Kaye, 27 Am. ULR (1977-1978) 
440-442.
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law did not prohibit hostage-taking in time of peace.1 The 
instruments regulating unlawful acts on board aircraft and 
crimes committed against internationally protected persons, 
though serving as models for the fomulation of the Hostages 
Convention2 only address the question of hostage-taking in 
part. The Hostages Convention was adopted to remedy the 
situation.3
(a) The Hostages Convention
The Hostages Convention is perceived as an expression 
of the international community that hostage-taking 
constitutes a "threat to international peace and security 
and that indeed it ought to be treated as a crime under 
international law11.4 There are three principal aspects of 
the convention relevant to the concept of criminal offence 
in international law. These are (a) preambular provisions 
telling of State opinion? (b) jurisdiction and (c) the 
political nature of the offence. Each aspect is considered 
in turn.
See Nanda, op.cit., p.92, and Poland, GAOR, Supp. 
No.39 A/32/39', 1977, p.33 para 19.
The Federal Republic of Germany submitted a working 
paper which served as the basic draft text of a 
convention for the Ad Hoc Committee. See UN Doc. 
A/AC. 188/L.3, Annex II, in A/32/39, 1977. Hereafter 
cited as FRG Draft. See also representative of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, A/32/39, p. 16 para 28; 
Nanda, op.cit., p.108 and Kapoor, op.cit., p.273.
GAOR, Supp. No.39, A/32/39: Federal Republic of
Germany, p. 16 para 28 and p.70 para 9? and, Mexico, 
p.20 para 6; and GAOR, Supp. No.39, A/33/39, 1978,
Canada, p.65 paras 10 & 11.
Kapoor, op. cit., p.256. (Emphasis added).
Endorsement of this position is found in UN 
Resolutions. See: SC Res. 579 (1985), Meeting 2637, 
18th December, 1985 and SC Statement on the Achille 
Lauro incident, Meeting 2618, 9th October, 1985.
/
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(a.i.) The Preamble
General Assembly Resolution 31/103 1 which established 
the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted to draft the Hostages 
Convention recognised that hostage-taking "violates human 
dignity". In discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee, Chile 
declared that tolerating the taking of hostages is 
equivalent to "legitimising a crime which was repugnant to 
the conscience of mankind".2 Canada stated that hostage- 
taking endangered the orderly conduct of international 
relations.
"[It constitutes a flagrant violation of] the 
moral and legal foundations of the United
Nations ....  Hostage-taking should be
punishable under international law since it was 
clear that in many cases criminal laws of 
individual countries were not adequate to deal 
with the perpetrator who seized or killed 
hostages in one country and sought refuge in 
another".3
Some of the terms used to describe hostage-taking are 
reminiscent of similar descriptions of practices already 
considered such as apartheid f torture and crimes committed 
against internationally protected persons. Further, these 
initial remarks by government representatives reveal a need 
felt by States to bring into operation a universally 
applicable regime of rules designed to prohibit hostage- 
taking in time of peace and to punish the perpetrators 
wherever present. This is the casus foederis of the 
Hostages Convention and it is recognised in the Preamble. 
In the fourth preambular paragraph4 the State Parties 
considered that hostage-taking is "an offense of grave 
concern to the international community and that any person
3. Adopted 15th December, 1976.
2. A/32/39, p.18 para 8. Emphasis added.
3. Ibid., pp.21-22 para 11. Emphasis added.
4. See commentory offered by Lambert, Terrorism and
Hostages in International Law - A Commentary on
the Hostages Convention 1979. 1990, p.74.
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committing an act of hostage-taking shall either be 
prosecuted or extradited". In this respect the Preamble 
differs significantly from other preambular provisions in 
conventions already considered. With other treaties the aut 
dedere aut punire principle appears in the operative 
provisions.
fa.ii.1 Jurisdiction
The exercise of jurisdiction in respect of hostage- 
taking under the convention is laid down in Article 5.1 
State Parties are obliged "to take measures as may be 
necessary to establish jurisdiction". They are not actually 
obliged to exercise jurisdiction, but to take steps to 
ensure (and this may involve enacting legislation) that the 
crimes under the convention are justiciable before national 
tribunals on the various bases of jurisdiction listed in 
Article 5. 2 The instances when State Parties would be 
competent to exercise jurisdiction are broad and several. 
They are the following:
i. Jurisdiction may be exercised by the State where 
the crime is committed. Under this head we also find 
that where the locus delicti is on board a vessel or 
aircraft, the State of registration may exercise 
jurisdiction: They are considered as extensions of 
State territory in accordance with international law.
ii. Jurisdiction may be exercised by the State whose 
nationals committed the crime. Under this head States 
Parties may, if they consider it appropriate, extend 
this basis of jurisdiction to stateless persons 
habitually resident in their territory.3
For a detailed analysis of Article 5 see Lambert, 
op.cit., pp.133-165.
See Lambert, op.cit., pp.142-143. Contra. see Shubber, 
op. cit., p.220.
Generally see Shubber, op.cit., p.223 para 4. Article 
IV of the Apartheid Convention also obliges High 
Contracting Parties to enact appropriate legislation 
to prosecute stateless persons who have committed the 
offence of apartheid. A similar base of jurisdiction 
is found in Ordinance of 28th August, 1944, enacted
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iii. Jurisdiction may be exercised by the "target 
State", i.e. when hostage-taking is committed in order 
to compel a State to do or to refrain from doing 
something. This basis of jurisdiction approximates 
mostly the so-called protective principle where 
jurisdiction is exercised by a State whose security or 
public order is threatened or placed in jeopardy. In 
this case there may be no connecting factor between 
the State exercising jurisdiction and the offender or 
the victim other than that the State is the scope for 
which the offence has been committed.
There is no similar provision in the conventions 
discussed in this chapter.
iv. Jurisdiction may be exercised by the State whose 
nationals are the victims of the offence (passive 
personality principle). The passive personality 
principle was adopted in the final session of the Ad 
Hoc Committee.1 The principle features prominently in 
immediate and more recent post 1945 legislation 
concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity.2
v. A State Party may also exercise jurisdiction where 
the hostage-taker is present in its territory. This is 
the principle of universal jurisdiction because the 
link between the State Party exercising jurisdiction 
and the offender is none other than his presence in 
its territory. The principle, as we have seen, is 
found in a number of instruments. In the Hostages 
Convention, as with others, the principle forms part 
and parcel of the aut dedere aut punire principle. It 
will be discussed in that context.
by France to punish war criminals. But the position 
there is the inverse to the provision in the Hostages 
Convention. The Ordinance gives French courts 
jurisdiction for war crimes committed against, and not 
by, stateless persons resident in France.
A/34/39, p.12 para 47.
See, inter alia.: China, Law Governing The Trial of 
War Criminals, 1946? Belgium, Law of 20th June, 1947; 
Norway, Law on the Punishment of Foreign War 
Criminals, 1946? France, Ordinance of 28th August, 
1944? Yugoslavia, Law of 25th August, 1945? 
Netherlands, Extraordinary Penal Law Decree 1943, as 
amended by Law of 10th July, 1947? Canada, Criminal 
Code Amendment Act 1987? and Australia, War Crimes Act 
1945 as amended by the 1988 War Crimes Amendment Act.
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Response to the Principles of Jurisdiction 
Territorial Principle
The territorial principle met with no objections 
during the Ad Hoc Committee's debates on the drafting of 
Article 5. The territorial principle as submitted in the 
FRG Draft remained unchanged, i.e. it includes exercise of 
jurisdiction by the flag State. It was eventually adopted 
as such by the General Assembly.1
Active Personality Principle
Chile2 was not in favour of including the nationality 
(active personality) principle of jurisdiction. It would 
only accept this principle if the offender was actually 
present in the territory of the State whose nationality he 
enjoyed. The Netherlands proposed3 that jurisdiction should 
be exercised by the State whose nationals commit the 
offence in the territory of a Contracting State or on board 
a ship or aircraft registered in a Contracting State. The 
Netherlands envisaged4 that an unqualified assertion in the 
convention in favour of the active personality principle 
"would lead to complications". Other members of the Ad Hoc 
Committee expressed support for the active personality 
principle.
Passive Personality Principle
There was much discussion with regard to the converse 
of the above principle, namely the passive personality 
principle which allows the State whose nationals are the 
victims of the offence to exercise jurisdiction. This 
principle, unlike the above, was not included in the FRG
See, generally, Shubber, op. cit., p.220 and Kaye, op. 
cit., p.477.
See A/32/39: p.86 para. 15, and in A/33/39: p.41 para 
14.
See UN Doc.A/AC.188/L.14, in A/32/39, p.114.
A/32/39, p.89 para 7.
367
Draft. It was inserted by France specifically to remedy the 
jurisdictional gap in same FRG Draft.1
There was division of opinion among States on the 
acceptability of this principle. Some2 did not object to it 
as such. But, in view of a proposal in the draft convention 
that States Parties may exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
with national law, it was felt redundant. Others3 considered 
the nationality of the victim as a subsidiary basis of 
jurisdiction, whereas another view emphasised that the 
passive personality principle would lead to jurisdictional 
problems of immense proportions especially where the 
hostages are of varied nationality.4 The United States and 
the USSR reiterated their opposition to the principle as 
they have done in the debates on the UN Convention on 
Torture. The US5 submitted that not all States have 
embraced this principle and applied it to internationally 
proscribed crimes. The USSR6 found the principle 
"interesting" but endorsed the US position and added that 
the drafters of the convention ought to pay due 
consideration to international law? implying a lack of 
international consensus concerning the acceptability of the 
passive personality principle to crimes defined by 
international instrument.
See UN Doc. A/AC. 188/L. 13 in A/32/39, p.113. Also see 
A/33/39, p.41 para 15 and Sweden, A/33/39, p.43 para 
27.
See Canada, A/33/39, p.44 para 31 and Japan, A/32/39, 
p.85 para 10.
See Algeria, A/33/39, p.44 para 32.
See the Netherlands, A/32/39, p.89 para 7, and in 
A/33/39, p.39 para 6. The position was also endorsed 
by States as diverse as the United Kingdom, A/33/39, 
p.40 para 11 and Iran, ibid., p.43 para 26.
A/33/39, p.43 para 24.
Ibid., p.44 para 29.
368
Comentators1 on the Hostages Convention have stressed 
that this basis of jurisdiction is questionable. As 
evidence they offer the rejection of the passive 
personality principle in a number of authoritative sources 
including, inter alia. Judge Moore's Dissenting Opinion in 
the Lotus Case.2 the Harvard Draft Convention On 
Jurisdiction,3 the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States4, and the writings of publicists5.
It is important to note, however, first, that the t* 
Third Restatement6 recognises that the passive personality 
principle, though not "generally accepted for ordinary 
torts and crimes, it is becoming increasingly accepted as 
applied to terrorist and other organised attacks on a 
State's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to 
assasination of a State's diplomatic representatives or 
other officials". Second. the American Law Institute cites 
Article 5.1.C of the UN Convention on Torture as further 
support in favour of the application of the passive 
personality principle in respect of crimes in international 
law.7 Third. this principle has been included in legislation 
enacted in pursuance of States Parties' obligations under 
the Hostages Convention.®
Shubber, op. cit., pp.223-224, and in Jurisdiction 
Over Crimes Committed On Board Aircraft. 1973, p.80; 
Kaye, op. cit., p.478 and Lambert, op.cit., pp.152- 
154.
PCIJ Ren.. Ser. A . No. 10, p.92.
29 AJIL (Sunp.) (1935) 579.
Article 30(2).. Adopted and promulgated by the American 
Law Institute, 1965, p.86. Hereafter cited as 
Restatement.
See Jennings, 33 BYIL (1957) 146 at 155.
Article 402, 1987, p.240.
See Third Restatement, Reporters' Notes, p. 243 
para.3.
See Clause 1.3(e) of the Canada Criminal Law Amendment
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The Protective Principle
The principle listed third in Article 5 approximates 
the protective principle.1 Where hostages are taken "in 
order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any 
act", same State may exercise jurisdiction. This basis of 
jurisdiction was drafted differently in the FRG Draft. 
There it was stated that jurisdiction is exercised when 
"that State itself or an international organisation of 
which the State is a member is to be compelled to do or 
abstain from doing anything". It is not clear whether this 
draft provision required the presence of a "target State" 
in all circumstances, i.e. even where the offence would be 
directed squarely at the international organisation. Thus, 
hostages would be taken either to compel a particular State 
to do or to abstain from specific conduct: direct
compulsion, or to compel an international organisation, of 
which the "target State" is a member, to perform or refrain 
from performing a particular act: indirect compulsion.
Several States advocated the deletion of any 
jurisdictional competence on the basis of international 
organisations being the subject of unlawful demands.2 
Mexico endorsed this position because it felt that the 
universal principle of jurisdiction would otherwise become 
operative.3 The authors of the FRG Draft could not
Act, 1985.
It has also been suggested by Lambert, op.cit., 
pp.151-152, that the "effects doctrine of territorial 
jurisdiction" is similar to the jurisdictional base 
contemplated in Article 5(1)(c).
See Netherlands proposal, UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.14 in 
A/32/39. See also Japan, A/32/39, p.85 para 9 and at 
A/33/39, p.43 para 25; Iran, ibid., p.43 para 26 and 
Nigeria, ibid., p.45 para 33.
A/32/39, p.78 para 26. See also the United Kingdom, 
which was prepared to compromise only if it were 
stipulated that jurisdiction is exercisable by the 
State in whose territory the international
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appreciate the concern expressed.1 Canada2 supported their 
position, and this for the same reasons given by Mexico and 
the United Kingdom which favoured deletion. It felt that 
as many States as possible should be able to establish 
jurisdiction, particularly those which were not directly 
affected if no other State wished to exercise jurisdiction. 
The United States3 considered the draft provision as 
contributing to the development of international law and 
stressed the need to ensure that international civil 
servants should be free from the risk of being taken 
hostage. It was prepared, however, to review its position 
if this basis of jurisdiction caused serious difficulties.4 
The Ad Hoc Committee adopted the Netherlands proposal and 
deleted all references to "international organisations”.5
Universal Jurisdiction and the ”Aut Dedere Aut Punire” 
Principle
Article 5.2 of the Hostages Convention obliges States 
Parties to take jurisdiction where the offender is present 
in their territory and is not extradited to the States in 
Article 5.1, i.e. to the locus delicti. or the national 
State of the offender/victim, or the "target State". Thus 
Article 5.2 contemplates the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction because there is no link between the offender 
and the forum state other than his presence in its 
territory. One writer6 has described the presence of this
organisation has its Head-Quarters, A/32/39, p.88 para
5 and at A/33/39, p.40 para 9.
A/32/39, p.93 para 7.
A/33/39, p.44 para 30. See also Yugoslavia, ibid., 
p.45 para 34.
A/32/39, p.84 para 8.
A/33/39, p.42 para 23.
A/34/39, p.12 para 48.
Nanda, op.cit., p.104.
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principle in the Convention as a "desirable basis to combat 
hostage-taking". This is an accurate as possible an account 
of initial State response to the presence of the 
universality prinipcle in the proposed convention.1
The aut dedere aut punire principle becomes operative 
as a result of Article 82 of the Hostages Convention which 
does not oblige the State Party on whose territory the 
offender is found to extradite him, but to submit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purposes of 
prosecution if indeed it does not proceed with extradition. 
The relevant State authorities are obliged to take action 
as they would in the case of an ordinary offence of a grave 
nature under domestic law. This clause corresponds with 
similar provisions in the Hague (Article VII) and Montreal 
(Article 7) Conventions and that in the UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Persons (Article 7).
The obligation for States Parties under Article 8 is 
to submit the case to their competent authorities "without 
exception whatsoever" and "whether or not the offence was 
committed on their territory". These qualifying words 
reflect clearly the regard in which the offence of hostage- 
taking is held by the drafters of the convention, i.e. as 
extremely serious crimes of particular concern to the 
international community.
As already indicated in the consideration of other 
crimes in this chapter, the phrase "without exception 
whatsoever" (which also appears in Article 7 of the UN 
Convention on Internationally Protected Persons) 
constitutes, albeit indirectly, a challenge to attempts at
See Chile, A/32/39, p.18 para 7? Phillippines, ibid., 
p.25 para 1; Poland, A/33/39, p.42 para 19. Mexico 
(A/32/39, p.78 para 26) felt that the application of 
the universality principle to acts of hostage-taking 
was acceptable in time of war but excessive in peace 
time. Subsequently it expressed unqualified support 
for universal jurisdiction (Ibid., p.90 para 11).
See Lambert's commentary on Article 8, op.cit., 
pp.187-208.
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rendering hostage-taking an excusable crime, for example, 
by declaring it a political offence. The phrase "whether 
or not the offence is committed in its territory" (not 
included in Article 7 of the UN Convention on 
Internationally Protected Pertsons) endorses the principle 
that, within a specific regime of international 
conventional rules, States are obliged to exercise 
jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes.
France1 and the Netherlands2 proposed amendments to 
limit the obligation to prosecute only if an extradition 
request from another State Party had been submitted and 
refused. In the Ad Hoc Committee and in the Sixth 
Committee the Netherlands opined that the State Party which 
has presence of the. offender should be obliged to prosecute 
only when:
"a much more directly involved State does not ask 
for extradition. In other words, if the State 
primarily concerned with the case does not deem 
it necessary or opportune to request the 
extradition of the offender in order to prosecute 
him, we see no reason why the State where the 
offender happens to be found, should be obliged 
to prosecute him".3
The Netherlands answered the objection that the 
prosecute/extradite obligation in the "hijacking" 
conventions and in that on crimes committed against 
internationally protected persons was not qualified in the 
manner proposed, simply by answering, without offering any 
explanation, that those conventions were different to this 
on hostages.4
The French/Netherlands proposals found little support 
and were eventually withdrawn.5 The "no safe-haven"
*. UN Doc. A/AC.188/L.13 in A/32/39, Annex II, Item K.
2. UN Doc. A/AC. 188/L.14, ibid. Annex II, Item L.
3. See NYIL (1979) p.384, (emphasis added), and ibid., 
(1981) p.239, and in, A/33/39, p.47 para 46.
4. A/32/39, p.89 para 8.
5. A/34/39, pp.15-16.
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principle could not be compromised. The following
statement by Canada in support of the prosecute/extradite
provision is typical of the general position:
"the fundamental legal principle underlying the 
three Conventions (i.e. Hague, Montreal and New 
York i.e., that on crimes against internationally 
protected persons) was, in essence, "prosecute or 
extradite”, and that principle should provide the 
basis for the work of the Committee particularly 
in view of the fact that those Conventions had 
been widely accepted by States with differing 
political orientations, in all regions of the 
world.1,1
Priority of Jurisdiction
A number of States Parties may be entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction under the convention in a given set of 
circumstances for instance, nationals of State A take 
hostage nationals of States B and C in State D. The 
offenders are subsequently apprehended in State E. 
Further, the offence was committed in order to induce State 
F to release a number of prisoners considered to be 
"political offenders" by the hostage-takers. States A - F 
inclusive, all parties to the Hostages Convention, may 
exercise jurisdiction as provided under Article 5. The 
question immediately arises where will the offenders be 
tried. The convention, like its parent treaties, does not 
settle this matter of priority over jurisdiction. But 
there is some evidence in the travaux preparatoires which 
suggests that the drafters considered the various 
principles listed in Article 5 as representing some 
hierarchical order.
The Netherlands2 referred to "primary compulsory 
jurisdiction" to be taken by States Parties in the
A/32/39, p.22 para 12. See also Japan, ibid., p.28 
para 10 and at A/33/39, p.51 para 18; Sweden, A/32/39, 
p.23 para 16; Lesotho, ibid., p.35 para 24; Syria, 
ibid., p.36 para 31; the U.S., ibid., p.89 para 10; 
United Kingdom, A/33/39, p.47 para 50; and the USSR, 
ibid., p.47 para 49.
A/33/39, p.39 para 6.
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following order: (i) by the territorial State; (ii) by the 
national State of the hostage-taker? and (iii) by the 
"Target-State". The Netherlands opposed jurisdiction to be 
taken on the basis of the passive personality and 
universality principles. The Netherlands reiterated its 
position declared during the adoption of the UN Convention 
on Internationally Protected Persons, namely that States 
Parties with primary jurisdiction "bear the heaviest burden 
of the Convention. [They] have at least a moral duty to 
request extradition when the alleged offender is found in 
a state which under normal jurisdictional rules, would have 
no involvement with the crime at all."1
Chile submitted a scheme very similar to that of the 
Netherlands but differed significantly in that its proposal 
introduced the universality principle for the Netherlands' 
active personality principle.2 Other States too
distinguished between primary and subsidiary jurisdiction 
but each of them have placed different heads of 
jurisdiction falling within each of these categories.3 The 
Federal Republic of Germany, authors of the original draft, 
accepted a distinction between primary jurisdiction under 
Article 5.1 and subsidiary jurisdiction under Article 5.2, 
but they wanted to increase rather than decrease the number 
of States Parties having primary jurisdiction.4
These various State positions address the problem of 
jurisdictional conflicts but do not resolve it. There is 
little consistency among the responses. It emerges clearly, 
however, that universal jurisdiction, as a means of 
punishing hostage-taking in time of peace, is considered a 
necessary though subsidiary basis of jurisdiction. Other
See NYIL (1981) 239.
A/33/39, p.41 para 14.
See, the United States, A/33/39, p.43 para 23? 
Algeria, ibid., p.44 para 32 and Nigeria, ibid., p.45 
para 33.
A/33/39, p.42 para 20.
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bases (particularly the territorial principle) are largely 
considered as primary jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction 
is considered as a "safety-net”, a means of last resort, a 
buffer between international justice and lawlessness. The 
legislative practice of States Parties to the Hostages 
Convention reveals that they are prepared to have the 
jurisdictional bases as listed in Article 5 incorporated 
into national law.1
fa.iii.) The Political Nature of the Offence
Unlike the position obtaining in the Genocide (Article
VII) and in the Apartheid (Article 11) Conventions, the
Hostages Convention does not stipulate that the crime of
hostage-taking should not be considered a political offence
for the purposes of extradition. The FRG Draft too was
silent in this respect. But Mexico2 had submitted the
following proposal:
"None of the provisions of this Convention shall 
be interpreted as impairing the right of asylum".
The principle behind this proposal is found in Article 15
of the Hostages Convention:
"The provisions of this Convention shall not 
affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, 
in force at the date of the adoption of this 
Convention, as between the States which are 
parties to those Treaties? but a State Party to 
this Convention may not invoke those Treaties 
with respect to another State Party to this 
Convention which is not a party to those 
treaties."
The question immediately arises whether the position 
under the Hostages Convention has provided an escape clause 
for hostage-takers. What is the position where a person
See Canada, Criminal Law Ammendment Act, 1985 (Clause 
1.3) and see Title 18 USC Para 1203; the U.K. Taking 
of Hostages Act 1982? the New Zealand Crimes 
(Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Act 
1980? and Japan Law No. 52 of 1987. On the Japanese 
legislation see Itoh, 32 JAIL (1989) 18.
A/AC.188/L.6 in A/32/39, p.Ill para 2.
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takes hostages for political purposes and subsequently 
escapes to another country where he presents himself to the 
local authorities and requests asylum? In the Ad Hoc 
Committee debates the US1 declared that hostage-taking, like 
attacks on internationally protected persons and diplomats, 
was inadmissable in all cases regardless of the 
circumstances. This statement was addressed at comments 
made principally by African and Non-Western European States 
to the effect that the convention must not prejudice the 
principle of self-determination.2
The US3 added that it was unnecessary to include 
provisions on asylum in the convention because asylum may 
always be granted without prejudicing the obligation under 
the convention to prosecute the hostage-taker if he is not 
extradited to a State on account that he may be prosecuted 
for his political views. He may indeed be extradited to a 
third State, such as the national State of the victim by 
virtue of Article 5 of the convention. This understanding 
endorsed the Mexican4 position, namely that the obligation 
to prosecute is paramount notwithstanding that "the crime 
of taking hostages could have political implications, could 
have a political intent, or be related to other political 
activities.1,5
While some States6 expressed concern at the prospect 
that the Hostages Convention would remain silent on asylum,
A/32/39, p.55 para 26.
Nigeria (A/32/39, p.59 para 45) objected to the US 
principle that certain acts were unjustifiable 
regardless of their motives.
A/32/39, p.91 paras 22 & 23.
Ibid., para 20.
See also Japan, A/33/39, p.51 para 18.
Venezuela, A/32/39, p.55 para 24 and Chile, ibid., 
p.91 para 19.
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others1 insisted that it ought to exclude same provisions on 
asylum. Article 10 of the convention renders extraditable 
the offences of hostage-taking between States Parties, i.e. 
hostage taking is to be included in existing, as well as in 
future, extradition agreements. For those States Parties 
where extradition is dependent on the existence of an 
extradition treaty, the Hostages Convention shall serve as 
a legal basis for extradition. State Parties which do not 
require extradition to be conditional on an extradition 
treaty are obliged to recognise the offence as 
extraditable. Further, the offence of hostage-taking is, 
for the purpose of extradition, considered as if it has 
also been committed in the territories of the States 
required to establish jurisdiction under Article 5.
This provision, in addition to the statements made by 
members of the Ad Hoc Committee, the presence of the aut 
dedere aut punire principle and the broad jurisdictional 
bases included in the convention all constitute evidence 
which indicates that if the political offence exception 
rule were to be invoked in extradition proceedings 
concering the crime of hostage-taking under the convention, 
it is unlikely to be successful.
D. International Terrorism
The evidence available on terrorism as a criminal 
offence in international law is substantial but its value 
is greatly conditioned by the principal difficulty, so far 
unresolved, namely the absence of an acceptable legal 
definition of terrorism as a criminal offence. A discussion 
of the multifaceted problems inherent in a definition of 
terrorism as a criminal offence in international law is 
beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the 
concept of terrorism shares a history similar to that of
Nicaragua, ibid., p. 56 para 30.
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aggression as defined by the UN.1
The failure to find a satisfactory solution to the 
definitional issues largely explains the absence of an 
international, non-regional, instrument on the subject. But 
this does not mean that efforts at drafting such an 
instrument have not been undertaken.
An early treaty is the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism concluded in 1937 by the League 
of Nations2. Its drafters were motivated by the 
assassination of King Alexander I of Yuogslavia in France 
on October 9th, 1934. Terrorism is defined in Article 1.2 
as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or 
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of 
particular persons, or a group of persons or the general 
public". In particular, High Contracting Parties are 
obliged (Article 2), inter alia, to render as criminal 
offences, any wilful acts causing death or grievous bodily 
harm or loss of liberty to Heads of States, their 
hereditary or designated successors, their wives or 
husbands, persons charged with public functions or holding 
public positions when the act is directed against them in 
their public capacity.
Though the League of Nations Convention has never 
entered into force and was ratified by only one State, 
India, it is relevant vis-a-vis the development of legal
See 1973 Report of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 
Terrorism (established by GA Res. 3034 (XXVII), 18th 
December, 1972), UN Doc. A/9028 and the Report for 
1979, GAOR, Supp.No.37 A/34/37. The ILA considered the 
topic of international terrorism at the following 
Conferences: New Delhi, ILA (1974): Madrid, ILA
119761; Belgrade, ILA (1980): Montreal, ILA (1982 
Paris, ILA (1984); Seoul, ILA (1986) and Warsaw ILA 
(1988). See, in particular, the Reports of the debates 
at the Belgrade (ILA (1980) pp. 505-519) and Montreal 
(ILA (1982) pp. 366-375) Conferences.
LN Doc. C549 M.385. 1937.V., reproduced in Ferencz, 
ICCt, v.I, p.380. Hereafter referrred to as League of 
Nations Convention.
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measures applicable to internationally proscribed crimes in 
the following respects:
(i) The drafters made a statement of principle whereby 
they reaffirmed:
"the principle of international law in 
virtue of which it is the duty of every 
State to refrain from any act designed to 
encourage terrorist activities directed 
against another State and to prevent the 
acts in which such activities take shape, 
undertake as hereinafter provided to prevent 
and punish activities of this nature and to 
collaborate for this purpose".1
A similar statement is found in draft preambular 
paragraph 2 of a Draft Convention For The Prevention 
and Punishment of Certain Acts of International 
Terrorism submitted by the United States to the UN Ad 
Hoc Committee on Terrorism.2
(ii) Article 8 of the League of Nations Convention deems 
extraditable acts of terrorism defined therein. 
Article 8 also provides that where extradition is 
conditional on an extradition treaty, High Contracting 
Parties may rely on its provisions for the extradition 
of the crimes proscribed. Article 8 has proved to be 
a model for the drafting of similar provisions on 
extradition in other treaties that have been examined 
in Part III of this thesis.
(iii)Article 9 obliges High Contracting Parties to 
prosecute nationals where extradition of nationals is 
prohibited and when presence of the perpetrators has 
been secured by the national State of the offender. 
This provision constitutes a partial application of 
the aut dedere aut punire principle which is found in 
more recent instruments, but which is not limited in 
its application ratione personae.
(iv) Finally, Article 10 provides for a qualified 
application of the universal principle of criminal 
jurisdiction. High Contracting Parties shall prosecute 
and punish foreigners present in their territory who 
have committed said terrorist acts outside the lex 
fori as if the offences had been committed within the 
lex fori as long as:
See Article 1.
See UN Doc. A/C.6/L.850, 25th September, 19^ 72, 
hereafter cited US Draft Convention.
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(a) extradition has been demanded and . refused for 
reasons not connected with the offence?
(b) the courts of the High Contracting Party have 
jurisdiction in respect of offences committed 
abroad; and
(c) the national State of the offender recognises 
jurisdiction exercised in respect of offences 
committed abroad.
The three principal measures identified above, namely: 
(i) a quasi-application of the universal principle of 
jurisdiction? (ii) perpetrators are either to be extradited 
or prosecuted? and (iii) the statement that a particular 
act is an extraditable crime, are also to be found in the 
US Draft Convention1, in the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism2, and in a Draft Outline of Single 
Convention on Legal Control of International Terrorism3 
prepared by the ILA at its Fifty-Seventh Conference in 
Madrid, including a Statement of Rules of International Law 
Applicable to International Terrorism4 adopted by Resolution 
No. 7 of 1984 at the ILA's Sixty-First Conference in Paris. 
At its Sixty-Second Conference (1986) in Seoul the ILA 
focus on terrorism concentrated specifically on matters
See Draft Articles 3, 4.2, and 7.
This does not define terrorism, it merely lists a 
number of practices which are not to be considered as 
political offences (Article 1). See also Article 7. 
ETS No 90, 1977.
See Article 11.(2) & (3) and Article III, ILA f!976^. 
p.143 et seq. See also Professors Radoynov (ibid., 
pp.122-123)? Dimitrijevic (ibid., p.125)? Greenburgh 
(ibid., p.132)? and Shearer (ibid., p.136) who 
expressed views in support of the general outlook that 
terrorists like pirates are hostis humani generis and 
that the most suitable method of reaching them is 
through the application of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle. Similar views had been expressed at the 
Fifty-Sixth Conference, ILA (1974^. which first 
addressed the topic of International Terrorism, see 
comments by Professors Lakshmikanth Rao Penna (ILA 
(19741. p.160)? Jethmalani (ibid., p.162)? Dinstein 
(ibid., pp.163-164)? Lipper (ibid., p.169)? and Cabral 
(ibid., p.172).
4 See Articles 4,5,6 and 7, ILA (1984^ . pp.6-7.
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concerning extradition.1 A set of draft articles submitted 
at the Seoul Conference excluded certain defences such as 
that of the political offence and that of "superior 
orders".2 At the same conference, Committee Member 
Professor Hatano (Japan) identified the aut dedere aut 
punire principle as a basic obligation to be incorporated 
in the proposed draft articles on extradition in the same 
fashion as the principle applies in international treaty 
practice concerning the proscription of acts as criminal 
offences.3 This proposal, along with a number of other 
measures including, a range of jurisdictional principles 
accompanied by a priority system for resolving conflicts of 
jurisdiction and the non-applicability of the defence of 
statutes of limitation, now appear in the ILA's updated 
Draft Articles on Extradition in Relation to Terrorist 
Offences.4
These legal measures and others such as provision for 
direct individual criminal responsibility are not only 
included in drafts prepared by the ILAS, but also by the 
ILC. In the ILC's 1954 Draft Code "terrorist acts" formed 
part of the definition of the concept of aggression. 
Aggression was defined, inter alia, as "the undertaking or
See, Legal Problems of Extradition in Relation to 
Terrorist Offences, ILA (1986^. p.559.
Ibid., Draft Article II, A, (Clarifications), p.562.
See I LA (1986 ^ . pp.566-567. Further see GA
Resolutions urging States to apply the aut dedere aut 
punire principle to terrorism: Res. 34/145, op. para
11, 17th December, 1979; 38/130, op.para 6, 19th
December, 1983; 40/61, op.para 8, 9th December, 1985; 
42/159 op. para 5(b), 7th December, 1987; and 42/29 
op. para 4(b), 4th December, 1989.
See ILA (1988). pp.1034 et seq.
See Resolution No. 7 of 1984, I LA f!984^ . p. 7. The I LA 
Explanatory Report (ibid., pp. 315-316), stated that 
application of these principles to terrorism had been 
motivated by their application to crimes in 
international law as formulated in the Nuremberg 
Principles by the ILC.
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encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist 
activities in another State”.1 In its subsequent efforts on 
the preparation of a Draft Code, the ILC initially followed 
the 1954 model, i.e. reference to terrorism was included as 
part and parcel of the concept of aggression.2 Terrorism 
was not, therefore, allocated a separate provision as a 
distinct crime. But, unlike the 1954 version of the Code, 
terrorism was defined in terms provided by the definition 
of the 1937 League of Nations Convention.3 That definition 
has been retained by the ILC. During its forty-third 
session (1991) the Drafting Committee has adopted a
See Draft Article 2(6) ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.II, p.151. 
See also ibid., 1985, v.II, pt. II, p.17 para 91.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.II, pt.I, pp.77-80 paras 124- 
154.
The ILC updated that definition of terrorism in so far 
as it included reference to unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and hostage-taking. See draft article 4 
(Second Alternative) Para.D.b.iii & iv, ILC Yrbk.. 
1985, v.II, pt.I, p.83. See also draft article 11(4), 
ibid., 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.84. Subsequently, reference 
to terrorism within the Draft Code appeared in the 
Rapporteur's Sixth Report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/411, 19th 
February, 1988, p.16) as draft article 11(3), Second 
Alternative, i.e. as part and parcel of the crime of 
intervention. At its fortieth session (1988) the ILC 
provisionally adopted a draft article on aggression 
but omitted all reference to acts of terrorism. The 
ILC referred the matter of intervention as a crime 
commited by States, which included reference to acts 
of terrorism, for consideration by the Drafting 
Committee. See ILC Yrbk.. 1988, v.II, pt.II, p.65
para 278. The matter was considered again at the 
forty-first session (1989) which resulted in the 
provisional adoption of a draft article 14 on 
"Intervention”, see GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/44/10) p.182. 
Summary Records of ILC debates for the forty-first 
session (1989) sessions have not been published at 
time of writing. But, at the ILC's following session 
a seperate provision on international terrorism 
reappeared. See draft article 16, GAOR, Supp. No.10 
(A/45/10) pp.62-64. Summary Records of the ILC for its 
forty-second session (1990) are unpublished at time of 
writing. Also generally, see McCaffrey, 84 AJIL (1990) 
930.
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separate draft article 24 on International Terrorism.1
A substantial part of the ILC membership has favoured 
the inclusion of terrorism in the Draft Code, but almost 
every single member who spoke in favour differed as to how 
terrorism ought to be defined; and this division persists.2
The value of the source material provided by the ILA 
and the ILC on the status of terrorism as a crime under 
international law is evidential but far from conclusive.
The question of defining terrorism as a crime is not 
the only issue over which a continuing debate is recorded. 
An issue of broader concern is whether the best approach to 
apply legal controls over this concept is piecemeal rather 
than general. Treaty practice, UN General Assembly 
Resolutions inviting States to become parties to treaties 
which deal with aspects of international terrorism,3 and
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 1991, p.7.
See the comments of the following members at the ILC's 
thirty-seventh session, ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.Is
Jacovides, p.14 para 16; Calero Rodrigues, p.17 para 
39; Sir Ian Sinclair, p.24 para 23; Mahiou, p.31 para 
16; Balanda, p.34 para 33; Ogiso, p.44 para 26; 
Razafindralambo, p.47 para 43; Njenga, p.49 para 13; 
McCaffrey, p.55 para 53; Yankov, p.58 para 15; Diaz 
Gonzalez, p.59 para 28; Ushakov, p.62 para 49; Huang, 
p.64 para 16; Arrangio-Ruiz, p.66 para 38; Roukounas, 
p.69 para 56; Tomuschat, p.70 para 15; Lacleta Munoz, 
p. 74 para 29; and Jagota, p. 77 para 56. At the 
following ILC Session few were the members who 
expressed their views on terrorism. See, ILC Yrbk.. 
1986, v.I: Lacleta-Munoz, p. 144 para 10; Ushakov,
p.145 paras 24-25 and contra, see Sucharitkul, p.159 
para 22. See ILC debates at Meetings 2053-2061, ILC 
Yrbk.. v.I, 1988.
Division of opinion on the definition of terrorism and 
of its perception as a crime committed only by persons 
acting on behalf of the State is also present in the 
Sixth Committee. See UN Doc. A/CN. 4./L. 410, 1987,
pp.122-123 and Doc. A/CN.4/L.456, 1991, pp.18-19.
See: GA Resolutions: 3034 (XXVII) op.para 5; 41/102; 
32/147; 34/145, op.para 8; 38/1309 op.para 5; and
42/159 op.para 9; and 44/29 op.para 5.
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State comment1 is source material which endorses the view 
that the piecemeal approach is preferred.2 The piecemeal 
approach avoids the pitfalls of generality and this is 
especially appropriate given that the concept has strong 
political overtones. There is hardly any evidence, other 
than drafts de leae fer^nda and an unratified treaty 
adopted more than five decades ago, that an international 
treaty defining international terrorism as a crime is the 
best response to this phenomenon in international law.
A recent effort in this piecemeal direction has been the 
adoption by the IMO of a Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
and, a Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf3.
42/159 op.para 9; and 44/29 op.para 5.
In observations and comments submitted by States in 
response to a request of the UN Secretary-General, who 
was directed by GA Res. 34/145, 1979, to compile a 
report on national legislation concerning terrorism, 
the following States reported that their legislation 
on terrorism was the result of their international 
obligations contracted in virtue of their ratification 
of international treaties such as that on hostage- 
taking, unlawful seizure of aircraft, crimes committed 
against internationally protected persons including 
diplomats and unlawful acts against the safety of 
civil aviation. See, UN Doc. A/36/425, 1981: Denmark 
(pp.8 and 25); German Democratic Republic (pp.8 and 
26); Greece (p.9); Qatar (p.9); Sweden (pp.20 and 32- 
37); Ukrainain SSR (pp.20-21 and pp.39-40); USSR 
(pp.21-22 and pp.40-43); and USA (pp.22-23 and pp.43- 
48). See also Recommendation by the UK (UN 
Doc.A/AC.160/WG/R.2) in GAOR, A/34/37, p.26 para 93, 
recommending that States not yet parties to those 
treaties which deal with aspects of international 
terrorism ought to ratify them; and endorsing regional 
efforts undertaken by the OAS and Council of Europe on 
terrorism.
For an innovative approach to the problem of applying 
legal controls to terrorism, see a recent contribution 
by Cassese, 38 ICLO (1989) 589.
See IMO Docs. SUA/CON/15, 1988 and SUA/CON/16/Rev. 1, 
1988. Texts reproduced in 27 ILM (1988) at pp.672 &
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These instruments were drafted in part as a response 
to the outcries generated by incidents such as that of the 
Achille Lauro in 1985 and thus, principally, to protect 
order in international navigation through the application 
of criminal law rules.
The IMO Convention is tailored on instruments 
discussed in this and the preceding chapter. Accordingly, 
it includes provision for various bases of jurisdiction 
including the universality principle, the aut dedere aut 
punire principle and the declaration of the offences as 
extradictable crimes, which now seem to be sine qua non 
provisions in treaties of this nature. They apply mutatis 
mutandis to the IMO Protocol by virtue of Articles 1(1) and 
3 thereof. These juridical characteristics are not only 
fashioned but drafted along parallel provisions in the 
"parent" treaties of the IMO Convention. They differ, 
however, in the following ways7?Jurisdiction. Article 6 
(1) and (2) of the IMO Convention divides the various bases 
of jurisdiction into two categories: "obligatory" and
"discretionary".1 The former bases comprise the territorial 
and active personality principles while the latter comprise 
the passive personality and the protective principles. The 
State in whose territory a stateless person is habitually 
resident, may also take jurisdiction and this is included 
in the "discretionary" group of jurisdictional bases. The 
universality principle is also provided for but does not 
form part of either the "obligatory" or "discretionary" 
group of jurisdictional bases.
The question of a hierarchical system among the 
various bases is another factor which presents itself in 
this context, as it has with the conventions already
685 respectively. Hereafter referred to as IMO
Convention and IMO Protocol respectively. Generally 
see Plant, 39 I CLP (1990) 27, Halberstam, 82 AJIL
(1988) 269 at 291, and Joyner and Francioni both at 31 
GYIL (1988) at 230 and 263 respectively.
See Plant, op.cit., p.44, Joyner and Francioni,
op.cit., pp.251 and 276 respectively.
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discussed. The text of the IMO Convention does not, prima 
facie, suggest such a system to be operative, the travaux 
preoaratoires are not helpful1 and there is already a 
division of opinion in doctrine on this point. Some 
consider the "obligatory and discretionary" bases as 
primary bases of jurisdiction and the universality 
principle as a secondary base of jurisdiction.2 Others 
consider the obligatory bases as an obvious representation 
of priority over the "discretionary" bases, and they even 
go as far as to assert that the flag state has preference 
should a conflict arise within the "obligatory" group of 
jurisdictional bases.3
The universality principle appears, as is now practice 
in international conventions of this nature, as part and 
parcel of the application of the aut dedere aut punire 
principle defined in Article 10 of the convention. Article 
10 is drafted in a manner which combines elements from 
parallel provisions in the Hague and Montreal Conventions 
and the UN Convention on Internationally Protected Persons. 
Accordingly, where an offender is not extradited, the 
obligation to prosecute under the IMO Convention is without 
exception whatsoever, whether or not the offence is 
committed in the lex fori. and the submission by the State 
Party of the case to its competent authorities for 
prosecution shall be without undue delay.
Plant, op.cit., pp. 30 n.13, member of the UK
delegation at the IMO Diplomatic Conference, reports 
that "in view of the limited available financial 
resources, no summary records were kept, although a 
record of the decisions of the conference was kept."
Plant, op.cit., pp.45-47. However, his review of the 
various bases of jurisdiction contains no indication 
that the drafters considered Article 6 (the 
jurisdictional clause) of the conventipn to provide a 
system of priority among the jurisdictional bases. 
See Halberstam, op.cit., p.302.
Francioni, op.cit., pp.277-278.
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The either extradite or prosecute principle, as with 
identical provisions in other treaties, is hailed by 
commentators as the "key provision" of the IMO Convention.1 
Extradition. By virtue of Article 11 the crimes defined in 
the IMO Convention and in the Protocol are considered 
extraditable. As is the case with the crimes defined by 
treaties considered in this chapter there is no reference 
in the convention to the non-applicability of the political 
offence exception rule. It is reported, however, that 
Kuwait had submitted proposals to have the matter expressly 
included in the Convention.2. The omission by the drafters 
to include such a provision in the treaty has been severely 
criticised by writers and considered a dangerous lacuna in 
the attempt to proscribe practices as criminal offences 
under international law.3
The evidence presented in this section on 
international terrorism suggests: (i) that there is general 
agreement that international terrorism deserves to be 
considered as a criminal offence by the international 
community? and (ii) that any effort at producing a 
universal instrument designed to apply the force of 
criminal law to the concept is invariably thwarted by 
problems of definition. However, a common feature of the 
multifaceted efforts that have attempted to regulate the 
concept of international terrorism, include, in part or in 
whole, several rules and principles of international law, 
applicable vis-a-vis established criminal practices which 
have been identified and discussed in Part III of this 
study.
Plant, op.cit. p.49 and Halberstam p.292.
See Plant, ibid., p.50 and at p.33 ff.23.
See Joyner and Francioni, op.cit., pp.258-260 and
pp.283-284 respectively.
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CHAPTER 8 
Other Practices
The practices examined in this Chapter are practices 
in respect of which efforts have been made or are being 
made to declare them criminal offences under international 
law. Currently, their status as such remains de leae 
fersfnda but, nonetheless, they merit examination.
A. Unlawful Dissemination of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances
The source material relevant to the status of unlawful 
distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances1 
(popularly known as "drug trafficking”) as a criminal 
offence under international law is quite convincing, and of 
the practices discussed in this chapter, "drug trafficking" 
is the most likely to join the ranks of other delicti jure 
gentium.
There is a substantial number of treaties, spanning 
the greater part of this century, which prohibit2 and 
provide for the punishment3 of "drug trafficking". Some 
instruments concluded under the auspices of the League of 
Nations such as the 1925 International Opium Convention 
(Articles 28 and 29) and the 1936 Geneva Convention for the 
Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs include 
provisions which allow States Parties to ensure that their 
laws allow for the exercise of jurisdiction on the bases of
This term is used here to include both chemically and 
agriculturally produced substances.
See Agreement Concerning The Suppression of the 
Manufacture of, Internal Trade In And Use of, Prepared 
Opium, 1925. 51 LNTS 337.
See International Opium Convention, 1925, 81 LNTS 317. 
Article 28 stipulates that Contracting Parties agree 
to make punishable breaches of domestic laws and 
regulations which enforce the provisions of the 
convention. Similarly, see Articles 2 and 5 of the 
1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit 
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. 198 LNTS 300.
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the territorial and of the active personality (in respect 
of offences committed in the territory third States) 
principles. The active personality principle is also found 
in Article 3 of the 1936 Geneva Convention. Article 7 of 
same convention provides an embryonic form of the either 
"extradite or prosecute" formula present in more recent 
treaties concerned with the criminal proscription of 
unlawful acts. Article 7 provides that where the laws of 
a "country" (not necessarily being a Contracting Party), 
which do not allow nationals to be extradited, the alleged 
offender shall be prosecuted in his national State as if 
the offence, though committed "abroad" (not necessarily in 
the territory of another Contracting Party) had been 
committed in its own territory. Furthermore, Article 8 
provides that crimes committed abroad (i.e. not necessarily 
in the territory of a High Contracting Party) by foreigners 
present in the territory of a High Contracting Party, may 
be tried in that State which has secured their presence as 
long as two conditions are satisfied: (a) extradition for
the foreign offender has been requested and denied on 
grounds independent of the offence per se: and (b) the law 
of the requested State permits jurisdiction to be taken for 
offences committed abroad by foreigners. Finally, Article 
9 provides that the offence of illicit traffic in drugs 
shall be deemed an extraditable crime and is to be included 
in extradition treaties between the High Contracting 
Parties.
In these various provisions we find rules allowing for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction applicable to acts deemed 
punishable by international agreement. We also find traces 
of the aut dedere aut punire approach to combatting illegal 
practices of international concern.
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs1, amended 
by Protocol in 1975 2, has repealed, in so far as States
520 UNTS 151. 
976 UNTS 106.
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Parties are concerned, League of Nations and other post 
World War II conventions concerning illegal trade in drugs.
The Preamble to the 1961 convention considers, inter 
alia, that "effective measures against abuse of narcotic 
drugs reguire co-ordinated and universal action". With 
regards to criminal law Article 36 is the relevant 
provision. It provides that each State Party shall adopt 
measures to render the following punishable as criminal 
offences:
"cultivation, production, manufacture, 
extraction, preparation, possession, offering, 
offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, 
delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, 
dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, 
importation and exportation of drugs".
But State Parties are obliged to adopt legislative
measures subject to their constitutional limitations. This
qualification weakens considerably the effectiveness of
Article 36.
Further Article 36.2.a.(iv) provides that nationals 
and foreigners may both be prosecuted by the High 
Contracting Party in whose territory the offence is 
committed. They will also be prosecuted by the High 
Contracting Party on whose territory they are found if they 
are not extradited. There is an obligation to prosecute 
here, even possibly on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
But there is no obligation to extradite. This is similar 
to the position concerning the aut dedere aut punire 
principle as discussed in various treaties in the 
preceeding chapters.
However, the position in Article 36 would seem to be 
that where the locus delicti is the territory of one State 
Party and the offender is apprehended in the territory of 
another, the State Party which has presence of the offender 
should first seek to extradite rather than to prosecute the 
offender. It is stipulated that the offender shall be 
prosecuted "by the Party in whose territory he is found if 
extradition is not acceptable in conformity with the law of 
the Party to which application is made". Article 36 does
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not provide for circumstances where the locus delicti is 
the territory of a non-State Party and the offender is 
subsequently found in the territory of a State Party.
Finally Article 36.2.b. recommends as "desirable” to 
have the offences included in extradition agreements 
between High Contracting Parties. This recommendation is 
now mandatory by virtue of the 1975 Protocol.
A most substantial contribution to the status of "drug 
trafficking" as a crime under international law was made 
via General Assembly Resolution 39/141 1 entitled "Draft 
Convention against Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances and Related Activities". 
Resolution 39/141 incorporates in Annex the working text of 
a proposed draft convention. Therein are included a 
significant number of proposals which feature in most of 
the treaties reviewed in other chapters of this Part. 
These common features include: (a) the question of
designation - Draft Article 2 declares "drug trafficking" 
a "grave international crime against humanity"? (b) the 
non-applicability of the political offence exception - 
Draft Article 5 provides that the practices shall not be 
considered political crimes for the purpose of extradition? 
(c) the non-applicability of the principle of statutory 
limitation - Draft Article 6? (d) the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility - Draft Article 7? (e) territorial 
and extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction - Draft Article 
10? and finally, (f) reference to the justiciability of the 
crimes before an international criminal court - Draft 
Article 11.
In 1988, the UN adopted a Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances2 but 
its provisions concerning the applications of criminal law
Adopted on 14 December 1984.
See UN Doc. E/CONF.82/15, 19th December, 1988. Text 
also at: 28 ILM (1989) 497. See Sproule and St.
Denis, 27 Can. YIL (1989) 263, for a general 
commentary on the treaty's principal provisions.
principles are considerably weaker than those of the draft 
convention described above presicely because it largely 
failed to reproduce in substance those same principles. 
The provisions on jurisdiction and the aut dedere aut 
punire principle are the only survivors of the draft 
convention.
Following the IMO Convention, the 1988 instrument 
discriminates between various bases of jurisdiction in 
respect of which States Parties are either obliged or 
permitted to take such measures as are necessary to 
establish their jurisdiction over the offences (Article 4). 
The territorial, "Flag State”, and active personality (but 
this applies only when the national is present in the 
territory of his own State) principles are mandatory 
grounds for taking jurisdiction. The universality 
principle and the active personality principle (applying in 
all other cases) are permissible grounds for taking 
jurisdiction. The "effects doctrine" is also present in 
the convention and it is permissible for States Parties to 
take jurisdiction when there is a conspiracy or an attempt 
to commit a crime occuring outside their territory but 
having effect within their territory.
Contrary to treaty practice identified in Chapters 5 
to 7 above, the aut dedere aut punire principle does not 
feature as a separate provision under the 1988 Convention, 
but as part and parcel of the provision on extradition 
(Article 6.9.) In addition, the relevant wording is far 
from standard and the phrases "without exception 
whatsoever" and "whether or not the offence is committed in 
its territory" relative to States Parties' obligation to 
submit the case to their competent authorities for 
prosecution, are conspicuously absent from the convention.
More source material relevant to the developing status 
of drug trafficking as a crime under international law is 
de lege fera/nda but, it clearly reveals a commitment to 
adhere to principles of law now standard in international 
effects to proscribe criminal practices. This is evidenced
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by the presence of a provision (Article XIV) on drug 
offences in a Draft International Criminal Code prepared by 
Professor Bassiouni1, and especially, by the recent 
(provisional) adoption of a Draft Article X by the ILC 
within the context of its Draft Code. At the Forty-Second 
Session (1990) the ILC has included a provision which 
renders drug-traffickers, regardless of their capacity at 
the time of commission and of the locus delicti, liable to 
punishment. Accordingly criminal liability is incurred 
even if the offence takes place within the territory of one 
single State. The ILC has stressed, however, that a "mass 
element”, as is present in the concept of crimes against 
humanity and genocide, is necessary in order to bring the 
crime of drug-trafficking squarely within the reach of 
relevant international criminal law rules.2 The draft 
provision has been improved by the Drafting Committee at 
the ILC's forty-third session.3
The ILC's approach to "drug trafficking” as a suitable 
candidate for inclusion in the Draft Code has, therefore, 
changed from an initially divided position to its current 
opinion that this is a practice which deserves to be 
suppressed and its perpetrators punished by the same 
principles of international law as the classical pirates 
and war criminals before them.4
International Criminal Code, 1987, p.163.
See ILC Report, GAOR, Supp.No.10 (A/45/10) pp.31-34 
and 67-70.
See draft article 26, UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 1991, 
p. 8.
At its thirty-eight session (1986) ILC members 
rejected, very categorically, the notion that "drug 
trafficking” was a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind. See Tomuschat, p.114 para 35; 
and Razafindralambo, p.129 para 28 in ILC Yrbk., 1986, 
v.I. In favour, however, see, ibid., Balanda, p.107 
para 34? Jacovides, p. 121 para 30; Arangio-Riuz, p. 123 
para 59 and Roukounas, p.117 para 54. At its forty- 
first session (1989) several members deemed "drug 
trafficking: a crime against peace and against
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The applicability of principles such as universal 
jurisdiction, aut dedere aut punire. justiciability 
regardless of motive, no time-limits for prosecution and 
the non-acceptance of "superior orders" for drug- 
traff ickers have been endorsed by writers in their 
contributions on the international legal status of this 
practice.1 In addition, recent practice reveals that the 
illegality of certain practices is considered to be such by 
States to warrant the use of force to bring the offenders 
to trial. This has been the case when Panama's former 
dictator General Noriega was seized in Panama City by US 
military forces in 1989 and subsequently arraigned in the 
United States for "drug trafficking". Alongside the 
protection of nationals, one of the recognised grounds in 
international law in respect of which use of force by 
States is permissible, the United States identified the 
seizure and arrest of General Noriega, "an indicted drug 
trafficker", as one of four reasons explaining the decision 
to send military personnel into Panama.2
humanity, in addition to being a form of terrorism: 
"narco-terrorism". See GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/44/10) 
pp.170-171. Sixth Committee views have, in the main, 
endorsed the ILC's effort to render "drug trafficking" 
a universally punishable crime, see UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.443, 1990, pp.37-38. But, reservations to 
this general view are still recorded within the Sixth 
Committee. See its report of the ILC's Report on the 
work carried out at its forty-second session, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.456, 1991, pp.20 & 33-36.
See Blum, 13 Israel LR (1978) 194 and Bassiouni,
writing in International Criminal Law Volume 1 Crimes, 
p.507. Some writers have included narcotics
dissemination in a catalogue of unlawful acts listed 
as international offences. See Dinstein, 5 Israel YHR 
(1975) 65 and Friedlander, 52 RIDP (1981) 393.
See 84 AJIL (1990) 545 at 547. Four years previously, 
US military aircraft forced a civilian (Egypt Air) 
passenger aircraft, flying over the high seas and 
carrying four persons who had unlawfully taken control 
of a cruise liner, The Achille Lauro. and its 
passengers hostage, to land at a NATO military base in 
Sicily. The four criminals had killed a US national 
during the course of the incident. On the legality or
B. Damage to the Environment
The principle of criminal liability in relation to 
environmental harm is de leae fer^nda and in formulating 
that principle there are problems ratione materiae and 
ratione loci.
/
So far efforts de leae ferahda to apply the concept of
delicta jure gentium to the environmental question have
been undertaken by the ILC in two of its draft projects:
that concerning the Draft Code and that concerning the
doctrine of State Responsibility.
Draft Article 19.3.d. is the relevant provision in the
ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility (Part I). It
provides that:
"A serious breach of an international obligation 
of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment, such as 
those prohibiting massive pollution of the 
atmosphere or of the seas;"1
constitutes an "international crime".
As originally drafted by Professor Ago the above
provision was worded in significantly different terms.
Then appearing as Draft Article 18.3.c., it read as
follows:
"The conservation and the free enjoyment for 
everyone of a resource common to all mankind".2
Until such time as the ILC's Drafting Committee
considered 18.3.c., which was then re-fashioned as 18.3.d.
otherwise of these "persuasive" measures taken by the 
US in the Achille Lauro incident see Cassese, 38 ICLP 
(1989) 601-603 who also addresses the applicability or 
otherwise of the universality principle of 
jurisdiction vis-a-vis American action taken.
ILC Yrbk., 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.96. See ILC 
Commentary, ibid., p.109 para 32 & p.121 para 71.
ILC Yrbk., 1976, v.II, pt.I, p.54. See also Ago's 
scant comments on Draft Article 18.3.c. in his Report 
(ibid., p.52 para 148) which seem to suggest that the 
inclusion of the "environmental question" as an 
"international crime" was almost accidental. During 
the ILC's debate on Article 18.3.c., Ago admitted that 
it was de leae feranda. Ibid., v.I, p.253 para 48.
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and reading as finally adopted, the ILC membership was 
generally hostile to it1, although some2 did suggest that 
the concept of the common heritage of mankind should be the 
proper substitute for "resource common to all mankind." 
Notwithstanding the divided position in the ILC, it 
reported that its membership expressed full agreement with 
Article 19.3.d. 3 But Sixth Committee4 views reiterated 
serious doubts concerning the status of environmental harm 
as an international crime. Bulgaria and the Federal 
Republic of Germany specifically objected to Draft Article 
19.3.d. in their replies on the ILC's Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility.5
It is in the context of the Draft Code that efforts 
have been made to place acts against the environment in the 
same class as other traditional delicta jure gentium. 
Within this framework the ILC attempts to apply to acts 
which damage the environment certain legal measures such as 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility, the 
justiciability of the act as a crime by virtue of the 
universal principle of jurisdiction, the applicability of 
the aut dedere aut punire rule, and the non-applicability 
of defences such as "superior orders" and statutes of 
limitation, which all form part of the Nuremberg legacy and 
are applicable vis-a-vis the more generally accepted
See ILC Yrbk., 1976, v.I: Ushakov, p.73 paras 4 & 5? 
Ustor, p.84 para 41? and El-Erian, p.87 para 8.
See, ibid., Rossides, p.83 para 75? Njenga, p.246 para
79 and later El-Erian, p.244 para 48. Castenada, 
p.243 para 35, was in favour of including unlawful 
action to alter climatic change. For a recent review 
of the developments in the field of climatic change 
and the concept of common heritage of mankind 
engendering erga omnes obligations in international 
law, see Editorial Comment, 84 AJIL (1990) 525.
ILC Yrbk., 1976, v.II, pt.II, p.121 para 71.
GAOR, A/31/370, 1976, p.62 para 174 - p.63 para 178.
ILC Yrbk., 1981, v.II, pt.I, p.72 and p.75 
respectively.
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criminal offences in international law.
The environmental damage question was considered 
within the context of the Draft Code from the ILC's thirty- 
sixth (1984) to the thirty-eighth sessions (1986) and later 
at its forty-first (1989) and forty-third (1991) sessions.
In 1984, "acts causing serious damage to the 
environment" were considered candidate for inclusion in the 
Draft Code.1 The general position of the ILC was favourable 
in principle2, but the Sixth Committee3 report reveals 
division of opinion in this regard.
In 1985, the ILC discussed the question of defining 
the concept of crime against peace and security of mankind. 
The Rapporteur tabled a definition (Draft Article 3 First 
Alternative)4 which virtually reproduced Draft Article 19 of 
the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility including 
sub-paragraph 3d thereof. Accordingly the question of 
environmental change as a crime per se was not debated. 
But the membership was generally opposed to Draft Article 
19 being reproduced verbatim as a definition of the concept 
of crime against peace and security of mankind.5 The 
position in the Sixth Committee's report for this session 
was much the same as that in the ILC6.
In 1986, the Rapporteur included damage to the 
environment within the general definition of crimes against
ILC Yrbk., 1984, v.II, pt.II, p.16 para 58.
ILC Yrbk., 1984, v.I: Calero Rodrigues, p.32 para 31?
Ogiso, p.35 para 49? Jagota, p.41 para 10. See also 
Sir Ian Sinclair, p.30 para 15 expressing caution on 
the inclusion of "environmental crime".
UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.22 paras 54-55.
See ILC Yrbk., 1985, v.II, pt.I., p.81.
Generally see ILC Yrbk., 1985, v.I, Meetings: 1879- 
1889 inclusive.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, pp.29-31.
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humanity.1 The response, again, was divided as to whether
this topic ought to be included in an international code of
crimes.2 The state of affairs persisted in the Sixth
Committee's consideration of the ILC's Report for the 1986 3
and the 1989 session where the relevant draft article on
crimes against humanity was resubmitted4, incorporating a
sub-clause on "any serious and international harm to a
vital asset, such as the human environment".5
Amidst the division of opinion in the ILC and Sixth
Committee on the status of environmental damage as a
criminal offence there was consensus on one factor, namely
that only "serious" and "internationally" committed harm to
the environment could ever be admitted as candidate crime
in the Draft Code.
At its forty-third session the ILC's Drafting
Committee adopted a draft article 26 entitled "Wilful and
Severe Damage to the Environment" which reads:
"An individual who wilfully causes or orders 
another individual to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment 
shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced [to
Draft Article 12(4), ILC Yrbk., 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.86 
and at pp.61-62 paras 66-76.
In favour see (ILC Yrbk., 1986, v.I) Francis, p. 101 
para 8? Sucharitkul, p.102 para 13; Calero Rodrigues, 
p. 103 para 24? Balanda, p. 108 para 38? and Mahiou, 
p. 128 para 11? Jagota, p. 125 para 79? 
Razafindralambo, p.129 para 29, Rasheed Mohammed 
Ahmed, p.132 para 52 and Diaz Gonzalez, p.133 para 66 
all expressed fervent support without adressing the 
juridical difficulties involved such as the wording of 
the provision. Contra, see Sir Ian Sinclair, p. 105 
para 17 and McCaffrey, p.119 para 10.
UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, p.103.
See Seventh Report on the Draft Code, UN
Doc.A/CN.4/419, 1989, p.11.
See ILC Report, GAOR, Supp.No.10 (A/44/10) pp.168-170
and Sixth Committee Report UN Doc.A/CN.4/L/443, 1990
p. 36.
 1"-1
A Draft International Criminal Code prepared by
Professor Bassiouni2 incorporates the "international offence
of environmental depradation". It is one of the few texts,
which though de leae ferafnda. attempts a comprehensive
definition: ^
"The significant pollution by a state, in breach 
of an international obligation, of the air, sea 
and rivers in a manner which impacts on other 
states, or causes damage or harm to another
state, or which significantly affects the
viability and purity of these elements, or which 
destroys in whole or in part, or significantly
harms the fauna and flora of the sea and
international navigable rivers; and the willful 
destruction of the endangered species, or
allowing their willful destruction, constitutes 
the offence of environmental depredation."
Another recommendation for criminalising conduct
harmful to the environment was made by a group of experts
in Recommendations and Legal Principles adopted on
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development3. They
called for "effective criminal liability to be established
and applied by states for actions of their nationals which
have a detrimental effect upon the environment, in
particular on ecosystems and species of international
significance, and including those actions in areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction". The Group also
adopted a draft text of a convention on the same topic but
did not include a provision on criminal responsibility.
They only provided for the traditional concept of State
responsibility (Draft Article 21).
The literature on the status of acts harmful to the
environment as crimes in international law is scant. Some4
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459/Add.1, 1991, p.8.
International Criminal Code, 1987, p.170.
Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1986.
See Nanda, 52 RIDP p.432.
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have simply put the question: should there not be an effort 
toward a progressive codification of international crimes 
pertaining to environmental pollution? Others1 have 
undertaken a methodological analysis of the status of such 
acts in international law. They question, in the light of 
relevant sources including treaties, international 
resolutions and general principles of law, whether relevant 
rules of international law applicable to crimes such as 
violations of the laws of war, torture, and unlawful 
seizure of aircraft, are also operative vis-a-vis practices 
harmful to the environment. One writer2 in particular 
argued for the prosecution of members of corporations, as 
the true and most effective sanction against offenders who 
damage the environment. The argument suggests that the 
corporate veil should be lifted to permit the prosecution 
of company executives responsible for changing the 
environment. Support for this theory was found in post 
Second World War trials where officers were charged, inter 
alia, for war crimes and where the defence of "superior 
orders” was rejected.
A number of international instruments relevant to the 
protection of the environment3 contain provisions obliging 
Contracting Parties to enact or make provision for the 
punishment of violations of specific operative treaty 
obligations. Such provisions are also found in conventions
McCaffrey writing in Bassiouni, International Criminal 
Law Volume 1 Crimes, p.541.
Iseman, 37 Albany LR (1972) 61 at pp.63 and 74.
See, inter alia, International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, Washington, 2nd December, 1946, 
161 UNTS 72? Convention for the Prevention of the 
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, 
Oslo, 15th August, 1972, 119 UKTS (1975)? Convention 
on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972? and Convention for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based 
Sources, Paris, 4th June, 1975, 64 UKTS (1978). But 
see the chronological analysis of McCaffrey, op.cit., 
pp.547-549.
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such as those on genocide, apartheid. unlawful seizure of 
aircraft and unlawful acts committed against the safety of 
civil aviation. But, unlike these conventions, the 
instruments concerning environmental protection do not 
include provisions which have come to identify the criminal 
proscription of practices in international conventional law 
such as the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of 
universality or the obligation to prosecute where 
extradition does not take place: aut dedere aut punire.
C. Economic Aggression
The concept of economic aggression, like its parent 
source aggression, is capable of more than one definition 
particularly in political terms. It is a volatile concept 
and thus escapes definition in juridical terms. For this 
reason alone, therefore, the status of economic aggression 
as a criminal offence in international law is very dubious.
The concept of economic aggression invites questions 
which challenge directly its very raison d'etre. For 
instance, the question which often presented itself in the 
UN's efforts to define the broader concept of aggression, 
is whether economic aggression is a separate concept per 
sg. Is it a direct or an indirect form of aggression? 
Should it be defined to include the use of armed force? At 
which point does the use of economic measures imposed by 
one State to the detriment of another constitute economic 
aggression? Must the measures be such as to induce a 
military response from the victim State or would any set 
of unfavourable economic conditions constitute economic 
aggression? If the economic measures are such that 
threaten the political independence of a State, is there a 
right to exercise force in self-defence?1
These questions have been amply addressed in other
On this point see Bowett, Self-Defence in 
International Law, 1958, p.106.
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writings1 and they are essentially beyond the scope of the 
present study. It is important, however, to reiterate the 
following recorded data.
The term "economic aggression" appears in diplomatic 
instruments as early as 1916. It is reported2 to have been 
employed in the drafting of a resolution by the British 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference calling for Allied 
action to be taken after the First World War against German 
"economic aggression".3
At the United Nations San Francisco Conference in 1945 
a Brazilian proposal to oblige UN Member States to refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of 
economic measures, was voted down.4
A number of governments have produced working papers 
or draft resolutions containing provisions defining the 
concept of economic aggression. These were submitted 
during the initial phase of United Nations efforts to 
define the broader concept of aggression.
In 1952 Bolivia5 drafted a resolution which included as 
acts of aggression: the threat or use of force by a State 
to deprive another of economic resources. The Bolivian 
proposal met with criticism in the 1953 UN Special 
Committee studying the question of defining aggression6. 
The United Kingdom and Brazil, members of that Committee,
See, Roling, 2 NILR (1955), 170? Farer, writing in
Cassese, The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of 
Force, 1986, p.121? and Rifaat, op.cit., pp.124 - 127.
See Bowett, op. cit., p.106.
House of Commons Debates, August 2nd, 1916, Vol 85 
col. 341.
Cf. Article 2(4) UN Charter. See Bowett, op. cit., p.
106 and Higgins, The Development of International Law 
through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 
1963, p.177 n.40.
GAOR, UN Doc.A/C6./L.211, 1952, Paragraph 3. Text
also reproduced in Ferencz, Aggression, v.II, p.92
See UN Doc. A/2638, 1953, pp.8-10.
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submitted that to extend the concept of aggression beyond 
the traditional view of armed attack was tantamount to 
amending the Charter.1 The United States2 representative 
pointed out that if the concept were to be included in a 
definition of aggression it would increase rather than 
decrease the circumstances in which States would purport to 
resort to use force in self-defence. However, other member 
States on the Committee such as the USSR,3 Iran4 and 
Dominican Republic5, were, in principle, in favour of 
including the concept of economic aggression. In support 
of its proposal Bolivia6 outlined three fundamental 
principles which are violated by an act of economic 
aggression: (i) the political independence of States, (ii)
the concept of equality among States and (iii) the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
States.
Another draft resolution defining aggression was 
submitted by the USSR7. This draft resolution included a 
definition of economic aggression which was worded in terms 
broad enough to include use of force.8 But Mexico9
x. Ibid., p.9 para 75.
2. Ibid., p.10 para 79.
3. Ibid., p.9 para 74.
4. Ibid., para 73.
5. Ibid., para 72.
6. Ibid., p.8 para 70.
7. UN Doc. A/AC. 66/L. 2/Rev. 1. in Annex to the Report of 
the 1953 Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
of Aggression, UN Doc. A/2638, 1953, p.13.
B. Operative paragraph 3 reads:
"That State shall be declared to have 
committed an act of economic aggression 
which first commits one of the 
following acts:
(a) Takes against another State measures of 
economic pressure violating its sovereignty
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submitted a Working Paper amending the USSR proposal by 
stipulating that there is economic aggression only if it 
is accompanied by or involves use of force. Other States 
such as Argentina1 put forward another view, namely that 
the concept of aggression should not be limited to armed 
aggression but should include other forms such as economic 
aggression which do not necessarily involve use of force.
From 1952 to 1972 various UN Special Committees 
working on the definiion of aggression and the Sixth 
Committee reporting on the work of these Special Committees 
all record a constant pattern, i.e. a division of opinion 
among member government delegates as whether to exclude or 
include and, therefore, define the concept of economic 
aggression (with or without reference to use of force).2
and economic independence and threatening 
the bases of its economic life;
(b) Takes against another State measures 
preventing it from exploiting or 
nationalising its own natural riches;
(c) Subjects another State to an economic 
blockade”.
Operative paragraph 6 prevents justification of 
economic aggression on the basis of political, 
strategic or economic circumstances.
See UN Doc. A/AC.66/L8, reproduced in Annex to UN Doc. 
A/2638, 1953, p. 14. But see also comments of the
Mexican delegate on draft definition of aggression 
submitted to the Special Committee on the Question of 
Defining Aggression in 1956, UN Doc. A/3574, Annex II, 
p.32 para 6:
"the definition of aggression should be 
confined to the idea of the use of 
force, and thus leave out of 
consideration the so-called indirect, 
ideological or economic forms of 
aggression".
See GAOR, UN Doc. A/2689, 1954, p.2.
See Sixth Committee Reports: GAOR, UN Doc. A/2322,
1952, p.88, paras 28 and 32; UN Doc. A/2806, 1954,
p. 11 paras 20-23; Report of the Special Committee
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Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter of the OAS1, jointly, 
provide that (Member) States shall not intervene in the 
external and internal affairs of other (Member) States and 
this prohibition is not limited to the use of armed force, 
but to any other form of interference "against the 
personality of the State or against its political, economic2 
and cultural elements". States may not use "measures of an 
economic character in order to force the sovereign will of 
another (Member) State and obtain from it advantages of any 
kind".
Operative paragraph 4 of the United Nations
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples3 decrees that:
"all armed action or repressive measures of all 
kinds4 directed against dependent peoples shall 
cease in order to enable them to exercise 
peacefully and freely their right to complete 
independence, and the integrity of their national 
territory shall be respected".
These international instruments are often cited in 
support of the case for outlawing aggression, in 
particular, economic aggression. But there is no evidence
A/3574, 1956, p. 8 para 63; Report of the Special
Committee A/7185/Rev.l., 1968, p.23 paras 51 and 52; 
Sixth Committee Report, A/7402, 1968; Report of the
Special Committee, A/7620, 1969, p.16 para. 27; Sixth 
Committee Report, A/7853, 1969, p.4 para 13; Report of 
the Special Committee, A/8019, 1970, pp.8-10 paras 26- 
30; Sixth Committee Report, A/8171, 1970, p.4 para 21; 
Report of the Special Committee, A/8419, 1971, pp. 8-
10 paras 26-30; Sixth Committee Report, A/8525, 1971, 
p.5 para 26; and Sixth Committee Report, A/8929, 1972, 
p.5 para 23.
119 UNTS (1951-1952) 3
Emphasis added.
Adopted by GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December, 1960.
Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights, p. 28, 
writes that this Declaration "is in the form of an 
authoritative interpretation of the (UN) Charter 
rather than a recommendation".
Emphasis added.
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in these sources, including the debates in United Nations 
bodies, which even remotely suggests that economic 
aggression constitutes a criminal offence.
There is hardly any literature on the question of
economic aggression as a criminal offence under
international law and its source value is, therefore, 
minimal. Publicists who have addressed the concept of 
"international economic crime"1 admit: (i) that currently
this is a matter for national law? (ii) that international 
law does not prevent States from proscribing certain 
economic practices occurring abroad as criminal offences, 
but restricts individual States from enforcing such crimes; 
and (iii) the law of international responsibility, though 
it may have a part to play in controlling certain types of
harmful international economic activity, is currently in
content and in application, undeveloped and imprecise.
The ILC is the principal body which has made 
considerable inroads in the "crirainalisation" of economic 
aggression in international law. The concept was proposed 
for inclusion as a crime against peace in the Draft Code on 
the basis that "there are economic measures which, in 
unequal relationships, take the form of aggression".2 
Generally, the membership of the ILC has been for the
This is a term with its own problems of definition. 
It may or may not be synonymous with the concept of 
economic aggression. It is used by Marston cited in 
Malekian, International Criminal Responsibility of 
States, 1985, p.147.
See Second Report on the Draft Code, A/CN.4/377, ILC 
Yrbk., 1984, v.II pt. I. p.100 para 80. In the Sixth 
Committee (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.24 para 62) 
some government representatives identified the 
following practices as forms of economic aggression: 
"undermining the principle of permanent sovereignity 
over natural resources, direct military intervention 
in defence of vital interests. and coercive measures 
against Governments which exercised prerogatives 
inherent in sovreignity such as nationalisation". 
These examples are worded in very general terms. They 
reflect the difficulties involved in defining economic 
aggression as a crime.
concept to be included under the proposed code.1 But 
serious reservations are also recorded indicating that the 
concept of economic aggression is largely a political 
rather than a legal concept2. Sixth Committee
considerations of the Draft Code broadly reflect the 
division in opinion recorded within the ILC. Some 
government representatives emphasised that aggression may 
come in the form of economic measures which threaten 
international peace and security and therefore should 
qualify as criminal offences. Others, while accepting the 
validity of this viewpoint, reiterated that the concept of 
economic aggression was too vague and nebulous to be 
considered for inclusion in an international code of 
crimes.3
See ILC Yrbk. . 1984, v.I: Ni, p. 16 para 30? Diaz 
Gonzalez, p.21 paras 26-28? Ushakov, p.24 para 16? 
Lacleta Munoz, p.25 para 23? Njenga, p.44 para 34? and 
Yankov, p.51 para 37? and ibid., 1985, v.I: Jacovides, 
p.14 para 17? Mahiou, p.32 para 19? Balanda, p.34 para 
37? Flitan, p.42 para 9? Razafindralambo, p.47 para 
42? Diaz-Gonzalez, p.60 para 32? Huang, p.64 para 20? 
and Jagota, p.76 para 58.
See ILC Yrbk^., 1984, v.I, Rapporteur Thiam, p.8 para
18 and Mr. Al-Qaysi, p.19 para 10, and, ibid., 1985, 
v.I: McCaffrey, p.55 para 52? and Yankov, p.58 para 
19.
See UN Docs. A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.24. paras 63-67? 
A/CN. 4/L. 398, 1986, p. 25 paras 102 - 105 and
A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, p.105 para 533.
PART IV
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CHAPTER 9 
Individual Criminal Responsibility
The principle of individual responsibility for crimes 
committed under international law has been amply addressed 
in Part III supra. Accordingly, consideration will only be 
given in this chapter to source material which has not been 
discussed under any of the headings in the preceeding 
chapters. The relevant source material consists
prinicipally of the work of the ILC and the contributions 
of publicists whose writings did not focus on the study of 
crimes examined in Part III.
1. The Work of the International Law Commission
(a) The Nuremberg Principles
The Nuremberg Principles, adopted in 1950 and drafted 
in the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, reflect 
the well accepted principle namely, that the individual is 
personally responsibile for crimes committed under 
international law. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Nuremberg Principle I enunciates the principle in explicit 
terms:
"Any person who commits an act which constitutes 
a crime under international law is responsible 
therefor and liable to punishment"1
The ILC and the Sixth Committee2 debates on Principle
ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.374 paras 98-99.
See ILC Yrbk.r 1951, v.II, p.49 paras 53-59. 
Yugoslavia (ibid., para 55) did suggest, however, that 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility 
ought to be applicable only vis-a-vis the crimes 
defined at Nuremberg and not in respect of crimes in 
international law generally.
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domestic laws. It was not a matter of repeating 
the terms of the (Nuremberg) Charter, which was 
limited by the facts which the Tribunal had to 
judge, but of trying to extract therefrom general 
principles of international law."1
Unfortunately, majority views in the Sixth Committee2 
objected to the fact that Nuremberg Principle II attempted 
to alter the traditional status of the individual in 
international law (i.e. as a non-subject) and to assert the 
supremacy of international law over national law. In 
particular, the United Kingdom suggested that punishment of 
individuals for crimes defined under international law 
could be secured, by permitting States to exercise 
jurisdiction over them, without altering "the classical 
concept that international law solely governs relations 
between States.113 This viewpoint was endorsed by other 
Sixth Committee members all of whom (in 1950), though 
desirous to see individuals tried for crimes defined under 
international law, refrained from subscribing to a written 
affirmation of the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility in an international code of crimes.
Nuremberg Principle III echoes the recommendations of 
the 1919 Commission on the Authors of War, Article 7 of the 
Nuremberg Charter (and the parallel provisions in the Tokyo 
Charter (Article 6) and (II.4.a) of CCL No.10) and Article 
IV of the Genocide Convention. It provides:
"The fact that a person who committed an act 
which constitutes a crime under international law 
acted as Head of State or responsible Government 
official does not relieve him from responsibility 
under international law."4
Once again the debate centred around questions of 
drafting. The ILC had no difficulty in accepting the
ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.I, p.38 para 16.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II, pp.49-51.
See Fitzmaurice, ibid., p.49 paras 63 & 64. 
ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.375.
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substance of this provision.1 But there were two 
significant points which emerged in the debate. The first 
concerned the question of mitigation of punishment and the 
second concerned the proper designation of persons acting 
on behalf of the State. Both are discussed in turn.
The Nuremberg Charter held that the official position 
of the major war criminals would not be considered as a 
factor for mitigating punishment. This was followed by the 
drafters of the Tokyo Charter and CCL No. 10, but not by 
those of the Genocide Convention. In the formulation of 
Nuremberg Principle III the ILC followed the Genocide 
Convention and omitted reference to mitigation of 
punishment.2 The Commission felt that it was up to 
tribunals to decide whether the office/position held by a 
defendent could serve, per se. as a mitigating factor in 
the determination of punishment.3
With respect to the second point i.e., the designation 
of persons acting on behalf of the State, the ILC 
Rapporteur adopted the term "public official". But the 
Nuremberg Charter (Article 7) refers to "responsible 
officials in Government Departments", which is also the 
position in Article II 4(a) of CCL No.10 (Article 6 of the 
Tokyo Charter refers only to "official position"), whereas 
the drafters of the Genocide Convention selected 
"constitutionally responsible rulers" and "public 
officials". The ILC considered the term "public official" 
to be too broad in scope. It opted for the phrase 
"responsible Government official" which subscribed to the 
practice laid down at Nuremberg and under the Genocide 
Convention. The scope is to affirm that immunity of Heads 
of States and of Government from criminal prosecution in
Ibid., v.I, p.39 para 70 - p.42 para 123.
See, however, Nuremberg Principle III in draft form. 
ILC Yrbk.f 1950, v.II, p.192.
Ibid., v.II, p.375 para 104. See debate, ibid., v.I, 
p.39 para 73 - p.40 para 92.
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international law is not without exception, and that the
view which believes that there is no personal
accountability for crimes under international law committed
by government officials because they constitute "Acts of
State" is unacceptable.
"A Head of State or high official who, under 
customary international law, could invoke the 
responsibility of the State as a defence, could 
not do so in the case of a crime under 
international law".1
This is the meaning of Nuremberg Principle III. The ILC 
intended to assert the international criminal 
responsibility of high ranking officials and separate it 
from that of lower ranking officials such as Group Captains 
and the private soldier.2 The criminal responsibility of 
lower ranks is covered, generally, by Nuremberg Principle 
I which applies to all individuals and, particularly, by 
Nuremberg Principle IV (discussed below in section 2) which 
removes the acceptance of "superior orders" as a defence 
for crimes under international law.
Terms such as "responsible government official", 
"Heads of State" and "constitutionally responsible ruler" 
used at Nuremberg and in instruments adopted in the post 
1945 era3 reflect the dictates imposed upon drafters by the 
exigencies of the times in which the crimes were committed. 
The international community, suffering from the horrific 
experience of the Second World War and shocked by the 
atrocious violations of international law that leaders of 
nations and of governments were capable of planning and 
implementing, was largely concerned with ensuring that such
Spiropoulos, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.I, p.41 para 117 and 
at para 112.
See ILC members Hudson and Cordova, ibid., p.40 paras
93 and 95.
See, however, the "grave breaches" provisions of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions which speak of "persons 
committing or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches". Emphasis added.
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persons would not escape punishment.
Current practice continues to be dictated by 
contemporary circumstances. For instance, acts of 
international terrorism are frequently committed by persons 
acting in a non-public capacity. Accordingly, the trend in 
treaties proscribing some aspect or other of international 
terrorism such as hostage-taking or unlawful acts committed 
against the safety of civil aviation, or in airports 
serving international civil aviation, or against the safety 
of maritime navigation, is to adopt a broad and all 
embracing phrase such as: "any person"1 or "alleged
offender". However, in certain instruments where human 
rights violations are designated criminal offences, such as 
the UN and OAS Conventions on Torture, and the casus 
foederis of the treaty is conditioned ratione personae, we 
find reference to "public official" or "person acting in an 
official capacity" or "public servant".
(b) The Draft Code of Offences: 1950-1954
The priniciple of individual criminal responsibility
was enunciated as Basis of Discussion No. 2 by Rapporteur
Spiropoulos in the first of the three reports submitted to
the ILC on the Draft Code of Offences. It read as follows:
"1. Any person, whether acting in an official 
capacity or as a private individual, who commits 
any of the acts mentioned in Basis of discussion 
No.l (this contained a list of criminal offences) 
shall be responsible therefor under international 
law and liable to punishment.
2. Any person in an official position, whether 
civil or military, who fails to take the 
appropriate measures in his power and within his 
jurisdiction, in order to prevent or repress acts 
punishable under this code shall be responsible 
therefor under international law and liable to 
punishment.1,2
This phrase generated problems of its own for the ILC 
when formulating the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility. See below pp.8-9.
ILC Yrbk.. 1950, v.II, p.278. See also ibid., p.260
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This clause was accepted in principle1 but it was held that:
"the rule establishing responsibility for crimes 
under international law ought to be drafted in a 
general way. without distinction as to the 
position occupied by the individual or the 
capacity in which he acted."2
ILC members Professor Brierly3 and Mr Sandstrom4 
emphasised that Heads of State and of Government should be 
specifically referred to in the draft provision on criminal
responsibility because "it was the Commi on's intention J
not to recognise their traditional immun: y in the code. 
The immunity of heads of States had been a long established 
principle but it.should no longer remain inviolate.1,5
The principle as stated in Basis of Discussion No 2 
was adopted as part and parcel of Draft Article 1 by the 
Rapporteur in his Second Report.6 But it was suggested that 
the principle of individual responsibility should be 
enunciated in a separate provision as Draft Article 2.7 In 
addition, the recommendation previously adopted by the ILC
1.e., to include specific reference to Heads of State and 
Government in the relevant provision, had not been adhered 
to by the Rapporteur. It was submitted that the general 
wording of Draft Article 1 covered all persons including
para 46, and Pella's Memorandum to the ILC (Yrbk. , 
1950, v.II, p.315 para 68).
2. The issue did arise, however, whether the Draft Code 
of Offences ought to make provision for the concept of 
State criminal responsibility. See ILC Yrbk.. 1950, 
v.I, p. 105 para 77 - p. 106 para 96. See also ILC 
Report, ibid., v.II, p.380 para 151.
2. Ibid., v.II, p.268 para 86.
3. Ibid., 1950, v.I, p.155, para 102.
4. Ibid., para 105.
5. Brierly, op.cit., supra.
6. UN Doc. A/CN.4/44, 1951. See ILC Yrbk.. 1951, v.II,
p. 43.
7- ILC Yrbk.f 1951, v.I, p.57 para 26-31.
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Heads of State and Government. However, some members 
continued to insist on the recommendation.1
The position remained largely unchanged in the third 
and final report2. Sixth Committee views were not radical3 
and Draft Article 1 was finally adopted by the ILC as 
follows:
"Offences against the peace and security of 
mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes 
under international law, for which the 
responsible individuals shall be punished."4
A provision on non-immunity of Heads of State and
responsible government officials was also adopted by the
ILC as Draft Article 3:
"The fact that a person acted as Head of State or 
as responsible government official does not 
relieve him of responsibility for committing any 
of the offences defined in this Code".5
Draft Article 1 as adopted by the ILC in 1954 is
essentially a weak attempt at stating the principle of
individual criminal responsibility. The wording adopted in
Nuremberg Principle I is by far a more lucid and
authoritative statement. At the expense of being succinct,
the 1954 ILC Draft Code of Offences presumes rather than
affirms the principle of individual criminal
responsibility. It does represent, however,:
"that for the first time a body of jurists (have) 
stated that individuals could be held criminally 
liable for international crimes committed by them
Ibid., 1951, v.I, p.82 paras 7 - 24,
See UN Doc. A/CN4/85, 1954. However, Professors
Scelle and Cordova (ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.I, p.125 paras
17 and 19 respectively) attempted, unsuccessfully, to 
insert a phrase in article 1 to the effect that 
responsible individuals shall be punished by an 
international criminal court.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/85, p.12.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.II, p.151.
ILC Yrbk., 1954, v.II, p.152.
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in the performance of their functions.111
(c) The Draft Code: 1985 - 1991
At its thirty-sixth session (1984) the ILC decided to 
limit the applicability of the principle of criminal 
responsibility under the Draft Code to individuals.2 At its 
following session the ILC considered a draft article which 
consisted of two alternatives differing ratione personae. 
ILC members were asked to elect between "individuals" 
(alternative 1) and "State authorities" (alternative 2) as 
subjects "who commit an offence against the peace and 
security of mankind are liable to punishment".3 The first 
alternative found general acceptance because it is all- 
emcompassing,4 although some members did suggest that 
specific reference to "State authorities" ought to be 
included alongside the generic term "individuals".5 Sixth
See Amado, ILC Yrbk.. 1954, v.I, p.124 para 16.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1984, v.II, pt.II, p. 11 para 32 and
p. 17 para 65a. This policy was largely endorsed by 
the Sixth Committee (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, p.15 
paras 20-26) but reservation was made to the effect 
that the ILC should not abandon discussion of the 
concept of State criminal responsibility.
See Draft Article 2, ILC Yrbk.. 1985, v.II pt.I p.81.
See comments by the following members, ILC Yrbk.. 1985 
v.I: Jacovides, p.13 para 10? Calero Rodrigues, p.15 
para 25; Malek, p. 18 para 42-46? Sir Ian Sinclair, 
pp.22-23 paras 8-12? Ushakov, p.26 paras 32-41? 
Riphagen, pp.35-37 paras 5-12? Sucharitkul, p.37 para 
25-30; Flitan, p.41 para 1-10? Ogiso, p.43 para 18? 
Razafindralambo, p.45 para 31? Njenga, p.47 para 1? 
Barboza, p.49 para 17-19? McCaffrey, p.53 para 37; 
Yankov, p.56 para 3-7? Diaz Gonzalez, p.58 para 22? 
Arrangio-Ruiz, p.65 paras 28-31? Roukounas, p.68 paras 
51-53? and Tomuschat, p.70 para 10. See also ibid., 
v.II, pt.II, p.13 paras 57-60.
ILC Yrbk. f 1985, v.I: see Francis, p.40 para 36;
Huang, p. 65 para 22? Roukounas, p. 68 para 53 and 
Lacleta-Munoz, p.73 para 22.
Committee1 views endorsed the position within the ILC as did
some of the States which submitted replies2 on the project
of the Draft Code.
At the ILC's thirty-eight session (1986) a fourth
report on the Draft Code was submitted which contained two
draft articles (3 and 8.1.a) directly relevant to the
principle of individual criminal responsibility.
The first provision (draft article 3) provided:
"Any person who commits an offence against the 
peace and security of mankind is responsible 
therefor and liable to punishment".3
This provision reopened the debate on whether, in addition 
to individual, State criminal responsibility ought to be 
provided for in the Draft Code. But the ILC4 and the Sixth 
Committee5 reiterated their position in favour of individual 
responsibility simplicitiir.
The second provision considered by the ILC at its
thirty-eight session is draft article 8.1.a :
"Apart from self-defence in cases of aggression, 
no exception may in principle be invoked by a 
person who commits an offence against the peace 
and security of mankind. As a consequence:
(a) The official position of the perpetrator, and 
particularly the fact that he is a Head of State 
or Government, does not relieve him of criminal
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, pp.16-18 paras 39-51. 
There was one dissenting view (para 44) which 
emphasised that a code limited ratione personae to 
individuals would not be effective in practice.
See ILC Yrbk.f 1985, v.II, pt.I, p.84
ILC Yrbk, 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.82.
See comments by ILC members in ILC Yrbk.r 1986, v.I: 
Illueca, p.137 paras 25-30; Ushakov, p.145 para 20; 
Jagota, p.148 para 50; Calero Rodrigues, p.155 para 
52; Sucharitkul, p.158 para 13 and Thiam, p.174 paras 
8-12.
UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, paras 485-492 and 594-596.
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responsibility.1,1
This exception to individual criminal responsibility is one 
of the legacies of the Nuremberg Charter. It was also
included (though in different form), as we have seen, in
Draft Article 3 of the 1954 Draft Code of Offences. The 
ILC membership endorsed the principle behind this
provision2. But hardly any comment was made concerning its 
purpose namely, to enunciate the rule that: perpetrators of 
crimes against the peace and security of mankind (being 
crimes under international law) incur criminal 
responsibility regardless of whether or not they acted in 
a private capacity or on behalf of the State at the time of 
the commission of the offence.3
These two key provisions relevant to criminal
responsibility re-appeared in the Rapporteur's fifth report4 
at the ILC's thirty-ninth session. Draft article 3 was re­
drafted with minor but significant alterations. Draft 
Article 8.1.a reappeared in identical form but as Draft 
article ll.5 It generated least discussion in the ILC and 
Sixth Committee debates and is thus discussed first.
Due to lack of time it was not considered by the ILC's 
Drafting Committee to which it was referred at the thirty-
ILC Yrbk.f 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.83.
See comments by the following members, ILC Yrbk.. 
1986, v.I: Illueca, p.140 para 39; Sir Ian Sinclair, 
p. 142 para 62; Jagota, p. 149 para 53; Ogiso, p. 150 
para 6; Balanda, p.151 para 19; McCaffrey, p.157 para 
8-10; Sucharitkul, p.158 para 18; Barboza, p.164 para 
73 and Thiam, p.177 para 37. The following members, 
however, suggested drafting amendments: ibid., see
Tomuschat, p.154 paras 43 and 44, and Calero- 
Rodrigues, p.155 para 59. See also Sixth Committee 
views UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, p.118 paras 616 and 
617.
See Rapporteur's Report ILC Yrbk.f 1986, v.II, pt.I, 
p.79 paras 235-240.
UN Doc. A/CN.4/404, 1987, ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.II, pt.I, 
p. 1.
See ILC Yrbk., 1987, v.II, pt.I, p.9.
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ninth session.1 It was to be considered at the next 
session. Notwithstanding this decision, Sixth Committee 
views2 on ILC's work at its thirty-ninth session endorsed 
the Rapporteur's commentary that this provision is to be 
modelled along the lines of the parallel provision (Article 
7) of the Nuremberg Charter. It was also suggested, and 
properly so, that reference to responsibility means 
responsibility "under international law" and these 
clarificatory words ought to be included at the end of the 
clause.
Draft article 11, unlike its counterparts: Nuremberg 
Principle III and Draft Article 3 of the 1954 Draft Code of 
Offences contains no reference ratione materiae. Perhaps 
such degree of qualification was considered unnecessary by 
the Rapporteur. Curiously, it solicited no serious comment 
from members during the ILC debate at its thirty-ninth 
session. A typical comment was: "Draft Article 11 is
acceptable".3
Draft article 11 was provisionally adopted with some 
amendments by the ILC at its fortieth (1988) session.4 
The term "perpetrator" has been substituted by 
"individual". This amendment has occured across the whole 
range of draft articles adopted by the ILC and its 
relevance to the concept of individual responsibility is 
discussed presently in connection with draft article 3. As
See ILC Yrbk., 1987, v.I, p.63 para 31 and p.226 para
5. See also, ibid., v.II, pt.II, p.12 para 58-61.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p.31 para 95-96.
One member, Calero Rodrigues, ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.I,
p. 15 para 5, did suggest that the content of draft 
article 11 was better placed within the Code as part 
and parcel of draft article 3. But, in particular, 
see views of (ibid.) Barsegov, p.14 para 52; Rao, p.17 
para 32; Hayes p.24 para 39; Njenga, p.26 para 51; 
Solari Tudela, p. 26 para 60; Yankov, p. 29 para 7; 
Eiriksson, p. 34 para 58; Shi, p. 33 para 45; Prince 
Ajibola, p.37 para 13; and Gutierrez, p.38 para 23.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1988, v.I, p.289.
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adopted draft article 11 reads:
"The official position of an individual who 
commits a crime against the peace and security of 
mankind, and particularly the fact that he acts 
as1 head of State or Government, does not relieve 
him of criminal responsibility."2
The reference ratione materiae. i.e. to crimes against the 
peace and security of mankind, has been included whereas 
the suggestion to add "under international law" qualifying 
criminal responsibility at the end of the clause was not; 
and this despite reports that article 11 "contains elements 
for several of the formulations" found in parallel clauses 
in 1945 instruments such as the Nuremberg Charter and the 
Nuremberg Principles.3 Finally, the words "he acts as" Head 
of State or Government have been inserted in place of "he 
is" a Head of State or Government. The proposal is meant 
to ensure that responsibility is incurred even in 
circumstances such as when control is exercised over 
territory occupied or annexed unlawfully and crimes defined 
in the code are committed in the course of the occupation.4
Draft article 3, the other provision relevant to 
individual criminal responsibility, was submitted to three 
phases of discussion. The first phase concerned its 
discussion by the ILC in plenary session were it was 
endorsed by the majority of the members.5 A small minority
Emphasis added.
See ILC Yrbk., 1988, v.II, pt.II, p.71. This 
provision has remained unchanged up to the ILC's 
forty-third session (1991). See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459, 
p. 6.
ILC Yrbk.f 1988, v.II, pt.II, p.71,
Ibid., p.71 para 4.
See ILC Yrbk. , 1987, v.I: Tomuschat, p.8 para 7;
Reuter, p. 10 para 20-21 and at p. 41 para 45-47;
Mahiou, p. 11 para 27; Bennouna, p. 11 para 34;
Barsegov, p. 12 para 43; Francis, p. 17 paras 34-35; 
Koroma, p.19 para 45; Graefrath, p.20 para 4;
Jacovides, p. 21 paras 15-16; Njenga, p. 24 para 43;
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proposed substituting the term "individual" by "natural 
person", deleting draft article 3 and replacing it by a 
provision stating that the code applies to crimes committed 
by natural persons.1 These suggestions clearly reveal 
efforts to identify explicitly that the individual is the 
primary subject of international criminal responsibility. 
But, despite the endorsement of this position by the ILC 
membership in toto f a substantial number of members 
insisted that the Commission ought to make provision, 
clearly indicating: (a) that a State may nonetheless incur 
international responsibility where crimes committed against 
the peace and security of mankind are attributable to it; 
and (b) that the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility operative within the Draft Code is without 
prejudice to the concept of State criminal responsibility. 
The need to reiterate these points of clarification 
resulted from the unfortunate confusion by some members of 
issues concerning international responsibility.
A State will incur international responsibility should 
it fail to honour one of the obligations contracted under 
the proposed code, such as if it fails either to extradite 
or to prosecute the alleged perpetrator of a crime defined 
under the Draft Code. Individuals who commit crimes 
defined under the code, regardless of whether they act on 
behalf of the State or in a private capacity at the time of
Solari Tudela, p.26 para 55; Yankov, p.27 para 66; 
Arrangio-Ruiz, p.29 paras 11 & 18; Illueca, p.31 paras 
21-24; Shi, p.32 paras 30 & 34; Prince Ajibola, p.36 
paras 4-5; Ogiso, p.38 para 27; Boutros-Ghali, p.42 
para 3; McCaffrey, p.43 para 20; Razafindrolambo, p.45 
para 5; Pawlak, p.55 para 32; Diaz Gonzalez, p.56 para 
43 and Beesley, p.57 para 59.
See ILC Yrbk. , 1987, v.I: Hayes, p.23 para 31;
Eiriksson, p.34 para 49; and Sepulveda Gutierrez, p.37 
para 17 who went as far as to say that the term 
"individual" lacked clarity because, in his view, a 
crime against the peace and security of mankind can 
only be committed by a person acting on behalf of the 
State.
the offence, will always incur criminal responsibility. 
However, the question remains whether States too may become 
criminally liable along with the individual perpetrators 
when the crimes were committed by persons acting on their 
behalf. Thus the issue formulated for determination is: 
does international law admit State criminal responsibility 
in addition to the traditional responsibility of States? 
If so, what form does this concept of State criminal
responsibility take, and how does it differ from that which
. . . / . .is traditionally recognised? Thefconcept of State criminal
responsibility is addressed in Chapter 10.
In order tos appeal to demands made by ILC members, 
Rapporteur Thiam conceeded that a paragraph could be added 
to draft article 3 stating, explicitly, that other than the 
criminal responsibility of individuals under the Draft Code 
a State may incur international responsibility for crimes 
against the peace and security of mankind committed by 
individuals acting on its behalf.1 This suggestion was 
adopted by the ILC's Drafting Committee, which marks the 
second phase of the formulation of draft article 3 2; and 
now provisionally adopted reads as follows:
"1. Any individual who commits a crime against
the peace and security of mankind is 
responsible for such crime irrespective of 
any motives invoked by the accused that are 
not covered by the definition of the offence3 
and is liable to punishment therefor.
2. Prosecution of an individual for a crime
against the peace and security of mankind 
does not relieve a State of any 
responsibility under international law for
See ILC Yrbk.r 1987, v.I, p.60 para 12.
Ibid., pp.233-235.
The wording in italics is intended to remove any 
possible grounds of exculpability based on motive. 
The Drafting Committee was inspired by a similar 
provision in the Apartheid Convention. Ibid., p.233 
para 12 and v.II, pt.II, p.14.
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an act or omission attributable to it."1
The Sixth Committee's views mark the third phase of 
the consideration of draft article 3. It was strongly
recommended that the language concerning "motive" in
paragraph 1 is to be deleted because (a) it is not 
important enough to warrant its inclusion in the code and
(b) it may be in breach of the principle "nullum crimen 
sine lege".2
2. The Defence of Superior Orders
(a) The Nuremberg Principles
" Principle IV
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of
his Government or of a superior does not free him
from responsibility under international law. It 
may, however, be considered in mitigation of
punishment, if justice so requires."3
This is the relevant provision initially considered by the 
ILC in its formulation of the Nuremberg Principles. It is 
an almost verbatim reproduction of Article 8 of the
Nuremberg Charter. Though there was consensus4 on the
principle as drafted above, the question whether or not
"superior orders" ought to be considered as a mitigating 
factor in the determination of punishment remained a thorny 
issue.5
A compromise was achieved by deleting the last 
sentence and inserting the phrase: "provided a moral choice 
was in fact possible to him."6 Nuremberg Principle IV was
ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.I, p.225.
2. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L/420, 1988, p.19 paras 43-44.
3. ILC Yrbk., 1950, v.II, p.193.
4. ILC member Yepes, ILC Yrbk., 1950, v.I, p.43 para 125
and at p.45 para 3 expressed dissenting views on the 
inclusion of Principle IV.
5. See summary records of the debate, ILC Yrbk.. 1950, 
v.I, Meeting 46 p.43 - Meeting 47 p.47.
6. See ILC Yrbk., 1950, v.II, p.375 para 104.
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adopted as amended. The amendment was suggested by 
Professor Brierly1 on the basis of the Nuremberg Judgment. 
Thus the ILC considered the question of "superior orders" 
as dealt with in the Nuremberg Judgment to reflect the 
customary law position.
Nuremberg Principle IV found general acceptance in the 
Sixth Committee2, but the question of exculpability where 
"no moral choice" is possible, attracted some debate. Some 
representatives suggested its deletion because it would 
place a heavy burden on the soldier in circumstances where 
the consequences of refusing to execute orders would result 
in some form of punishment which would not remove all moral 
choice. Others would have had it deleted because it might 
increase the number of acquittals.
(b) The Draft Code of Offences: 1950-1954
Originally the provision on "superior orders" was
formulated in the same manner as the draft version of
Nuremberg Principle IV.3 But when the Commission adopted
this provision it reverted to the wording of Nuremberg
Principle IV as adopted and, as Draft Article 4, came to
read as follows:
"The fact that a person charged with an offence 
defined in this Code acted pursuant to order of 
his government or of a superior does not relieve 
him from responsibility, provided a moral choice 
was in fact possible to him".4
Comments submitted in 1951 by States on the ILC's text 
of the Draft Code of Offences found objection with the 
phrase "provided a moral choice was in fact possible to
Ibid., v.I, p.43 para 128.
See ILC Yrbk. , 1951, v.II, p.52 para 88 - p.53 para
98.
See Basis of Discussion No. 2 ILC Yrbk. . 1950, v.II,
p. 278 and Rapporteur's commentary at pp.270-272. See 
also Draft Article II, ILC Yrbk.f 1951, v.II, p.61.
ILC Yrbk., 1951, v.II, p.137.
him". Egypt proposed that this phrase should be
substituted by:
"provided that, in the exis/ting circumstances, 
the possibility of acting 'contrary to such an 
order was open to him".1
This recommendation was eventually adopted by the ILC
subject to some minor drafting changes:
"The fact that a person charged with an offence 
defined in this Code acted pursuant to an order 
of a Government or of a superior does not relieve 
him of responsibility in international law if, in 
the circumstances at the time, it was possible 
for him not to comply with that order."2
The Egyptian amendment provides two key factors which
further underline the concept of the individual's criminal
responsibility for committing crimes under international
law. The first is the introduction of the words
"international law" following "responsibility". This
reiterates the principle of international criminal
responsibility for the individual. The second, is found in
the proviso which, unlike earlier drafts including
Nuremberg Principle IV, endorses the nature of "superior
orders" as a non-absolute defence allowing for mitigating
circumstances, and at the same time, avoids the extra-legal
concept of "moral choice".
(c) The Draft Code: 1986-1991
Draft article 8.I.e. studied by the ILC at its thirty-
eight session (1986) provided that:
"Apart from self-defence in cases of aggression, 
no exception may in principle be invoked by a 
person who commits an offence against the peace 
and security of mankind. As a consequence:
(c) The order of a Government or of a superior 
does not relieve the perpetrator of 
responsibility, unless he acted under the 
threat of a grave, imminent and irremediable
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/85, 1954, p.28.
ILC Yrbk.f 1954, v.II, p.152. Emphasis added.
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peril;111
This clause departs from the 1954 version of the Draft 
Code in three ways significant to the concept of individual 
criminal responsibility in international law:
(i) The key words "under international law" 
following "shall not relieve him from
responsibility" which appear in Draft
Article 4 of the 1954 version have been
ommitted;
(ii) The "mitigating factor" clause has been 
deleted and replaced by a concept of "grave, 
imminent and irremediable peril"; and,
(iii)the question of the non-applicability of 
"superior orders" does not appear as a 
separate legal provision.
Draft article 8.I.e. attracted two general comments 
from the ILC membership2. The first is that, in principle, 
"superior orders" is not acceptable as a ground exonerating 
the individual offender from criminal responsibility. The 
second is that draft article 8.1 in toto. and in
particular, sub-paragraph (c) need re-thinking and re­
drafting. The concept of "grave, imminent and irremediable 
peril", was not welcomed by the majority of members. It 
seemed to lend itself too readily to subjective
interpretation.3
The criteria of "grave, imminent and irremediable 
peril" were identified by the Rapporteur as measures by 
which coercion is determined and where there is coercion 
there is room for exculpability. Post 1945 war crimes 
decisions by military tribunals were cited in support of 
the general theory that coercion may be a defence in the 
execution of orders, having regard: (a) to the specific
circumstances of each case i.e., due consideration be given
See ILC Yrbk.f 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.83.
ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.I, Meetings 1964-1967.
Draft article 8.1.c hardly received any comment in the 
Sixth Committee's review of the ILC's work , at its 
thirty-eight session. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, 
p.119 para 621.
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to the personality of the perpetrator, the nature of his 
duties, and the context in which the order was given; and
(b) to the fact that the offender was deprived of the 
freedom to choose right from wrong.1 However the Rapporteur 
indicated that the concept of crimes against humanity 
including the crimes of genocide and apartheid constitute 
exceptions to the rule concerning "superior orders" as laid 
down in draft article 8.I.e.2 Thus, in so far as these 
crimes are concerned "superior orders" is to be denied as 
a ground of defence. Such an excpetion is harmful because 
it discriminates between practices which are all considered 
criminal offences under a single code of crimes. It also 
creates an unnecessary hierarchy among the crimes defined 
therein.
At the following session, draft article 8.1.c was 
totally redrafted and appeared as draft article 9 (d) which 
reads:
"The following constitute exceptions to criminal
responsibility:
(d) the order of a Government or of a superior, 
provided a moral choice was in fact not 
possible to the perpetrator."3
The differences between the above clause and its 
predecessor are self-evident. First, by virtue of the new 
introductory words to the provision, "superior orders", far 
from being a non-absolute ground of defence with mitigating 
circunstances, is now a priori an exception to criminal 
responsibility. Second, the standards of "grave, imminent, 
and irremediable peril", happily, have been deleted. But, 
the position has reverted to the "moral choice" formula as 
originally suggested in 1951 by Brierly and adopted in 
Nuremberg Principle IV. Third, the wording of sub­
See ILC Yrbk.r 1986, v.II, pt.II, p.77 paras 218- 
226.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1986, v.II, pt.II, p.77 para 217-234.
See ILC Yrbk., 1987, v.II, pt.I, p.7.
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paragraph (d) is weak because it gives rise to questions of 
interpretation: what is intended by the term "in fact"? 
Unfortunately, the Rapporteur's commentary offers no 
assistance.1
The ILC discussion on draft article 9(d) reveals the 
following points:
(a) Draft article 9 constitutes a list of
extenuating circumstances which might affect 
the punishment awarded by the tribunal. It 
is not a list of exceptions to 
responsibility. This is also true of
paragraph d. Indeed, it was suggested that 
9(d) should be reformulated on the basis of 
Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter.2
(b) The concept of "moral choice" should be
deleted. In particular, suggestion was made
that 9(d) should be deleted altogether. 
However, should the ILC decide to retain it, 
reference to "moral choice" ought certainly 
be omitted.3
(c) The question of non-applicability of 
"superior orders" vis-a-vis crimes committed 
under international law dates from the First 
World War period. It forms part and parcel 
of the Nuremberg Principles. Its importance 
in the Draft Code is such that it warrants 
a separate provision.
Sixth Committee views endorsed the above points.4
Draft article 9 was sent to the ILC Drafting 
Committee5, but due to lack of time it was not considered at 
the thirty-ninth 6, fortieth7 (1988), forty-first (1989)8 and
See ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.II, pt.I, p.9 paras 19-22.
Ibid., v.I, see: Graefrath, p.21 para 9 and Njenga, 
p.25 paras 49-50.
ILC Yrbk. . 1987, v.I, see: Barsegov, p. 14 para 52;
Rao, p. 17 para 31; Koroma, p. 19 para 48; Jacovides, 
p. 23 para 9; Yankov, p.28 paras 4-5; Shi, p. 33 para 
44; Eiriksson, p.34 para 56; and Sepulveda Gutierrez, 
p.37 para 22.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p. 31 
See ILC Yrbk.f 1987, v.I, p.63 para 31.
Ibid., p.226 para 5.
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forty-second (1990)1 ILC sessions. At the forty-third
session (1991) the ILC Drafting Committee recommended the
following provision, which reveals that ILC suggestions
made at the thirty-ninth session were taken into
consideration.
" Article 11
Order of a Government or Superior 
The fact that an individual charged with a crime 
against the peace and security of mankind acted 
pursuant to an order of a Government or superior 
does not relieve him of criminal responsibilty, 
if, in the circumstances at the time, it was 
possible for him not to comply with the order."2
Draft article 10 (currently numbering 11) complements
the provision on "superior orders” and provides:
" Responsibility of the superior
The fact that a crime [offence] against the peace 
and security of mankind was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his superiors of 
criminal responsibility, if they knew or had 
[possessed] information enabling them to 
conclude, in the circumstances at the time [then 
existing], that the subordinate was committing or 
was going to commit such a crime [offence] and if 
they did not take all [the practically] feasible 
measures within their power to prevent or repress 
[suppress] the crime.3
This provision does not have a corresponding clause in 
either the Nuremberg Principles or the 1954 Draft Code of
See ILC Report to the GA. GAOR, Supp. No.10, (A/43/10) 
p.140 et seq.
See ILC Report to the GA. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, 
(A/44/10) p.173 et seq.
See ILC Report to the GA. GAOR, Supp. No. 10 
(A/45/10) p.54 et seq.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.459, p.5.
See UN Doc. A/CN. 4/L. 459, 1991, p.5. The words in
parenthesis include the wording used when the article 
was first drafted. They have been deleted at the 
forty-third session by the Drafting Committee. See ILC 
Yrbk., 1986, v.II, pt.I, p.83. The present drafting is 
more accurate but does not alter the substantive 
meaning.
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source" of draft article 11 is Article 86.2 of Additional 
Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At the 
ILC's thirty-eight session (1986) draft article 11 
attracted very little comment1 and the position was very 
much the same in the Sixth Committee's review of the ILC's 
work for that session.2 It generated slightly greater 
interest at the ILC's thirty-ninth session (1987)3 and in 
the Sixth Committee's Report for that session.4 The general 
feeling was that it could be easily replaced or accompanied 
by a provision on complicity in the code. Draft article 11 
has been provisionally adopted (as already indicated) at 
the ILC's fortieth session (1988)5, reconsidered at the 
forty-third session and draft provisions on complicity, 
conspiracy and attempt have been submitted at the ILC's 
forty-second session (1990)6. It remains to be seen whether 
both provisions will be adopted by the Commission,7 but the 
fundamental legal principle in draft article 11 relevant to 
the concept of individual responsibility is that a 
superior, regardless of whether he conspired with, incited, 
ordered, or acted as accomplice, in the commission of 
crimes defined under the Draft Code, is a subject of 
criminal responsibility and may be tried by appropriate 
tribunals.
See ILC Yrbk. . 1986, v.I: Sir Ian Sinclair, p. 142 para 
63; Lacleta Munoz, p.143 para 6; Sucharitkul, p. 158 
para 19 and Barboza, p.165 para 75.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, p.119 para 624.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1987, v.I, Meetings 1993-2000.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p.30.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1988, v.II, pt.II, p.70.
See UN Doc. A/CN4/430, 1990.
The relevant provision on conspiracy, complicity and 
attempt has been referred to the Drafting Committee. 
See GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/45/10) pp.15-30. For Sixth 
Committee views see UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.456,1991, pp.23- 
33.
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criminal responsibility and may be tried by appropriate 
tribunals.
The position concerning "superior orders" in the ILC's 
work on the Draft Code is yet to be determined. The 
combined contribution of the 1954 Draft Code of Offences 
and that of the text currently under consideration is de 
leae feranda. The present wording of article 9(d) of the 
Draft Code generates its own difficulties as identified 
above. In particular, the abscence of specific reference 
to international criminal responsibility incurred under 
international law detracts force from the rule as 
formulated for adoption.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the ILC has 
largely embraced the principle formulated at Nuremberg and 
subsequently in international practice. In addition, the 
ILC has taken the further step of asserting that the 
success or otherwise of the invocation of "superior orders" 
as defence for crimes committed under international law, is 
without prejudice to the question of the personal criminal 
responsibility of the superior who may equally be 
answerable for his role in the commission of the crime.
3. Doctrine
The criminal responsibility incurred by individuals
for committing certain internationally unlawful acts is
recorded in the writings of the classical publicists. In
their treatises on the law of nations both Grotius and De
Vattel record the position under classical law. De Vattel
identified ill-treatment of women and children by
belligerents, use of poisoned weapons, and "assassination"
as practices so heinous and contrary to civilised order
that every State is permitted to seize and to try the
alleged offender.
"There is to-day no Nation in any degree 
civilised which does not observe this rule [of 
the prohibition of the above practices in time of
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war] of justice and humanity1  The sovereign
who makes use of such execrable means should be 
regarded as an enemy of the human race, and all 
Nations are called upon, in the interest of the 
common safety of mankind, to join forces and 
unite to punish him2.”
In Blackstone/s Commentaries of the Laws of England3 we
find violations of safe-conduct, infringements of the
rights of ambassadors and piracy as the three principal
offences (crimes) against the law of nations which when
committed "all mankind must declare war" against the
perpetrator who may be punished by any "community [on the
basis of] the rule of self-defence."
The position.under contemporary international law is
authoritatively stated by Brownlie4:
"Since the latter half of the nineteenth century 
it has been generally recognised that there are 
acts or omissions for which international law 
imposes criminal responsibility on individuals 
and for which punishment may be imposed, either 
by properly empowered international tribunals or 
by national courts and military tribunals."
The debate on the status of the individual as a
subject of international law has also generated
considerable comment relevant to the principle of
individual criminal responsibility. It is argued that
traditional criminal offences in international law such as
piracy, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide
are evidence that the individual is obliged under
international law to refrain from committing certain acts
for which there is personal responsibility. Accordingly,
in addition to personal fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed under international law, the individual is also
The Law of Nations On The Principles of Natural Law 
v.III, p.283 para 145. Emphasis added.
Ibid., p.289 para 155.
Vol.IV, at p.71.
Principlesf p.561 para 5.
433
a subject of obligations imposed by international law.1
The concept of criminal offence in international law 
and the responsibility it involves for individuals
See, among others, Marshall-Brown, 18 AJIL (1924) 
p.532; Spiropoulos, 30 Hague Receuil (1929) p.196; 
Eagleton, 39 Proc. ASIL (1945) p.23; Levy, 12 UCLR
(1945) 313; Donnedieu de Vabres, 70 Hague Receuil
(1947) 564; Schneeberger, 35 Georgtwn LJ (1947) 481;
Ehard, 43 AJIL (1949) 240; Lauterpacht, International 
Law and Human Rights. 1950, pp.42-45; Manner, 46 AJIL 
(1952) 428; Glaser, Droit International Penal
Conventionnel. 1954, v.I, Chapter II, Section I, pp. 56 
-59 & 63; Section II, pp.63-70 and Section III, pp.70- 
76; St.Korowicz, 50 AJIL (1956) 533; Bischop, 8
Annales FDI (1959) 122; Balladore-Pallieri, Diritto
Internazionale Pubblicof 1962, p.220 para 69; 
Norgaard, The Position of the Individual in 
International Law. 1962; Carnegie, 39 BYIL (1963) 402; 
Brownlie, 50 Va.LR (1964) 435 at pp.448-451;
Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International 
Law, 1964, p.232; Trumpy, 34 Annuaire AAA (1964) 120; 
Fenwick, International Law. 1965, at p.151; Tucker, 36 
Univ. CLR (1965) 341; Cavare', Le Droit International 
Public. v.I, 1967, p.486; Oda writing in Sorensen, 
Manual of Public International Law. 1968, p.469; 
Lauterpacht, International Law - Collected Papers. 
v.I, 1970, p.141 para 50; Rhyne, International Law.
1971, p. 121; Baade, writing in The Future of the 
International Laegal Order. 1972, v.IV, p.291; Prakash 
Sinha and Tornaritis writing in Bassiouni, Treatise.
1972, v.I, pp.122 & 103 respectively; Green, Law and 
Society, 1975, pp.247-249; Higgins, 24 NYLSLR (1978) 
11; Levi, Contemporary International Law. 1979, p.78; 
Janis, 17 Cor. ILJ (1984) 61; Komarov, 29 ICLP (1980) 
21; and Snee, 25 St. Louis ULJ (1982) 891.
seriously challenge the traditional theory that 
alone are subjects of international law.
CHAPTER 10 
State Criminal Responsibility
1. Consideration of the Concept by the ILC
Since its eighth session in 1956 to date the ILC has 
been working on the codification of the topic of State 
Responsibility. It is within the context of this topic 
rather than that of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind1 that the concept of State
Since 1984, the ILC has not discussed the concept of 
the criminal responsibility of States during its work 
on the Draft Code. The reasons for this are explained, 
in part, by the decision of the ILC to have the scope 
ratione personae of the Draft Code limited to 
individuals. Furthermore, there is divided opinion on 
whether the Draft Code should make provision at all for 
the criminal responsibility of States. At any rate, 
the topic was addressed at the sessions cited below, 
but it was never properly defined and those who 
supported it gave the general impression that a State 
could incur international responsibility for criminal 
offences in international law. However, there is
hardly any evidence in the relevant summary records of 
the ILC debates which indicates that State criminal 
responsibility was understood as representing anything 
other than the traditional form of international 
responsibility incurred in respect of the commission 
of criminal offences in international law. See ILC 
Yrbk.. 1984, v.I: Jagota, p.41 para 15; Koroma, p.43 
para 27 and Balanda, p.49 para 32; ibid., v.II, pt.II, 
p.11 para 32; Sixth Committee Report, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.382, 1985, pp.15-16; ibid., 1985, v.II, pt.I, 
paras 11-17; Sixth Committee Report, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.398, 1986, pp.16-18; ibid., 1986, v.II, pt.I, 
p. 70 para 148; Sixth Committee Report, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.410, 1987, pp.98-99; ibid., 1987, Sixth
Committee Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.420, 1988, p. 18.
At its forty-second session (1990) the ILC debated 
the question of establishing an international criminal 
court. See Eight Report on the Draft Code, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/430/Add. 1, 1990. It was decided that the court's 
jurisdiction ratione personae would, for the time 
being, exclude States. See, GAOR, Supp. No.10 (A/45/10) 
p.47 para.128. The limitation of the court's 
jurisdiction ratione personae to individuals was 
endorsed in the Sixth Committee, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.456, 
1991, p.44. Views in favour of extending the principle 
of criminal responsibility to States, were in a 
distinct minority.
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criminal responsibility has been addressed by the ILC. It 
will be discussed in this chapter in four stages 
represented by four Rapporteurs: Professors Garcia-Amador, 
Ago, Riphagen and Arrangio-Ruiz, who have contributed to 
the Commission's work in this field over a forty year 
period. Further, the discussion will separate, as far as 
possible, the theoretical content of the concept of State 
criminal responsibility from that concerning the form which 
such responsibility may take if it were capable of being 
implemented.
Professor Garcia-Amador presented a Memorandum and six 
reports to the ILC on the topic of State Responsibility.1 
The question of criminal responsibility of States arose 
during debates of the first and second reports. It has 
already been recorded2 that Professor Garcia-Amador 
distinguished between wrongful acts in international law 
which give rise to civil liability and those which engender 
criminal punishment. However, Garcia-Amador reiterated the 
rule that criminal responsibility in international law can 
only be incurred by individuals whereas civil 
responsibility is incurred by States.3 This was also the
In replies submitted by States on the proposal to 
establish an international criminal court, no mention 
was made to the effect of extending the jurisdiction 
ratione personae of the court to subjects other than 
individuals. See UN Docs. A/CN.4/429, /Add.1,2,3, &
4, 1990.
See Memorandum in UN Doc.A/CN.4/80, 1954, ILC Yrbk.. 
1954, v.II, p.21; First Report, UN Doc.A/CN.4/96, 
ibid., 1956, v.II, p.173; Second Report, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/106, ibid., v.II, p.104; Third Report, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/111, ibid., v.II, p.47; Fourth Report, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/119, ibid., v.II, p.l; Fifth Report, UN 
Doc.A/CN.4/125, ibid., v.II, p.41; and Sixth Report, 
UN Doc.A/CN.4/134 and Add.l., ibid., v.II, p.l.
See Chapter 3 above.
See ILC Yrbk., 1956, v.II, pp.188-189. See also Basis
of Discussion No.II ibid., p.219.
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general feeling within the ILC although some members1 did 
accept, but only as a matter of principle and without 
offering any explanation, that the concept of criminal 
responsibility of States was conceivable. A more concrete 
explanation of the concept of State criminal responsibility 
was offered by Professor Ago (later to succeed Garcia- 
Amador). He submitted that the concept of the criminal 
responsibility of States does not mean responsibility 
arising from failing to make reparation as a result of 
crimes committed under international law nor for failing to 
punish the individual perpetrators concerned. But it means 
that the State responsible actually incurs some form of 
punishment.2 Reprisals were suggested by Ago as a possible 
form of this type of international criminal responsibility 
of States.3
Until Ago's appointment as Rapporteur, the ILC had not 
expressed any definite position concerning the validity or 
otherwise of the concept of the criminal responsibility of 
States. The most substantial contributions on the topic 
only emerged during Ago's term of office.
Initially, in the 1960's between the ILC's fifteenth 
and twenty-first sessions the debate of a number of 
memoranda submitted by various ILC members in 1963 
represents the only occasion4 in this period where the 
principle of State criminal responsibility was discussed. 
The ILC members who advocated the view that it was time for 
the Commission to place on record that States, like 
individuals, may be punished in international law, did not 
explain their thesis. They merely stated it as a matter
See Francois and Scelle ibid., v.I, p.239 paras 3 and
5 respectively.
ILC Yrbk., 1957, v.I, p.170 para 23.
Ibid., p.157 para 63.
See, however, comments by Eustathiades at the ILC/s 
twenty-first session, ILC Yrbk.. 1969, v.I, p.115 para 
15.
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of principle, while others who endorsed it reiterated their
advice that the ILC should adhere solely to the study of
State "civil" responsibility because the question of
criminal liability of States was more a political rather
than a legal matter. Some even felt that it was dependant
upon the establishment of an international criminal
tribunal, which is considered to be an unlikely occurrence.
The following citations clearly reflect the mood in the ILC
on the topic of State criminal responsibility for the
period under consideration:
"The traditional legal principle which exempted 
collective entities from all criminal liability 
has been superseded; criminal liability can now 
be imputed not only to the public representative 
directly responsible for the injury but also to 
the entity in whose name he acted.
.... (T)here are acts and omissions for which a 
State is answerable both civilly (reparation) and 
penally, in the same manner as an individual who 
causes an injury to another person."1
However, the general response to the above was the
following:
"....(A) discussion of the topic (of State 
criminal responsibility should not be
included).... in a draft intended to be submitted 
to over one hundred States...."2
Certainly the most concrete proposals issued by the 
ILC on the criminal liability of States occurred in the 
1970's between the Commission's twenty-second and thirty- 
first session. ILC records for 1970 show that its 
membership was prepared to accept that there are unlawful 
acts in international law which are more serious than 
others and which may constitute criminal offences giving 
rise to a separate regime of international responsibility 
for the offending State than that traditionally provided
See Memorandum by Mr. Modesto Paredes, ILC Yrbk. . 1963, 
v.II, p.244 paras 1 and 2. See also Tsuruoka, ibid., 
p.249 para 9.
See Gross, ibid., p.230.
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for under international law.1
In 1976 the concept of "international crime" was 
introduced by Professor Ago when he drafted Article 19. 
The impressive source material employed by Ago to formulate 
Draft Article 19 and its relevance to the definition of the 
concept of criminal offence in international law has been 
considered in Chapter 3 above. The present section, 
however, concerns Ago's understanding of the principle of 
criminal liability of States which is summarised as
follows:
(a) the fact that relevant source material, such as
judicial decisions, reveals that the international 
responsibility ^ incurred by States is invariably the 
obligation of offending States to make reparation, 
does not exclude other forms of international
responsibility which result from the breach of a 
particularly serious international obligation such as 
that which constitutes a criminal offence in 
international law.
(b) The commission of practices such as genocide,
apartheid and colonialism, which have emerged largely 
since the Second World War, cannot be adequately
redressed by the traditional forms of international 
responsibility. The State perpetrating such offences 
must become subject to a heavier penalty under 
international law than simply providing reparation.
(c) The trial and punishment by States of persons who, 
acting on behalf of another State, have committed 
crimes under international law, does not represent the 
criminal responsibility of the State whose officials 
have committed crimes in international law.
(d) Quite independent of the personal responsibility that 
may be incurred by officials, acting on behalf of a
See ILC Yrbk.f 1970, v.I., Tabibi, p.183; Reuter,
p.187; Ustor, p.209 para 2; Thiam, p.213; Rosenne, 
p. 219 and Elias, p.222. See also, however, the 
criticism offered by Sette-Camara, ibid., pp.183-184 
and Castren, p.186.
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State, the State itself, as a separate entity, may 
incur criminal liability under international law, for 
instance if it wages a war of aggression or 
participates in the commission of the crime of 
genocide. In addition it must be stated that, the 
commission of crimes under international law by 
persons acting in a public capacity does not 
invariably trigger the penal responsibility of the 
State represented.
(e) Finally, Ago concludes that States other than the 
national State of the public official who commits a 
crime in international law, ought to bring the 
individual offenders to trial. Further, the State 
whose national committed such crimes while holding 
public office should be subject to a separate form of 
"criminal" responsibility in international law.1 
The foregoing points constitute as clear an 
enunciation of the concept of State criminal responsibility 
as is likely to be offered by the ILC. It is important to 
note that, except for some members2 who suggested total 
severance of diplomatic and economic relations as a form of 
State criminal responsibility, the ILC's consideration of 
Draft Article 19 does not provide any indication whatsoever 
of what is meant by State criminal responsibility in 
international law. The majority of members' comments 
advised on how the wording of the draft article could be 
improved. Official response 3 can only be described as 
generally negative of Draft Article 19. In the Sixth 
Committee,4 for instance, the reasons given to explain why 
Article 19 was unacceptable, ranged from problems of
ILC Yrbk.f 1976, v.II, pp.27-33.
See ILC Yrbk.. 1976, v.I, Martinez Moreno, p.70 para 
25.
See the Federal Republic of Germany, ILC Yrbk.. 1981, 
v.II, pt.I, p.74 and Sweden, ibid., p.78.
See UN Doc. A/31/370, 1976, p.43 et seq.
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peace and security.
3. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations 
Charter, in the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of a State under paragraphs 1 and 2 
above, and its rights and obligations under any 
other rule of international law, the obligations 
under the present article shall prevail.”1
This provision was referred to the ILC Drafting
Committee because although it represented a concept which
was acceptable in principle to the ILC membership, it was
generally found to be inadequate and poorly drafted.2 The
Sixth Committee's response was very similar. It was
suggested that the rights and duties of the immediate
parties i.e., the offending and the victim. State/ should be
properly identified; that draft article 6 should be dealt
with in a separate chapter in Part II of the Draft Articles
and that the system of mandatory sanctions operative under
the UN Charter should be applicable in the context of
"international crimes".3 In 1983 the ILC re-evaluated its
position with most of the members not really defining the
concept of the criminal liability of States but expressing
the view that the concept should be developed. Rapporteur
Riphagen4 reiterated some of the possible consequences
triggered by "international crimes" which he had identified
in the previous session (1982) and added; (a) the eraa
omnes character and (b) the right of UN intervention in
matters involving the commission of an "international
crime", as additional elements typical of the concept of
"international crime". Sixth Committee's views on the
See ILC Yrbk.. 1982, v.II, pt.I, p.48.
ILC Yrbk.. 1982, v.I., Malek, pp.206-207; Sir Ian
Sinclair, p.213 para 11; Jagota, p.216 para 33; 
Barboza, p.218 para 9; Balanda, p.220 para 25; Lacleta- 
Munoz, p.222 para 31; Ushakov, p.223 paras 43-45; 
Koroma, p.234 para 32 and Quentin-Baxter, p.238 para 
17.
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.352, 1983, pp.36-41.
ILC Yrbk., 1983, v.II, pt.I, p.11 para 58 - p.12 para
62.
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ILC's work at its 1983 session were mugh divided: some
advocated the view that the study of the concept of State 
criminal responsibility should be abandoned, while others 
who favoured its study to be continued, disagreed on 
whether or not the draft articles ought to define the 
consequences engendered by the commission of "international 
crimes".
In 1984 the greater part of article 6 was reformulated 
as draft article 14 and a new article 15 was also 
introduced purporting to regulate the consequences of the 
crime of aggression. Articles 14 and 15 are reproduced 
below but they were largely criticised by the ILC at its 
1984 and 1985 sessions principally for the following 
reasons: (a) States' obligations in respect of
"international crimes" need further elaboration than those 
specified in article 14; (b) UN Charter provisions were not 
intended to cater for State criminal responsibility and 
therefore should not be implemented as such; and (c) the 
crimes listed in Draft Article 19 of Part I should be 
reflected in Part II of the Draft Articles. In the Sixth 
Committee's consideration of articles 14 and 15 the 
following points were raised in addition to those outlined 
in the ILC debates. These are, that the doctrine of State 
immunity ought not to apply where "international crimes" 
have been committed and States should be obliged to punish 
the individual perpetrators of same crimes. The principle 
of universal jurisdiction was mentioned in this context. 
Articles 14 and 15 read as follows:
" Article 14
1. An international crime entails all the legal 
consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
and, in addition, such rights and obligations as 
are determined by the applicable rules accepted 
by the international community as a whole.
2. An international crime committed by a State 
entails an obligation for every other State:
(a) not to recognize as legal the situation 
created by such crime; and
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(b) not to render aid or assistance to the State 
which has committed such crime in maintaining the 
situation created by such crime; and
(c) to join other States in affording mutual 
assistance in carrying out the obligations under 
subparagraphs (a ) and (b ).
3. Unless otherwise provided for by an 
applicable rule of general international law, the 
exercise of the rights arising under paragraph 1 
of the present article and the performance of the 
obligations arising under paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
the present article are subject, mutatis 
mutandis. to the procedures embodied in the 
United Nations Charter with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
4. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations 
Charter, in the event of conflict between the 
obligations of a State under paragraphs 1, 2 and 
3 of the present article and its rights and 
obligations under any other rule of international 
law, the obligations under any other rule of 
international law, the obligations under the 
present article shall prevail.
Article 15
An act of aggression entails all the legal 
consequences of an international crime and, in 
addition, such rights and obligations as are 
provided for in or by virtue of the United 
Nations Charter."1
In 1986 Rapporteur Riphagen presented the first draft 
set of articles of Part III. Comments relevant to the 
concept of "international crime" expressed at this thirty- 
eight session merely acknowledged the fact that this 
concept necessitated further elaboration. Riphagen7s draft 
articles for Part III hardly touched upon the concept of 
"international crime". In the following session (1987) 
Professor Arangio-Ruiz succeeded Riphagen as Rapporteur and 
in the 1988 session presented his preliminary report on 
Part II and Part III of the draft articles ab initio. 
Professor Arangio-Ruiz stated that he would treat the legal 
consequences flowing from "international delicts" and
See ILC Yrbk.. 1984, v.II, pt.I, p.4.
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"international crimes" separately.1
A second report2 was presented at the ILC's 1989 
session where the Rapporteur explained, inter alia, that 
the concept of punitive damages awarded against States 
reflect payment as compensation being proportionally in 
excess of the material loss or harm actually suffered by 
the victim State. These type of damages were recommended 
by the Rapporteur as an ideal form of the concept of State 
criminal responsibility in international law. The argument 
advanced in favour of the application of punitive damages 
is that in the absence of international institutions 
competent to punish sovereign States, such type of damages 
will deter rich and powerful States, otherwise punishable 
solely by traditional forms of reparation, from committing 
international crimes.3
The ILC membership supported this line of approach. 
Indeed the eraa omnes character of "international crimes"; 
the duty of States not to assist the offending State and 
the duty to help the victim State, were reiterated as 
characteristics particular to the concept of "international 
crime". However, the following points of dissent are
recorded in the ILC debates. Several members disagree with 
regard to (a) the manner in which State criminal
responsibility is to be provided for in the draft articles;
(b) provision for remedying non-material loss including the 
concept of punitive damages; and, (c) the principle of
State criminal responsibility per se. which continues to be 
challenged as being inconsistant with the progressive
development of international law and considered redundant 
within the proposed Draft Articles.4 The position within
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/416, 1988, pp.4 and 7.
See UN Docs. A/CN.4/425 and Add.l, 1989.
Ibid., see paras 138, 139 and 141.
See ILC Reports on its work at the 1988 and 1989 
sessions in GAOR, Supp.No.10, (A/44/10) pp.194-198 and 
in (A/45/10) pp.181-188.
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the Sixth Committee is largely similar to that in the ILC.1
2. Doctrine
Few are the writings of publicists which squarely 
address the question: is there a criminal responsibility
States in international law? These writings may be
divided into two groups representing those for and against 
the concept.
The argument traditionally promoted by those who do 
not subscribe to the theory of State criminal 
responsibility is the following: States are sovereign
entities in international law and they may only incur an 
obligation to make reparation for internationally wrongful 
acts. States may and will incur international
responsibility either for promoting, encouraging, 
tolerating, assisting, participating and facilitating the 
commission of criminal offences in international law or for 
failing to prevent the commission of same offences, or 
failing to punish the responsible individuals. But in all 
events that responsibility shall not be in the form of 
criminal punishment. Criminal responsibility in
international law can only be incurred by physical persons. 
The members of this school of thought include publicists of 
international repute but especially those whose 
contributions have been inspired by the ILC's Draft Article 
19 on international crime and State responsibility.2
See UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.443, 1990, pp.41-43.
See: Resolutions and Recommendations of the
International Law Institute, Annuaire. 1951, p.361;
Drost, The Crime of State. 1959, Bk.I., p.283 para 175 
and especially para 181 at p. 297 where he described the 
concept of State criminal responsibility in 
international law as "legally senseless, morally 
meaningless, politically pernicious, sociologically 
incorrect, psychologically erroneous, penologically 
inexpedient and impracticable"; Starace, 153 Hague 
Receuil (1976) 267 at 293-294; Diaconu, 12 Rev.Rom.
(1978) pp.358-369; Marek 14 RBDI (1978-79) 460; Dupuy, 
Annuaire FDI (1979) 539; idem., 84 RGDIP (1980) 449; 
De Stoop writing in Australia and International Law.
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Publicists who have advocated the theory of the 
international criminal responsibility of States are 
definitely in a minority. These may be further sub-divided 
into two categories. On the one hand there are those who 
merely accept the theory in principle without explaining 
what they understand by the criminal responsibility of 
States in international law or what form such
responsibility may take.1 On the other hand, and these
1984, p.178; The Crimes of State. Weiler, J.H., (ed.), 
1989, see in particular Graefrath (pp.161-169) who, 
though not admitting the principle of State criminal 
responsibility, accepts that a victim State is entitled 
to demand guarantees of non-repetition from the 
offending State and, singly or collectively with other 
States, to take jurisdiction over the offending State's 
alleged offenders to prosecute them even if they acted 
on behalf of the State; also Aldrich (p. 219) and 
Dominice (p.257); and finally see Gilbert, 39 I CLP 
(1990) 345 for a most recent contribution on ILC Draft 
Article 19 and the concept of State criminal 
responsibility which is described as currently 
representing ,fa flight of academic fantasy".
Sir Hartley Shawcross in his opening argument as Chief 
Prosecutor before the Nuremberg Tribunal, Opening 
Speeches, pp.56-57, reiterated the accepted view that 
States may incur responsibility for criminal acts. But 
this is quite different from saying that there is a 
criminal responsibility in international law for 
States. This position was adhered to in his closing 
arguments, Closing Speeches. p.56, but then it was also 
submitted there that "there is no substance at all in 
the view that International Law rules out the criminal 
responsibility of States and that since, because of 
their sovereignity, States cannot be coerced, all their 
acts are legal." Lauterpacht, International Law and 
Human Rights, p.41 does not exclude the concept of 
State criminal responsibility and refers the reader to 
Oppenheim's 7th edition on international law which is 
edited by Lauterpacht. Munch and Triffterer both 
writing in Bassiouni, Treatise, vols.I & II, p.144 and 
p.86 respectively, accept the criminal responsibility 
of States in international law but only if an 
international criminal court were established. See 
also Bassiouni and Derby, 9 Hof.LR (1981) at 539-540 
who identify the principle of criminal responsibility 
of juridical entities in international law as if it 
were a customary rule applicable whenever criminal 
offences are committed in international law. The 
validity of this statement is questionable,
447
represent an even smaller minority, there are those who 
have actually been bold enough to offer concrete ideas 
explaining the meaning of the criminal liability of States 
in international law. For this reason alone it is 
worthwhile to reproduce relevant extracts. Oppenheim's
treatise provides:
"The State, and those acting on its behalf, bear 
criminal responsibility for such violations of 
international law as by reason of their gravity, 
their ruthlessness, and their contempt for human 
life place them within the category of criminal 
acts as generally understood in the law of
civilised countries ....  Moreover, the extreme
drastic consequences of criminal responsibility 
of States are capable of modification in the 
sense that such responsibility is additional to 
and not exclusive of the international criminal 
liability of the individuals guilty of crimes 
nnnnnittr>d in violation of International Law.1"2
Accordingly, Oppenheim clearly separates individual 
criminal responsibility of persons who commit crimes in 
international law when acting as organs of the State from 
the criminal responsibility of the State qua State, which 
in turn implies something more than the traditional forms 
of international responsibility. Oppenheim suggests that 
State criminal responsibility may take the following form: 
measures and sanctions taken in pursuance of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. In addition, Oppenheim also considers the 
punishment of persons responsible for war crimes on the 
basis of universal jurisdiction as a form, in itself, of 
State criminal responsibility.3
particularly because it is offered by Bassiouni & Derby 
as part of a discussion of the forms of international 
responsibility arising from breaches of the Apartheid 
Convention which hardly represents international 
consensus.
Emphasis added.
International Law. v.I, pp.355-357 para 156(b).
Ibid., p.356.
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Brownlie1 records military occupation, the
demilitarization or the destruction of offensive
capabilities of a State, reprisals, pacific blockade and
even suspension or expulsion from international
organisations, as forms of the criminal responsibility of
States in international law suggested by other writers.
Brownlie's own conclusion, however, is that the concept of
State criminal responsibility:
"has no legal value, cannot be justified in 
principle, (and) [tjo attempt to go beyond 
compensation would seem to be impracticable? and 
if it were practicable, it would be immaterial 
whether the surplus was regarded as a fine or 
exemplary damages..... In general the concept is 
futile though not juridically impossible".2
Use of Force, pp. 150-154. See also Rifaat, Aggression. 
p.130.
Op.cit., pp.152-153. See also, System of the Law of 
Nations, v.I, pp.32-33, 1983, and Shaw, International 
Law, p.408.
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